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Ordering the Jungle

Territory, atmosphere and resistance at the France-UK border

PhD Thesis

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To Elia and Dario, my home

Contents

Abstract

This thesis focuses on how bodies become political and how resistance can (or not) emerge, with particular attention to how orderings come out of the entanglements of bodies caught into emergent atmospheres. Through the notions of territory, affect, and event, I investigate the social formation of political bodies and the conditions of possibility for their becoming (or not) a transformative force, thus developing a capacity for challenging the society of control.

As empirical ground I make use of my ethnographic fieldwork in the makeshift camp of Calais, aka 'the Jungle', for its ambiguity of being a social body, a multiplicity, and an assemblage of materialities and affects. The apparent disorderly life in the Jungle is showed as an organised and controlled one, with orderings and rhythms that unfold over the time and affectively turned into an atmosphere that captured the intensity of the Jungle-body, thus refraining its political force.

My theoretical framework is inspired by the writings of Deleuze and Guattari, Spinoza, and new materialist thought. I consider social formations as the result of the co-functioning of bodies in an assemblage that *consumes* intensity while gaining in organisation. Through this, I explore how the political struggle is modulated, fixed, or (maybe) liberated.

Acknowledgements

Since I started my PhD in 2014, I have never stopped discovering the power of affect to organise encounters. Good encounters have always prompted new ones, in a vortex of empowering forces that has made this thesis possible. I am very grateful for this chance. The first good encounter was with the extra-ordinary work of Andreas and his approach to space. Through Andreas I could meet the thought of Gilles Deleuze, which was both a breakthrough and an epiphany. Nonetheless, without the following encounter, that with Miriam, I would have not been able to make anything out of this epiphany. Andreas, Deleuze, Miriam and I have, to use a Deleuzian concept, have assembled joyfully and the assemblage has been a hugely productive one for me. So, first and foremost, my grateful thanks go to them. To Andreas, for being much more than an academic supervisor, for being an inspiring mind and a supportive guide, for being capable of advising while leaving total freedom. To Miriam, for being so generous, helpful and motivating. For being the perfect travelling companion, too. To both, for contributing gracefully to making these three years so rich and special.

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Introduction

We are segmented from all around and in every direction[1]

1 This work is about the encounter between an exploration of how orderings emerge and a makeshift encampment in the North of France, known as 'the Jungle'. The encampment, which in 2016 gained reputation as one of the largest "refugee camps" in Europe, harboured at its highest up to ten thousand people, mostly from Sudan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Eritrea and Ethiopia. Such encounter has required relentless negotiation with concepts, disciplinary boundaries, and affective drives. First, what does it mean to study how orderings emerge? It means to grasp how bodies organise themselves and in relation to other bodies. I understand here orderings as the temporary result of a process through which relations amongst different bodies are regulated and organised so that a certain order comes forth. From this perspective, this endeavour is certainly both social and spatial, if we understand the social as the holding together of heterogeneous things, "a very peculiar movement of re-association and reassembling,"[2] as Bruno Latour puts it, and space as a "random-encounter site where actual bodies [...] meet, move around, connect with, and disconnect from one another."[3]

Why orderings and the encampment of Calais? I went to Calais first to see how the apparent mess of the makeshift camp and the presumed order and control of the near state-led camp of container confronted with each other: my aim was to challenge this dichotomic and prefabricated perspective and build a new, more complex and nuanced one.[4] When I arrived to the Jungle, I found order in the apparent chaos and disorder in the apparent controlled space of the containers, as expected. What I could not expect was to be witnessing to the unfolding of manifold entanglements of people, things, and practices that by getting together *somehow* were "exhibiting concrescence," and, most of all, were creating

1 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (trans. Brian Massumi) (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1987) p.208.

2 Bruno Latour, *Reassembling the Social. An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005), p.7. As it will be evident all through this PhD, I want to clarify that I do not adhere to the Actor-Network-Theory. Nonetheless, I recognise its relevance in urban studies and, more broadly in social sciences, for having put an emphasis on the need for both taking into account nonhuman bodies in social research and thinking the social in terms of a distributed agency.

3 Francesca Ansaloni and Miriam Tedeschi, 'Ethics and spatial justice: Unfolding non-linear possibilities for planning action', *Planning Theory* 15 (3) 2016: p.323.

4 As I explain later in this work, the two formations, the makeshift encampment and the camp of container built by the French state supposedly shared the same objective, that of hosting people on the move stuck in Calais, but they were born out of different logics.

something collectively. Was that *something* political? Was it a form of resistance? The body of the Jungle was producing orderings and manifesting a certain degree of organisation; still, it was not generating broad resistance in the form of protests, sit-ins, hunger strikes, assemblies, and so on. Only scattered resistance practices were being brought forth, while the collective formation was engaged in the endless making of the Jungle as a home. When I was in Calais for my longest fieldwork period, the eviction of half of the encampment had been announced and then accomplished. This occurrence led me to shift my focus to **how and through which mechanisms orderings and control shape the political becoming of bodies and their modes of engaging in resistance**.

The grip on resistance is fundamental in how I approached the research question, and is inherently connected with the notion of power and the theoretical framework through which I assume to understand power relations empirically. This work is thus conceived as a mapping of the Jungle of Calais that seeks to debate it as a site of resistance (or not) by assembling its multiple components, practices, and relations and then unpacking, through a coherent methodological approach (ch.1) the *territories* that constituted and organised it, exploring their nature and their unfolding (ch.2); by visibilising how affective territories and imaginaries contributed to the emergence of an *atmosphere* of the homely that produced control through affects (ch.3), and by showing how territorial movements, intensities, and affects in the Jungle limited its becoming a site of collective *resistance*, while leaving room for momentary escapes (ch.4). In this chapter I set the stage for presenting my approach, the path that I followed, and illustrating how it might challenge current framings of events such as the Jungle. My starting point is that we would not know what the Jungle "could do" if we conceived it as a camp. Before going to that, let me discuss about power, control, bodies, and space.

2 Power and control have always been a focus of interest for theorists, especially in philosophy and political theory. This provides anyone who is interested in control with a rich and diversified amount of concepts and more or less comprehensive theories. In a compelling conversation about the role of intellectuals in relation to power issues, Deleuze and Foucault agreed on the elusive nature of power and the impossibility of a totalising theory to explain power struggles. As for Foucault, intellectuals find themselves within the same system of power they refer to and in this sense their knowledge-constructions should be part of it as a struggle against any form of power. It is in this vein that he asserts that theory "is practice." By the same token, Deleuze contends that a theory cannot be overarching and its relation with practice is one of reciprocity, where both theory and practice form sets of multiple "relays" that connect one to another.[5] In this idea of connected relays, the Deleuzian understanding of a process of knowledge production which is inevitably rhizomatic and where concepts are open multiplicities in complex relations with one another, is intrinsic and graspable.

This thesis is about power and desire, or desire *qua* power, and how this force can generate orderings, control, and, possibly, resistance. In this sense, it is important to provide a framework through which to describe what kind of power is the one I am interested in here

5 Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, 'Intellectuals and Power', in Donald F. Bouchard (ed.), *Language, Counter-memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1977).

and how it is related to desire, affect, and emotion. In the context of this research, power and desire are analysed in their unfolding as forces that transform space, bodies and matter. The focus is the forces that affect our own movements and challenge our emplacement, most of which we are not aware; it is the functioning of these forces, the analysis of their relations and their spatial and affective dimensions. With this purpose in mind, I borrow concepts from Deleuze, Foucault, and Spinoza, and use them as 'tools' for assembling, not a theory of power or desire, but rather a practical understanding of how power relations work in space and time, are shaped by desire, and eventually move bodies toward certain directions, even toward resistance. In other words, I have opted for disregarding the juridico-normative approach to power that clings to institutional forms, and rather embrace a more embodied and situated analysis which focuses on the mechanisms and the modes of emergence of power relations. In this perspective, the substantial volume of literature in geography and urban studies that conceive power mainly in its molar configurations is not here the source of reasoning, which is rather supported by philosophical and political lines of thought that focus on the molecular.[6] Either way, as Michel Foucault puts it, "theories of government and the traditional analyses of their mechanisms certainly don't exhaust the field where power is exercised and where it functions. The question of power remains a total enigma."[7]

It is impossible to look into orderings without advancing a conceptualisation of power, for the two are inextricably related. In this PhD I rely on the thought of Gilles Deleuze, as developed in his writings alone and with Félix Guattari, for delineating a theory of power and control that aims to free the field from metanarratives, categorical infrastructures and moral issues. The conceptualisation of power (and control) that Deleuze puts forward and which is informed by his interpretations of Spinoza, Nietzsche and – at least partially – of Foucault's thought, permeates then this research and helps me understand how control is constituted through relations of forces in the daily practices that compose our social space. Deleuze's engagement with ethics, space and social processes – despite his (especially with Guattari) use of a terminology and an approach which do not fit in a normative perspective on politics – offers a perspective on social practices that spreads out new ways of thinking about the political.[8] In what follows I am also providing brief explanations to the terms that I introduce.

In his study of Foucault's oeuvre, which is influenced by Spinoza and Nietzsche's philosophy, Deleuze reports two modes of thinking about power as critical.[9] One is the idea of power as relation: "power is relation. And power relation is a relation of forces".[10] The second point is

6 I refer here to literature that in inspired by Marxist lines of thought and the School of Frankfurt, according to which power is relational but expressed in terms of class domination and based on structural social relations. In human geography and urban studies we have scholars such as David Harvey, Neil Brenner, Edward Soja, and Richard Sennett, among others. I do not want to diminish the importance of this strand of thought and of paying attention to how social formations and economic processes orientate reality and have a role in relation to how space becomes. Nonetheless, it is the emphasis on the structural dimensions of the world and on the direction that is pre-given to power relations that is deemed problematic here and is overcome.

7 Ibid. p.213.

8 Paul Patton, *Deleuze and the Political* (London: Routledge 2000). Patton explains that the copious use that Deleuze and Guattari have made of a peculiar terminology has hindered the apprehension of their work as political. Nonetheless, the intention of the two philosophers was to be political, quite overtly in their major books, the Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus.

9 As Patton says "through his studies of the philosophies of Nietzsche and Spinoza, he (Deleuze) develops a concept of power which has none of the juridical and moral presuppositions typically associated with power in the tradition of modern thought." [Patton, *Deleuze and the Political*, op. cit. p.49].

10 Gilles Deleuze, *Lectures des cours sur Foucault, 14 January 1986*, http://www2.univ-paris8.fr/deleuze/article.php3?id_article=442 [accessed 21 September 2016].

that, in order to grasp power, one has to discard big entities – such as social formations and institutions. Instead, one has to look at particles and molecules, where a 'microphysical' social field characterised by instability emerges. From these positions, other concepts ensue that are deemed relevant for this research.

Reading Foucault, Deleuze assumes that power should not be sought in a singular force, which would give it a direction and build a hierarchy; rather it must be understood as a relation itself, moving "from one point to another in a field of forces" and being defined by the points it intersects.[11] In other words, power is not located in one body, nor it can be possessed by any body. On the contrary, a body must be seen as the result of the differential of forces that enter into a mutual relation that we will call power.

Since power is a relation, Foucault says, it cannot be considered as an attribute of the body, something that can be "appropriated." Furthermore, it cannot be located in one institution, a social class or an individual; rather, power is to be found in the multiplicity of forces that fill the social space. Permeating a multiplicity, it can activate "innumerable confrontations," while passing through the dominated forces as well as through the dominating.[12] This is what a microphysics of power entails: that we apprehend power as a matter of waves and particles rather than a matter of big stratified wholes.[13] A matter of bodies, velocities and affects, instead of ready-made social structures in a dominating-dominated relation. By body I mean the Spinozan mode of existence of things. A body, Deleuze explains, is defined neither by its form nor by its subjectivity; rather, it is intended in a kinetic way as a relation of slowness and speed between the particles of which it is composed, and in a dynamic way for its capacity for affecting and being affected, for any body affects and is affected by other bodies.[14] This conceptualisation has two important consequences: first, it refers to body as *any* body, not only the human body, thus positioning this work in the line of thought that is displacing the social sciences, in particular by decentring the human subject and focusing on the vitality of materiality.[15] Second, it puts an emphasis on affect as central to agency, and therefore to any reasoning about politics and ethics.[16] In chapter 3 the importance of affect in relations of power and control will be fleshed out.

What these principles tell us about the nature of power is relevant for this work in two aspects. First, if we choose to look into a microphysics of power, paying attention not only to molar but also molecular entities, we have more chances of understanding power as "diffuse, fluid and unstable." This perspective opens up to the potential offered by a multiplicity of relations and forces, as well as by the unpredictable outcomes of their possible compositions. Put

11 Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1988).

12 Deleuze, *Foucault*, op. cit.

13 Gilles Deleuze, *Lectures des cours sur Foucault, 7 January 1986*, http://www2.univ-paris8.fr/deleuze/article.php3?id_article=439 [accessed 21 September 2016].

14 Gilles Deleuze, *Spinoza. Practical Philosophy* (San Francisco: City Lights Books 1988).

15 Within the field of urban studies and human geography, I am referring to a myriad of studies that have been produced in the two decades, with growing intensity, that cannot be put under the same umbrella, like the 'non-representational geographies', 'assemblage-thinking', actor-network-theory. Despite their differences, they all assume the agency of things, affective intensities as productive, and the flatness of the real, as crucial for understanding the social. See: Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift, *Cities. Reimagining the Urban* (Cambridge & Malden: Polity 2002); Ignacio Farías and Thomas Bender (eds.), *Urban Assemblages: How Actor-Network Theory Changes Urban Studies* (London: Routledge 2009); Ben Anderson and Paul Harrison, *Taking-Place: Non-Representational Theories and Human Geography* (Farnham: Ashgate 2010); Colin McFarlane, 'Assemblage and Critical Urbanism', *City* 15 2 (2011): pp.204-224. For a philosophical account of new materialistic ontologies: Rick Dolphijn and Iris van der Tuin (eds.), *New Materialism: Interviews and Cartographies* (Ann Arbor: Open Humanities Press 2012).

16 See Jane Bennett, *Vibrant Matter: a Political Ecology of Things* (Durham: Duke University Press 2010).

differently, if we think of power as embodied by molar entities or "appropriated" by bodies, we may bind the apprehension of social processes to binary mechanisms; on the contrary, if we conceive power as distributed among bodies, we may end up paying greater attention to how the micropolitical is traversed by forces whose interplay can redefine bodies' relations and reorganise social space at any time. So, essentially, construing power as relational and its functioning as molecular, we discard metanarratives and a mainly categorical approach to social and political practices. As I show below, dualism is problematic in that it seeks to reduce complexity. This choice does not set aside stable and bound molar entities, but it puts forward a different way of conceptualising their role in a fashion that includes but makes them less central in the mapping of power relations.

Second, if we look at power as diffuse, it means we cannot determine its position because it does not have a central one. It moves strategically along lines of force. As Deleuze puts it, "Power is not some body's property [*propriété*]. By contrast it is the exercise of every body."[17] The real is relentlessly organised and stratified by forces that are activated through bodies' relations: control is thus open, horizontal, and continuous. It is the age of control, the one we live in, according to Deleuze.[18] This point is pivotal to understand the nature of the atmosphere, which I explore in chapter 3, along with issues of distributed responsibility that are covered in chapter 4.

The Jungle is all about *this* power, as we will see. Approaching the Jungle from the perspective of the macropolitical would not be less interesting or less challenging. It probably would have brought me to focus on police brutality, the contradictions of political action, the injustices of the asylum machine as mechanisms of control. There are at least two reasons for which I have decided not to build on these nevertheless crucial issues but to integrate them as components of a broader framing. First, my aim was to study ordering processes and control movements and I did not want to fix a direction *a priori* to the flow of power. The mapping of this direction should have been, conversely, the result of the research. The question that oriented my work, as I mentioned, was how the political, and possibly resistance, could emerge out of orderings and control: if I drew from the start the map of the field of forces that crossed the Jungle I would not then be able to see anything beyond it.

In this perspective, choosing the makeshift camp of Calais would prove particularly compelling because of its unplanned character. As I make it clear in chapter 2 and show throughout the pages of this work, the Jungle was an emergence of orderings out of rational models of planning. Observing it from a multiple range of views, through the lens of a relational and distributed power, responded to this peculiar aspect. Second, many scholars who were studying the Calais case were already treating it through the governmental lens.[19] For example, while Miriam Ticktin focuses her interest on the camp of containers as the embodiment of racist politics, Oli Mould sets the problem of the Jungle in binary terms, where

17 Gilles Deleuze, *Lectures des cours sur Foucault, 7 January 1986*, http://www2.univ-paris8.fr/deleuze/article.php3?id_article=440 [accessed 21 September 2016] (my translation).

18 Gilles Deleuze, 'Postscript on Control Societies', in Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations* (trans. Martin Joughin) (New York: Columbia University Press 1995) pp.177-182.

19 See Miriam Ticktin, 'Calais. Containment Politics in the 'Jungle'', *The Funambolist Magazine* 5 (2016): pp.29-32; Oli Mould, 'The not-so-concrete Jungle: Material Precarity in the Calais Refugee Camp', *Cultural Geographies* (2017): pp.1-17; Tom Davies, Arshad Isakjee and Surindar Dhesi, 'Violent Inaction: the Necropolitical Experience of Refugees in Europe', *Antipode* (2017). For analysis of the Calais case before the 2015-2016 Jungle, see also: Kim Rygiel, 'Bordering solidarities: migrant activism and the politics of movement and camp at Calais', *Citizenship Studies* 15 (1) 2011: pp. 1-19; William Walters, 'Acts of Demonstration: Mapping the Territory of (non-) Citizenship' in E.F. Isin and Greg Neilson (eds.), *Acts of Citizenship* (London: Zed Books 2008): pp. 182-207.

we have on one side the authorities as agents of violence and oppression, and on the other side the volunteers as triggers of process of home-making. This vision is not to be dismissed, but I want to overcome its dualism by providing a more composite conceptualisation that brings to light productive entanglements. This literature was a source of information and consideration but was also limiting for its one-sided perspective on control.

Sticking to a conception of power such as the one I have described above is deemed the most appropriate way to understand the Jungle in its complexity and processual unfolding. It remains a partial view on the assemblage of the Calais makeshift encampment, but with more than one vantage point from which to regard its making up. On the one hand, this approach enabled me to orientate the gaze in many directions without giving a prevalent weight to one or another body or pre-determined sense to power relations. My intention was to enlarge the horizon including the manifold bodies (material and immaterial) that, while encountering and connecting to each other *across* the Jungle, expressed and enacted forces of power.

On the other hand, I regarded power as a field of forces, that is, soaking reality. In this sense, it is the process that becomes the focus of the research. The Jungle was a lively and ever-changing body which identity was not and could not be fix(ed). Understanding the Jungle as a forcefield permeated by power encouraged me to discard moral positions that would have reduced the possible interpretations of ongoing processes. Moral imperatives are not good or bad *per se*; on the contrary, they might urge to challenge a reality that we judge unfair. Nonetheless, in the context of this work their force would have been too determining in setting the direction. Let me briefly unpack this point, by connecting power to affect.

Control is *conatus*, it is what drives bodies' acts, movements, emplacements, and discourses. The concept of *conatus* is used by Spinoza to refer to "the endeavour to persist in being" and grounds his apprehension of the social and the political. According to Spinoza, every body is marked by the force of the conatus, which nevertheless is not exerted alone but in relation to other bodies' forces, following the impetus to "enact its nature."[20] As Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos suggests, the *conatus* "can be also put in autopoietic terms, as the body's necessary operation to generate itself and its own elements in order to carry on its being and becoming", thus making us understand control as the endeavour that makes the body survive and keep on reproducing itself; its autopoietic mode of existence.[21] In this sense, control can rather be understood as a mechanism that results from a power *to* (act) than a power *over* (bodies). From the theoretical perspective of this work it is deemed to be more productive explaining power in terms of an action (*to*) than that of a position (*over*). This is because, while the former explicitly refers to a relation (again, of forces) which direction is not established a priori, the latter fixes a standpoint from which the dominant and the dominated are known from the outset. This point is critical if we consider that in the Jungle the sense of the action was given by the interaction of multiple bodies, and not by a few ones. In the next section, this idea is developed further with respect to dismissal of the 'camp' as the framing concept for understanding the Jungle.

The conception of power as power over (something/someone) is a natural generator of

20 Moira Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd, *Collective Imaginings. Spinoza, Past and Present* (London: Routledge 1999).

21 Andreas Philippopulos-Mihalopoulos, *Spatial Justice. Bodies, Lawscape, Atmosphere* (New York: Routledge 2015) p.8.

categories, which separates oppressed bodies from oppressing ones, and winners from losers in any possible struggle. As such, it sticks moral tenets to bodies as if they were universal and forever determined, thus taking for granted the effects of power relations on bodies' capacity of acting. Categories are shun here on the premise that they are the result of a distinction that is reductive for being a simplification as well as a mechanism of exclusion which limits our possibilities of observation. Social and moral categories do not provide us with knowledge but rather hinder our possibilities of enhancing it. As Levi Bryant contends, the outcomes of an act of distinction – that is the operation we carry out whenever we organise the world into categories - become unintelligible to those who have made it, and the distinction itself becomes invisible:

> "by virtue of the withdrawal of distinctions from view in the course of using them, distinctions thus create a reality effect where properties of the indicated seem to belong to the indicated itself rather than being effects of the distinction. As a consequence, we do not realize that other distinctions are possible. The result is thus that we end up surreptitiously unifying the world under a particular set of distinctions, failing to recognize that very different sorts of indications are possible."[22]

In order to avoid, or at least to reduce, the appeal to categorisation and use of moral values, it is not sufficient to think of power as relational: we need to place emphasis on a body's capacities of (re)action when it encounters and composes with other bodies. We need to think of power *affectively* and *ethically*.

A force, Deleuze holds in Spinozan terms, is always in relation to another force and within this relation it may express two modes of existence: it can affect other forces or it can be affected by them. From this angle, I want to emphasise the capacity – the power – of bodies in terms of affects. I read power ethically through Spinoza, for whom bodies' power is expressed by the transformation they undergo when they encounter and intersect with other bodies. This transformation can be one that either enhances their capacity of act, affecting them positively, or shrinks it, affecting them negatively.[23] In this perspective, viewing conatus as the effort for keeping one's ability to be affected, "good and bad per se do not exist. Rather, desire comes first and, based on one's *conatus*, ultimately proves pivotal in determining what combinations a given body deems good or bad for itself."[24] Affect is the sense of the relation with the world of every body, it produces reality. Every body builds its own world through the affects that put it in connection with other bodies and according to which it will affect or be affected either positively or negatively, ending up either empowered or weakened.

This is the ethics of Spinoza to which I want to adhere, an ethology, as Deleuze calls it, that is interested in grasping bodies' power only in terms of their capacity of affection and not a priori as moral attributes, but following the events that the encounter produces.[25] Rather than judging a body's action according to principles and values that presume to know what

22 Levi R. Bryant, *The Democracy of Objects* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Open Humanities Press/MPublishing 2011) p.21.

23 Baruch Spinoza, *The Ethics (Ethica More Geometrico Demonstrata)* (Project Gutenberg 2009 [1677], available at: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3800/3800-h/ 3800-h.htm [accessed 26 September 2016].

24 Ansaloni and Tedeschi, 'Ethics and spatial justice: Unfolding non-linear possibilities for planning action', op. cit. p.326.

25 Deleuze, *Spinoza*, op. cit.

is universally good or bad – as morality does – we observe 'what a body can do' when it comes across other bodies and agrees or disagrees with them.[26] For the body considers good what affects it positively and makes it flourish, not vice versa. In other words, it is in the dynamic encounter among bodies that we can outline an ethical understanding of power relations as a result of bodies' multiple compositions and affections.

3 Before moving to power and space, and why I consider important to dismiss literature about camps with respect to the Calais encampment, let me briefly put the Jungle in context by fixing some points in its history. The port of Calais is distant about 36 kilometres from the UK shores and this is why it is the first port in France for passenger transport. In 2015, for example, approximately 10 millions of passengers got one of the 50 ferries that daily leave the port bound for Dover. The Channel crossing being the shorter compared to all other ports on the French coast, its history starts earlier than that of the Jungle. One of the first interventions of the French state to expel and disperse people who were blocked in Calais and not allowed to cross the Channel by boat, was probably in the spring of 1999. Fleeing the war in Kosovo, many people were arriving to the French coast to reach the UK and ask for asylum, ending up occupying the waiting rooms of the ferry terminal in Calais.[27] Following protests by local associations, the Prefecture decided to open a temporary accommodation centre in a hangar. From this solution, which got overcrowded immediately, in September 1999 the centre of Sangatte opened in a hangar ironically owned by the Groupe Eurotunnel Corporation.[28]

The episode of Sangatte has been a crucial moment in the history of migration in the north of France, for it set a precedent which even today represents a boogeyman for both France and UK. Opening with 150 guests, it reached its maximum of 1500 people in the autumn of 2002. The centre was a hangar managed by the Red Cross and funded by the French state. Following several clashes between groups, the French state involved the riot police to constantly surveil and control its premises. This combination exposed quickly the dual approach of the humanity and firmness that would be a constant of French migration policy.[29] However, as Didier Fassin explains, the role of the humanitarian organisation and that of the police overlapped and sometimes paradoxically switched, with Red Cross workers exerting controlling functions and riot police mainly playing a part in preventive action.[30] As soon as it opened to the people who at that time were squatting in Calais and depending on aid groups for food, clothes, and blankets, the centre closed volunteers outside, as well as the media.[31] Between its opening and its closure, the centre of Sangatte hosted more than 65 thousands people, coming mostly from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran. And it became very

26 Gatens and Lloyd, *Collective Imaginings*, op. cit.

27 This account is partially based on the report "La loi des Jungles", realised by the French Organisation for the Right to Asylum (Coordination Française pour le Droit d'Asile, CFDA): CFDA, *La Loi des Jungles. La Situation des Exilés sur le Littoral de la Manche et de la Mer du Nord* (2008), available at http://cfda.rezo.net.

28 The Eurotunnel, which opened in 1994, was already in 1999 a possible way to cross the Channel. The access to the tunnel was located in the city of Coquelles, which now hosts a detention centre.

29 Frédérique Cornuau, Xavier Dunezat, 'L'Immigration en France: Concepts, Contours et Politiques', *Espace Populations Sociétés* [Online], 2 (2008), accessed the 19 May 2017 at http://eps.revues.org/3330; DOI : 10.4000/eps.3330.

30 Didier Fassin, *Humanitarian Reason. A Moral History of the Present* (trans. Rachel Gomme) (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press 2012).

31 See the short documentary by Florence Pezon (2002), "Welcome OUT/IN Sangatte" at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HyefAoIOCYI. Journalists were allowed inside upon agreement.

[1]



Figure 1. Calais as point of transit. Source: the author

soon matter of conflict and mutual charge between the French and British governments: the former blaming the other for being too attractive for migrants; the latter contesting the existence of the Red Cross centre for encouraging migrants through hospitality to cross illegally. Negotiations between the two governments led to the decision of closing the centre with the British government's engagement to grant access to the country to most of the hosted people.[32]

In the mid-80s, the first people arrived in Calais from Eastern Europe after the end of Cold War. But it was in the early 90s, when migration started to become visible in the area and that the French and British governments started reacting. They adopted two essential countermeasures, consisting one in the dislocation of the British border in French territory, and the other in the increase of security on sensitive areas. The first step to the dislocation of border controls was the enforcement of the Sangatte Protocol in 1993, signed in view of the opening of the Eurotunnel in 1994. The Sangatte Protocol established that frontier controls would have been exerted by both national officers at each departure site, that is Fréthun (France) and Folkestone (UK).[33] In 2001, when the Red Cross centre was already active, the Sangatte Protocol was extended to the train stations of Eurostar departures, such as the Paris-Gare du Nord, Lille station, or London-St Pancras, among others.[34] Bilateral border controls were then strengthened with the Treaty of Touquet, signed in 2003 and entered into force in 2004. The agreement confirmed the juxtaposition of French and British controls extending them to the entire Northern French coastline, at least on paper, to answer to the dispersion of migrant people along the French coast that followed the closure of the Sangatte centre. It also established that if the state of arrival refused the entrance to a person, this person should be accepted back by the state of departure, which, considered the prevalent direction of the migration flow from France to the UK, increased even further the weight on the side of France.[35]

The other countermeasure – to which the British government started contributing financially from the Touquet treaty – was the material and technological securisation of the borders on the French territory. As the CFDA report illustrates, it is in 2003 that the process of securisation of the port of Calais started speeding up, while for Eurotunnel it had started in 2001, due to the proximity between the Coquelles' site and the Red Cross centre.[36] After the closure of the Sangatte centre and the scattering of migrant people along the coast, with a greater concentration in the areas of Calais and Dunkerque, the port of Calais has seen the largest deployment of resources to increase the level of protection of the facility. In 2016, an information leaflet counted for the port 225 officers, 129 security cameras, and 30 kilometres of fencing, of which 15 kilometres equipped with an infrared detection system.[37] Calais, in almost fifteen years of investments, has been completely transformed according to principles of security enforcement into a medievalised landscape (see figures 2 and 3).

32 The UK gave access to 1039 people (mostly Afghans and Iraqis), while the remainder ones were either transferred to Afghanistan or brought to host centres for asylum seekers in France (source: CFDA report). See also http://www.liberation.fr/evenement/2002/12/03/france-et-angleterre-ferment-la-plaie_423496.

33 This process is called "juxtaposition of control". See the Sangatte Protocol at https://goo.gl/epa6Je.

34 http://treaties.fco.gov.uk/docs/fullnames/pdf/2002/TS0033.pdf.

35 http://treaties.fco.gov.uk/docs/pdf/2004/TS0018.pdf.

36 CFDA, *La Loi des Jungles*, op. cit. To increase the security at the Coquelles' Eurotunnel site, the Corporation that owns the facility provided it with "40 kilometres of barbed wire, electrified security fence, infrared sensors, 280 CCTV, 360 security agents."

37 Available at https://goo.gl/yNQZ53.

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Figure 2. Medievalised landscape, next to the Ferry Terminal of Calais. Source: the author

Figure 3. Medievalised landscape, next to the Eurotunnel site. Source: the author

All throughout the history of the relation between migration and security controls, evictions or, more broadly, the hardening of the government of migration has gone hand in hand with investments on security. In July 2009, the French and British governments signed an administrative agreement with the aim to fight illegal immigration by reinforcing security measures, creating a coordination centre in French territory, and reducing migratory pressure through voluntary or forced repatriations.[38] Security measures were to be funded entirely by the UK, while France would engage in reducing pressure on its side. At the end of September 2009, the French government evicted around 800 people in Calais from one of the makeshift encampments called 'the jungles'. In particular one of these was dismantled through a big police operation in front of the media, which resulted in 278 interrogations.[39] Since the end of the Sangatte centre, the scattering of people had led them to occupy squats or live rough in the woods next to the port, or next to rest areas along the motorways.

These more or less temporary spaces for living, characterised by the makeshift arrangement of tents or shacks, had been following the rhythm of a sequence: settlement, aid from volunteers, then eviction, and again. The lifespan of each encampment or squat was variable, but its fate was common to others. In 2004 some shacks and tents appeared in rue de Garennes, next to the industrial area called "les Dunes." This emplacement, *le bois Dubrûle*, located at the end of the port area, had been built, dismantled, and rebuilt many times. It is from here that the story of term 'jungle' began, so it seems. The Afghans, who were in numbers there, called the little wood where they had found a place to arrange their temporary refuge, *jangal*, a Pashtun word for forest. Lost in translation, the term became quickly 'the jungle', first among the volunteers and then both in the French and British media, and was since then employed to designate the makeshift settlements of migrant people in the area.[40] The 'jungles' were often covered with wood, which was then transformed into firewood and building material, thus leaving room for more shelters and leading to disappearance of the forest.[41]

The year 2009 was important in Calais also for a camp organised by the No Border network in June, months before the muscular evacuation. As Naomi Millner explains, "The European 'No Border' network established itself primarily as an affinity group with the struggles for the "right to movement regardless of citizenship status." The network operated through "direct action", that is, organising demonstrations or interventions aimed less to force policy reform than to establish "forms of self-regulation and government" outside the institutional framework.[42] "Calais became an iconic focus for the No Borders," and after the camp it set up a base in the port city at the Franco-British border.[43]

After the 2009 eviction, phases of settling-dismantling-resettling started again in cycles, protests were recurring and the presence of the No Border activists helped with opening a season of squats.[44] The occupation of abandoned houses or hangars had been quite common

38 https://www.immigration.interieur.gouv.fr/content/download/36185/273222/file/013_070609ArrangementFrGb.pdf.

39 http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2009/09/22/debut-de-l-evacuation-de-la-jungle-de-calais_1243358_3224.html.

40 Haydée Sabéran, *Ceux qui passent* (Paris: Carnet Nord 2012).

41 http://www.la-croix.com/Journal/La-jungle-Calais-2016-08-25-1100784614.

42 Naomi Millner, 'Routing the camp: experiential authority in a politics of irregular migration', *Journal of Political Power* 6 1 (2013): p.95.

43 Ibid.

44 The opening of squat is a "direct action" in No Borders' activism, as I was told by an activist of the network and

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

Figure 4. Map of the squats and jungles in Calais from Sangatte on. Source: Veronika Boutinova, artist (Calais)

Figure 5. Map of the Calais area and localisation of the Jungle (2015-2016). Source: the author

since 2003. All squats followed the same cycle of settlement-evacuation-resettlement: squat Pagniez, squat Thélu, rue Blériot, the old University, rue Mouron, rue Neuve, Victor Hugo...to arrive to the last big squat before the 2015-2016 Jungle, the Fort Galloo squat, permanently evacuated in June 2015.

And so we come to the event I hereafter will refer to as 'the Jungle'. During summer 2014 the presence of migrants in Calais came back to occupy the media: more people arriving to Calais, evacuations in sequence. As it happened in 2009, the French and British governments decided consequently to reinforce their bilateral cooperation in the field of illegal immigration through a 15 millions euros fund to be financed by the UK. The fund would contribute to increase the levels of security around the port through "permanent facilities," such an additional barrier along the motorway leading to the port.[45] At the same time, it was September 2014, there were rumours about the imminent creation of a day centre funded by French state for providing basic care to the migrants stuck in Calais. The centre would be located within the premises of the old summer camp Jules Ferry, which was just across the motorway and not far from the then existing Tioxide jungle, born as a result of earlier evacuations.

At the beginning of 2015, the migrants present in Calais lived scattered in different encampments and squats all through the town. The Galloo squat was still open, a small encampment had settled along the road to the Eurotunnel, a jungle had been growing on the area of the Tioxide factory, not far from the 2009 jungle, and the Jules Ferry centre had opened to distribute food and provide other services.[46] At the end of March, state officials started informing people that all the encampments and squats would soon be evicted and the only area where a settlement would have been tolerated was an abandoned landfill next to the Jules Ferry centre and also, ironically, to the motorway bound for the port. Most of the migrants, with the help of a bunch of French volunteers, left their tents and shacks to move to the identified area, even before the dismantling was formally announced.

This was the beginning of 'the Jungle', the last big one, at least for now. Let me know just recall briefly the episodes that have marked its story, for the details will be offered in the next chapters. In July 2015, the Jungle sheltered between 2500 and 3000 people and its development was already highly covered by the British media. It was during the 2015 summer that, in conjunction with the growing Syrian crisis, the massive arrivals of people on the Greek coasts and the many deaths at sea, that a huge mobilisation of British citizens began in the Jungle. In September, the local association l'Auberge des Migrants had already passed from "shortage, to excess" of manpower and supplies.[47] From September 2015 to January 2016 intensity and excess characterised the encampment: it was growing at fast pace, wood and bush leaving place to tents and shacks, every day new people flocked to

I was confirmed by a volunteer of L'Auberge des Migrants, who appreciated the effort put by the local activists to demonstrate while also answering to the problem of accommodation for migrant people in Calais. For an account of the practice of protest: https://passeursdhospitalites.wordpress.com/2015/02/03/a-calais-et-dans-le-reste-de-leurope-les-exiles-sorganisent/.

45 https://www.immigration.interieur.gouv.fr/content/download/73749/540330/file/Declaration-commune_20sept2014.pdf.

46 When in April 2015 the Jules Ferry centre had reached its full activity, it served one hot meal a day and hot drinks in the morning, provided 60 showers, 40 toilets, a laundry, power outlets, a small health facility, and an accommodation centre for 400 lone women and their children. It functioned until the final eviction of the Jungle in October 2016 and it was managed by La Vie Active, a French NGO: http://julesferry.vieactive.fr/le-centre-jules-ferry/.

47 http://www.tdg.ch/monde/europe/La-course-a-la-generosite-dans-la-jungle-des-migrants/story/15924525.

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Figure 6. Aerial view of the Jungle (October 2015). Source: AFP (BBC website)

Figure 7. The site of the Jungle in context. Source: the author

it, both migrants and volunteers, less and less people could leave. Over the weeks, the encampment was taking the shape of a small village, or a shantytown - a *bidonville* – as French volunteers called it, with shops, restaurants, a church, mosques, schools, and cultural centres that made it an extremely lively spot in an otherwise dull city. The edges of the encampment, three streets and the dunes on one side, where patrolled by the police, especially the border with the motorway, which was regularly taken by the migrants to try to get on the passing lorries, in their way toward the port. As I describe more in detail in chapter 2, the residents of the Jungle deliberately provoked tailbacks by pouring onto the motorway from the encampment and were strongly repulsed back by the police through copious use of tear gas. This became more intense during the month of November and clashes with the police broke out on a daily bases, especially at night. What was announced at the end of August by the then Minister of Interior Manuel Valls, that the French state would have built an accommodation centre to host 1500 people from the Jungle, was turning into reality at the end of the year 2015. In December a wide area of the makeshift camp was evacuated to make room for the construction of a camp of container, the 'temporary welcoming centre', Centre d'Accueil Provisoire, or CAP. During the first months of 2016 the excess of intensity of the Jungle reached its peak: in January a 100 metres strip between the encampment and the motorway was first evacuated, then bulldozed, to create a no-man's land with the aim to contain the daily attempts to occupy the motorway;[48] in February, following the opening of the CAP in January, the Prefecture announced the partial dismantling of the southern area of the Jungle.[49] To this announce, the aid groups working in the Jungle replied by filing an emergency injunction to ask to postpone the dismantling. Leaving for chapter 2 a more comprehensive account of the dispute and its consequences, here suffice it to say that the partial eviction was part of the French state programme that aimed to displace people from Calais to hundreds of accommodations centres all throughout France, the so-called Centres d'Accueil et Orientation (CAO). The organisation of these centres had started in the autumn 2015 and was only partially achieved in March 2016, when the eviction started. The CAOs represented, in the narrative and action of the state, the waiting room before acceding to the Centres d'Accueil des Demandeurs d'Asile (CADA), reserved to whom had already laid down a claim for asylum, but whose capacity was often overwhelmed.[50] These centres were also, in practice, a modality for keeping migrants far from Calais, at least for a while, and sorting them in case they decided to lay down a claim and were then rejected, as I discuss in chapter 4. Following the partial dismantling, most of residents of the southern area moved to the northern one by filling out any empty centimetre; some other moved the Grand Synthe camp, 30 kilometres further from Calais; some others just left, and a few accepted to move to a CAO.

Tensions grew in the Jungle after the partial eviction, as people continued to arrive and the place kept on filling up. Chances to cross the Channel, at the same time, were not increasing, so frustration was also rising up.[51] At the end of May 2016, a big fight exploded amongst

48 http://www.lavoixdunord.fr/archive/d-20160118-G5DDFW?referer=%2Farchives%2Frecherche%3Fdatefilter%3Dlast5year%26facets%3DGL%253AROSSEL_GL_FR_CALAIS%26sort%3Ddate%2Bdesc%26start%3D20%26word%3Djungle%2Bbande.

49 http://www.lavoixdunord.fr/archive/recup%3A%252Fregion%252Fannonce-du-demantelement-de-la-moitie-de-la-jungle-ia33b0n3327144.

50 The French government has created a website dedicated to communicating its intervention in Calais: https://etat-a-calais.fr/laccueil-en-france/. In the Jungle, but even in the 2009 jungle, used to live people who had already claimed for asylum but could not be accommodated in a CADA because of lack of place.

51 In 2015 the French border police (PAF, Police aux Frontières) made a monthly census. According to these data, for example, in October it was estimated that about 6000 people were living in the Jungle. In February 2016 aid groups

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

Figure 8. Aerial view of the Jungle (February 2016). Source: Franck Dubray (France3Info)

Figure 9. Aerial view of the Jungle (September 2016). Source: Ben Davis (Facebook)

men who were in line for getting the daily meal at the Jules Ferry centre, and then extended in the makeshift camp, without the intervention of the police to calm it down. At the end of the day, 40 people got injured and around 50 shelters were destroyed by a huge fire.[52] Since then, the police prevented volunteers from bringing any building material into the encampment, so only tents were admitted as shelter. The shadow of a definitive eviction loomed during the following months, until it became actuality when, in September 2016, the former president Nicolas Sarkozy and the then president François Hollande formally visited Calais. With the national elections approaching, the second needed to respond to the political opponent by evoking the imminent evacuation and dismantling of the encampment.[53] And this happened, despite the final attempt of the aid groups to block it in court,[54] between the 24 and 26 October, with around 5600 people leaving by bus to the CAOs and many uncounted who just abandoned Calais.[55]

How did the Jungle differ from what had happened before? First, this Jungle was unofficially 'tolerated', albeit in constant threat. French institutions had invited migrant people to move there and, once it was settled, evicted one by one every remaining squat in town. When a supposed 'migrant' was found by the police outside the Jungle and was not questioned, he or she was sent back to the Jungle.[56] Then, with its 18 months of life, not only the Jungle gathered a huge mass of people at certain moments, but also nobody can say how many thousand people had stopped there for a while during its lifespan, be them migrants, volunteers, state officials, artists, and so on. The continuous turnover was associated to a core of sedentary people, and these opposing movements pushed the Jungle to the paradoxical condition of being both ever-changing and involved in a process of sedentarisation.

The massive arrival of British volunteers changed the landscape of aid compared to old jungles and squats: before them, French volunteers were constantly understaffed, underfunded, and overwhelmed. Most of them were retired, with spare time and plenty of motivation, but limited capacity of attracting donations and volunteers. The British brought in what the French lacked most: the ability to mobilise funding and people. This occurrence, it will become clearer throughout the text, had many consequences in the making of the Jungle. Another aspect of the peculiarity of this encampment was the reduced force of the No Borders. The group in the Jungle was composed of a dozens of people from all over Europe and changed frequently composition. They had an info point in the Jungle where they provided legal information and their main activity was to document police violence. Despite the scarceness of their presence, if compared to the numbers of aid volunteers from the other groups, they soon became the scapegoat of any even small insurgency, so

(Help Refugees) launched their own census to rebut institutional data, which were deemed to be overestimated. Before the partial eviction the air groups' census counted almost 5500 people, while the French state only 3700. These data, as I show in chapter 2, became the reason of a dispute over the opportunity of eviction itself. After a light decrease that followed the March eviction, numbers started again to rise, until September, when they reach more than 10 thousand people, according to the aid groups, only to decrease again to around 8 thousand before the final eviction in October.

52 http://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/nord-pas-de-calais/pas-de-calais/calais/rixe-calais-retour-au-calme-dans-la-jungle-apres-les-scenes-de-guerre-de-la-veille-1008045.html.

53 http://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/nord-pas-de-calais/pas-de-calais/calais/ce-qu-il-faut-retenir-de-la-visite-de-francois-hollande-calais-1094953.html.

54 http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2016/10/12/les-associations-deposent-un-refere-contre-le-demantelement-de-la-jungle-de-calais_5012664_3224.html.

55 http://www.lemonde.fr/immigration-et-diversite/article/2016/10/24/depart-des-migrants-de-calais-la-france-avec-cette-evacuation-est-sous-le-regard-du-monde_5019322_1654200.html.

56 This happened regularly, for example, when people from the Jungle occupied the motorway trying to get into lorries. They were sent back by the French police who shouted at them "go jungle!".

much that several organisations decided to stand up for them publicly.[57] Ultimately, several jungles before this one had recreated a lively place, a city-like environment. As I show in chapter 2 and 3, the Jungle reached a degree of sedentarisation and organisation that had never be seen in previous encampments.

Naming 'the Jungle' the encampment that has been studied for this PhD is a choice that needs to be explained. As I mentioned, the term dates back to the after Sangatte period, when people hidden themselves in wooded areas and then eventually built up small makeshift camps. When the 2009 jungle was evicted, the term "became a catch-all for the living conditions of the migrants outside of Calais," as Ayesha Hameed maintains.[58] Referring to that episode, she argues that the term has ended up conveying an image of a state of nature that is ideologically linked to migrants as to qualify them as primitive and 'other': "the 'jungle' describes a congealed landscape [...] that plays a sleight of hand in invoking a specific spatial location but then conferring on it a primordial, ahistorical quality."[59] At the time of the 2009 eviction, the then French Minister for Immigration Eric Besson declared that "you have bosses, you have chiefdoms: it's the law of the jungle that reigns, and on the territory of French Republic the law of the jungle cannot endure,"[60] confirming that in the state perspective, "the jungle is another place and time and must be purged," as Hameed puts it.[61] This can be sustained also for the 2015-2016 jungle, for the methods of containment and government of migration had not changed and neither the images that were conveyed. Yet, as for the term jungle, something different happened. French institutions had dismissed the name of jungle and called the encampment 'la lande', which in French indicates a wild and unproductive area, what that piece of land was before housing migrant people: partly a former dump and partly a protected area. Yet, the image that is transferred is no less disparaging than the jungle's. Despite this institutional change in vocabulary, both French and British media kept on using the term jungle, but referring at the same time to the dire living conditions and the liveliness of the emergent multiethnic village. The jungle, in the media, was not only a place of "primordiality," but also of agency, creativity, and eventfulness. Sometimes, some residents of the Jungle complained about being treated "as animals," thus evoking the link with the term jungle not in its original Pashtun meaning, which was a neutral one, but in its transmutation, in its political shape. This happened when they talked to the media or to a European documented individual, when politics was at stake in the possibility of being given a voice. But most of the time, in the daily routine of the encampment, the Jungle was just *a* place, it was a proper name for a place of living. "Cities take shape through a plethora of 'fixed namings'", Amin and Thrift say, and this name had gained nuances and integrated difference until it became a proper name, with the capital letter.[62]

4 How such an event can be conceptualised? A broad strand of literature on the spatial configurations of mobilities and migrations would suggest analysing the Jungle as a camp. In

57 http://www.gisti.org/spip.php?article5284.

58 Ayesha Hameed, 'The Petrification of the Image', *Continent* 4 4 (2015): p.43.

59 Ibid. p.44.

60 http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/calais-la-premiere-d-une-serie-d-evacuations_789260.html (my translation).

61 Hameed, 'The Petrification of the Image', op. cit. p.44.

62 Amin and Thrift, *Cities*, op. cit. p.24.

what follows I am offering an excursus on literature about camps and proposing a different path. Before getting there, let me come back for a moment to power by looking more closely into biopower, a concept that has influenced many studies about both migration and camps.

Biopower is the kind of power directed to life itself, operating through the "administration of bodies and the calculated management of life," in Foucault's theoretical frame.[63] It is what "brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge-power an agent of transformation of life."[64] In this sense, as Roberto Esposito explains, biopower is productive with respect to life, it produces change within life.[65] The notion of biopower has been widely employed in migration studies and literature about camps that focus on the government of migrating bodies. Academic literature on camps, in particular, has widely borrowed from the biopolitical theorisation of Giorgio Agamben's notion of camp. In this section I try to set the stage for a discussion which aims to dismiss this conceptualisation with respect to the Jungle of Calais, proposing instead a different paradigm based on the notion of territorial assemblage, affect, and atmosphere.

"Empire is materializing before our very eyes", Hardt and Negri claim in the preface of their most influential book.[66] The Empire they are referring to is the sovereign power that 'governs the world', the global mechanisms that control the economic and social domains, a networked apparatus that manages human life through a biopolitical model of power. *Empire* draws heavily on the Deleuzian reflections about the "Control Societies" and the notion of biopower elaborated by Foucault, which both provide a critical insight into the sneaky mechanisms of power at work in our globalised world. Biopower and control, if we assume them as correlative,[67] refer to the management of living populations without clear spatial delimitations – unlike disciplinary power – and the regulation of life processes through the modulation of interventions on probabilistic basis. This construct needs some preliminary reflections to help explain why, despite its thematic pertinence in relation to this research, the engagement with it will not be the starting point of my exploration.

The term *biopower* is used for the first time by Foucault in *La Volonté de Savoir* (1976), where it is described as a form of power that is centred in the body – conceived as foundation of biological processes – and which mechanisms are based on controls that aim for normalisation, hierarchization, and measuring.[68] This form of power represents in Foucault's last work the most contemporary expression of power inherent to the social body by virtue of its direct hold on life. The notion of biopower, as well as that of *bare life*, which has been elaborated by Giorgio Agamben as part of his revision of the Foucauldian theorisation, is of utmost relevance for a research that deals with control and orderings. Even more so, this is true for a research which empirical ground is a makeshift settlement inhabited by thousands of migrant people who embody bare life in the Agambenian framework. Both concepts are

63 Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality. Volume I: an Introduction* (R. Hurley trans.)(New York: Pantheon Books 1978), p.138.

64 Ibid. p.143.

65 Roberto Esposito, *Bíos. Biopolitics and Philosophy* (trans. Timothy Campbell) (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press 2008).

66 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2000).

67 Thomas Nail contends in 'Biopower and Control', in N. Morar, T. Nail and D. W. Smith (eds.) *Between Deleuze and Foucault* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 2016), p.247-263) that the idea of control for Deleuze and the concept of biopower for Foucault are the same, both in content and form. Both forms of power, Nail maintains, "take the life of populations as their content and the management of probability as their form" (p.261).

68 Foucault, *The History of Sexuality. Volume I: an Introduction*, op. cit.

pivotal for unmasking the paradox of state politics and humanitarian aid, and they will be deployed in this work, in particularly in chapter 4. Yet, they are not sufficient for making sense of power mechanisms in a spatial and corporeal fashion, as this thesis tries to do. Moreover, the content of Agamben's work on *homo sacer* is explicitly focused on sovereign power, which core activity is precisely deemed to be the production of a biopolitical body.

Let me take the concept of bare life first: would it prove productive in the case of the Jungle of Calais to understand the complexity of power relations? Partly. Bare life is the life of *homini sacri*, human beings deprived of political significance, stripped of rights, who find themselves in a "zone of irreducible distinction" – the state of exception – where their inclusion into the political realm is accomplished through their exclusion from it. Bare life is the contemporary political subject, according to Agamben, in that it becomes "the earthly foundation of the state's legitimacy and sovereignty,"[69] which bears power over bare life only in virtue of its birth.[70] The narrative of homo sacer is taken from ancient Roman law, according to which the "impure" individual could be killed and the killer not be charged of homicide. At the same time the Roman law proscribed the sacrifice, hence making of the impure a sacred body. The paradox lies in homo sacer being divested of political rights inasmuch as he/she can be killed without that act being legally judged a homicide, and yet be trapped in "a continuous relationship with the power that banished him/her precisely insofar as he/she is at every instant exposed to an unconditioned threat of death."[71] This conceptualisation has, for Agamben, its spatial manifestation in the camp, where bare life can be managed outside "the normal order:" while the exception itself becomes the rule, it is integrated permanently into the juridical order through the spatial arrangement of the camp.

The camp, Agamben argues, has colonial origins of which it maintains the juridico-political structure: it was born out the suspension of the law through the martial law, the state of emergency – a state of exception – and then has been given "a permanent spatial arrangement," which is independent from the normal juridical order, thus placed outside and inhabited by bare life. At the same time, Agamben continues, it is not just outside, for what is left outside through the exception is included "through its own exclusion."[72] In this sense, the sovereign power is fully realised through the camp, as it is operating through the normal order. From this paradox it follows that law and fact are confused and blur into each other, so much that legal and illegal make no sense anymore: as a result, "everything in the camp [is] truly possible."[73] Agamben depicts the Nazi camps as the most paradigmatic biopolitical space, suggesting that every space that is constituted as a state of exception, where human bodies are treated as bare life, can eventually be regarded as a camp. From this perspective, the camp is the "biopolitcal paradigm of the West," because it is through the camp that the sovereign power can produce bare life, the biopolitical body *par excellence*.[74]

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69 Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1998) p.75.

70 In his work on biopolitics Esposito affirms that the link between birth and nation found its higher (and deadlier) expression in Nazism, but in origin it is what allowed the sovereign power of the nation state to unify its population under a common identity. The Declaration of Human Rights and the Citizen shares the same ideological basis that associates birth (and the bodies of subjects) to the body of the sovereign, the nation. See Esposito, *Bíos. Biopolitics and Philosophy*, op. cit.

71 Ibid. p.103.

72 Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, op. cit. p.96.

73 Ibid. p.97.

74 Ibid. p.102.

A wide strand of literature on migration that has been inspired by Agamben's narrative focuses on the exceptionality of the camp in relation to the state and the law, and secondarily on the figure of the refugee considered as surviving in a state of bare life.[75] In this vein, the refugee camp is the non-place, a "space of indistinction," where life is marked by isolation and exclusion from the political, economical, and social life.[76] The geographical approach of this line of thought views the camp as a spatial biopolitical technology through which the sovereign power operates, by means of the state of exception, for the management of care and control over individual and collective life. In this perspective, the Nazi camp is, following Agamben, only the matrix for many other forms of camp that are being created today, for example, to manage migrations. "Camp thinking" becomes then a rally cry for acknowledging the ubiquitous presence of camps around us and engaging in a critical enquiry to better understand the logic of their functioning.[77]

However, these representations of the refugee camp have recently undergone broad criticism by a line of thought that defends the idea of migrants' agency against their depiction as bare life, and more broadly, aims to "challenge the borders of migration studies" by placing particular emphasis on the 'subjective' dimension of migration.[78] Agambenian accounts have been called into question "for ignoring the specificity and historical material reality that such camps take and the various social, political, geographic, and economic relations that constitute them."[79] This strand of literature, known as 'autonomy of migration', proposes a different perspective on migration and camps, which tends to value migrants' agency instead of their total subjugation to the sovereign power, and contests the spatial boundedness of the paradigm of exceptionality for the camp.[80] William Walters points out that "for all its critical thrust, Agamben's line of thinking seems to lead us away from a dynamic, agonistic account of power relations, and instead fosters a rather one-sided and flattened conception of migrant subjects."[81] Scholars who follow the autonomy of migration approach regard migrant people as active subjects who, challenging the borders and by virtue of their movements, are the reason for the tactics, manoeuvres and policies that are brought about to enforce control, and not the other way around. By the same token, migrants' struggles for freedom of movement are seen as political acts, which defy the power

75 To cite a few: Suvendrini Perera, 'What is a Camp…?' *Borderlands e-journal* 1(1) 2002, available at http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol1no1_2002/perera_camp.html; Bülent Diken, 'From Refugees Camps to Gated Communities: Biopolitics and the End of the City', *Citizenships Studies,* 8 (1) 2004: p.83-106; Didier Bigo, 'Detention of foreigners, states of exception, and the social practices of control of the Banopticon', in P. K. Rajaram and C. Grundy-Warr (eds) *Borderscapes: Hidden Geographies and Politics at Territory's edge* (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis 2007) p. 3-34; Claudio Minca, 'Geographies of the camp', *Political Geography* 49 (2015): p.74-83.

76 Diken, 'From Refugees Camps to Gated Communities: Biopolitics and the End of the City', op. cit.

77 Minca, 'Geographies of the camp', op. cit.

78 Nicholas De Genova and Martina Tazzioli (eds.), 'Europe/Crisis: New Keywords of "the Crisis" in and of "Europe"', *Near Futures Online,* 1 (2016), available at http://nearfuturesonline.org/europecrisis-new-keywords-of-crisis-in-and-of-europe/.

79 Kim Rygiel, 'Bordering solidarities: migrant activism and the politics of movement and camp at Calais', Citizenship Studies 15 (2011): p.3.

80 Rygiel, 'Bordering solidarities: migrant activism and the politics of movement and camp at Calais, op. cit.; Glenda Garelli and Martina Tazzioli, 'Choucha beyond the camp. Challenging the borders of migration studies', in Nicholas De Genova (ed.) *The Borders of Europe* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, forthcoming). See also Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Nielsen, 'Né qui, né altrove – Migration, detention, desertion: a dialogue' *Borderlands e-journal* 2 (1) 2003; Available at http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol2no1_2003/mezzadra_neilson.html; Engin F. Isin and Kim Rygiel, 'Abject spaces: frontiers, zones and camps' in E. Dauphinee and C. Masters (eds.) *The logics of biopower and the war on terror: living, dying, surviving* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2007) p. 181–203; William Walters, 'Acts of Demonstration: Mapping the Territory of (non-) Citizenship', op. cit.; Rutvica Andrjasevic, 'From Exception to Excess: Detention and Deportation across the Mediterranean Space', in Nicholas De Genova and Nathalie Peutz (eds.) *The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space and the Freedom of Movement* (Durham: Duke University Press 2010).

81 Walters, 'Acts of Demonstration: Mapping the Territory of (non-) Citizenship', op. cit. p. 186.

of the state and the juridical order, through the mass phenomenon of migration itself and also through the numerous protests they engage along their journeys.[82] In this sense, "by re-centring the analysis of camps away from exceptionality,"[83] the camp is conceptualised less as a place of immobilisation and powerlessness, and rather in its social, political and material intertwinings as a multifaceted space where inhabitants not only suffer exclusion and lack of rights, but they also negotiate, resist and struggle.

According to Nando Sigona, who puts forward an agent-oriented approach to understand the political impact of migration, there is a specific form of membership that is produced in and by the camp, which is born out of the complex relationships that the inhabitants establish with it and with the state through it, influencing inhabitants' mode of being political.[84] Camps are seen in this perspective as "contemporary spaces of politics"[85] that play a central role in the everyday life of people whose legal status is insecure. With a more spatial approach, but in the same line of thought, camps are categorised by Michel Agier in relation to their management, so that he distinguishes between self-organised camps (like the Jungle), transit centres, detention camps, and refugee camps. The first type emerges, for Agier, as a refuge in an inhospitable context, a stop-over along the journey of exile. Following an urban logic and drawing on the history or certain Brazilian favelas, Agier describes how a self-organised camp may, through political claims and conflicts, reach a stability that transforms it in an urban ghetto. This is the logic that has fascinated a number of French intellectuals who have seen in the Jungle a possible germ of a future hospitable city, as I mention in chapter 3. In this view, the separation between an inside and outside is marked, for the logic that makes the camp exist is that of exclusion and marginalisation, which produces *hors-lieux*.[86] To this vision of the camp as a city, which according to Bauman can free the migrant subject of victimisation and humanitarian discourse, Peter Grbac adds a focus on the built environment "as a space that reconceptualizes the way in which politics, people, and practices intersect and interact."[87] Grasping the city as the space where citizenship can be fostered, and "new ways of being political/being a citizen are forged, experimented with, and enacted,"[88] Grbac suggests that we can conceptualise the camp in terms of its capacity to promote the participation and appropriation of everyday life. In other words, the camp-as-city should allow the inhabitants to decide over their environment and express their agency. If this claim can be valuable when referred, as Grbac does, for the refugee camp managed by an humanitarian organisation, where room for manoeuvre is little for the refugees, it is less productive for a place like the Jungle. In the Jungle, the involvement of the inhabitants in the construction of the encampment cannot be regarded a priori as a political claim, for, as it will be clear in chapter 4, this would propose a limited grip on what resistance might be and conceal other claims.

82 As Walters notes, this line of thought has in Hardt and Negri's Empire its most influential expression.

83 Nando Sigona, 'Campzenship: reimagining the camp as a social and political space', *Citizenship Studies,* 19 (1) 2015: p. 5.

84 Ibid.

85 Ibid. p.6.

86 Michel Agier, 'Ce que les villes font aux migrants, ce que les migrants font à la ville', *Le Sujet dans la Cité* 7 2 (2016).

87 Peter Grbac, 'Civitas, Polis, and Urbs. Reimagining the refugee camp as a city', *Refugee Studies Centre*, wps n.96 (2013), available at https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/publications/civitas-polis-and-urbs-reimagining-the-refugee-camp-as-the-city: p.20.

88 Engin F. Isin, *Democracy, Citizenship, and the Global City* (New York: Routledge 2000) p.13, cited in Grbac, 'Civitas, Polis, and Urbs. Reimagining the refugee camp as a city', op.cit. p.22.

Going beyond the city-like model, but in the same vein of Grbac, Adam Ramadan puts forward an attempt of understanding the camp from the everyday practices that produce it, that is, from the material and political engagement of the inhabitants. In his account, first, camps are governed and controlled by a whole range of institutions that all together participate in the making of the camp's orderings, of which the state is only one agent among others; second, the camp is the result of the relations and interactions of all those that live and work in and with it and is "an active arena of agency."[89] The case of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, which Ramadan uses as empirical support, shows how Palestinian people in the camps have organised themselves not only culturally but also politically to "ensure their survival in exile" and claim for a political resolution. Finally, the camp is where the temporary dimension is suspended, in the wait for the political resolution, and present is lived as "an enduring struggle for survival and return to a time and place of meaning."[90] To explain how the camp is constituted by "multiple transnational and international networks and relationships,"[91] Ramadan suggests the use of the notion of assemblage, but confining it to a mainly descriptive tool, it fails to exploit its analytical potential. So doing, he is unable to explain how "the assemblage of buildings, homes, people, institutions, social relations and practices that have grown up from a gathering of destitute refugees sheltering in tents" work, through which mechanisms this assemblage may be productive of the political.[92] What is missing in Ramadan's account, and many of the geographical approaches to camps, is space. If we lack space in the Agambenian conceptualisations of the camp, for space is the bi-dimensional container of the juridico-political order, we also lack it in other more 'spatial' formulations, where space is, albeit present, put in the background by fusing it with the camp. What is spatial, in other words, is the camp. But if space is either a matter of geographic scale or a passive substratum, how could our understanding of the social and political entanglements *of the camp* be enhanced, given that they are the product of intrinsically spatial relations and connections?[93] To overcome this shortcoming, space must be conceptualised as manifold, ontologically relational, always open to becomings. As Doreen Massey suggests, "if space is the sphere of multiplicity, the product of social relations, and those relations are real material practices, and always ongoing, then space can never be closed, there will always be loose ends, always relations with the beyond, always potential elements of chance."[94] From this standpoint, the notion of assemblage can then put at work productively to analyse the Jungle not as 'a camp' but as an assemblage, that is, through the spatiality that the assemblage produces and not as a space itself. I describe this endeavour in the next section, where I outline a framework that aims to go beyond both the paradigm of exceptionality and not-spatial approaches to the entity called 'camp'.

The main concern of this research is attempting to understand how orderings emerge out of bodily encounters, in particular when bodies are caught into atmospheres. Which mechanisms subtend to the unfolding of orderings? How to account for orderings that are the result of relentless actions and forces (thus, power relations) of a multiplicity of bodies

89 Adam Ramadan, 'Spatialising the refugee camp', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers,* 38 (2013): p.71.

90 Ibid. p.73.

91 Ibid. p.70.

92 Ibid. p.74.

93 Ansaloni and Tedeschi, 'Ethics and spatial justice: Unfolding non-linear possibilities for planning action', op. cit.

94 Doreen Massey, *For Space* (London: Sage Publications 2005) p.95.

performing both as individuals and a multitude?[95] To put it bluntly, I am interested more in how spatial orderings are built out of an intersection of bodies and affects – a multiplicity, a "living arrangement"[96] – and less in investigating the nature of the camp as it were a bounded and fixed entity.

Against this background, the concepts of bare life and Agamben's conceptualisation of the camp would not prove very productive. First, with reference to the notion of bare life, the main reason for which I am not adopting it as a starting point for my exploration is that, in the context of this research, I understand agency as distributed. Agency, albeit with different degrees of capacity depending on one's relative emplacement within the social arrangement one is imbricated in, is not centralised, as I argue in chapter 3. If we see social formations as rhizomatic entanglements of bodies that are connected through relations of forces, we agree with Karen Barad that "agency is not an attribute but the ongoing reconfigurings of the world," and the world "is an open process of mattering through which mattering itself acquires meaning and form through the realization of different agential possibilities."[97] From this standpoint, adhering to Agamben's framework would imply to locate the core of the agentic capacity within a sovereign power, no matter where it is found. Bare life, Agamben maintains, is "at the margins of the political order" and this is undeniably what happens to migrants today after they have abandoned their country of origin.[98] Nonetheless, it is paramount to point out the exclusionary mechanism through which a migrant is held as bare life not only in camps, but also en route, and by centring only on this perspective a great many other dimensions might get lost.

Second, it would be deceptive to think of the Jungle from the viewpoint of the refugee camp, either in the "essentialized" form, as we find it in normative narratives informed by Arendt and Agamben's lines of thought, or in the exclusively anthropocentric perspective that is advanced by other accounts that focus on the social and political dimension of the camp.[99] The Jungle is known as a refugee camp in the media, which is correct according to the Cambridge dictionary definition that in general terms refers to a camp as "a place where people who have escaped their own country can live, usually in bad conditions and only expecting to stay for a limited time."[100] UNHCR also insists on the transitory dimension and the presence of displaced persons without mentioning the kind of management.[101] This nomenclature is useful for defining a place where displaced persons live temporarily, but it might conceal or flatten the diversity of people living in a makeshift camp like the Jungle.

As for the notion of bare life, I need to distance myself from a framing on the camp as

95 Here the term 'multitude' is not used as opposed to sovereign power, as in *Empire*. It has neither the ambiguous meaning of *vulgus*. For now, it is synonymous with crowd, but its connotation will be problematized in the fourth chapter.

96 Ian Buchanan, 'Assemblage Theory and its Discontents', *Deleuze Studies* 9 (3) 2015: pp.382-392.

97 Karen Barad, *Meeting the Universe Halfway. Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning* (Durham and London: Duke University Press 2007) p.141.

98 Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, op. cit. p.12.

99 See also: Michel Agier, *Gérer les Indésiderables. Des Camps des Réfugiés au Gouvernement Humanitaire* (Paris: Flammarion 2008); Zygmunt Bauman, 'The Century of Camps', in P. Beilharz (ed.) The Bauman Reader (Oxford: Wyley 2001).

100 http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/refugee-camp.

101 UNHCR applies the term of "camp" to "temporary settlements including planned or self-settled camps, collective centres and transit and return centres established for hosting displaced persons" (Norwegian Refugee Council/Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (NRC/IDMC), *Camp Management Toolkit*, May 2008, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/526f6cde4.html [accessed 9 June 2016].

exception because if the Jungle was to be regarded as an exception, the consequences that stem from this would not be those considered by Agamben. Laws and norms that govern undocumented migration were de facto suspended within the borders of the Jungle so that no one was apprehended when *inside* the camp, but only if caught outside.[102] The paradox of the Jungle was that state surveillance stopped at its borders in a time-space that was suspended. However, the borders were porous and unmarked, so sometimes the state broke in and the pending threat descended upon the makeshift camp in the form of an eviction, tear gas canisters, or administrative controls to shops and restaurants. The paradox was that the Police entered the Jungle only if they were able to put in place the standards of security that their protocol required. This meant, for example, not intervening in emergency situations as they would have done *elsewhere*.[103] The rule of the law was suspended there, at least temporarily, only to be enforced elsewhere. But the limit was neither clear nor permanent. For an undocumented migrant being in the Jungle was safer with respect to her 'illegal' status than wandering in Calais or anywhere else. Federico Rahola makes an interesting argument about the exception of the "form of the camp" by transforming it in excess.[104] The camp, Rahola maintains, is today the heir of colonialism, which project was based on confinement. From its origins in the space of the colonies, until today in contemporary camps, space has been configured as excess, as something that transcends the dichotomy inside/outside, and therefore dealt with by the juridical order *through excess rather than exception* to the rule. In its paradoxical dimension, the Jungle was more 'excess' than it was exception: every occurrence that transcended the normal order had to be treated as an event out of (this) order. For example, when the French state needed to control the access to the piece of land occupied by the makeshift camp, as it happened during the final evacuation in October 2016, it had to issue a by-law that established a 'protection zone', which was accessible only through prior authorisation.[105]

Agamben, like many scholars in his line of argument, refers to any camp from the theoretical framework of the detention camp. This might work in some cases, but for the Jungle and within the context of this work, I prefer to distinguish between camps for confining migrants and *this* camp, for two reasons. First, I think that adopting the internment camp as correlative risks conflating the camp and confined bodies into the same analytical categories. Following Ramadan's reasoning, this approach could have concealed the manifold entanglements that made the Jungle a place of "complex and multiple sovereignties," where different bodies and practices contribute and participate to the making of the legal orderings.[106] In the Jungle,

102 This does not mean that the inhabitants of the Jungle could not exit the encampment. They could get in and out without being questioned at checkpoints, but they ran some risks of being questioned in town or in proximity of sensitive areas, such as the port and the Eurotunnel. To apprehend a migrant outside the camp the police had to either catch her while breaking the law, or dispose of a formal requisition (*Réquisition du Procureur de la République*) specifying time frame and space where the control could be effectuated. Legal activists blamed the police in Calais (and used this as element in trial) for practising ethnic profile out of the law when questioning 'supposed' migrants in the streets. Inside the camp one could be apprehended in case of presumed crime. For example, some people were arrested during the administrative control on shops and restaurants for practising 'illegal commercial activity'.

103 Interview with Gilles Debove, Calais Police Union representative (27 July 2016). The emergence I am referring to is a fight that erupted at the end of may 2016 in the Jungle, where many people were injured and various fires broke out.

104 Federico Rahola, 'La forma campo. Appunti per una genealogia dei luoghidi internamento contemporanei', *Conflitti Globali* 4 (2007): 11-27.

105 'Arrêté portant creation d'une zone de protection à Calais', accessed on 27 October 2016 at http://www.pas-de-calais.gouv.fr/content/download/23980/168537/file/Recueil%20sp%C3%A9cial%20n%C2%B070%20du%2023%20octobre%202016.pdf.

106 Ramadan, 'Spatialising the refugee camp', op. cit. p.67.

"the space allows for greater fluidity and exchange of social relations between non-citizen migrants, French and UK citizens, and residents of Calais," as Kim Rygiel suggests.[107] Such relations made the Jungle a very particular space of porous and temporary reception and restricted the possibilities to delimit it semantically or transform it in a paradigm for other spaces of exclusion.

Second, exclusion was not spatially ascribable to the encampment, for in the Jungle migrants were not detained but were instead detainable and deportable, as they were outside. The Jungle suspended temporarily and spatially their condition, but whenever the Jungle was dismantled or the migrants were apprehended outside its boundaries, they would have remained beyond its 'protecting' power. In this sense, the camp was less the "materialization of the state of exception," or "a localization without order" than the visibilisation of the spatio-temporal suspension of the applicable order. The embodiment of the condition of detainability and deportability of thousands of people trapped in a haven that sooner or later would stop shielding them. As Glenda Garelli and Martina Tazzioli maintain, within both the humanitarian and asylum regime people's lives are governed and controlled well beyond the borders of a camp. In order to grasp the complex relations that map people's mobilities and crystallisations in their mutual unfolding, it is critical to place "the supposedly bordered-space of the camp in a broader economy of governing mechanisms of spatial strandedness and temporal suspension,"[108] including, as I will try to do, territorial and affective elements that produce orderings and control.

Another crucial dimension which might suggest extending the understanding of the Jungle beyond the camp in Agamben's sense, is the one proposed by Papadopoulos, Stephenson, and Tsianos, who argue that the space of the camp is where migrants' speed of circulation is regulated and decelerated.[109] So camps in Europe "are markings on the map of travel, communication and information centres, rest houses and, not infrequently, informal and unregulated credit institutions which act as banks for those on the move."[110] From this standpoint, camps serve the purpose of establishing a regime of control which exploits more the temporal than the spatial dimension, which is mobile, with the aim to contain the excessive movements of migration. This is why a camp such as the Jungle is better understood rhythmically and as *durée* than as the spatial expression of the sovereign power.

5 Exploring orderings conceived as the result of negotiations of bodies' countless encounters entails entering the *territory* of sociomaterial formations, and observing them not as complete objects, but as multiplicities, rhizomes, *assemblages*. In the vocabulary of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, these are entities characterised only by rhizomatic lines that, unlike structure, can connect to any point without following any hierarchy, with neither subject nor object, neither beginning nor end. Multiplicities, or assemblages, are defined by segmentary lines that tend to organise and striate them, and other lines – lines of flight

107 Kim Rygiel, 'Bordering solidarities: migrant activism and the politics of movement and camps at Calais', op. cit. p. 5. Even if this article refers to a settlement put up and then dismantled in 2009 in proximity of the city of Calais, the last Jungle maintained a similar porosity, despite the greater distance from the town centre and the better readability (hence controllability) of its borders.

108 Garelli and Tazzioli, 'Choucha beyond the camp, op. cit.

109 Dimitris Papadopoulos, Niamh Stephenson and Vassilis Tsianos, *Escape Routes. Control and Subversion in the Twenty-first Century* (London, Ann Arbor MI: Pluto Press 2008).

110 Ibid. p.198.

– that push them toward change and transformation, by establishing more connections. The assemblage can also be seen as a method for framing an entity to be studied, if we conceive it "an approach, an orientation to an object that operates as a way of thinking the social, political, economic, or cultural as a relational processuality of composition and as a methodology attuned to practice, materiality, and emergence."[111] In this double sense it is put at work here: as a method, a rhizomatic journey on which I embark theoretically in chapter 1, but also empirically along the whole text; and as concept-tool by which to explore the orderings, the segmentary lines, of the Jungle. The rhizomatic nature of the notion of assemblage is consistent with the kind of power which has been delineated above. The rhizome describes a map, a network, where every point is not determined by its position but by its connections and which configuration is characterised the manifold possibilities it opens up for heterogeneous elements to connect through it. In this sense, within the assemblage we have both the forces that push it toward organisation and order, and those that pull it to the unexpected and the new, towards acts of resistance.

Let us assume that our reality operates through autonomous and spontaneous arrangements of multiple and heterogeneous elements, which might be interconnected or ruptured according to the particular nature of the contingent junction of bodies (and space). The line of the next branching is not pre-determined, nor is the becoming of the self-created arrangement, which can either be blocked by rigid lines – ending up thus temporarily organised and its flows frozen – or free lines of change. The parts of the assemblage, in other words, are not branches of a vertical tree, pieces whose existence and meaning depend hierarchically on a greater whole, with which they are in a necessary, causative relationship. Rather, they are (dis)connected bodies, as though in a complex but horizontal, flat rhizome, that is, an irreducibly heterogeneous multiplicity of bodies where any point may connect to any other. "Assemblages always 'claim' a *territory*, as heterogeneous parts are gathered together and hold together. But this can only ever be a provisional process: relations may change, new elements may enter, alliances may be broken, new conjunctions may be fostered. Assemblages are constantly opening up to new lines of flight, new becomings."[112]

This kind of arrangement, which Deleuze and Guattari call *agencement* and has been translated in English as *assemblage*, is a key concept in the ontology of Deleuze and Guattari. I consider it a strategic tool that allows to look at the Jungle on the basis of its orderings (and lines of flight) and thus to understand how it formed and evolved as a spatial *process* more than a bounded object. The assemblage is "something which happens" between at least two terms that are agents and "brings into play within us and outside us populations, multiplicities, territories, becomings, affects, events."[113] What the assemblage does, and the notion of camp does not, is, through a spatial thinking that is non-Euclidean: to put an emphasis on movements that from gathering can lead to dispersion, think of agency as distributed, understand power as relational and processual rather then central, and underline the role of encounters in the making of the real.

Orderings, from this perspective, emerge as a result of what Deleuze and Guattari call segmentarity, to wit the movement, a sort of inclination of the world toward a stratification,

111 Colin McFarlane, 'The city as assemblage: dwelling and urban space', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 29 (2011): p.652.

112 Ben Anderson and Colin McFarlane, 'Assemblage and Geography', *Area* 43 2 (2011): p.126.

113 Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, *Dialogues* (trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam) (New York: Columbia University Press 1987): p.51.

such as "every rhizome contains lines of segmentarity according to which it is stratified, territorialized, organized, signified, attributed [...]."[114] Both molar and molecular assemblages are composed by segments, which are nevertheless more rigid in the former and more supple in the latter. Life is continuously segmented, either through binary oppositions like class or gender, or by a multiplicity of forces that operate in everyday life and across every assemblage:

> "There are spatial segments – dwellings, territories, public and private domains; temporal segments – habits, memories, schedules, rhythms, disciplines; segmentation of percepts and affects and concepts, of work and play, of personal and family relations."[115]

This PhD is, then, about the segments that organised the Jungle and territorialised it, and (ultimately) the movements of escape from this striation.

6 The territory "is the first thing that constitutes an assemblage," Deleuze and Guattari say.[116] My work starts, in chapter 1, by outlining the territory of the research, setting the first boundaries. In this PhD I have chosen to use a case study as a research method that allows, by focusing on a specific assemblage, to welcome evolution and adapt to the changes that might be imposed by the field. The case study is a process of learning that proceeds through experience and empirical investigation, with a direct engagement of the researcher, who is encouraged to mobilise a rational plan without dismissing affects and emotions. The objective of the chapter is thus to show **how the work of the researcher, the process of acquiring and elaborating knowledge, is inherently connected to the field of study** in many ways. First, the researcher has to build her own territory to get to know her field, that is, she has to proceed by both organising (thus controlling) and creating. The idea of territorial move is at the basis of the discussion of chapter 2, but in chapter 1 is introduced for the first time to set the stage for understanding the relation between power and knowledge. Territory is thus conceived here as a process of knowledge-making that develops through encounters, affective and spatial negotiations, and by setting distances. This point is the opportunity to propose a brief account of an auto-ethnography, through which I explain how I entered the field and how I responded to contingent constraints by changing tactics and also methodology. Second, and related to the former, the process of acquiring knowledge is an embodied one during which the researcher learns through her own body. Put differently, it is through the encounters with other bodies (included the 'body' of the research itself) that the researcher moves forward, or draws back, depending on the encountered body and how this latter impinges on hers. Third, the research starts always *in the middle*, for when the researcher enters the field she is thrown in the middle of things. This means that the researcher must move rhizomatically by following one or more threads that put her in relation to the assemblage-field. This path cannot be completely planned in advance and, especially, can be hardly retraced back, once (partially) completed. Knowledge is thus built piecemeal, without searching for causal relations that cannot be determined.

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114 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus,* op. cit. p.9.

115 William Bogard, 'Sense and Segmentarity: Some Markers of a Deleuzian-Guattarian Sociology', *Sociological Theory* 16 1 (1998): p.68.

116 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus,* op. cit. p.323.

Participant observation has ended up being the principal methodological tool that I adopted in the field: it responded to the need for both an embodied enquiry attentive to the material and affective nature of the field, and a high responsiveness to the unpredictability of a rhizomatic journey. As I explain in chapter 1, the intensity of the moment during which I did my fieldwork – with the imminent, then ongoing, eviction – along with the mobile nature of the field itself and the shortage of time for my enquiry, all together made participant observation the most appropriate technique of research. As part of participant observation, I also empirically practiced the lawscape in the Jungle. The lawscape is the continuum where law and space are co-determined: they ontologically co-exist but they visibilise differently, so that it can happen that one body's movements are controlled by the law without one being aware. Vice versa, the law might be so visible that one feels in prison yet being in an open space. This notion can be put at work in the field by rendering the researcher particularly thoughtful to how bodies move in space and to how 'invisible' laws might direct bodies. The concepts on which I elaborated my theoretical framework and I organised my empirical work have thus emerged by observing and then reflecting upon what had been observed, in a continuous exchange between the two dimensions. And that is how the notions of territory, affect, atmosphere, and crowd have been each both theoretically explored and empirically 'felt' and 'lived' on the ground.

The territory marks the boundaries and the thresholds of this work in chapter 2. The notion of territory lays the foundation of the whole theoretical framework because is the primordial process through which the social emerges out of spatial relations. In this sense, territory is inextricably linked to control and orderings: it is itself an ordering mechanism through which a body (individual or collective) organises itself out of its environment and organises other bodies' spatiality. Chapter 2, thus, elaborates on this notion in order to **understand how territorial movements give rise to orderings and organisational patterns**, and, in particular, how orderings had emerged in the Jungle. In this respect, I first link the territorial operation to the every body's need for a home, by borrowing the Deleuze and Guattari's idea of territory as a refuge that is built out affectively of the body's unknown and hostile milieu. So doing, I am already putting an emphasis on the affective nature of territory, which I elaborate further in chapter 3, and its agentic capacity in producing the social by encouraging the activation of relations and connections. This activation is prompted by the mobile character of territory: territory is not the bound and static geopolitical concept assigned to sovereign power; it is rather the temporary result of a process triggered by the affective exchange that occurs when bodies encounter. The emergence of a territory involves expressiveness, that is, the act of boundary making must be a visible operation of closure: the lawscape of the body that is marking its territory is, at least temporarily, hypervisible to complete its exclusion/inclusion operation. But territory is mobile, it closes and opens, in constant connection to its milieu. As I mentioned, it is a process that develops through movements of territorialisation, deterritorialisation, and reterritorialisation. This means that any territory can emerge and endure, can be dismantled at any time, and eventually stabilise again, elsewhere, only to restart the process in an always different way.

By analysing the Jungle through this lens I show how orderings emerged as a result of the encounters of bodies, their assembling and their territorialising movements. In particular, I show how the Jungle was born out countless negotiations and the attunement of bodies to other bodies' rhythms. In particular, I focus on the territories built by aid groups, the state, and stuff – namely the supplies that flew into the encampment – and their interminglings.

Finally, I guide the reader across multiple territories and emergent orderings, within the flow of a sedentarisation movement that the ever-growing organisation of the encampment boosted. This journey, which starts with the image of home and refuge, continues by emphasising the role of affect in assembling manifold territories and making them coalesce into a collective body, an atmosphere. In chapter 3, after discussing the agentic capacity of affect, I seek to **analyse how the assembling of multiple territories by means of affect and desire generates collective imaginings and an atmosphere, capable of capturing and controlling bodies**. I thus describe first the process through which affect territorialises collectively through imaginaries, thus generating powerful forces that attract, mobilise, and steer bodies. This process is observed in the Jungle, as many territories stuck together through the affective image of the 'refugees'. From the excess of emotional flow that was produced around this image on the one side; and the sense of belonging, hospitality, and community that unfold both materially through the physical building of the makeshift camp, and immaterially through narratives, on the other side, an atmosphere could emerge.

If territory is home, as we have seen in chapter 2, atmosphere in the Jungle was an enveloping bubble engineered by the desire of home and hospitality: the more the Jungle got a permanent character, the more stuff was put into it, the more the desire for home grew. The atmosphere functions by creating an enclosure of which it conceals the borders, and this happened step by step in the Jungle, through a plethora of territorial movements. Once one is caught inside, because one desires it, the separation with the 'outside' is reinforced through the integration inside of what is left outside: this means building a reassuring inside and a threatening (or uninteresting) outside. So doing, the sense of haven develops from the normalisation of the excess from which the atmosphere has emerged, the creation of habit. This is how an atmosphere controls: you do not feel the excess anymore, so you stay comfortable where you are, within the atmosphere.

In the Jungle the consequences of the homely atmosphere were on the side of the political: the political was dismissed from the atmosphere, thus integrated as an inside, that is, as the reproduction and the endurance of the Jungle itself. Politics, and resistance, thus, were to be found in the existence of the encampment, no more options were made available. The atmosphere is a powerful mechanism of control because is not operated centrally by one body, but agency is distributed along lines of desire. Nonetheless, other regimes, whose movements of territorialisation kept migrant people divided and dividuated, were at work, before, during and after the Jungle. Chapter 4 aims to **explore how the atmosphere joined the regime of (im)mobility of the asylum in hampering a complete withdrawal** from oppressive forces in the Jungle. Resistance is conceived here as multiple and not oppositional and thus as resistance to forces that attempt to block desire. In this sense, resistance can be a collective transformational event (a crowd) capable of changing the mode of thinking, like an event which implies the withdrawal from the atmosphere. To understand how this possible line of flight emerges, the temporality of both the atmosphere and the regime of (im)mobility is investigated. On the one side, we have an atmosphere which visibilised only the present time and invisibilised the future, reterritorialising it into a perpetual present. The time of the atmosphere was the present of the habit, of the daily practices, of rhythms and repetition, of the territories that built a home; the indefinite time under which people's lives were suspended and on hold. Future, what was beyond the Jungle, was dissimulated into the eternal present of the Jungle. On the other side, the regime of detainability in which migrant people were captured invisibilised future *beyond* the Jungle, through

deterritorialising movements. Following Simondon and Deleuze, I show how the regimes of (im)mobility, through processes of individualisation and dividuation, were keeping on dividing migrants both spatially, through dispersion, and legally, by turning them into information: the *dividual* case of the asylum process, fingerprints in the Eurodac database. These movements were reproduced in the Jungle, which became a collective body as an atmosphere of the homely, from where a complete withdrawal never came about.

Where was resistance, though? The crowd is a concept advanced here in order to evoke the possibility of bringing about transformation by assembling and individuating collectively: the crowd is an affective event which cannot but generate a new mode of thinking and acting as a result. The Jungle, I argue, never became a crowd, for it potential stock of energy was kept at bay by the orderings and control practices that have been delineated so far. By hindering the possibility of a collective individuation through the above mentioned mechanisms, the atmosphere and the regime of (im)mobility produced a myriad of singular struggles. The responsibility of the impossibility of a collective withdrawal is distributed along the assemblage of the Jungle; however, bodies can be better or worse placed in the assemblage and it is from this position that a body may try to steer the assemblage in the desired direction. For the Jungle the only possible resistance was of another kind: one to be enacted through a temporary withdrawal from the atmosphere, daily acts that attempted at reorienting the lawscape of the (im)mobility regime, the relentless striving for life.

Chapter 1

Affective territories

I was on an exploration of into unknown territory. Worse than unknown, indeed, because the then existing literature on slum districts was highly misleading. It would have been impossible to map out at the beginning the sort of study I eventually found myself doing[117]

I chose Calais as a special setting for understanding how orderings emerge, at the time when the French state was trying to manage a situation that was manifestly getting out of hand. It was August 2015 and the situation in Calais was already being largely covered by European media, included the Italian ones. One of the first coverage of the growing makeshift camp in Calais told the stories of people who were settling down during the day, by building huts and human relations, while trying to cross the Channel at night. I was looking for an empirical case enabling me to observe orderings in the making, in particular I was interested in how flows of energy and intensity are striated and organised by powerful forces. At that time I did not have a political research question in mind and my focus was more on the process through which orderings come into being. When I chanced upon the issue of the improvised settlement in Calais that was filling in through daily arrivals of people, the political dimension appeared as self-evident. The occurrence, as far as I could understand it on the surface, was an ongoing process with the interesting feature of being represented as informal and disorganised.

At the end of August 2015 another element was added that made the new Jungle of Calais an even more appealing case to be studied from the vantage point of the socio-spatial ordering process. The then French Minister of Interior Manuel Valls announced the forthcoming construction of a "humanitarian camp" in Calais, next to the makeshift one and destined to replace it.[118] A closed and controlled camp built and managed by French authorities that would have been realised 'within the Jungle' suggested the possibility of exploring two supposedly antithetical entities unfolding side by side, thus leaving space to challenge dualisms and

117 William Foote Whyte, *Street Corner Society* (Chicago: The University Chicago Press 1955).

118 See at http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/08/31/calais-manuel-valls-annonce-la-construction-d-un-campement-humanitaire-d-ici-2016_4741532_3214.html.

ready-made categories such as formal/informal or spontaneous/organised.[119] Until its dismantlement, and from the Autumn 2015, the state had been increasingly manifesting its influence over the informal camp known as 'the Jungle' by reinforcing security, with the double aim to prevent people from crossing the British borders, and to encourage them to claim asylum in France. On the other side, many different people from all over Europe, but mainly from the UK, had been gathering and contributing to organise life in a space that the Mayor of Calais labelled as "anarchic environment."[120]

I was aware that this would not have been a 'typical' urban case of orderings emerging out of everyday practices and urban encounters. There were everyday practices and encounters in a dense human environment, but the political issue at stake – to wit the arising of a social formation as a result of the gathering of both people on the move *and* people moved by the desire of helping, observing, or learning – was a peculiar backdrop for a study on control and urban orderings. Even more so, for it was not a camp managed by an institution, be it the UNHCR, an international NGO, or a local authority. Nonetheless, its being 'extreme' and exceptional because of its impermanence and intensity would have enabled a productive study in a limited time span. As Bent Flyvbjerg contends in relation to knowledge making from context-dependent cases, "atypical or extreme cases often reveal more information because they activate more actors and more basic mechanisms in the situation studied."[121]

The interest of choosing a single case and make a case study out of it lies in both its singularity and the level of detail that the researcher can achieve. The case study is a research method that focuses on the particular assemblage that produces the context of analysis and from this standpoint is capable of detecting change and evolution precisely because of this attentiveness to the characteristics of the field of inquiry.[122] In the field of public policies, this method includes practices of observation and interaction that all together aim to compose and decompose the complex interrelation of content and expression of the assemblage(s) that are object of analysis and that give sense to how the political problems arise or are formulated. It is an empirical approach that is based mainly in the practical and direct investigation of how social (thus also technical) and spatial entanglements operate, through which relations and with which consequences in terms of exchange, learning, and transformation. In this sense, Francesca Gelli explains, it necessarily requires a deep involvement of the researcher, who must be ready to call into question her hypothesis, her methodology tools, and her assumptions, against the continuous flow of information and knowledge that the field of research generates and might challenge the process of inquiry. "The experience of change is key to this kind of research."[123] As Gelli explains, the case study is not meant to demonstrate a thesis through experimentation, to *prove* something. It is rather best suited to *probe*, that is to gain knowledge and learn through experience and empirical investigation. According to Charles Lindblom, we inquiry following a relentless trial-and-error process that allows us to learn by acting, since we "continue to probe and

119 The forthcoming camp would have been built on the same emplacement of the makeshift camp, next to the Jules Ferry Centre. This choice resulted in the eviction of many tents and shacks that occupied the area allocated to the 'official' camp.

120 Natacha Bouchart, 24 January 2016, at http://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/nord-pas-de-calais/natacha-bouchart-il-est-hors-de-question-d-accepter-cet-environnement-anarchique-911791.html.

121 Bent Flyvbjerg, *Making Social Science Matter. Why Social Inquiry Fails and How it Can Succeed Again* (New York: Cambridge University Press 2001) p.78.

122 Francesca Gelli, *Politica e Politiche. Lo Studio di Caso? Una Domanda di Ricerca* (Milano: Giuffrè editore 2002).

123 Ibid. p.4.

learn in every action we take."[124]

Lindblom adopts *probing* as the most appropriate term to describe the research practice in social science, as "it emphasises persistence and depth of investigation, uncertainty of result, and possible surprise."[125] This way, Lindblom wants to point out the limited capacity and potential of models of rationality in social (and political) investigation. In his view, research is a social activity which mixes rationality and emotion, design and improvisation, but the affective dimension is pivotal in order to acquire knowledge and understand the reality the researcher wants to investigate. Quite interestingly, Lindblom gets to assert that while "cold rationality" is not sufficient to address social issues, "some sensitivity of feeling or affect" is essential and can be only encouraged through interaction.[126] In this framework, the presumed neutrality and objectivity of the researcher is not a lens through which the research can be either arranged or evaluated. Even more so, as Flyvbjerg puts it, if learning is the primordial goal of social investigation, "the proximity to reality which the case study entails and the learning process which it generates for the researcher will often constitute a prerequisite for advanced understanding."[127] All in all, he contends, objectivity is an issue for every research method, but what makes the case study a good method for learning is both the reduced distance between the researcher and the object of investigation, and the greater disposition toward revising points of departure and assumptions along the way.

The case study, Gelli stresses, is not primarily a method for collecting and analysing data. It is rather a methodology for probing and learning. It is processual and it is embodied. Against this backdrop, paraphrasing Nigel Thrift, I will take both the process and the body seriously.[128] This implies that, as I explain below in detail, the hindrances and constraints that I encountered unexpectedly, as a result of my commingling with the assemblage of both human and non-human bodies that was my field, made me adapt by both rethinking about the centre of my interest and circumscribing my methodological tools.

1.1 (the will to know) the Jungle

My plan, when organising my fieldwork, was to use participant observation and semi-structured interviews to observe and account for how control mechanisms, patterns and movements operate on the ground, how space had been emerging as a result, and what kind of space one could encounter. However, I was rather convinced since the beginning that to produce knowledge differently – as the poststructuralist critique has been urging on for a while – I needed to be open to redefine the "linear narrative of knowledge production in research methodology" that goes from employing methods, producing data, coding and analysing them, and finally developing theories, and be ready to "learn to live in the middle of things, in the tension of conflict and confusion and possibility."[129]

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124 Charles E. Lindblom, *Inquiry and Change. The Troubled Attempt to Understand and Shape Society* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press 1990) p.30.

125 Ibid. p.7.

126 Ibid.

127 Flyvbjerg, *Making Social Science Matter,* op. cit. p.84.

128 Nigel Thrift, 'Afterwords', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 18 3 (2000): 213–55.

129 Elisabeth Adam St. Pierre, 'Methodology in the fold and the irruption of transgressive data' *International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education* 10 (2) 1997: p.176. As St. Pierre reports, Foucault, Butler and Derrida had called into question what it is taken for granted in knowledge production and the need for a redefinition of our

When I started the fieldwork, I did not have a precise theoretical articulation for the forms of control I was about to investigate. My main thesis suggested that I would have found orderings everywhere, but I did not know what to expect. I wanted to look for any possible form of control coming from and directed to *any* body. Control, in my earlier conceptualisations, was the result – on one body's agency and one's capacity of affecting or being affected – of a differential in power relations. Two bodies encounter: they react according to how their capacities of affecting and being affected are expressed in that precise event, and in relation to the specific body they are running into. With this theoretical positioning I approached the field.

I got stunned to realise from the very first moment to what extent control could be widespread in any direction I was looking at. Control was all over, and, undeniably, it was all over me too. I was part of the same milieu as all the other bodies in the Jungle, and in order to carry out my inquiry I needed to multiply my encounters. So doing I was keeping on building my own territory like any other body. And while marking my territory, finding a way of communicating my presence to the others, thus "becoming part of a collective atmosphere," I was observing other bodies building their own territories.[130]

Processes of territorialisation activate when heterogeneous bodies engage directly and expressively with others, when they enter in a mutual relationship and compose with others. When heterogeneous elements assemble (meeting people, using objects, collecting information, and so on and so forth), a process is set in motion that "both necessitates and relies on the generation of continuous knowledge (of self, of milieu and of the link between them, if one were pedantic enough to separate them), itself unfolding on a busy spatiality of material movements."[131] In this perspective, territorialisation indicates what we can do when we need to make a move in order to select relevant information from our milieu. Put differently, the process of territory-formation is in itself one of creation, distinction, and organisation: through it we produce the knowledge we require in order to keep on controlling our territory. Or, as Foucault argued, we cannot separate the goals of power from the goals of knowledge, since in knowing we control and in controlling we know.[132] Through our knowledge-creation practices we act upon the bodies with which we relate, and by doing so, we can observe what they are capable of under these stimuli.[133] In the field, collecting information means acquiring knowledge that the researcher will analyse later. In a field such as the Calais Jungle, where I was about to observe how bodies relate to each other, my body was the key medium of knowledge and my inquiry could not be but embodied. As Daniel Cefaï maintains, the body, through the senses, is the main tool of the researcher who aims to explore the field ethnographically, that is through one's own direct engagement. It is so that "the affective body, the sensitive body, the mobile body, and the body-face, are the different vectors of an experience, which will be then transformed into ethnographic knowledge."[134] It began immediately: as soon as I got in contact with the

epistemologies in order to be able to describe the world anew.

130 Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 'Milieu, Territory, Atmosphere: New Spaces of Knowledge' in A. Cusinato, A. Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos (eds.) *Knowledge-creating Milieus in Europe* (Berlin Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag 2016).

131 Ibid. p.84.

132 Gary Gutting, 'Michel Foucault' Edward N. Zalta (ed.) *The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy* (May 2013) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/foucault/

133 Bryant, *The Democracy of Objects*, op. cit.

134 Daniel Cefaï, '¿Que es la etnografia? Primera parte. Arraigamientos, operaciones y experiencias de la encuesta', *Persona y sociedad*, enero-abril XVII, 1 (2013): p.107. Available at http://personaysociedad.cl/ojs/index.

context of my exploration I had to conceptualise the territorialising movements of which I was both witness and key player through my own body.

My encounter with the field was one of such intensity it overmastered me. This should have come without surprise. As researchers, "social animals," we might expect that feeling "a stranger in world completely unknown" would bring a load of challenging feelings, impose sudden changes, repeatedly call into question the direction to take, and what sense to make of our observing experience.[135] This duly happens and we may be led to wonder what to do with the affective side of a research. The researcher can decide whether to include it either as the account of her encounter with the field, a way to tell which impact the exchange with other bodies had on her own; or to explain how blending with the field helped her acquire what knowledge. Or both. But what is this affective event about? The puzzling sensation results from the traces that other bodies leave on us. A gaze that creeps you out. Cold wind that freezes fingers. Unintelligible whispered foreign words that make you anxious. The collision is unavoidable at one's first encounter with a field which is unfamiliar, and it might convey what Spinoza reported as inadequate ideas, those one must not stop at. [136] Inadequate, because they emerge as the result of the affective reaction arising ceaselessly when a body acknowledges other bodies merely through the effects the encounter brings forth on it.[137] It can be a very physical reaction, but it is not limited to that. It can follow the contact with other bodies that affect me disagreeably: my hands unable to write because of the chill; weary limbs after walking for hours; sickness for being exposed to chemical gas or the loathsome smell of human fluids. Inadequate, because these (fragmented) encounters bring forth passions, that is to say, from a Spinozan-Deleuzian perspective, negative affections that prevent me from getting access to knowledge, if one settles with them.[138] Such affections inform me that I have changed in response to an event, but they do not provide me with an insight of what happened between the encountered body and me. Even so, these inadequate (because incomplete) ideas may impact the fieldwork to a certain extent, in that they can determine some minor changes in our movements of territorialisation: whether accepting the invitation for a cup of tea to recover from freezing; or heading back home instead of persisting in hanging around; or avoiding distasteful situations. The fieldwork is sprinkled with such collisions and following reactions. Giving account of these become part of the inquiry, for the researcher's approach to both the definition of the problem and the methodological outline cannot be separated from her mode to experience the field. It is so that the situated and embodied experience of the fieldwork, where the body is the medium and the tool of the researcher, the 'border becomes the method': "the body is finite and situated: it occupies space, it has perspectives, it understands what is happening as of here and now. It is involved in both verbal and non-verbal interactions. It is the place where experiences form."[139] Put differently, whereas the body has its own agency in the fieldwork and is source both of knowledge and action in the same plane of other bodies, its becoming

php/pys/article/viewFile/101/61.

135 Whyte, *Street Corner Society*, op. cit. pp.279, 289

136 Deleuze, *Cours sur Spinoza, 24 January 1978*, http://www.webdeleuze.com/php/texte.php?cle=14&groupe=Spinoza&langue=2. Deleuze recalls that for Spinoza if we stop at the traces on our bodies, if we do not try to understand 'what a body can do', what a body is capable of and why my body reacts in a certain way to an encounter, we do not form adequate idea, we do not build knowledge.

137 Deleuze, *Cours sur Spinoza, 24 January 1978*, op. cit. "An affection is the following: it's a state of a body insofar as it is subject to the action of another body".

138 Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, op. cit.

139 Cefaï, '¿Que es la etnografia? Primera parte. Arraigamientos, operaciones y experiencias de la encuesta', op. cit. p.108.

(in) the field of the inquiry follows the territorial logic of the encounter.

As Andrea Brighenti argues, "the very production and accumulation of knowledge is a territorial move."[140] The territorial move towards knowledge is a process that passes through encounters, thresholds as spaces of negotiation, and finding 'the good distance'. Dwelling the thresholds is a crucial step in the territorialising movement that enables the researcher to situate her own body in the field. A threshold is the space-time block where the distance between the body and the environment is fixed and knowledge can be built. It is a liminal condition that "mediate(s) a relationship with otherness" and "acquires its meaning as a point of both contact and separation through the practices that cross it," as Stavros Stavrides holds it.[141] The threshold is what in the territorial process negotiates affectively with otherness, which, in a fieldwork, is what enters in relation with the researcher: the field, encountered bodies, one's own experience, one's own and others' desires. The threshold is what Gilbert Simondon would identify as the eternal passage from the preindividual to the individual, a passage that is never achieved and which inexorable push is assured by the affective flow between bodies.[142] "The push that keeps the world rolling other; the energy that fuels change; the work of transformation,"[143] is the force that passes through every encounter, namely affect.

So territory is (also) affective and people are not affected the same way. What is convenient for me, what makes me feel good and connects me to action, it might easily not correspond another person, or vice versa. In the space of the threshold that the researcher dwells it is possible to observe how bodies affect each other. Having access to this knowledge is a step further than merely acknowledging the effects that another body has on mine. It represents a means for understanding bodies "in terms of their capacities for engagement with the powers of other bodies."[144] In the context of this work, I purport that apprehending how affects work may enable the researcher to say something about power relations. Indeed, it has social and political implications. After all, if the possibility to get the perception of what affects me or affects any other body is the way toward (affective) knowledge about power, we can do no other than understanding the world and ourselves "by the affections that the external bodies produce on our own."[145]

The relevance of the role of affects (and emotions) in cognition and in our mode of grasping the world has been emphasised by many recent works in different disciplinary fields over the last twenty years.[146] As we will see, if we recognise that bodies move and feel at the same time, and through this moving-feeling process they change, we must accord a special place to the embodied and affective experience of the social researcher.[147] We need to accept the idea that a significant proportion of every human action is not conscious and is rationalised

140 Andrea Mubi Brighenti, 'On Territorology. Toward a general science of territory' Theory, Culture and Society 27 (1) 2010: p.57.

141 Stavros Stavrides, *Towards the City of Thresholds* (professionaldreamers 2010) p.81 and p.16.

142 Gilbert Simondon, *L'Individuation à la Lumière des Notions de Forme et d'Information* (Grenoble: Editions Millon 2005).

143 Thrift, 'Afterwords', op. cit. p.216.

144 Paul Patton, *Deleuze and the Political,* op. cit. p.78.

145 Deleuze, *Cours sur Spinoza* 24 January 1978, op. cit.

146 John Protevi, *Political Affect. Connecting the Social and the Somatic* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 2009).

147 Brian Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual. Movement, Affect, Sensation* (Durham and London: Duke University Press 2002).

only at a later stage. The analytical process of a fieldwork is not a linear one and "ideas grow up in part out of our immersion in the data and out of the whole process of living,"[148] whereby living entails a never-ending process of becoming, passing from an emotional status to another one, and experimenting difference – "the methodology of life."[149]

1.2 The research-tuber (how I settled in the field)

I stayed in Calais for my fieldwork from the 14 of February to the 16 of March 2016. The day I left Italy, the 12 of February, the Prefecture of Nord-Pas-de-Calais issued an injunction that announced the forthcoming demolition of the southern part of the makeshift camp known as the Jungle. The injunction gave 10 days of delay before the beginning of the operations of dismantlement, so in the meantime the humanitarian organisations that assisted migrants in the Jungle announced that they would appeal in the administrative Court of Lille against the partial eviction. In court, the 22 of February, the aid groups (along with 250 signatory migrants) lost the appeal and the demolition began on the 29 of February. These events changed substantially my fieldwork. Not the events themselves, but the situation they gave rise to in the field, and how they affected people, their mood and their action subsequently. First, the uncertainty of the trial and the pending dismantlement, later the on-going demolition and the hectic relocation of shacks and caravans from the area under eviction to the safe one in the north: my four weeks on the field flowed in an environment completely different than I expected. It soon became evident that it would have been hard to talk and meet people as I had planned to do, because volunteers and humanitarian professionals were either very busy or very reticent; and the massive presence of the media made of me just one more intrusive questioner. I had always the impression that the moment was not the right one to make an interview, or even to ask for an appointment. It was a matter of gazes, bodily movements, facial expressions, and atmosphere. It was fully a matter of affects.

The makeshift camp had grown fast since April 2015 by the time of my fieldwork in February 2016. When local authorities evicted refugees from the city and let them settle in the ex-dump that became 'the jungle', at the beginning there was just a bunch of French local volunteers on site trying to help out with some food and basic items. During summer, and especially since the end of August 2015, many British volunteers poured in, three big French NGOs arrived,[150] and the humanitarian aid machine was set in motion quickly and efficiently.[151]

L'*Auberge des Migrants* is the main reference for aid in Calais, it is consulted by local authorities, it is contacted by all those who want to visit the Jungle, be them journalists, independent volunteers, prospective volunteers, researchers, and students. It exists since

148 Whyte, *Street Corner Society,* op. cit. p. 280.

149 Elizabeth Grosz, 'Bergson, Deleuze and the Becoming of Unbecoming', *Parallax* 11 (2) 2005: p. 6. Experiencing difference on the field means not reducing reality to dualisms or unities, but understanding it as generating even more variation and difference.

150 Médecins sans Frontières, Médecins du Monde, and Acted.

151 http://www.tdg.ch/monde/europe/La-course-a-la-generosite-dans-la-jungle-des-migrants/story/15924525; http://www.streetpress.com/sujet/1434461906-calais-migrants-humanitaires-en-greve; http://www.calaidipedia.co.uk/the-uk-grassroots-movement; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/12/help-refugees-calais-accidental-activists?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other

2009, but it has completely evolved in September 2015 with the arrival of British people in the mood for help. As it is stated in their by now obsolete website, "the Auberge used to serve eight hundred hot meals three days a week. We were around ten people working to help refugees. These were about one thousand and occupied eight squats and small 'jungles' scattered all over Calais, from the port to the tunnel. (...) Today [January 2016] 6000 refugees survive in just one jungle [and] the Auberge serves two thousands meals every day, distributes vans full of donations every week in a very organised manner, it has been building 650 shelters in ten weeks, and keeps on distributing surviving kits to the most vulnerable refugees" (my translation). In August 2015 a group composed by three young British women working in the creative industry (radio, music, fashion) and with broadly connected social networks, launched a campaign on twitter to collect some supplies for the camp in Calais, thus supporting a friend of hers who was going there to deliver some stuff he had been collecting by himself. The response they received was so huge and fast they had to manage quickly a storehouse in London, volunteers in London and in Calais, logistics and communication. In a few days they set up a crowdfunding page, a wishlist on Amazon website in a couple of weeks, and the following month they had built a partnership with L'Auberge des Migrants to manage a warehouse in Calais for storing, sorting and distributing donations. In October 2015 they registered as a charity and are so far working on 26 projects across Europe under the name of *Help Refugees*.[152]

While planning my fieldtrip to Calais, my idea was to volunteer for a while with the main aid organisation on site, with the aim of approaching the camp from this perspective. I thought it would have been easier that way. Having been a humanitarian worker myself in the past, I imagined it a smooth and simple way of entering the volunteering machine, one that would have then worked as an oiled mechanism for me to stay in the Jungle as an insider. So this is what I did. What I experienced instead destabilised me. The daily management of the Franco-British humanitarian organisation L'Auberge des Migrants-Help Refugees was entrusted to a group of young long-term volunteers mainly from the UK, who distributed assignments based on criteria that were unfathomable and disempowering for me, who was there for a different purpose than just volunteering. I felt as I was under their control – and I actually was – with no many options as to escape from it except than leaving.

On my first day as a volunteer I arrived early for the morning meeting and was able to observe the incessant movement of people in and out the warehouse. Newbies were clearly recognizable by their stillness and their lost gazes. The meeting was held by a girl who invited prospective volunteers to gather in a circle and do some stretching exercises. This request made me feel uncomfortable, probably because it reminded me of the kind of rituals I had to follow when I was twelve and I was a girl scout. Or maybe I simply felt out of place: older than the average of those present and with other goals than just volunteering for a good cause. Yes, it was cold and, yes, there was the need to create a cheerful atmosphere, and still I found it odd. That day the leading girl asked who among us had been a scout and on that basis I was tasked with checking donated tents together with two women from London. My two partners were in Calais just for the weekend and wanted to visit the camp, so I witnessed them striving to avoid the assigned task that would have confined them in the warehouse for the whole day, and finally obtaining to join a group in the Jungle. I followed

152 http://www.helprefugees.org.uk/how-we-started/; https://www.theguardian.com/voluntary-sector-network/2015/oct/01/helpcalais-how-a-hashtag-grew-into-a-social-movement-to-support-refugees; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/12/help-refugees-calais-accidental-activists.

them without knowing what to expect, ending up cleaning some areas from rubbish by hand (with gloves), often under the doubtful gaze (as it seemed to me) of the people of the Jungle. The second day I was sent to the warehouse to organise boxes filled with clothing. With almost no idea of what I was doing, I just tailgated a French guy who looked as if he knew. That day I nonetheless had the chance to be in the right place at the right moment and could assist in the warehouse to a conference press held by the representatives of the main French aid organisations on the field. They were announcing in front of the French local media their decision to appeal in court against the injunction over demolition. My big chance was to meet Maya, a French middle-aged volunteer who looked very familiar with the media and whom I asked if I could take part to meetings amongst volunteers. I did not know, at that time, that I was obtaining access to a very interesting stage. In fact, when I spoke to Maya I was just interested in assisting to aid groups' weekly meetings. What I got access to was another story. I did not know that organisational meetings were being held in the Jungle between resident volunteers and some migrants.

I went to my first meeting the same evening of my encounter with Maya, on the 22 of February. It took place in one of the huts that constituted the Jungle Books Library, basically a 30-40 square metres reading room equipped with chairs, tables and a stove. Being the first time for me in the Jungle at night, getting there by myself and having to park far away from the entrance of the camp to avoid getting fined by the police, I felt uneasy. Would it have been dangerous to go in the camp with the dark? Would I have found the place in the indistinguishable tangle of shacks? Maya simply told me that I would have found it easily and to call her if I got lost. When I arrived to Jungle Books, safely, I saw a few people talking outside the hut. Among them, a blond young guy stopped me and asked with his inquisitive gaze what I was there for. I felt uncomfortable as if I was really out of place, once again. Fortunately, it was Maya who had invited me and, with her name as laissez-passer, I was let in. Still an outsider, but a little less so. Since that first time, I attended several meetings, until no meeting was held anymore (last one the 9 of March).

On the third day of my experience at the warehouse, a new girl was sorting the volunteers into groups of work, following a different but still unfathomable principle. She asked who had been there for at least three days and already been to the camp, so I raised my hand and I joined a group. I headed toward the group of people who had just been appointed, but the girl decided that they needed only five people and I was in excess, being me the sixth one. She was so blunt that two veteran volunteers felt obliged to apologize in her behalf, one by saying that they would have loved me anyway; the other one whispering that I was lucky in the end, because that group was going to collect the rubbish in the camp. So I went for the sorting task. That day would have been the last one of me pretending to be a volunteer and thereafter it would have been just me, a researcher in Calais. My main constraint was time, which I did not have much. I could not wait to become an 'experienced' volunteer, a long-term presence, before I was allowed to provide aid in the camp. At the same time, I found it difficult to escape the mechanism of the aid organisation where everybody was so proud and excited for being there to "change the world"[153] and to confess them that my purpose was not to 'help' but to study, investigate, probe. With the eviction approaching and the looming spectre of chaos to come, I then resolved to change of tactics. "Try again. Fail again.

153 Quote from the video 'People helping People: the Umbrella' at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GYI2gmjcGDI, minute 4'48.

[10]

[11]

Figure 10. Inside the warehouse of L'Auberge des Migrants-Help Refugees. Source: the author

Figure 11. Press conference of the local aid organisations (22 February 2016). Source: the author

Fail better."[154]

The state of affairs (my marginalisation in the volunteer 'family' – as they called it, great apprehension among volunteers in relation to the eviction, and the fasted-pace succession of events) persuaded me to change of plan and strategy. I had just made what William F. Whyte calls a "false start," one that made me feel "ill at ease" as an impostor.[155]

I decided that I would have just gone to the Jungle and observed what was going on there, whereas instead of coming up to people as a questioner, I would have had informal cross talks on site. I actually did some more formal interviews, but in the end they have been, as expected, less revealing than extemporary chats. Having informal chats rather then formal interviews was not a planned and by default decision. It was the only option available at that moment in the Jungle. Again, if I could spend several months on the field I would have given myself the time to make people trust me and talk to me spontaneously and free from filters to mediate our encounters. I had to face two main constraints: first, with no much time on my side I could not expect to get acquainted and build confidence with those who had been there for a long time and had established strong connections and been creating well bounded and fortified territories. Second, the uncertainty and chaos generated by the first eviction made most conversations both rhetorical and misplaced. In the end, I also conducted several formal interviews, when I evaluated that casual talks would have been unlikely to happen. With 'formal' I mean an interview that I have prepared, during which I sat down with someone whom I had arranged an appointment earlier on. These arrangements were made usually by mail, by phone or in person, directly with the interviewee. In one circumstance I had to set up the meeting through the communication officer because I was not able to find a straight way to get in contact with my target.

Also, my positioning as researcher was problematic. When dealing with some volunteers, who perceived themselves as those who were "making the difference" in the middle of a humanitarian crisis, I felt judged as being of little or no help.[156] When discussing with the inhabitants of the Jungle I felt quite often guilty of being there to 'take advantage' of the crisis for my personal research purposes. During the time spent there I was always distressed about my presence, my role, and my scope. In this sense, I knew that I would have liberated myself from those bad affects only if I could finally build a political positioning. Connected with this, there was the ethical dimension of my work. I did no one audio recording of my verbal exchanges. I instead took notes and several videos of extemporaneous events, but not many pictures. The massive presence of professional journalists and photographers, and their inevitable intrusiveness, put on the practice of photography a heavy charge of bad affects. For this reason in this work I also make use of visual documents not of my own. I understand here ethics in a Spinozan-Deleuzian perspective, that is, as I explained in the introduction to this work, as the direction and the affective result that an encounter makes to happen. In this sense, from an ethical point of view, audio recording would have introduced a medium between me and my interlocutor which would have fixed the affects and frozen the emotions' flow. In many cases, the gestures of pulling out the recorder (my phone,

154 Samuel Beckett, Westward ho! (London: John Calder Publishers 1987), cited in J. D. Dewsbury, 'Performative, Non-Representational, and Affect-based Research', in Dydia DeLyser, Steve Herbert, Stuart Aitken, Mike Crang, and Linda McDowell (eds.) *The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Geography* (London: Sage Publications 2010) p.321.

155 Whyte, *Street Corner Society,* op. cit. p. 288.

156 The narrative of "making a difference" was the most used in videos and posts on the social medias as a cry for more help on site when volunteers were lacking.

in this case) and turning it on, would have established a new stage of the conversation. And the encounter would have taken a different direction. Not a better or worse one, but probably a more affectively controlled one.

And then, the demolition of the southern area of the camp began, on the 29 of February, with a massive presence of the police in riot gear. The first day there were protests, turmoil, fires, stone-throwing, and teargas. Not necessarily in this sequence. The following days the demolition proceeded in a relatively calm mood, except for the almost daily fires, and consequent bedlam. As soon as the volunteers realised that the eviction was unavoidable (that is, on the first day...) they started organising the transfer of caravans and shacks from south to north: an hectic activity that went on for the entire period of my fieldwork and somehow accelerated the demolition itself, with the help of occasional fires of which the police usually was blamed for by volunteers and young Afghan migrants were called guilty by French authorities.

My fieldwork having turned into participant observation exclusively, I resolved to be in the Jungle every day, following extemporary threads, meeting people, exchanging thoughts, and being captured by the flow of events. This meant sometimes surrendering to the eventfulness of the flow, sometimes moving on purpose, and sometimes wandering around aimlessly. I had to let myself, my milieu and my fieldwork transform under the force of affects, in order to travel the road along many others, of turning myself into a part of the Jungle itself. In other words, my exploration would have been carried out through the relations I engaged with the Jungle, in search for alliances that would help my work and enhance my possibilities for observation. What exactly would I look for? How would I give account of my experience? How would I produce knowledge?

Since the beginning, I decided that I would have employed participant observation in the fieldwork and built a theoretical framework to help me understand that world and position myself politically. The two processes proceeded in parallel and I could not help but letting myself be caught into the folds of the Jungle and forgot my role there from time to time, being just me, in the middle of a huge struggle.[157]

For both practice and theory I embarked on a rhizomatic journey, following threads, breakouts, and connections. The *researcher-tuber*. This take entails at least three consequences. First, it implies that the research must start in the middle. It could not be otherwise. In a rhizomatic understanding of the real, encounters, events, and arrangements of bodies emerge in the middle and it is not possible to trace a linearity of cause-effect between two events. For a rhizome, unlike a tree, is not structured, it "has always multiple entryways," it has neither beginning nor end, since "the beginning always begins in-between, intermezzo."[158] In this respect, "to begin in the middle [...] is hardly a beginning. Rather, it is the moment in which one discovers that one has been 'thrown-in', without trace of original momentum that can be linked to one's situation in any causal way," and one is obliged to connect oneself with the stems of the real, without expecting to re-arrange hierarchically a world which is multiple and itself connected with other worlds, for "one finds oneself right in the middle

157 In particular, when it happened that I could establish closer relationships with some residents of the Jungle, I started questioning about my presence there, my role as a privileged person with the right documents, and how I could possibly help.

158 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit.

of things, surrounded by a movement that cannot be controlled."[159]

The impossibility of total control does not mean that the researcher is at the mercy of events, or that she has to be worried about her being in the middle. Deleuze reassures us about the middle: "what matters on a path, what matters on a line, is always the middle, not the beginning or the end. We are always in the middle of a path, in the middle of something."[160] The researcher should just be aware that for every piece of information she has access to, there is a countless number which remains hidden, as if they were stems of grass growing underneath the soil. The researcher is not confronted with a root-shaped reality that she can trace by following the branches from the start point to the end. She pragmatically enters in the middle, accessing one of the multiple entryways that constitute the range of possibilities for connecting with the world she wants to explore.

The second consequence is the blurring of boundaries. The rhizomatic journey does not search for roots, rather it strives for putting every element of its multiple dimensions on the same plane: "lived events, historical determinations, concepts, individuals, groups, social formations."[161] In so doing, boundaries between heterogeneous elements are erased and the lines that compose the rhizome might proliferate unhindered. These hazy boundaries include also disciplinary distinctions, accepted models of thesis writing, and the subjectivity/objectivity of the researcher. As St Pierre puts it, if the dualism is broken, then subjectivity has no inside or outside. Hence, the boundary, the division, and the violent binary partition disappear.[162] To empirically blur boundaries I decided, as I have already mentioned, to avoid being a questioner, but rather an observer. Yet, it was the only option I had to reconcile time and the demands of the field. After about ten days on the field, my presence was seen as familiar by most of the people I used to exchange with. On the other side, I was careful of making linkages between heterogeneous elements that I understood as control mechanisms and practices: be them codes, movements, or discourses. Boundaries do not cease to exist once we have built our territory. Yet, a territory can always been deterritorialised, or it can enter other territories, so that distinctions and distances may change.

The third consequence is both theoretical and empirical. Understanding reality rhizomatically has forced me to look out for empowering or undermining connections, *agencements*, and encounters. I did it for myself as a researcher, but especially to avoid settling with narratives and overarching explications of control. It was me, as a part of that particular *agencement*, who mapped the rhizome. So the rhizome I mapped for this thesis emerges from the path I personally chose to follow, "a trail that may connect to other trails, diverge around blockages or disappear completely," and that "is never completely re-traceable."[163]

I deemed participant observation to be the appropriate method for this rhizomatic endeavour, for two main reasons. First, because unlike other methods that aim to identify structures and macrosystems, such quantitative analysis or even qualitative methods based mainly on interviews, "ethnography acknowledges the existence of a fundamental

159 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 'Milieu, Territory, Atmosphere: New Spaces of Knowledge', op. cit. p.80.

160 Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues (trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam) (New York: Columbia University Press 1987) p.28.

161 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus,* op. cit. p.9.

162 St. Pierre, 'Methodology in the fold and the irruption of transgressive data', op. cit. p. 178.

163 Eileen Honan, 'Writing a rhizome: an (im)plausible methodology' *International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education,* 20 5 (2007): p.535.

phenomenon of porosity of the social."[164] Ethnographic observation enables the researcher to make (some of) the multiple lines of the rhizomatic reality visible through specific procedures of visibilization. These procedures include "finding means by which to render visible the spatial (and temporal) patterns within which we encounter, are encountered by, other bodies, other forms of embodiment," for instance, mapping the flows of in/visibilisation by detecting the modes, the moods, the velocities, the gazes, the narratives, the animosity, the language, the codes, the forcefulness, and so on.[165] To this purpose, I have decided to adopt a *lawscaping* approach, which I discuss in the following paragraph. Secondly, if we agree that knowledge in the field of social sciences is always situated and we, as researchers, are embodied in the same space we want to know – thus taking part in its construction – ethnographic observation makes us delve into the challenges of being close to the eventfulness of space and observing the unfolding of its chaotic relations. Ultimately, I agree with Brighenti when he contends that ethnographers "will not have to deal with structures, functions or social systems. Rather they will find themselves confronted 'just' with a becoming that, taken as a whole, with its temporary velocities and its contingent ecological nebula, is chaos or (...) *plenum*. In respect to this chaos, the observational task for the ethnographer could be described as an attempt to 'slow down' the events, in order to visibilise the connections, series, and links that cross the *plenum*."[166]

Ethnography is a form of qualitative research that resorts to a variety of methods and techniques to collect information on the field, but "participant observation is perhaps the defining method that distinguishes ethnography from other qualitative research designs," thanks to the direct and incarnated relation the researcher establishes with the field.[167] Research through ethnographic participation is therefore the result of how the researcher encounters the otherness of its field of investigation and how she is able to negotiate with it her presence and her willing to know. In the context of this work, 'otherness' was neither the people of the Jungle nor the volunteers. It was neither the police nor the French institutions. Rather, it was the entanglement of those human bodies with other material and immaterial bodies that all together constituted the fluid body of the Jungle. It was by plunging into the Jungle that I attempted to understand this assemblage.

There is one more point that makes ethnography the best-suited practice for a research which is focused on embodied movements of control, power, and politics. It is its capacity to accommodate the affective dimension of experience and perception. Academic debate has being enriched in the last decade by theoretical investigation around affects, senses, emotions, and their implication in knowledge-production and empirical methods. These approaches look out for new forms of exploration and ways for knowledge-production that do not endorse any specific kind of method, but are open to experimentation.[168] The vision of Sarah Pink, which I endorse, is coherent with a rhizomatic understanding of the world, as she defines ethnography as "a process of creating and representing knowledge (about

164 Andrea M. Brighenti 'L'osservazione etnografica', in A. Cancellieri and G. Scandurra (eds.) *Tracce Urbane. Alla ricerca della città* (Milano: Franco Angeli editore 2012): p. 269 (my translation).

165 Nathan Moore and Anne Bottomley, 'Law, Diagram, Film: Critique Exhausted', *Law and Critique* 2012 23(2): 163–182, cited in Philippopulos-Mihalopoulos, *Spatial Justice*, op. cit. p. 99.

166 Brighenti, 'L'osservazione etnografica', op. cit p. 268 (my translation, original emphasis).

167 Annette Watson and Karen E. Till, 'Ethnography and Participant Observation', in Dydia DeLyser, Steve Herbert, Stuart Aitken, Mike Crang, and Linda McDowell (eds.) *The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Geography* (London: Sage Publications 2010) p.122.

168 Sarah Pink, *Doing Sensory Ethnography* (London: Sage Publications 2009).

society, culture and individuals) that is based on ethnographers' own experiences. It does not claim to produce an objective or truthful account of reality, but should aim to offer versions of ethnographers' experiences of reality that are as loyal as possible to the context, negotiations and intersubjectivities through which the knowledge was produced."[169] With an approach *à la* Merleau-Ponty, Pink sees the ethnographic project as the being-in-the-world of the researcher that activates all the senses in the effort to give a direction to her emplacement. The researcher is often unprepared to tackle the field: on one side one can never be fully ready to deal with the unpredictability of an ethnographic fieldwork; on the other side, (partial) unpreparedness is rich in potential. Following Pink, the multisensoriality which the researcher must be able to grasp is something that emerges throughout the encounters with the field and includes undergoing a variety of sensory experiences that might bring fortuitous and unexpected elements of knowledge. In a similar vein, Ash and Gallacher interpret the embodied relation of the researcher with the field of study in terms of *attunement*, which is "the capacity to sense, amplify, and attend to difference" that enables her "to appreciate and understand the complex material forces that structures situations beyond the envelop of human emotion."[170] In their account, they refer to vibration as a concept that helps reveal the possibilities for the researcher of paying attention to what happens at thresholds, where the encounter between bodies produces a resonance that can be captured through senses. Vibration is particularly interesting because it recalls *la résonance* to which Simondon refers when speaking of the liminal condition between the individual and its environment.[171] This vibration is what enables the system of each individual (body) to enter in relation with the environment, with 'otherness', and thus to participate entirely to its unfolding. By the same token we can use the notion of imagination as the affective junction that is, as we will see in chapter 3, a mechanism at the heart of how affects are channelled and, from a methodological perspective, can become a tool through which one gets attuned to a context of research. Imagining, following Pink, is an everyday practice that can become shared and collective. Acquiring the capacity to align oneself, to *attune* with how bodies in the field move, sense, and imagine, can give the researcher a key to a deeper understanding of how the assemblage she is interested in is constituted.[172] The importance of entering in resonance with the field's imagining relies on its being, as Arjun Appadurai has also noted, "a fuel for action,"[173] a productive force, in Spinoza's thought, which "courses throughout all of reality."[174]

Once collected, information must be elaborated and, following the same empirical approach, the outcome of the fieldwork – in the form of notes, collected materials from internet, photos, videos, etc. – can be thought through and written down both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically means that concepts that emerged during the fieldwork, by observing and living the Jungle, then needed to be worked through and reflected upon as to make sense of an experience that was also affective and atmospheric. Deleuze and Guattari see concepts

169 Sarah Pink, *Doing Visual Ethnography* (London: Sage 2007) p.18.

170 James Ash and Lesley Anne Gallacher, 'Becoming Attuned: Objects, Affects, and Embodied Methodology', in Mia Perry and Carmen Liliana Medina (eds.) *Methodologies of Embodiment. Inscribing Bodies in Qualitative Research* (New York and London: Routledge 2015) p.73.

171 Simondon, *L'Individuation à la Lumière des Notions de Forme et d'Information,* op. cit.

172 Pink, *Doing Sensory Ethnography*, op. cit.

173 Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large. Cultural Dimensions of Globalisation* (Minneapolis, MN and London: University of Minnesota Press 1996) p.7.

174 Antonio Negri, *The Savage Anomaly. The Power of Spinoza's Metaphysics and Politics* (Trans. Michael Hardt) (Minneapolis and Oxford: University of Minnesota Press 1991) p.87.

as a (conceptual) multiplicity which exists only in relation to a problem.[175] In this sense, as the problem appeared to me as such with respect to issues of control and ordering(s), it immediately needed a concept that could be apt to address it. This is how the territorial assemblage, atmosphere, and crowd have become concepts, sets of real circumstances and not merely metaphors.[176] Concepts do not stand alone, they are not bound entities, and they need to combine with other concepts through bridges, "link up each other, support one another, coordinate their contours, articulate their respective problems and belong to the same philosophy, even if they have different histories."[177] The concept is a whole and it is fragmentary at the same time. In other words, it is always open to transformation. In this work, affect is the bridge that connects the main concepts, the backbone of the entire theoretical framework.

Empirically here refers to writing. Writing is a representation of the fieldwork once it has been reflected upon, but it also might convey the emotional side of it. If our emplacement in the context of the research is certainly enmeshed with materiality and affectivity, also our narratives are. When we transform our embodied experience into written account we are still plunged, through our body, in the materiality and affectivity that forged our fieldwork and our knowledge. The role of writing is to represent the theoretical findings without loosing the material and affective richness.[178] As Philip Vannini suggests, representations can be enlivening, to wit, "less concerned with faithfully and detachedly reporting facts, experiences, actions, and situations and more interested instead in making them come to life, in allowing them to take on new and unpredictable meanings."[179] In his view, this endeavour involves a substantial engagement with creation and imagination which is put into writing by combining an assertive (traditional) style with a more unreal or surreal one, which might convey the affective dimension, "a sense of possibility, of condition, of wish, of fear, and of hope."[180] It is in this vein that the academic writing in this work is sometimes ruptured by a more personal and intimate style, which tries to convey the sense of the affective involvement of the researcher.

1.3 Methods

In line with what has been said so far, that entering in relation with a field affectively implies experimentation and serendipity, methods follow the same experimental approach, so that, as Derek McCormack puts it, the question is not about what techniques to choose in advance among the available ones, it is more about "not knowing in advance what kind of technique will allow you to go on, and not really knowing what the technique will help you do."[181] In

175 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* (trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell)(New York: Columbia University Press 1994).

176 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus,* op. cit. It is Massumi in his translator's foreword who defines concepts as "circumstances" without subject nor object (p.xiii), while Deleuze and Guattari claim that "the plane of consistency is the abolition of all metaphors" (p.69).

177 Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?,* op. cit. p.18.

178 Pink, *Doing Sensory Ethnography*, op. cit.

179 Philip Vannini, 'The Irrealis Mood', in Philip Vannini (ed.) *Non-Representational Methodologies. Re-envisioning Research* (New York and London: Routledge 2015) p.119.

180 Ibid.

181 Derek McCormack, 'Devices for Doing Atmospheric Things', in Vannini (ed.) *Non-Representational Methodologies. Re-envisioning Research*, op. cit. p.100.

my fieldwork I can identify three 'places' where I applied different methods in order to answer the main research question, namely how orderings and, possibly, resistance emerge out of bodies' encounters, and to investigate the mechanisms through which orderings are constituted. These places are fictitious and the mechanisms of territory, atmosphere, and time applied to all of them, but I distinguish here because different methods fit to them. One place was the encampment, meant within its physical and imaginary borders. It was porous, as we have seen, but its borders were made visible. The second place was the internet, where many exchanges occurred and narratives were also built and spread. The third place I will call it 'the outside': it is not within the borders of the encampment, but it is intertwined with it in material and affective ways. I must put it clear: there was no outside to the Jungle once one was captured in its web. Nonetheless, there were some moments and spaces beyond the physical borders of the camp where activity was less hectic and more conventional methods could be adopted.

In the encampment, I did mainly *participant observation*. Being a researcher-tuber implied, as I showed, to let myself be captured by the affectivity and materiality of the camp, sometime following a plan, sometime feeling free to wander and just observe, sometime striving for what Spinoza would call the 'good encounter'. This practice involved spending time with people in the Jungle, with volunteers, artists, migrants, journalists. It meant going to restaurants, being invited to drink tea or coffee in shacks or caravans, running from fire or tear gas, witnessing to disputes, getting wet under the rain, attending meetings, freezing in the cold, watching a children's class, watching a drama class, attending to the Legal Centre's interviews. During my time in the Jungle I rarely took notes. I had my notebooks always with me (and I lost one) but except for meetings, it was hard to write down, so I either did it later or registered audio notes. As a part of this activity, I also met space through the *lawscape*, that is, I made the notion of lawscape frame the observation of both mine and other bodies' relation with the space and with each other.[182] Before moving to the next place of research, let me briefly enter the lawscape.

There is no escape to the lawscape. Might you *feel* it or not, the law is (all over) there and controls your movements. The law I am referring to must be understood not only as the oppressive force of the state, but also as the law of everyday life, that which distributes and hence controls space and bodies. Law in the lawscape is not just the *state* law, "but also the law of space that brings bodies into encounter with other bodies, which [...] by the time it is incorporated, its origin as state law cedes priority to the emergence of a specifically situated law."[183]

It can be a regulation, a by-law, or a tear gas canister. Likewise, it can be a gaze, a dress code, or an acrid smell. It can be matter or atmosphere. You bump into a wall: how do you know that you are not allowed to reach what is behind? Because of the lawscape: the wall's height, its thickness, perhaps the barbed wire or simply a billboard. Everything tells you that your movements are hindered. You can decide to climb it, but you do it with the awareness that you are *breaking the law*. For a time frame the lawscape has been visible to you and your body has been under its influence, no matter if consciously or not. You live in a makeshift camp in Calais and you are a hungry guy from Sudan. You see a long queue of Afghan guys waiting for food distribution. You will probably step away and look for another

182 The concept of lawscape is borrowed from Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos (2015).

183 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, *Spatial Justice,* op. cit. p.68.

source of food. To understand the lawscape one must acknowledge that any movement/ emplacement of a body in space is the result of a negotiation with the force of control of the law of other bodies and space.

Everything is part of the lawscape, where law and space are co-determined: "the law spreads on pavements, covers the walls of buildings, opens and closes windows, lets you [...] move in a certain way, stay still in a certain way."[184] To put it differently, it is the lawscape that allows the body to perform whatever action. Space in the lawscape combine relentlessly with bodies (and vice versa): bodies become space and space becomes bodies. In these encounters, bodies and space can affect and be affected by the law, thus producing different orderings. In this continuous *lawscaping* of bodies, space and law become in/ visible. In particular, when law is so pervasive that the lawscape can be easily engineered and bodies do not notice it (the law) anymore, the lawscape becomes atmosphere, which is "the lawscape that has managed to reach its 'perfect' dissimulation as a non-lawscape."[185]

The in/visibilisation of the law, hence its orderings, is a process that can be lived and felt, observed and perceived, if one pays due attention to other bodies and one's own movements in the lawscape, if one abandons oneself to a 'sensorial ambling'. This activity is a participant observation that involves all the senses, not just vision. It is related with *percepts*. As Bottomley and Moore point out: "here, we are not concerned with a real-out-there and whether we can or cannot see it – but rather with finding means by which to render visible the spatial (and temporal) patterns within which we encounter, are encountered by, other bodies, other forms of embodiment."[186] The orderings that emerge along lines of power are not as obvious as it might seem, one has to look for them to become aware of the lawscape. While moving in the lawscape, and while acquiring awareness of how other bodies *lawscape*, one produces one's own lawscape. The "sensual ambling" becomes then an exercise of observation during which the researcher can make her own tests, can respect or defy the lawscape she is plunged in, and register how it changes (or not) through her (and other bodies') movement. As Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos puts it,

> "Through corporeal, spatial, immersive learning techniques such as walking, one rediscovers and reinscribes one's reality, repositions one's body in the middle of the lawscape, observes the law in both its controlling and enabling, becomes aware of the inevitability of materiality, and eventually becomes responsible for one's own position, one's own lawscaping."[187]

The lawscaping practice has been highly relevant for my work, for at least two reasons. First, it helped visibilising how control is exercised through bodies' emplacements and movements, that is, through bodies' relation to space. In this sense it enhanced my capacities of capturing orderings and mapping segmentarity, and intensified my attentiveness to control mechanisms, becoming an invaluable technique for acquiring knowledge, not a neutral one, though. Lawscaping is an embodied engagement of the researcher. It therefore inherently rests on the subjectivity of the lawscaping agent. I was a white and documented woman in the Jungle; my movements, my positioning, and my interaction with space and bodies

184 Ibid. p.38.

185 Ibid. p.107.

186 Bottomley and Moore, 'Law, Diagram, Film: Critique Exhausted', op. cit. p.167.

187 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, *Spatial Justice,* op. cit. p.106.

were culturally determined and gender-related. For example, when walking alone along the muddy streets of the camp I often stepped up the pace with an unpleasant feeling of imminent risk. This could in turn make me less mindful to some details and more focused on suspicious clues. As a white woman I often felt eyes on me. This made sometimes difficult to enter into restaurants if I were alone, or to venture in the Jungle at night. Similar to what might happen in a city, but enhanced by being surrounded by men. The awareness of this conditioning put me in a better position to observe volunteers' lawscapes (white, documented) and the power of their bodily presence, but in a worse position to observe the inhabitants of the Jungle. My privileged condition of white documented person made me feel often uncomfortable with respect to my role there. I had chose to be there and so I occupied a dominant position that made me feel guilty. As a direct consequence of this emplacement, but also due to lack of time, I observed and engaged in conversations, but not formally interviewed migrant people.

Second, while other techniques of ethnographic research are best suited for encounters with human bodies, lawscaping as a tool for knowledge can be precious to make human-nonhuman relations of control and nonhuman orderings visible. The lawscaping practice sets a flat ontological plane where bodies move and where no distinction is established between human and nonhuman bodies. By way of example, this approach enabled the visibilisation of the agency of elements such as fire and supplies (food and clothes mainly) in the emergence of orderings, as I show in chapter 2 and 3.

As a consequence of the constraints of the fieldwork in the Jungle, the other methodological tool I made great use of was *informal chats*. Participant observation included interacting with people on an improvised basis most of the time. Informal chats proved to be an extremely useful and precious way of 'capturing the mood' and make myself more comfortable in the camp, while at the same time obtaining relevant information about the multiple relations that everyone could establish with the Jungle. When I had informal chats with an inhabitant of the Jungle I always tried to keep a low profile and not be inquisitive or intrusive. The chat was more the medium through which I could become more familiar with the person and eventually learn something about his situation, without looking for information when it was not spontaneously handed. Unable to conduct formal interviews to some volunteers for a widespread mistrust I was subject to, I opted very often for informal chats whenever the opportunity arose. In a few cases I had to formally ask for interview in order to reach people who were very busy and used to give formal interviews to journalists. With them (see table 1) the opportunity for informal chats was unlike to arise, so I preferred to choose the other option. The inconvenient was that even if I got some relevant information, the majority was reticent, the ambiance of the interview was not completely relaxed and I could not gain their confidence.

name	**role**	**date**	**place**
Annie P. Gavrilescu	Census coordinator, Help Refugees	27 February 2016	Jungle Books (encampment)
Guillaume	Communication officer, La Vie Active, CAP	1 March 2016	Centre d'Accueil Provisoire (CAP)
Joe Murphy	Founder, Good Chance Calais Theatre	7 March 2016	Kabul cafè (encampment)

Maya Konforti	Volunteer, L'Auberge des Migrants	11 March 2016	Pakistani restaurant (encampment)

Table 1. Semi-structured interviews in the encampment

The second place of inquiry has been the Internet. After coming back from my first fieldwork in Calais in November 2015 I created a Facebook account. Until then, I was determined to keep myself away from a social network that is so intrusive. When the woman who hosted me and my family in Calais told me that I would have got more chances to come into contact with people on the field if I had had a Facebook account, I decided to give up my privacy in the name of research. As a matter of fact, this choice has proved to be unavoidable in the long term, or it would have been extremely difficult and time-consuming to search for news and get account of what was going on when I was not in situ. However, it has been more than this. The use of social networks (including Twitter and Instagram, albeit to a lesser extent) has turned my 'fieldwork' everlasting, as it were. Even when I was not there with my body, that is most of the time of my PhD period, I could affectively and emotionally 'experience' the field. Moreover, I could get the chance to 'witness' mechanisms of control at work through and *in* the social media. Doing ethnography remotely is not new, but with the new social media the temporal dimension has changed. You are not collecting data from archives; you are able to bodily live the events you are connected to. You are involved to such an extent that you might have a sensual experience of what you are witnessing.[188]

I was checking the local newspaper site that afternoon and I found this title in the homepage: "Calais, 33 migrants and 5 volunteers injured in a fight."[189] It was afternoon and the news was very concise, not telling more than did the title. In a restless mood, I was following the local websites and volunteers' Facebook accounts when the information was updated that a huge fire had also broke out. I was not there in body but I could 'see' the event through the affect that connected me to the Jungle, for being familiar with the place and being aware that many people I knew were there. In the evening, some volunteers posted the updates asking for more donations to replace stuff that had got lost in the fire. The day after, I read the account that illustrator Lisa Mandel and sociologist Yasmine Bouagga published on *Le Monde* and contacted Yasmine to check if she was fine (see figure 12). I lived the event as I was there, experiencing unrest, fear, and sorrow.

As Patty Gray argues, through social media the online researcher is certainly present on her field only virtually, but her participation is actual. In this sense, online-mediated ethnography can be valuable, even more so if the researcher is familiar with the context where the action is unfolding for having already been there in flesh and blood during the fieldwork.[190] I started with Facebook and then extended the use of social networking sites to Twitter and Instagram, the former especially to follow media hypes. I added video-archiving sites such as Youtube or Vimeo; then blogs; local and national (both French and British) news websites.

To give an example of the intertwining of events that develop in the field and online, when

188 Patty A. Gray, 'Memory, Body, and the Online Researcher: Following Russian street demonstration via social media' *American Ethnologist* 43 (3) 2016: p.500-510.

189http://www.francetvinfo.fr/faits-divers/calais-33-migrants-et-cinq-benevoles-associatifs-blesses-dans-une-bagarre_1716505.html.

190 Ibid., p.507.

I was in Calais for the last time in July 2016, during a meeting among volunteers and exiles it came to my attention that a new issue had been arising during my absence. This had something to do with alleged inappropriate conduct of some female volunteers in relation to the inhabitants of the Jungle. At that time the group of volunteers that was coordinating activities in the settlement was drafting a code of conduct to regulate this issue. Two months later, at the beginning of September, I stumbled upon a conversation in a closed group on Facebook, where people were discussing about that issue on moral basis. Intersecting information from participant observation in the field, from the social media, and from associations' mailing list, I was able to get a more complete picture, albeit always a partial one. This access would not have given me insights into the process that had made the issue become a 'public' problem, as Gusfield would have,[191] but enabled me to follow a thread that from a small circle of people led to an article published in a national British newspaper.[192]

To compose the digital field related to the Jungle of Calais, I entered both open and closed groups of volunteers, I followed the Twitter account of the mayor of Calais and local newspapers, I subscribed to the newsletters of the same newspapers, I followed individual people (migrants, volunteers, journalists, artists, activists, etc.) I met in the Jungle and some blogs, I received the weekly newsletter from the local aid groups. The groups on Facebook, many of which have kept functioning after the final eviction of the camp, were mainly devoted to the exchange of information among current, former and prospective volunteers, about needs in the camp, how to help, emerging issues such as security or misconduct, as I illustrated above. In the end, these groups were used especially to collect supplies and money for aid activities and have a minimum of control over the afflux of volunteers, who were being readdressed to the biggest association, L'Auberge des Migrants.

title	Type/content	address
Calais - People to People Solidarity - Action from UK	Facebook group (open)/ aid support	https://www.facebook.com/groups/CalaisMigrantSolidarityActionFromUK/
Law of the Jungle - People to People Solidarity	Facebook group (closed)/human rights, legal issues	https://www.facebook.com/groups/LawOfTheJunglePeopleToPeople/
Calais Migrant Solidarity (No Borders)	Facebook group (closed)/activists from the No Borders network	https://www.facebook.com/groups/calaismigrantssolidarity/
Help Calais	Facebook group (closed)/ aid support	https://www.facebook.com/groups/1486136575014090/
L'Auberge des Migrants	Facebook page/aid organisation	https://www.facebook.com/LAuberge-des-Migrants-358496450338/
Help Refugees	Facebook page/aid organisation	https://www.facebook.com/HelpRefugeesUK/
Care4Calais	Facebook page/aid organisation	https://www.facebook.com/care4calais/

191 Joseph R. Gusfield, *The Culture of Public Problems* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1981).

192 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/calais-jungle-volunteers-sex-refugees-allegations-facebook-care4calais-a7312066.html.

Calais Action	Facebook page/aid organisation	https://www.facebook.com/calaisaction/
Refugee Info Bus	Facebook page/aid organisation	https://www.facebook.com/RefugeeInfoBus/
Info CAO	Facebook page/aid support for CAO	https://www.facebook.com/InfoCAO/
Calaisiéns en colère	Facebook page/group anti-migrants	Page closed
Calaidipedia	Website/resources	http://www.calaidipedia.co.uk/
Passeurs d'Hospitalité	Blog/activist	https://passeursdhospitalites.wordpress.com
Le Blog de François G	Blog/activist	https://blogs.mediapart.fr/francois-g/blog
Plateforme de Services aux Migrants	Website/Resources, aid organisation network	http://www.psmigrants.org/site/

Table 2. Main social media/website sources (organisations, activists, groups)

The investigation of the digital 'place' proved useful for the overall work because through the social media I could observe (and get confirmation of) how central was 'stuff' in the making of the Jungle. If in chapter 2 I introduce stuff as a fundamental element of the territorial assemblages of the Jungle, in chapter 3 I show to what extent it was critical in mediating affect and contributing to building a homely atmospherics. Furthermore, through social media I could learn of the fate of some people who I had met and whom I lost track. I will report briefly about some of these ex-residents from Sudan, Iran or Tunisia in chapter 4, by showing how they personally benefitted from the Jungle's arrangement.

The third place where I developed my work was beyond the Jungle, but still in direct relation. I refer here to the aid groups meetings and to formal *semi-structured interviews* I conducted in different locations in Calais, or even elsewhere, in Paris, for example, or by phone. These interviews were aimed more to help me understand specific issues, such as legal or normative ones, or to investigate the engagement of certain organisations in their work in the encampment. I interviewed aid professionals, a journalist, a blogger and legal advisors. This place was also where I *collected documents* about regulations, bylaws, and court judgments to analyse rhetoric and narratives which were also part of the becoming of the Jungle.

My all work in the field was a relentless negotiation with other bodies' territories. In the next chapter I hence start by exploring some of these.

name	role	date	place
Stéphane Duval	Director, Jules Ferry Centre	17 November 2015	Jules Ferry Centre
Nathanaël Caillaux	Coordinator, Plateforme de Services aux Migrants	18 November 2015 / 25 July 2016	Coffee shop, Calais / Le Channel, Calais
Sylvain	Site manager, L'Auberge des Migrants	3 March 2016	L'Auberge des Migrants' warehouse
Delphine Kwiczor	Journalist, Nord Littoral	3 March 2016	Coffee shop, Calais
Philip Wannesson	Blogger and activist	8 March 2016	Coffee shop, Calais
Gilles Debove	Police Union representative in Calais	27 July 2016	Coffee shop, Calais
Aurélien	Calais Migrant Solidarity (No Borders)	28 July 2016	Meeting place for associations (Calais)
Thibaut Feutry	Head of Mission, Acted	29 July 2016	Acted's offices in Calais
Norma Juillen	Legal advisor	17 November 2016	Coffee shop, Paris
Elisa Mora	Legal advisor	15 June 2016	Phone call

Table 3. Semi-structured interviews out of the encampment

[12]

Figure 12. Emeute (riot). Source: Lisa Mandel, Yasmine Bouagga, “Les Nouvelles de la Jungle,” blog at Le Monde (http://lisamandel.blog.lemonde.fr/page/5/)

[13]



[14]



Figures 13 and 14. Snippets from posts in Facebook groups. Source: Facebook

Chapter 2

Home

My home has no door
My home has no roof
My home has no windows
It ain't water proof
My home has no handles
My home has no keys
If you're here to rob me
There's nothing to steal
A la maison
Dans ma maison
C'est là que j'ai peur
Home is not a harbour
Home home home
Is where it hurts[193]

Home is where one starts from.[194]

"[I]n order to constitute the space of a habitable house and a home, you also need an opening, a door and windows, you have to give up a passage to the outside world."[195] Territories are carved out from space as a refuge from chaos and they emerge expressively. They are created when a functional element becomes expressive, when thresholds and boundaries are drawn, and a distance is set. In order for a territory to be marked, hence to be generated, it needs an organising principle, a selective move, and a rhythm. The territory appears through an act that marks a line, but its boundaries may be blurred and fluid, may be changing, may be just thresholds. In his work on *Territorology*, Andrea Brighenti holds that boundaries are constitutive of territory and consequently that boundary-making is an unavoidable move in the territorializing process.[196] While I agree with this, I am putting less emphasis on the action of drawing the limits as the primary act of becoming expressive of the territory. I rather associate this (affective) action with the materiality that it deploys.

193 "Home is where it hurts" (2008), Camille, French singer.

194 T. S. Eliot, East Coker V, *Four Quartets*.

195 Jacques Derrida, *Of Hospitality* (trans. R. Bowlby) (Stanford: Stanford University Press 2000) p.61.

196 Brighenti, 'On Territorology. Toward a general science of territory', op. cit. See also Andrea Mubi Brighenti, 'Teoria dei Territori', *Scienza & Politica* 25, 48 (2013): pp.175-183.

I am not saying here that one act is primordial compared to the other one, rather that they are ontologically co-constitutive of the territory. Matter and affect join up to engender expressiveness, so that a territorial body chooses its proper material and passes it into sensation via a spatial move that marks boundaries when unfolding.

This notion of territory is put at work in this thesis to understand how organisational patterns are built and orderings arise, and to unveil the coding and transcoding processes through which they unfold. My endeavour is to show how the territorial assemblage, through its operations of closure and opening, exclusion and inclusion, "form[s] an ordering mechanism that becomes the basis for formation of social groups."[197] Control, in this framework, is inherent to the mechanism and surfaces in this chapter as a by-product of territory-making, but not in a strategic sense. Control is rather co-constituted with the territory's closure, when the territory selects and divides as a mode of internal organisation that invites selectively the environment in. This operation, I argue, is inextricably linked to every body's need for a home, a *chez soi*.

Territory is conceptualised here as a process of segmentarisation, instead of a static and bounded element inextricably linked to an idea of sovereignty. This way, it can be employed as productive concept-tool to study sociospatial phenomena. Lines of thought that propose strategic views of territory can be useful when addressing how institutional practices consolidate their *power over* through processes of territorialisation. However, it is less so if our interest is to explore how sociospatial phenomena emerge and transform in space and time through relations, and if we assume that these relations produce territories. From this prism, I feel the need to look for a definition of territory that builds itself a territory by selecting, including, excluding; in other words, by drawing boundaries.[198]

There are at least three elements that describe the notion of territory that is explored in this conceptualisation, and which is being looked into along this chapter. First, territorialisation is an affective act through which one builds a space where to feel good, a home, a *refuge*. The orderings and the patterns that are produced as one is seeking for a soothing intimacy are totally inseparable from chaos and disorder which they come from, and against which they are supposed to raise a shield. Territorialisation is an operation of self-organisation, which, understood in biological terms, supposes a system and an environment that are inextricably linked. The territory emerges when a system (a body) and a milieu communicate and the first starts differentiating from the second in order to acquire its own identity, to find its *home*. We will have that, to a closure – which is necessary for the constitution of the system through a self-ordering, it corresponds a paradoxical openness, which is necessary for the territorial body to relate with other bodies, to evolve and keep on living. Closure and openness are not in opposition, they form part of a continuum where they co-exist, so that "what remains is neither closure nor openness, but the movement between the two."[199] Self-organisation postulates the existence of a system, the body, and an environment that is not just related to the former, but which "is part of the system while being outside", that is to say inter-dependent.[200] By conceiving the environment as the negation of the

197 Brighenti, 'On Territorology. Toward a general science of territory', op. cit. p.58.

198 Pier Luigi Crosta refers to this mode of assigning a function to a definition as "strategic construction" [Crosta, *Pratiche. Il Territorio 'è l'uso che se ne fa'*op. cit.]

199 Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, *Absent Environments* (Oxon: Routledge-Cavendish 2007) p.2.

200 Edgar Morin, *Introduction à la Pensée Complexe* (Paris: Editions du Seuil 2005) p.32.

system (what the system is not) but still correlative to the system itself, and a system as the difference it establishes with the environment itself, Niklas Luhmann confirms this principle of inter-dependency.[201] In fact, in Luhmann's autopoietic theory, the system emerges through differentiation from its environment, that is to say, through openness,[202] while at the same time acquiring its own identity through selection, hence closure.[203] In this view, the territorial body and its territory are inextricably linked with each other. By the same token, the territory is self-constructed and its environment framed by the self-constructing operations of the territorializing movement, making it impossible to conceive them as two separate elements. This territory-home is cut out from what it might threaten the territorial body's consistency, and is framed by setting patterns in order to protect it. Yet, this is not a safe harbour, at least not indefinitely, for its openness to the new is at the same time what it ensures its survival and what endangers it. Its temporariness is situated: should the territory be dismantled somewhere, it could be regenerated elsewhere. It would not be the same territory as before, but still home for a while, striving for an order against the chaos.

The second character of territory is in/visibility. Sensory qualities that are the marked features of the territory reveal the territorialising process in its making: it is by expressively territorialising the milieu, to wit, by selecting from the milieu the components that need to be transformed in communicative features, that the territorial body *territorialises*. And it is in the process of becoming expressive of selected qualities that distances are established, frames are raised, and borders are put up. "Critical distance is a relation based on matters of expression. It is a question of keeping at a distance the forces of chaos knocking at the door."[204] As Elizabeth Grosz puts it, "territory is always the coming together both of spatiotemporal coordinates (and thus the possibilities of measurement, precise location, concreteness, actuality) and qualities (which are immeasurable, indeterminate, virtual, and open-ended), that is, it is the coupling of a milieu and a rhythm".[205] And this process, which conjugates expressive matter and distances, is in/visible, because the relations it establishes determine its degree of in/visibility, as I explore empirically in the Jungle using the camp of container of the French state as example of this mechanism. In this vein, in/visibility is not a property of the territory; it is rather a relational quality that relies upon an exchange of affects among bodies (and space), and is more about senses in a wider interpretation than just vision. The manifestation of the territory to other bodies' perception and affect is anything but obvious. Depending on their mutual relations – which are always also relations of power – bodies are affected (and can affect) differently and their possibilities for negotiating with other bodies' territories vary largely. For this reason, one territory may be very apparent to those bodies that need to negotiate their position and distance with it, while another one may be transparent to bodies that can shorten distances. This is not to say that territory's expressive features may become invisible, rather that their expressiveness is a form of communication the effects of which depend on bodies'

201 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, *Absent Environments,* op. cit.

202 In Luhmann, unlike in systems theory, systems are closed entities. The system is closed because no transfer of information is supposed to occur, but at the same time, it is through the mechanism of external reference that the environment is included within the system. The external reference ("the system's keyhole through which it looks at the world", in Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2007: p.24) works through selection of what in its environment is consistent (and understandable) with system's operations, while globally the environment remains unutterable and unintelligible.

203 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, *Absent Environments,* op. cit.

204 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus* op. cit. p.320.

205 Elizabeth Grosz, *Chaos, Territory, Art. Deleuze and the Framing of the Earth* (New York: Columbia University Press 2008) p.18.

power to be affected by them.

And we come to the third character of the territory, which understands territory as mobile in space and time. Inherent to the idea that the *socius* is crossed by movements of territorialisation, deterritorialisation, and reterritorialisation, is that the territory is marked and determined but its openness makes it vulnerable to change. There is no moral direction here: change can be for the better or for the worst, according not to a moral paradigm that would judge it on presumed universal values, but to a situated and affective ethics. Thus, deterritorialisation might entail a change that affects positively the territorial body by providing it with extra powers, new resources, or stronger connections. Conversely, it might open "the flesh to the cosmo-universe without the protective space of a house or personal territory," hence jeopardizing the cohesion of the individual and making collapse its territory.[206] Deterritorialisation is always followed by a reterritorialisation, meaning that if the body leaves the territory then it necessarily builds a new one elsewhere, but under different conditions, establishing unprecedented relations, and with undetermined, yet always negotiable, results. Each movement carries with it the ethical consequences of the encounters that it actualises, which in a Spinozan perspective are positive if the involved bodies can preserve, or even enhance, their power to affect and to be affected.

In what follows, I am briefly tracing a path across some strands of thought about the notion of territory that, albeit compelling, are less productive in the context of this thesis. I am then delineating a framework for territory by both exploring further the concepts I have just outlined and illustrating them through the relentless movements the territories of the Jungle originated. In particular, I follow the threads of the aid groups, the French state, and 'stuff' to map the territorial assemblage.

2.1 Territories, borders, identities

The concept of territory is ambiguous and slippery. It cuts across various disciplines, acquiring nuances and different analytical powers, as Jean Gottman implies by saying that

> "To politicians, territory means the population and the resources therein, and sometimes also the point of honor of Irredentist claims. To the military, territory is topographic features conditioning tactical and strategic considerations as well as distance or space to be played with; occasionally it is also resources in terms of local supplies. To the jurist, territory is jurisdiction and delimitation; to the specialist in international law it is both an attribute and the spatial extent of sovereignty. To the geographer, it is the portion of space enclosed by boundary lines, the location and internal characteristics of which are to be described and explained. To the specialist interested in political geography, and I happen to be one, territory appears as a material, spatial notion establishing essential links between politics, people, and the natural setting. Under a purely analytical approach, the notion of territory would break up and dissolve into a multitude of different concepts such as location, natural resources, population

206 Tamsin Lorraine, 'Ahab and the Becoming-Whale: the Nomadic Subject in Smooth Space' op. cit. p.161.

density, settlement patterns, modes of life, and so forth."[207]

Is territory the political category that refers to a bounded space where a sovereign power is exerted? Is it, in other words, the spatial definition of a political institution as Gottman argues?[208] Or is territory a spatial strategy aimed to control people and phenomena, as Robert Sack and Torsten Malmberg maintain?[209] In this chapter I will provide an understanding of territory that is less close to political and geographical categories and more to ecological approaches, by borrowing less from the cited geographers and more from the processual and relational thinking of Deleuze and Guattari.

The nature of territory has haunted geographers for a long time, and still does.[210] As Frédéric Giraut illustrates, in geography the notion of territory has been employed either to refer specifically to the spatial delimitation of state sovereignty, notably in geopolitics; or as a trope for the appropriation of space, from perspectives that emphasise issues of identity and power; or even as a buzzword for a bounded area.[211] At the beginning of the Seventies of the last century, political geography is dominated by a celebrated work by Robert Ardrey that attempts to explain human practices by referring to animal territoriality. To wit, as an instinct and an answer to an imperative need.[212] In the same years, Edward Soja, as an early career geographer, on one side endorsed the behavioural character of human territoriality, on the other side contended that analyses of territoriality should not be founded exclusively on inferences from animal behaviour and human individual space, but be open to the cultural dimensions of individuals and societies.[213] In his analysis, Soja considers that while micro-territoriality might well have biological basis that still need to be investigated, macro-territoriality is a cultural phenomenon which serves as a bedrock for the political organisation of space, in that it regulates social interaction and maintains the social order. Soja never explicitly refers to the concept of territory. Nonetheless, when it comes to putting forward a description of what is territoriality spatially, he offers a rather static vision where space and territory blur into each other and form an atmosphere of spatial identity and exclusiveness.[214] Both Soja and Gottman have insisted on the importance of territoriality as nexus between social processes and space, but focusing their attention on formal political systems as the fundamental creators of territories. To go beyond this normative notion of territory we have to understand Robert Sack's thought.

In his very influential *Human Territoriality* – which has become a milestone in most of the political geography literature – Robert Sack makes even more explicit the relation between

207 Jean Gottmann, *The Significance of Territory* (Charlottesville VA: University of Virginia Press 1973) p.ix, cited in Stuart Elden, The Significance of Territory, *Geopraphica Helvetica* 68 (2013) p.66.

208 Jean Gottmann, *La Politique des Etats et leur Géographie* (Paris: Arman Colin 1951).

209 Robert David Sack, *Human Territoriality: its Theory and History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1986); Torsten Malmberg, *Human Territoriality: Survey of Behavioural Territories with Preliminary Analysis and Discussion of Meaning* (The Hague: Mouton 1980).

210 Anssi Paasi, 'Territory' in J. Agnew, K. Mitchell and G. Ó Tuathail (eds.), *A Companion to Political Geography* (Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing 2003) pp.109-122.

211 Frédéric Giraut, 'Conceptualiser le Territoire', *Historiens et Géographes* 403 (2008) pp.57-68. Giraut is especially focused on the French geographical literature. For an excursus on the Anglophone thought see David Delaney, *Territory: a Short Introduction* (Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing 2005).

212 Robert Ardrey, *The Territorial Imperative: A Personal Inquiry into the Animal Origins of Property and Nations* (New York: Atheneum 1966)

213 Edward Soja, *The political organization of space* (Washington DC: Commission on College Geography, Association of American Geographers RP 8 1971).

214 Soja, ibid. p.34.

space and power as embedded in the notion of territoriality.[215] When Sack contends that territoriality is "a spatial strategy to affect, influence, or control resources and people, by controlling an area", he understands it as a spatial behaviour that has little to do with instinct and much more with rational motivation about how to use a space, how to organise social activities spatially, and how to assign meanings to places.[216] In what I regard as an extremely interesting example that helps us grasp Sack's idea of territory, he actually refers to a domestic situation where a dad who is busy with his homework has to deal with his two young children attempting to wash the dishes in the kitchen. Willing to prevent his children from smashing the dishes, the parent has, according to Sack, a non-territorial option and a territorial one. The dad can choose to either remove the dishes from the reach of his children, or make the kitchen 'off limits' by excluding the kids from the room, even temporarily. For Sack, of the two strategies, only that which bans the children from a space is the one that builds out a territory. This example provides us with at least two clues of Sack's thinking about territory. First, territory for Sack is conceptually linked to a place, an identified space, a *geographic area*.[217] In this view, actions that are not spatially circumscribed – such as removing dishes from the reach of children – might end up exercising a spatial control but are not considered as producing territory. Second, for a territory to come into being it must exist the intention of exerting any sort of control over an area, a human being, or a relationship. In other words, the act of territorializing is a rational one that seeks control as its goal. To a certain extent Sack might have drawn from Foucault the idea that the division and partition of space aimed to control individuals is a form of territoriality that is at the service of the disciplinary machine. This geometric and behavioural approach, Alexander Murphy suggests, is more interested in the causes that produce the territory and in its outcomes than in investigating the nature of territory.[218] As it will be clearer below, I propose a conceptualisation of territory that goes beyond rational accounts of territory. Not only a 'rationally' identified place (the kitchen, in the example) can be understood as territory. The act of removing the dishes might be seen as a territorialising one which changes affectively the way the children relate with space, thus modifying their territory and their parent's.

In terms of contemporary approaches, Claude Raffestin offers a cross-cutting position, which advocates for a sharp conceptual distinction between space and territory in geography and a relational approach to territoriality in which power is an unavoidable element. In his view, "space becomes territory as soon as it is involved into a social relation of communication."[219] By drawing widely from Henri Lefebvre and Michel Foucault, Raffestin posits that territory is the result of how individuals interact to modify their environment and social relations while transforming themselves. Territory is, in his account, a dynamic relation of the individual with otherness, to wit, with space and other bodies.[220] Raffestin challenges conventional conceptualisations of territory that do not provide any explanation about why and how a territory is structured, destructured, and restructured, arguing that territory is precisely

215 Sack, *Human Territoriality. Its Theory and History* op. cit. See also David Delaney, *Territory: a short introduction* op. cit.; David Storey, *Territory: the Claiming of Space* (Edinburgh: Prentice Hall 2001).

216 Ibid. pp.1-2.

217 Ibid. Albeit spatially determined, the territory is not immovable. For Sack the geographical determination of the territory does not mean that the territory is fixed. For example, the personal space, understood as social distance, moves along with the body of the human holder.

218 Alexander B. Murphy, 'Entente Territorial: Sack and Raffestin on Territoriality', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 30 (2012) pp.159-172.

219 Claude Raffestin, Per una Geografia del Potere (Milano: Edizioni Unicopli 1981) p.153, my translation.

220 Ibid.

the spatial outcome of a process of social production.[221] To paraphrase, this is what Andrea Brighenti advocates when he calls for a concept of territory to be explored "not simply as a specific historical and political construct, but more radically, as a general analytical tool to describe the social sphere and, ultimately, as a social process in itself."[222] According to Brighenti, a science of territory – what he calls *Territorology* – must manipulate the concept of territory with the purpose of investigating the *socius* "in terms of territorial relationships, traits, operations and vectors."[223]

Recent shifts in the theorisation of territory have been encouraged by transdisciplinary approaches that have challenged some static visions opting for more nuanced and complex interpretations. Of these, I will cite three, which I regard as more relevant for this research. First, from territory as a bounded container of meaning and political action, some scholars have moved towards borders, grey areas in between, and mobility and transformation along those now more indistinct lines. In this framework, jurisdictional boundaries and geographical limits of state sovereignty are undermined in favour of a broadened interest in contingent practices which, albeit influenced by the existence of conventional borders, are probed as spatially mobile. Recognizing that "people live their lives across and between territories rather than within the 'little boxes' of official state space",[224] is another way of stressing the importance of investigating practices and social relations and, somehow, fostering a shift of perspective from territory as sovereignty to territory as relation. As Arjun Appadurai mockingly claims, "States are the only major players in the global scene that really need the idea of territoriality based on sovereignty."[225] Although associated with sovereignty and the geographical limits of the state, and inextricably tied with the production and reproduction of (closed) territories,[226] borders and boundaries are seen here functioning as polysemic and heterogeneous entities. Etienne Balibar, views borders as a complex construct that mirrors the multiple identities that have to deal with them and the multiple practices that are shaped by the presence of boundaries.[227] By the same token, Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, by positing border *as method*, call for a rethinking of the notion based on a conception of an heterogeneous and multiple space, where divisions and connections are continuously produced and reproduced, and borders, as the result of relentless negotiations, are at the same time institutions and a set of social relationships.[228] If, as Brighenti notes, "border is a territorial device *par excellence*", it should not come with surprise that in our contemporary world borders proliferate while mobilities are

221 Claude Raffestin, 'Territorialité: Concept ou Paradigme de la Géographie Sociale?' *Geographica Helvetica* 2 (1986): pp.91-96.

222 Brighenti, 'On Territorology. Toward a general science of territory', op. cit. p.55.

223 Ibid. p.65.

224 Peter G. Mandaville, 'Territory and Translocality: Discrepant Idioms of Political Identity' *Millennium* 28 (1999) p.658, cited in Delaney, *Territory: a Short Introduction* op. cit. p.56. For a similar positioning see also Arjun Appadurai, 'Sovereignty without Territoriality: Notes for a Postnational Geography' in Patricia Yaeger (ed.) *The Geography of Identity* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press 1996) and John Agnew, *Geopolitics. Re-visioning World Politics* (New York: Routledge 2003).

225 Appadurai, 'Sovereignty without Territoriality: Notes for a Postnational Geography' op. cit. p.342.

226 See Reece Jones, 'Spaces of Refusal: Rethinking Sovereign Power and Resistance at the Border', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 102 (2012): pp.685-699; Paolo Novak, 'The Flexible Territoriality of Borders', *Geopolitics* 16 (2011): pp.741–767; Anssi Paasi, 'Border Studies Reanimated: Going Beyond the Territorial/Relational Divide', *Environment & Planning A* 44 (2012): pp.2303-2309.

227 Etienne Balibar, *La Crainte des Masses. Politique et Philosophie avant et après Marx* (Paris: Galilée 1997).

228 Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, *Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labour* (2008) at http://eipcp.net/transversal/0608/mezzadraneilson/en; Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, *Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labour* (Durham & London: Duke University Press 2013).

multiplying.[229] From this perspective, which relates territories and mobilities through the notion of border, the territory acquires a vibrant and vital character that controverts its static understanding and pursues a radical different one, where mobility and change are inherent to the territory more than fixedness and stability.

A second strand of thought that inspires this chapter is feminist theory and its leverage on contemporary understandings of identity and subjectivity, which takes issue with dichotomic views of social relations and space production. Among the most influential, Doreen Massey's reflexions on the manifold and ever-changing nature of spatial identities challenge the idea that identities are built out spatially as bounded and stable entities. On the other side, Massey provides a relational and processual conceptualisation of space that insists on the interconnectedness, embeddedness and embodiedness of our spatial experience. For "both personal identity and the identity of those envelopes of space-time in which and between which we live and move (and have our 'Being') are constructed precisely through that interconnectedness."[230] In addition, the idea that space has a role in the construction of gender relations has opened up ways of calling into questions uncontested spatial divisions, such as public/private, or spatial restrictions linked to specific (bounded) identities.

A third line of thought is the one which is drawn from a Deleuze-Guattari reading of social processes as movements of de-re-territorialisation. In this philosophical vein, three elements emerge that will be retained for our understanding and definition of territory: first, the processual character of the territorial entity, contra its presumed boundedness; second, the territory has its expression in rhythms, through which it fixes patterns that in turn stabilise the territory; and third, territories are the result of affective relations. For this approach I will bring together the line of thought of Deleuze and Guattari, and the sociological reading that Brighenti makes of their conceptualisation.

The conceptual tools that I draw from these strands of research and thinking inform my reasoning throughout the chapter and help me answer two questions. What kind of understanding of socio-spatial processes can be put forward by a processual and relational notion of territory in terms of power forces? Can this approach to territory help unpack movements that otherwise would stay concealed under dichotomic interpretations of sovereignty and agency? I support my theoretical constructions through some examples extracted from my encounter with the Jungle of Calais, thus disclosing how territories emerge, are dismantled, and reconstituted through the endless movement of bodies, countless encounters, and the inexorable production of codes, rhythms, and patterns.

Before we enter the territory of the Jungle, let me briefly introduce some thoughts about how territories are affective, leaving room for an extensive exploration of affect in the next chapter, where I discuss the affective territoriality of an atmosphere. As I already mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, within the theoretical framework that substantiates my reasoning, bodies and space produce affect as a result of their mutual compositions. The

229 Andrea Mubi Brighenti, 'Mobilizing Territories, Territorializing Mobilities' *Sociologica* 8 1 (2014) p.2.

230 Doreen Massey, *Space, Place, and Gender* (Minneapolis MN: Minnesota University Press 1991) p.122. Massey conceptualizes space "as taking the form not of some abstract dimension but of the simultaneous coexistence of social interrelations at all geographical scales, from the intimacy of the household to the wide space of transglobal connections" (p.168). Massey grounds her discourse on the notion of place instead of that of territory. However, her approach toward the multiple nature of identity and its spatial unboundedness is consistent with our reasoning.

affects that flow "through the bodies of humans and other beings,"[231] thanks to the interactions which bodies (and space) engage, are what characterises any territorial assemblage. Affect indicates the capacity to affect other bodies and to be affected in turn, the force that moves bodies beyond rationality and consciousness.[232] The territorial move through which one seeks a refuge from chaos is affective in that, first, it involves an exchange with a milieu (bodies and space), the consequences of which transform all the involved bodies and space. Second, this move has to do with *how* the territorialising body sensuously differentiates from the milieu, and how it acquires qualities that make its territory emerge, what Deleuze and Guattari term "matters of expressions."[233] In other words, being territory the result of an encounter amongst bodies and space, and this interaction involving necessarily affective forces, territory cannot but be affective. Furthermore, its affective dimension, as I show below, is visible.

2.2 Refuge

It is the search for a centre, which would bring calm and stability in the middle of chaos. Around this centre, space is organised. Chaos is outside, we are at home. We select and withdraw, we stabilise and create order. And finally we can open the circle and let the outside in, or we can leave home. To construe their idea of territory, Deleuze and Guattari draw fully from a biologist and an ethologist – Jakob von Uexküll and Konrad Lorenz[234] - and evoke the ancient cosmogonies, where order was born out of chaos.[235] However, more than searching for a justification of human territoriality in either behavioural or strategic terms, they rather seek a description of its mechanisms and functioning, and the becoming of territory. Guattari explains that

> "The notion of territory must be understood here in a broad sense, which extends beyond the meaning ensued from ethology and ethnology. Territory can refer to a lived space as well as a perceived system within which one feels "at home." Territory can deterritorialize – that is, open up - and embark on lines of flight, or even split up and collapse. Reterritorialization consists of an endeavour for recomposing a territory that is undergoing a deterritorializing process."[236]

Guattari suggests that, first, territory is more than a spatial concept: it is what can create a sense of being at home. "C'est qui me permet de dire *'c'est chez moi'*."[237] Second, as I have

231 Nigel Thrift, *Non-Representational Theory. Space, Politics, Affect* (Abingdon: Routledge 2008) p.236.

232 Gregory J. Seigworth and Melissa Gregg, 'An Inventory of Shimmers', in G. Seigworth and M. Gregg (eds.) *The Affect Theory Reader* (Durham & London: Duke University Press 2010).

233 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus,* op. cit. p.315.

234 Ibid. See also Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, op. cit.

235 "Sometimes one goes from chaos to the threshold of a territorial assemblage: directional components, infra-assemblage. Sometimes one organizes the assemblage: dimensional components, intra-assemblage. Sometimes one leaves the territorial assemblage for other assemblages, or for somewhere else entirely: inter-assemblage, components of passage or even escape. And all three at once. Forces of chaos, terrestrial forces, cosmic forces: all of these confront each other and converge in the territorial refrain." [Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus,* op. cit. p.313].

236 Félix Guattari, Les Années d'Hiver. 1980-1985 (Paris: Bernard Barrault 1986) pp.294-295.

237 "It is what makes me say 'It's home'" (my translation), Maël Le Garrec, *Apprendre à philosopher avec Deleuze* (Paris: Ellipses 2010) p.20.

already mentioned, territory is inextricably linked with three movements that represent the precondition for it to come into being: territorialisation, deterritorialisation, and reterritorialisation. On the one side these movements emphasise the relational dimension of territory as being constituted by and through the encounter of bodies and space; on the other side, they hint at the intrinsic mobile character of the territory.

Let me start with home. Home, not unlike territory, is an elusive concept. In literature it has been approached by so many angles and within so different disciplinary fields, that establishing an unambiguous definition might be a difficult if not impossible task.[238] Home has been melted into the built form of a house, the equally slippery concept of place, and the bounded space of a nation; or it has raised controversial issues about gender and race. The problem with home is its being such a familiar term to the extent that its unreflective use can be misleading.[239]

In this framework I consider relevant to see how home and territory can relate with each other and which notion of home might help unveil new readings of the Jungle as a territorial assemblage. As Alison Blunt and Robyn Dowling illustrate in their account on geographical thinking about home, beside humanistic explorations on the poetics of home and homely feelings, which "privilege an idea of home as grounding of identity" and romanticise home as a centre of meaning, feminist frameworks counterpose imaginaries of home that might be also oppressive and alienating.[240] The idea of home as the source of belonging, identity, and safety, is thus problematized through politicized understandings of home where the positive outcomes of the process of home-making are seen less as fixed than ever-changing. The focus of feminist critics is on the boundary private/public which certain understandings of home imply. The sharp distinction between a public domain which appears as uncanny, and sinister and a domestic one which is reassuring and protective, are dominant identities that feminist and critical studies aim to challenge with a view to blur boundaries and unveil the enmeshing of the public and the private in the process of home-making.[241] As Yael Navaro-Yashin suggests, if we read carefully the Freudian explorations on the affective dimensions of the *heimlich* (familiar) and the *unheimlich* (uncanny), we discover not an antinomy but a relation of ambivalence, where familiar and uncanny can be part of the same process.[242] This more complex vision is also purported by Massey and her both material and emotional grip on home. She criticises conceptualisations of the "place called home" as assigning static and fixed identities, in contraposition with otherness and what is considered to be *outside*. Against this argument, she suggests to understand home (and place) as the result of the encounter of a set of social relations that exist "both *in* and *across* space," where they

238 Paolo Boccagni, *Migration and the Search for Home. Mapping Domestic Space in Migrants' Everyday Lives* (New York: Palgrave McMillan: 2017). See also Alison Blunt and Robyn Dowling, *Home* (London and New York: Routledge 2006). There is a rich strand of literature about home and migration that adopts the notion of home as analytical tool through which to study the experience of migration through the lens of a searching for a sense of belonging [see for example Sara Ahmed, Claudia Castañeda, Anne-Marie Fortier and Mimi Sheller (eds.), *Uprootings/ regroundings. Questions of Home and Migration* (Oxford and New York: Berg 2003)]. While interesting, there is not enough room in this work for an analysis of the migration experience. As it will appear clear in the next chapter, the home-making process of the Jungle did not involve only the migrant subject, but the whole assemblage in its making (as assemblage and as *home*).

239 Jan Willem Duyvendak, *The Politics of Home. Belonging and Nostalgia in Western Europe and the United States* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2011).

240 Blunt and Dowling, *Home*, op. cit. p.11.

241 Paolo Boccagni and Andrea Mubi Brighenti, 'Immigrants and home in the making: thresholds of domesticity, commonality and publicness', Journal of Housing and the Built Environment 32 (2017): 1-11.

242 Yael Navaro-Yashin, *The Make-Believe Space. Affective Geography in a Postwar Polity* (Durham and London: Duke University Press 2012).

interrelate in peculiar ways and produce effects that exceed both themselves and the space of their encounter. Home, according to Massey, is thus a place that is built out of social relations with an "elsewhere," and which identity is all but fixed and stable.[243]

Uncertainty about how to assign the meaning of *home* to a place arises from considering the concept of home as a property of that place. Home, however, is "a process of creating and understanding forms of dwelling and belonging," and like territory, is something that is not given but must be built.[244] In this vein, boundaries are not those established by a predefined 'home', but those that are drawn along the process of its making. And along the process, meanings, signs, and affects of home might emerge: "the house shelters day-dreaming, the house protects the dreamer, the house allows one to dream in peace," Gaston Bachelard writes.[245]

Home, therefore, has a twofold sense in this framework: on the one side it is a territorial movement, that, as in Massey's account of place, is never stable: "is a relational, incomplete achievement rather than a pre-given and unproblematic domestic place."[246] On the other side, home is the desire for belonging, identity, and security that may not coincide with a 'house' but has a spatial and temporal dimension which is nonetheless materialised throughout the process. To put it clear, I am not investigating why the Jungle made people feel at home, but how this 'home' has been created. In this sense, the notion of home is strongly affective and related to familiarity and belonging, but its making is unpredictable and its materialisation is never attached to any predetermined body, be it a place, a person, a group, or a thing.

How does this sense of belonging emerge? And what is it about? If we follow Deleuze and Guattari – who investigate territory while discussing nature, art, music, and the social field – territory can be understood as *a compound of percepts and affects* arranging a space that has been carved out from chaos, while functions are being transformed into matters of expression that communicate 'this is home'. This is my home, you can be invited or not. You can either feel welcome or rejected as an intruder. Territory's intimacy is generated precisely through the deterritorialisation that takes place when functional components are transformed into expressive features. It is through deterritorialisation that they acquire new and different functions that express a motif, a signature. These emergent qualities define a territory in terms of a possession which is both spatial and affective.

> "The expressive is primary in relation to the possessive; expressive qualities, or matters of expression, are necessarily appropriative and constitute a having more profound than being. Not in the sense that these qualities belong to a subject, but in the sense that they delineate a territory that will belong to the subject that carries or produces them. These qualities are signatures, but the signature, the proper name, is not the constituted mark of a subject, but the constituting mark of a domain, an abode. The signature is not the indication of

243 Massey, *Space, Place, and Gender*, op. cit. pp.168-169.

244 Blunt and Dowling, *Home*, op. cit. p.23.

245 Gaston Bachelard, *The Poetics of Space. The Classic Look at How we Experience Intimate Places* (trans. John R. Stilgoe) (Boston: Beacon Press 1994) p.6.

246 Boccagni and Brighenti, 'Immigrants and home in the making: thresholds of domesticity, commonality and publicness', op. cit. p.4.

> a person; it is the chancy formation of a domain."[247]

"We can make the difference!", the British girl claimed with determination.[248] "We are change!", she insisted, in her effort to motivate a group of newly arrived people who were listening to her *welcome* speech. It was more than a motivational discourse, she was really inviting them (and me) *in*, to join the volunteer team by entering their territory made of 'humanity' and, manifestly, of youth and vitality. Everyone was invited, but to be comfortable one had to recognise the territorial qualities and make them her own. This was a British territory, despite being on French land, so that were you be only French-speaking you would have felt less at home in there.

"I have been invited by Maya", I said.[249] And he let me in with just a gaze, the same way as he stopped me from moving forward a few seconds earlier. The blond guy revealed his presence through his posture: he was standing next to the entrance of Jungle Books' reading room, where the meeting would be held. He looked confident; he looked as if this was his place. He knew who was an intruder – as I was – and who belonged to the group, thus appearing as a sort of doorman, who was not. If it were up to him I would not be allowed into 'his' territory. Fortunately, I had a key.

At the White Mountain restaurant a music that sounded unfamiliar to me was playing.[250] Melodies that I would have said Asian, in general terms, without being able to distinguish neither the musical genre nor the language of the lyrics. I entered: no more than a dozen young men were sitting in small groups and watching at the source of music, a television on the wall. The tv showed a ceaseless sequence of music videos ranging from Bollywood-like musicals, to allegedly contemporary or even traditional Asian songs. I had a hot tea while watching tv, for it was a good way to feel more comfortable. In the room, except me, there were only Asian-like men.[251]

As a *chez moi*, territory is the answer to the need of a domain and an abode, that is also the ethos, the 'accustomed place' in the original meaning, that distributes space with a refrain (*ritournelle*) as organising principle.

> "When do I do 'Tra-la-la'? When do I sing to myself? I sing to myself on three occasions. I sing to myself when I am moving about in my territory, wiping off my furniture with a radio playing in the background, that is when I am in my home [chez moi]. Then, I sing to myself when I am not in my home and I am trying to reach home, at nightfall, at the hour of agony. I am seeking my way

247 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus,* op. cit. p.316.

248 Quote from my fieldnotes of the first days as a volunteer at L'Auberge des Migrants – Help Refugees warehouse, from 20 to 24 of February 2016. Every morning the logistic officer, or another long-term volunteer in her behalf, used to give a speech for newbies, mainly to explain that the volunteers had a humanitarian and not a political mission. At that time, there were at least 10 newbies every day, and more during the weekends.

249 Quote from the encounter with a British guy who was standing outside the Jungle Books shack – where the meetings amongst volunteers and migrants were held – on the evening I attended a meeting for the first time (22 of February 2016).

250 The White Mountain was an Afghan restaurant in the Jungle and it was very popular among volunteers. It was very spacious, the food was considered as good enough, it has a tandoor oven to prepare Afghan bread (*naan*), and his owners were welcoming. I was there three times during my fieldwork, one of which by myself. On that occasion, it was quite early in the morning so the place was almost empty and I could take the time to observe the space and the *habitués*.

251 I did not speak nor interviewed any of the people in the restaurant, so I could only guess that they were from Afghanistan and maybe Pakistan, for these two countries were well represented in the Jungle. Moreover, most of the restaurants and shops were run by Afghan and Pakistani people.

[15]

[16]

Figure 15. The Jungle Books library and the reading room. Source: Jungle Books library Calais Facebook

Figure 16. White Mountain Restaurant, Jungle. Source: Vice

> and I give myself courage by singing 'tra-la-la'. I am going towards my home. And then, I sing to myself when I say 'Farewell, I am leaving and I will carry you in my heart...'. It is a popular song [...] when I am leaving home to go somewhere else, and where to go?"[252]

The refrain is a concept that crosses many fields of sense in the work of Deleuze and Guattari. It is the song of the bird that marks the territory. It is a block of sensation. "The whole of the refrain is the being of sensation".[253] In this respect, the affective dimension of the refrain – and of its territorial components – cannot be dissociated with its mode of emergence. The refrain, la *ritournelle*, is an affective mode of connecting with other forces, of attracting forces that might stabilise us or repulsing forces that threaten us with disorder. In other words, a mode for establishing a relationship, while functioning as an "attractor in the midst of sensible and significational chaos."[254] For Guattari, despite being spatially defined, territory is less an extensive than an intensive category, it has an atmospheric character which can be sensed. Refraining the sensory world becomes a way to settle one's nest while shunning the uncanny. "Without this refraining [*ritournellisation*] of the sensory world [...] surrounding objects would lose their air of familiarity and would collapse into a distressing strangeness."[255]

The relationship between the familiar and the uncanny, between *heimlich* and *unheimlich*, is not a binary one. In Deleuze and Guattari's line of thought, this relationship is dynamic and it refers to the three movements that are associated with it, of which nobody "cannot even say what come first".[256]

Dougar is the traffic jam, in an unidentified Sudanese dialect.[257] *Dougar* has been territorialized somewhere in a remote region in Sudan as 'traffic jam'. Someone, some day, has deterritorialized *dougar* in a French small area, along a motorway that leads to the port. It still meant 'traffic jam', but its function had changed: in the Jungle it was a rallying cry for people to rush to the motorway to exploit unexpected tailbacks to try and sneak into one of the lorries heading to the port, and from there to the UK. *Dougar* was materially reterritorialized on makeshift barricades built in order to force lorries to slow down, once the fortuitous tailbacks had stop happening along the same stretch of motorway.[258]

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252 Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, *L'Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze* (produced and directed by Pierre-André Boutang), DVD (Paris: Editions Montparnasse 2004).

253 Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* Op. cit. p.184.

254 Félix Guattari, 'Des subjectivités, pour le meilleur et pour le pire' *Chimères* 8 (1990): 23-37. Translation by Gary Genosko, in Félix Guattari, *The Guattari Reader* (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers 1996) p.200 (original emphasis).

255 Félix Guattari, 'Ritournelles et affects existentiels', *Chimères* 7 (1989) p.9.

256 Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, op. cit. p.68.

257 The origin of this term is unclear. Some volunteers I talked to in the Jungle thought it was a Sudanese word. But the official language in Sudan is Arabic, so it had to be a local dialect. K., a Sudanese guy whom I met there, told me instead that the word did not mean anything to him, and he had heard it in the Jungle for the first time. A piece of news in the Independent reported *dougar* without explaining the origin: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/calais-crisis-migrants-striving-to-reach-england-grateful-for-a-traffic-jam-sent-from-heaven-10343164.html. Despite the uncertain root, each of my sources agrees on that the term was mostly used by Sudanese migrants and then adopted by other people in the Jungle, with the same purpose. See also Philippe Wannesson's blog: https://passeursdhospitalites.wordpress.com/2015/05/07/dougar/ and French journalist Haydée Sabéran https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/221016/dans-le-camp-de-calais-reviendra-deja-fait-plus-difficile?onglet=full, for whom *dougar* comes from a Sudanese language.

258 As reported by Philippe Wannesson (a blogger and activist who has been writing on migrants' issues in Northern France for years) in an interview on the 8 March 2016: between autumn 2013 and June 2015 along the motorway in proximity of the camp (that was settled in march 2015) fortuitous tailbacks were very common three or four times a week. When they stopped being so recurring, without the interviewed knowing the reason, those living in the Jungle next to the motorway found an expedient to reproduce tailbacks by building makeshift barricades,

These movements that compose the refrain from which the territory is drawn are critical in Deleuze and Guattari's territorial paradigm. The concepts of territorialisation, deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation are used to express the importance of the relentless transformation that bodies undergo and that may enhance their life chances, thus ensuring their unceasing becoming-other, while at the same time putting at risk their coherence. The prerequisite for these movements is the existence of an *outside* that is itself part of the inside, of milieus from which the territory "borrows" components in order to emerge.[259] It is in this relationship with the milieus that the territory both keeps open the possibility of change and exposes itself to danger. The territory may emerge when the components that it selects from the milieus are translated into sensory qualities and are accommodated inside. It may contain 'vectors of deterritorialisation' that enable the transcoding of one component into the component of another territory, thus fleeing home to embark in an adventurous journey. Or, it may be breached by forces that unsettle it and drive it to confronting again with chaos.

If territory is "a space of intimate exchange of the body with its immediate surroundings that allows the self-regulation of the organism that sustains its continued existence,"[260] the emphasis on change rather than on fixity helps us understand it as a mobile object, where stability is a temporary condition, escape is a possibility that can be grasped, and chaos is always a looming threat behind the door.

Bryant convincingly explains that deterritorialisation is not to be intended simply as an "escape from territory". Interpreting code as "formed matter that serves a particular function", he suggests that deterritorialisation should be understood as "a decontextualization of a bit of code" that is first appropriated, then reconfigured and attributed new functions and different expressions elsewhere. "When code is stolen it is separated and isolated from its original milieu or territory, liberated from its original function, and then resituated in a new territory."[261] In *L'Invention du Quotidien,* Michel De Certeau refers to the displacement and reinvention of the possible moves that the walker on the street can make by selecting or transforming the spatial arrangements she comes across, by using a trope. "Thus Charlie Chaplin multiplies the possibilities of his cane: he does other things with the same thing and he goes beyond the limits that the determinants of the object set on its utilization. In the same way, the walker transforms each spatial signifier into something else."[262] This transformation, which is a deterritorialisation, attests every time the emergence of a new territory and the departure from the old one: the walker can decide to walk the pavement or sit down on it, to sleep on a bench or practise parkour on a wall. It should be noted that this decontextualization, or transcoding, as Deleuze and Guattari also call it, must first acquire expression in order to give birth to a territory, so that these emergent

especially at night. See also https://passeursdhospitalites.wordpress.com/2016/04/19/partie-nord-du-bidonville-letat-joue-le-pourrissement/.

259 As Zourabichvili points out, "a refrain does not mark a territory without including at the same time the outside, from which the territory distinguishes itself without leaving it behind" (my translation). François Zourabichvili, Deleuze. Une Philosophie de l'Evénement (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1994) p.116.

260 Tamsin Lorraine, 'Ahab and the Becoming-Whale: the Nomadic Subject in Smooth Space' in Ian Buchanan and Gregg Lambert (eds.), *Deleuze and Space* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 2005) p.161.

261 See Levi R. Bryant's blog at https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2011/07/02/deterritorialization/ [accessed on 13 Dicember 2016].

262 Michel De Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life* (trans. Steven Rendall)(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press 1988) p.98. This reference to De Certeau has been borrowed from a footnote in Pier Luigi Crosta's introduction to his "Pratiche. Il Territorio 'è l'uso che se ne fa'", where he borrows it in turn from Paolo Cottino. See Pier Luigi Crosta, *Pratiche. Il Territorio 'è l'uso che se ne fa'* (Milano: Franco Angeli 2010) p.10.

qualities "cease to be merely functional and become expressive features, making possible a transformation of functions."[263] In other words, territory is created from features (sounds, colours, marks, *signatures*...) that make possible the transformation of functions through a deterritorialisation and a correlative reterritorialisation elsewhere. Eventually it did not matter where *dougar* came from and what its meaning was. It was a rallying cry that could be territorialized each time on the running toward a tailback of lorries along the motorway.

The polysemy of concepts in Deleuze and Guattari's work make it possible to give them a social and political reading, as many have proposed.[264] As for territory and the correlative concepts, they might offer an understanding of how the *socius* – the social *megamachine*, as Deleuze and Guattari call it in Anti-Oedipus – is constituted.[265] In their view, the social field is certainly made of structures and functions, but recognising these features is not sufficient to account for how bodies move in and through the *socius* while producing and reproducing it. It is in this perspective, which puts an emphasis on the process, that they tie the concept of territory to those of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, because "everyone, at every age, in the smallest things as in the greatest challenges, seeks a territory, tolerates or carries out deterritorializations, and is reterritorialized on almost anything - memory, fetish, or dream."[266] Territory is home, but it is not fixed forever. A process is involved that is relentlessly building and dismantling territories, creating and dissolving relations, entering and leaving systems of control and order toward uncertainty and instability. Their focus on the processual and relational dimension is what it makes their theoretical framework so compelling. As Brighenti points out, by stressing the idea of movement which is inherent to Deleuze and Guattari's line of thought: "emphasis on the act leads to the recognition that territories are not simply relational, but also and primarily processual, evental and directional entities."[267]

Adopting a Guattari-Deleuze perspective on territory helps me move beyond the epistemological debate that questions whether territory is the result of either instinctual or strategic human activity. While both these positions tend to investigate territory as an object that should be described as such, the former encourages centring on the process by which the territory produces "ordered social relations",[268] the becoming of the territory itself and the relations that result from the process. This implies exploring how the territory can be produced, grow (and get stronger), dissolve, and be reproduced, while conceiving it (along with the *socius*) in its mobile, shimmering, and unsteady dimensions. In addition to this, instead of having the material and the immaterial as opposite properties that eventually describe different kind of territories, in this conceptual paradigm it is possible to integrate them as two modes within the same process, where expression and function, bodies, space and affects, contribute all to the emergence of the territory, and thus, to orderings.

263 Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?,* Op. cit. p.183.

264 See for example Paul Patton, *Deleuze and the Political*, op. cit.; Martin Fuglsang and Bent Meier Sørensen (eds.), *Deleuze and the Social* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 2006); Ian Buchanan and Nicholas Thoburn (eds.), *Deleuze and Politics* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 2008); Nathan Widder, Political Theory after Deleuze (London and New York: Continuum 2012); Rosi Braidotti, 'Nomadic Ethics' in D. W. Smith and H. Somers-Hall, The Cambridge Companion to Deleuze (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012) pp.170-197.

265 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane) (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press 2000).

266 Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?,* op. cit. pp.67-68.

267 Brighenti, 'On Territorology. Towards a general science of territory', op. cit. p.63.

268 Ibid. p.67.

2.3 The emergence of the Jungle

The territory is nothing natural; it is not something that simply 'exists'. The territory is 'done'. It is an experiment that can be successful or unfortunate depending on the encounters that come about. If, as Pier Luigi Crosta suggests, every definition is a programmatic one,[269] how does our framing of the concept of territory help us understand the Jungle in terms of control and orderings? And how did territories emerge in the Jungle? How did the Jungle emerge? Definitions of territory that regard it mainly as a space of sovereignty, a rational construct, or the basic mechanism to control other bodies, may convey compelling and useful insights about how formal apparatus build territories which are long-lasting and powerful, or how those apparatus exercise control precisely through territorial operations. It is especially thanks to these territories that the notion of territory itself has become so relevant in many disciplines and "an important geographical project would be to understand how these sticky territorial spaces work in the modern world."[270] However, this approach would conceal the multiple affective and material relations that have shaped the Jungle and, most importantly, it would fasten us to a perspective, the sovereign one, which would make us associate the territorializing process mainly to the institutional apparatus.

The territory of Deleuze and Guattari is the *chez soi* that emerges to protect us but the openness of which makes it so fragile it can crumble, with its emphasis on mobility rather than fixity, on coding and transcoding, on the expressiveness of closure and the exposure of openness. This territory enables a reading of the Jungle that on one side refrains from establishing any border a priori, and on the other side recognizes the possibility of transformation as always virtually present, thus seeding chaos into any possible order.

The Jungle has not been planned. It has not come out from the project of a rational subject. It has never been a strategic construction, rather the product of relentless negotiations among a wide range of human and non-human bodies. Let me briefly explore this thought before going back to territory. Planning and public policies are all about control; control is their conatus, namely the Spinozan "effort by which each thing strives to persevere in its being."[271] Planning's desire is precisely to establish its territory through boundaries, by setting up regulations and making its ideals of order emerge expressively by channelling bodies' movements into predetermined corridors of action. Negotiation with space and bodies is necessary for planning's principles to be implemented, but planning's conatus is what drives it in the first place toward ordered outcomes that autopoietically enhance its capacity for controlling through empowering (generally for planning itself) negotiations. Planning strives for stability and its operations are always directed to fix and reduce the instabilities of any system by limiting the possibility for deterritorialising movements to happen. Planning is a lawscape and lawscape is a continuum where every thing is kept under control: in this case, under the control of planning. There is still space for further transaction and eventually escape, because the lawscape can be ruptured, but bodies' movements have always to negotiate first with planning. In other words, bodies' relations are mediated by the ubiquitous planning-lawscape. This was not the case in the Jungle. Multiple lawscapes confronted each other to *make space*. It becomes clear why a concept of territory as mainly a rational act or a finite space on the background of human activities

269 Pier Luigi Crosta, 'Reti translocali. Le pratiche d'uso del territorio come 'politiche' e come 'politica'', op. cit.

270 Murphy, 'Entente Territorial: Sack and Raffestin on Territoriality', op. cit. p.168.

271 Deleuze, *Spinoza,* op.cit. p.21.

cannot suffice here. This is also why the project of an "ephemeral city" as the evolution of the makeshift camp is not possible.

> "An ephemeral city welcomed for five years on Calais' territory, as a fairground city in addition to the city centre, as a haven that will certainly set a precedent along migration routes in Europe. In the city, the infrastructuring of a street network for pedestrians and cyclists will extend route de Gravelines, rue de Garennes et chemin des Dunes. It will also expand through new lines of public transport. Multiple fountains, dry toilets, fire-fighting systems, and the necessary equipment for waste management, will mark out the main road system, which main arterial street will be accessible to firemen's vehicles. On the edge, within the '100 metres strip' and beyond, all along the routes that lead to the city centre, a moving garden generated by the cultivation of one thousand indigenous species. The prefiguration of the becoming of the 'third landscape' of the heath, which in five years will be handed over its status of protected area, a 'sanctuary for migratory birds'."[272]

This city is the 'good' side of the Jungle: vibrant, creative, welcoming, inclusive; but also sustainable, provided with services, comfort, and infrastructures. In one word, planned. How could this city possibly keep the character of a makeshift camp which is born out of unplanned encounters and practices, while also being planned, namely, controlled by the planning law? The lawscape of a planned, albeit ephemeral, city would be very different from the multiple and ever-changing lawscapes of the Jungle. Multiplicity and transformation could still be accommodated into a planned version of the encampment, but not in the form *of the Jungle*. For the Jungle *as it was*, its ever-changing orderings, could only emerge out of the unintentional and piecemeal process through which it was born, not a planned one. [273]

A piece of land that was at the same time a protected area for biodiversity conservation, an old dump and an area of environmental risk, because of its proximity to chemical plants, was a desert island where exiles were a sort of Crusoe waiting for being rescued, waiting for leaving, but striving for living meanwhile.[274] And this desert island was the territory of sand and wooded dunes, swamps, salted fields and meadows, where the *sedge warbler*, the *gadwall*, the *kentish plover*, the *crested newt* and the *common snipe* among many others, built their territories out of the advantageous environment.[275] During the nineteen months of life of the Jungle on that area, the landscape has completely changed under what ecologists would call the *human pressure*, and which I see as unceasing territorial movements that framed it, until the land was territorialized again by animals and plants

272 Perou is an action research group (*laboratoire de recherché-action*) based in Paris. It aims to "experiment new urban tactics in order to produce the city of hospitality against the inhospitable city" [http://www.perou-paris.org/Manifeste.html]. In Calais they conducted a multidisciplinary research proposing to capture the vitality and creativity that the Jungle generated as a support of a paradigm for the welcoming city. See at https://reinventercalais.org/1-pour-laccompagnement-dune-cite-ephemere-du-xxie-siecle/.

273 One must not forget that the Jungle was also the territory of smugglers, community mafias, the black market. All this could not be accommodated into an 'ephemeral' model of city.

274 The area where local authorities and the French state pushed exiles to settle, with the aim of freeing the town centre from their squats, was a 18 hectares site closed between the motorway heading to the port, a residential low-density neighbourhood, sown fields and a protected coastal area. It was in the proximity of the Jules Ferry centre, a State-funded compound where food distribution and other services were organised.

275 The area occupied by the Calais camp is classified as "Zone Naturelle d'Interet Ecologique, Faunistique et Floristique", which places it among the national sites that host significant species in terms of biodiversity (see at https://inpn.mnhn.fr/zone/znieff/310007286).

[17]

Figure 17. The protected area where the Jungle would settle. Source: L'Auberge des Migrants (Facebook)

once the Jungle was dismantled. During that period, something happened that not only transformed the landscape and challenged the ecosystem: a living and mobile arrangement emerged throughout the multiple encounters that were made possible by the rhizomatic nature of the desert island. Neither the animals nor a human system planned the overall process from the beginning. It happened as a consequence of countless arrangements, bargaining, and *transactions* – as Dewey would put it – which had been forming affective protective spheres.[276] Peter Sloterdijk's account of the genesis of those shields that are supposed to preserve us is evocative:

> "The circle that protects the human being is not constructed nor simply found, but it is spontaneously created on the threshold that distinguishes the construction and self-fulfilment or, rather, it is done in the making of the curvature – as those who gather around a camp fire, free *and* determined, benefit immediately from the heat."[277]

The Jungle emerged as a refuge and a complex assemblage of bodies whose territories *were* the Jungle, even when they did not materially belonged to the place called the Jungle, which authorities called *la lande,* to refer to both the camp and to the piece of land.[278]

It seems that the Afghans and the Pakistani were the first to arrive.[279] They occupied the best piece of land they could find: it was close to the road that gave access to *la lande*, it was flat and did not require too much work to be cleaned up from the bush that covered the area. It was the end of March 2015 and in Calais there were around one thousand two hundred people squatting in many different places in the town centre. They had been informed that they could move to *la lande* and they would not have been further tolerated in town by state authorities and the police.[280] As people moved to *la lande* from squats or arriving from outside Calais, they chose an emplacement for which they had to bargain with the landscape, but also with a multiplying number of neighbours, their desire to be in proximity to their fellows countrymen, an urban-like zoning that was setting up – with a high street of shops and restaurants, ethnic neighbourhoods – as well as with volunteers' actions and movements. And over time, constraints increased with the place getting more crowded, the availability of desired place shrinking, volunteers building shacks instead of tents and bringing in caravans, the state installing water points and chemical toilets, and eventually the police bulldozing ample parts of the land to accomplish to their regulations and procedures.

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276 In transactions, each participant assumes a part in the exchange that has not been defined a priori, but only emerges "*in and because of* a transaction". In this sense, as Crosta points out, transactions are not only s*ituated* interactions, they are also constitutive of every body (both human and non-human) which is involved in their emergence and which relational dimension is transformed as a result. See Crosta, *Pratiche. Il Territorio 'è l'uso che se ne fa'* op. cit.*;* John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley, *Knowing and the Known* (Boston: Beacon Press 1949).

277 Peter Sloterdijk, *Sfere I. Bolle* (Milano: Raffaello Cortina Editore 2014) (my translation, original emphasis) pp.71-72.

278 *La lande* was the terms used by politicians to refer to the Jungle. It was used in particular by the mayor of Calais and other local politicians to mean belittlingly a wasteland.

279 I have based the narrative of the first settlers on the storytelling of three interviews that I conducted during the month I spent in Calais, with a journalist of "Nord Littoral", a local French newspaper; a French volunteer who has been helping exiles in the Calais area for six years and who was living in the Jungle at the time of the first eviction; a French activist who runs a blog on exiles' issues in Calais.

280 The number of migrants in Calais in March 2015 corresponded to 1200 according to the activist Wannesson (https://passeursdhospitalites.wordpress.com/2015/03/) and 2500 according to Gilles Debove, the police officer who gave me this figure during an interview on 27 July 2016.

Every move supposes a negotiation, every encounter entails "the actualisation of manifold possibilities of connection" that are enabled "by the nature of the space where (and with which) encounters take place: its being manifold and becoming, its being undistinguishable by those bodies that are parts of the same continuum."[281] Space is where random encounters occur and bodies meet, connect and disconnect with each other. In this framework, space is not a geographical and representational object. It is rather an open entity that, as Massey argues, is the product of social relations, which in their relentless unfolding convey irreducible elements of change.[282] It is there that negotiations, thus agreements or disagreements, assembling or disassembling, entering or leaving, originate. In this sense, the territory is a block of space-time that is generated through bodies' relations. After all, "time and space [...] are the *consequences* of the ways in which bodies relate to one another."[283]

We need to think of territory as the act of marking a distance, which is however not a geometric distance, but one based on proximity in a relational space rather than contiguity in a geographical space. This approach maps space (and reality) as a rhizome, an open multiplicity of both human and non-human bodies that enables its different parts to ceaselessly establish non-hierarchical connections and changes through encounters and ruptures.[284] Encounters form the constituent event that prompts transformation and triggers the emergence of arrangements, *assemblages*, through the negotiation of bodies amongst them and with space. In this sense, the Jungle could be mapped according to each body's rhizomatic connections, which depended on its relation with the space and other bodies and could change over time.

"Territory is the first assemblage."[285] When connected, bodies form an assemblage, a territorialisation is always involved, meaning that the assemblage is what holds together heterogeneous bodies that build a territory, it is what gives them consistency. The assemblage is doubly constituted by a content, which is its territory and bodies that compose it, and expression, which is the refrain, or how the content manifest itself expressively. This double articulation's *raison d'être* is co-functioning: heterogeneous components work together as a machine, in symbiosis, and their unity is only that which the assemblage derives from a cogwheel that articulates both a *state of things* and a regime of signs.[286] These two characters are the segmentary lines of the assemblage, those that organise it. But then, the assemblage has more than these two aspects. It has a third dimension, which is precisely that which assures its transformation, through movements of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation: "There is no assemblage without territory."[287] From this perspective, it is not territory that matters, for "territory is a place of passage,"[288] but the movements that it enables and the ever-changing configurations and arrangements that are relentlessly re-produced through them. Let me now go back to the territorial assemblage of the Jungle.

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281 Francesca Ansaloni and Miriam Tedeschi, 'Understanding space ethically through affect and emotion: from uneasiness to fear and rage in the city', *Emotion, Space and Society* 21 (2016): p.19.

282 Massey, *For Space*, op. cit.

283 Bruno Latour, 'Trains of Thought: Piaget, Formalism, and the Fifth Dimension', *Common Knowledge* 3/2 (1997): pp.170-191.

284 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus,* op. cit.

285 Ibid. p.323.

286 Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues,* op. cit.

287 Ibid. p.72.

288 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus,* op. cit. p.323.

[18]



Figure 18. Territories of the Jungle, map in the warehouse (before February 2016). Source: J Jason Mitchell (Twitter)

It is impossible to trace the original starting point, because it does not exist as a single point but as multiple ones. Hence, I assume the narratives of those I have encountered and interviewed, or even mine, as starting points. Every starting point is somewhere *in the middle* of the whole story, but it will tell us something about how the territory of the Jungle had emerged.

Joe is from the UK. He is an actor, a playwright and one of the founders of the Good Chance Theatre in the camp of Calais.[289] When Joe Murphy and his peer Joe Stevenson arrived in Calais, encouraged by media coverage in the UK, they decided to launch a crowdfunding campaign to raise some money and put up a project. Their idea was to create "a warm space, always open, where everyone would be welcomed," and in order to translate it materially they built a dome, a *democratic* semi-sphere. The white dome was at first erected in the northern outskirts of that which at the time, August 2015, was a sort of construction site with still a lot of space available. The site was chosen because it was out of the main road and it was ready to be built upon. Quite soon the dome had to be moved. At the end of August 2015, the French Prime Minister Manuel Valls announced that a humanitarian camp would have been constructed next to the makeshift one and the site that was identified was occupied by tents, shacks, and the dome.[290] The French government marked the emplacement of the future camp made of containers, as a form of communication and the ratification of any possible negotiation; and then sent a private company to clear it. The reterritorialisation of the dome was not its repositioning. Rather, it is to be found in the new policy, which had to deal with different milieus and new encounters. First, heading south, they could not find an even plot of land and they had to level it. They decided to level a wider area than that they needed and made it clear who was desirable as a neighbour and who was not. The dome moved in October and a few weeks later the area had become rich in services: the 'Unofficial' Women and Children's centre, the welcome point of Secours Catholique, and the Legal Centre. To those "hippies" volunteers who came to ask whether they could settle nearby with their caravans, Joe answered no. Those people had political claims, Joe considered, and the Good Chance Theatre was not a place for political fight, except for its own being there, for having set up its territory in the Jungle. Second, the dome was among the most visible building in the Jungle, what in urban language one would call a landmark. Despite its visibility from afar, the dome was not easy to reach by walk, precisely because it held a secluded spot in the middle of a sea of shacks and mud. As Joe loved to repeat, the dome existed for everyone and nobody would have been forced to join the activities. Once I was there, mainly volunteers and Asian men shared the space. Some people took part in the activity, a young man was sitting on a bench, another one was riding his bicycle inside without anyone complaining. It looked like a shared space, except that it was a second home for many Afghan people, who were the largest neighbours in proximity. Joe told me that at the beginning, a group of Afghanis put a national flag in front of the dome and started singing the Afghan anthem. Instead of preventing them from doing that, Joe and his partners invited other groups to do the same. Still, there was a sharp difference

289 My first encounter with Joe Murphy was at a meeting of those held just before the first eviction took place. The Good Chance Theatre had mainly evening shows and during the day was managed by volunteers who held sessions of theatre, art workshops, karate lessons and other events. At that meeting we could not talk, and later I simply crossed him at the wrong time. Either I could meet him or his partner by accident, or I had to engage the formal path, a formal appointment taken by their communication officer. Before going through the officer I tried with an Italian actress who was volunteering, but this attempt was unsuccessful as well. The interview was arranged for the 7 March 2016.

290 http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/08/31/calais-manuel-valls-annonce-la-construction-d-un-campement-humanitaire-d-ici-2016_4741532_3214.html.

[19]

[20]

Figures 19 and 20. Tags of the census. Source: the author

between the raising of the Afghan flag and those that followed. The first act was drawing a territory, marking a distance, and creating a rupture. The acts that ensued were more of a kind of barren repetition. Barren, not in its representational dimension, but in the sense of a territorial move. When the repetition began, the territory was already formed and the repetition served only to reinforce it. The afghan flag and the dome had become a new territorial assemblage, beyond any intention, only through the affective power of an expressive feature. And the refraining of other flags somehow came to confirm its power, while losing their own expressivity and becoming silent. The Afghan flag did not need to be issued again; the territorial assemblage had already emerged out of a milieu that was inevitably invited in.

When I met Joe, the first eviction was ongoing but the dome, along with other services at its proximity, had been appointed as a *lieu de vie*, one of the places of living that could be saved from demolition, according to a verdict of the Administrative Court of Lille.[291] On the 12 of February 2016 the French Prefecture announced that half of the Jungle was going to be dismantled and a few days later the intention was turned into law.[292] When the decree was issued and before the eviction started, the aid organizations decided to react and appeal against the state decision. They hired a lawyer and worked with her towards a line of defence that would block the demolition. The two main arguments offered different prisms through which regarding at the demolition issue. One proposed an alleged objective insight into the numbers of people living in the southern part of the Jungle at the time, by oppugning the method of the survey and hence the numbers declared by the state officers. Immediately after the announcement of the forthcoming demolition of the southern area of the Jungle, the aid groups organised a census that, in their view, would serve to contradict the figures that the French state had released about the number of people who were leaving in the Jungle. According to the aid organisations, institutional figures were underestimating the real numbers on account of several flaws in their method of collecting data. First, for carrying out the fieldwork early in the morning, when most of the people were absent from their shelters, usually on their way back from the nocturnal attempts to cross the Channel. Second, state officers were blamed for counting only those they would find inside the shelter at the moment of the inspection, without interviewing people about the actual number of occupants. To this, volunteers counterpointed their method, based on a double check at different moments of the day and a two-page questionnaire distributed with the support of translators, inquiring about origin, age, family status, period of stay in the Jungle, and other information.[293] The census was not just a tool to be used in the courtroom through numbers. It materialized itself in the Jungle by way of tags on shelters. Every shack and every tent within the boundaries of the camp was turned into a piece of census, a declaration of war against authorities. Measures turned expressively what leading aid organizations wanted into what they believed: that the Jungle was too overpopulated to be evacuated without offering alternatives.[294] I followed this event as it was coming into

291 http://www.nordeclair.fr/info-locale/demantelement-de-la-jungle-de-calais-la-justice-jna60b0n1042934

292 http://www.lemonde.fr/immigration-et-diversite/article/2016/02/12/l-etat-va-raser-la-moitie-de-la-jungle-de-calais_4864362_1654200.html and https://passeursdhospitalites.files.wordpress.com/2016/02/arrc3aatc3a9-prefc3a8te-19-02-2016.pdf

293 The census was carried out the first time in February 2016 and each month since then, until the complete destruction of the Jungle in October 2016. It was managed by a British girl who worked for Help Refugees and was very reluctant to share her method and data, which were published monthly on the website of the organization. See by way of example: http://www.helprefugees.org.uk/news/new-calais-census-released-568-children-calais-74/

294 "Measures turn what we want into what we believe", inspired by Gabriel Tarde in Andrea Mubi Brighenti, 'The Social Life of Measures: Conceptualizing Measure-Value Environments', *Theory, Culture & Society* online 2017.

being, observing as the tags on every shelter of the Jungle were manifesting their political force through movements of territorialisation, deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation. Every shelter was assigned an alphanumeric code composed by a number indicating the sub-sector and a letter indicating the occupied sector (north or south), followed by the number of the registered shelter. First the tags territorialised every hut of the Jungle: they became marks that erased the anonymity of the encampment, points of reference in the disorienting landscape, orderings. After the eviction, when every single hut and caravan was moved to the north, all references were lost in the south, which remained vacant, only to be reterritorialized in a new landscape of signs that made visible the instability of this territory in the northern area.

Let me go back for a moment. Before the trial, the Jungle was already a site of multiple struggles and multiple territories. The French state, through ACTED, a French NGO that was being funded to provide water and sanitation, had a small role within the boundaries of *la lande*. On the other hand, the state had the control of the main entrances through the police, and had carved its territory out of the encampment by building a fenced camp of containers. This camp called CAP (Centre d'Accueil Provisoire) was managed by La Vie Active, a French NGO in charge of some more services in the Jules Ferry centre, a fenced site outside but in proximity of the Jungle. Within the boundaries of *la lande*, the territory of the state was a threat coming from the boundaries: extremely porous ones, though. Suffice it to say, when in May 2016 a large-scale and violent fight blew up between Afghans and Sudanese in the Jungle, the police did not enter the encampment. The police officer I interviewed explained that the police intervene only when all the safety measures are in place in order for police officers to work properly without risk. In the makeshift camp this was not the case: it was too chaotic, it had narrow streets and every corner was a possible escape route. No safety measures could apply there for the police. The paradox of the state owning a piece of land where the State law could not always be enforced.[295] With reference both to the unplanned character of the encampment which I discussed earlier in this chapter and the enforcement of the asylum regime, which I will explore in chapter 4, the French state had made the Jungle the place where the exception had not become rule, but the rule had become the exception.

So, before the trial, the Jungle was an assemblage of many different territorial assemblages, which included its inhabitants, volunteers, journalists, researchers, workmen of the waste collection service, firemen, etc., that confronted with the territory of the state mainly at the borders. With the trial, the census and through the tags, the Jungle emerged as the territory defended by the aid organizations. It was not the first time that the aid groups had challenged the French state, but it was the first time they were transcoding their territory in the Jungle to face the state. They were making the Jungle their territory by re-functionalising the materiality of the camp through some *refrained* tags. Territory, Guattari says, is "never given as object but always as intense repetition."[296]

The other argument the organizations used to employ was a subtler one. A few days before the trial, they tagged every shelter of the Jungle with "*lieu de vie*", place of living, and a heart. This operation was aimed at the French state through the media, but also intended

295 Interview with Gilles Debove, Calais Police Union representative (27 July 2016).

296 Félix Guattari, *Chaosmosis: an Ethico-Aestetic Paradigm* (trans. Paul Bains and Julian Pefanis) (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press 1995) p.28.

[21]



Figure 21. Map of the Jungle: Acted divided the encampment in sectors to organise its management. The same mapping was used by other organisations and to tag every shelter. Source: Acted.

to sensitize personally the judge of the Court of Lille, whose visit to the camp was planned on the eve of the trial. These tags aimed to reinforce the previous ones used for the census. And all together, they were the territorial device through which boundaries that until then had been fixed along the perimeter of the encampment, now were moved inside to react to a menace that was pointing to the core of the Jungle, to its survival. The power of the threatened eviction was that it affected aid organizations in a way that pushed them to emerge from the inertia of the daily routines to repositioning themselves more politically, by closing their territory against the state, but at the same time opening to upheaval. The offset of their closing was that, as I will discuss briefly, they re-functionalized their territory and, by turning the inhabitants of the Jungle into numbers, they opened to the same biopolitical framing the state had adopted. I cover this in depth in the chapter 4. Now it suffices to say that this opening was unveiling and bringing to the light, thus *visibilizing,* a biopolitical territory that the state and the aid organizations shared. The assemblage of sustenance.

From the perspectives of both the state and aid groups, their machines of sustenance were two distant and incompatible galaxies. On one side, the state neglected the work of volunteers, obstructing it at discretion.[297] On the other side, volunteers criticized vehemently the system of food provision put in place by the state.[298] If we regard the provision of food as a machinic arrangement, the two systems cooperated, they were part of the same gear that managed, distributed and fed the residents of the Jungle. This machine had specific blocks of space-time that functioned through highly expressive and visible apparatus for the administration of bodies: queues, reservation tickets, disposable tableware, predetermined schedules, and food tailored on the mass of population. And this is the point: the whole food assemblage co-worked by assuming the inhabitants of the Jungle as a population. Over the months, the aid organizations had modified their functioning in order to meet the needs of the residents and provide them a more individualized service, but the tailoring was accompanied by an inescapable increase of apparatuses to manage their daily operations. In addition, especially with regard to the raw scheme supply, the urgency of customizing the provision led the volunteers to implement individual negotiations with one or more individuals from the diverse ethnical communities. These connections established power relations with unpredictable consequences.[299] These practices can be considered biopolitical in two senses. On the one side by putting bodies' life – as sustenance through feeding – at their core, they established a power relation, a precise territory with boundaries, functions and sensory qualities, and "acted as factors of segregation and social hierarchization, exerting their influence on the respective forces of both these movements, guaranteeing relations of domination and effects of hegemony," as Foucault puts it.[300] On the other side,

297 As pointed out, the French state had the control of boundaries and accesses to *la lande*. Depending on the will of police officers, without particular commands, the police officer on the field could decide to let in or out people recognized as not migrant.

298 The two systems were run in accordance with totally different principles. Volunteers had two schemes: one scheme provided raw food to people who had the possibility of cooking through exiles individuals who collected it in behalf of their family or their group of fellows. The other scheme provided prepared meals at specific hours and in specific spots. There were three main kitchens in the Jungle run by volunteers that supplied meals especially in the evening. The state distributed one prepared meal per day at the Jules Ferry centre from 2 pm and hot beverages in the morning. Volunteers deplored the state for assuring only one meal per day and for eluding the needs of many inhabitants of the camp, who preferred to cook their own meals instead of eating pre-cooked ones.

299 By way of example, during a meeting among the so-called *relais communautaires* (Anglophones volunteers referred to them as the community leaders) and aid organizations, I witnessed a quarrel between two Syrian guys. One was accusing a former *relais*, by then in the UK, of having cheated his community by selling supplied food he should have distributed.

300 Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality. Volume I: an Introduction,* op. cit. p.141.

the feeding practice, in its full materiality, cannot be dismissed as a neutral or apolitical process on the grounds that it does not involve discursive factors. In this respect, reworking Barad's theorization on materiality, I want to put an emphasis on matter as an agent with a capacity of *doing* of its own, not correlative to but intertwined with discourses. If we understand feeding practices and their apparatuses of production as material phenomena, and discourses as a product of the enactment of those same practices, we cannot but view matter as inseparable from discourse and material-discursive practices as agents of territorialisation. As such, matter, in its *mattering*, creates boundaries and exclusions.[301] Matter territorialises in its becoming matter. Feeding territories, as we will see in the next chapter, kept the Jungle in rhythm, established specific relations with inhabitants of the makeshift camp, and the encampment itself, and deterritorialised the political struggle by fixing a centre.

To sum up, the refunctionalization of the territory of aid groups went through the expressive performativity of the tags. On the one side, via the code corresponding to the file of the questionnaire; on the other side, via the *lieu de vie* caption. In the first instance, the territory was constituted as a biopolitical one through the association of individuals and numbers, of individuals and the undetermined mass of the inhabitants of the Jungle. This refunctionalization had visibilized another territory, one which the aid organizations shared with the state, the territorial assemblage of sustenance, of food provision. In the second instance, the territory was built by transcoding shelters into 'home', matter into meaning. This latter operation closed the territory but, as I show below, opened to disruption.

The trial resulted in the confirmation of the eviction notice for the southern area of the encampment.[302] The judge rejected all the instances but agreed on maintaining the *lieux de vie*. Except that she transcoded the meaning implied in the tags in two fashions: on the one hand, the court order questioned the numbers provided by applicants by valuing instead those presented by the state, affirming that those numbers (of people) would have found enough place to sleep in the available state-led structures, the Jules Ferry centre and the CAP. Accordingly, only *cultural* and *worship* places in that half part of the camp were identified as *lieux de vie* and thus kept, while *houses* were left out of the safeguard plan. The judge refused to recognize the shelters as place of living, as 'home'. In this regard, the territory of the Jungle – the way the taggers had created it – was first deterritorialised, collapsing into pieces, only to be reterritorialised onto two new territories: the one of the state-provided containers and tents; the other one of the disposable territory of the eviction. The dome was among the *lieux de vie* that the judge recommended to save. The dome, among others, was decontextualised and then recoded as a relevant place, one which deserved to stay because "carefully crafted."[303] At the same time, the vast area of shacks, caravans, shops (and a disguised mosque), was territorialised as worthless, hence expendable.

301 "Materiality is discursive (...), just as discursive practices are always already material." Karen Barad, 'Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of how Matter comes to Matter' *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 28 3 (2003).

302 See http://lille.tribunal-administratif.fr/content/download/56106/498105/version/1/file/Ordonnance%20de%20r%C3%A9f%C3%A9r%C3%A9%20n%C2%B0%201601386...pdf.

303 Ibid. p.14: "lieux soigneusement aménagés" (my translation).

2.4 Visibilisations

The container camp the French state built, the CAP, opened in January 2016 after the dismantling of a portion of the existent makeshift camp.[304] White containers surrounded by fences, expressiveness and distance. The white container, no longer a metal box, was soon turned into a cage and the fences became a prison which marked the distance between state control and its enemies, an attempt of closing the chaos outside. The state made a portion of the makeshift camp its territory by bestowing expressiveness on a piece of land that was previously occupied by tents (and the dome), which were invited to resettle elsewhere. When the container camp opened, it established a regime of dialogue with its milieu. Some (journalists, researchers, volunteers) had to negotiate their access by asking for formal permission to the French NGO in charge of its management. Its prospective residents had to negotiate their access by releasing their palm prints, but no documents nor personal details, except for their country of origin. Some people (lone migrant women) were excluded.[305] Some just turned the fences into a breach and let the Jungle enter into the territory that the state had so painstakingly shaped; or, put it differently, let the chaos of the Jungle corrupt the order of the fenced camp. The main narratives about the two places, mostly shared from volunteers and the media, labelled the Jungle as an urban object – as lively and messy as a city is – and the container camp as a prison: closed, controlled and inhospitable.[306] These narratives were held as if the two places were counterposed in terms of control. This was explained on the grounds that in the Jungle people had freedom of movement, a great variety of food offer to choose from, including the possibility of cooking one's own meals, intimacy in small tents or shacks, and spaces for socialising – what you may find in a city – while the camp of containers lacked all these features and *felt* like a confinement camp. How did the regime of visibility of the camp of containers produce orderings? I will argue that, despite appearances, control emerged also through the narratives of control.

How visibility and territories relate? Elaborating on Brighenti's conceptualisation of visibility as a territorial field, as I have already mentioned, I construe territory as a complex phenomenon to which different regimes of visibility correspond, each with its own apparatus of visibilisation.[307] To recall, I have described the Jungle as a refuge that emerged expressively, result of the relentless negotiations amongst the bodies that encountered and intermingled in the same milieu. As we have seen with the example of the census and the tags, the territory visibilises its space of emergence and distance through a refrain, "a

304 The camp, named Centre d'Accueil Provisoire (CAP) by the French state, was composed of 125 containers of 12 places each, equipped with beds, heating and lockers. Within the facilities it offered a room (unequipped when I visited it the 1 March 2016) for families and kids, toilets and sinks outside the bedrooms. No other socialising spaces were available, nor equipment for cooking. Showers, laundry and food provision were to be found outside, in the Jules Ferry Centre, which was closed at night, or in the makeshift camp, where food was available at the volunteer-led kitchens or the restaurants. See http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/08/31/calais-manuel-valls-annonce-la-construction-d-un-campement-humanitaire-d-ici-2016_4741532_3214.html; http://m.lavoixdunord.fr/region/migrants-de-calais-les-travaux-du-campement-humanitaire-ia33b48581n3156763.

305 Inside the Jules Ferry centre, the same state-funded NGO, La Vie Active, run a space which was assigned to offer accommodation to lone women and lone mothers with underage children. The container camp did not accept those two categories on the grounds that promiscuity needed to be avoided.

306 See for example: http://www.lavoixdunord.fr/region/calais-le-camp-humanitaire-pour-migrants-un-nouveau-ia33b0n3262309; http://www.liberation.fr/france/2016/01/12/a-calais-les-migrants-pas-vraiment-emballes-par-le-camp-de-containers_1425934; http://www.liberation.fr/debats/2015/10/21/a-calais-un-camp-des-annees-30_1407751; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/12/calais-jungle-residents-defy-bulldozers-police-ultimatum; https://www.theguardian.com/world/commentisfree/2016/jan/20/france-is-bulldozing-the-calais-jungle-but-its-replacement-looks-suspiciously-like-a-jail.

307 Andrea Mubi Brighenti, *Visibility in Social Theory and Social Research* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2010).

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Figure 22. The camp of containers (CAP), viewed from the Jungle. Source: the author

Figure 23. Welcome billboard at the CAP. Source: the author

performance (...), an organization of color or movement."[308] The visual is implicit in this account, for a territory is only coming into being in its field of visibility, which is both intensive and extensive. Also, its visibility implies a relation between territory and space: the territory materialises its spatiality by becoming visible. Let us think of the tags: shelters, after this expressive movement, were not anymore only the built environment of the encampment, they had turned into the spatial emergence of a practice run by volunteers.

However, visibility is not a property of the territory; "it is the element in which it is possible to inscribe and project a series of *thresholds* in the 'flesh' (*à la* Merleau-Ponty) of the social."[309] While thresholds signal the passage into a territory and its field of visibility, both the territory and its visibility are the outcome of relational processes and, in this sense, the territory can be in/visible if its field of visibility is engineered accordingly. As I discussed in chapter 1, thresholds can be understood as porous and smooth boundaries that create "potential spaces of transition, which mark – if and once they have been passed through – some sort of qualitative difference for those involved."[310] In these spaces, visibility is negotiated as well.

Territory is the lawscape of one body; it is a lawscape where law, the law of every body, has become more visible than space; where space has been rendered invisible (if not only for a moment) by the matter of expression of the body's law. Following Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, I have described in chapter 1 the lawscape as the plane where law and space intertwine; where every body, in its materiality and spatiality, is governed by the law of other bodies. It is a law that can be *nomos* or *logos*. While law as *logos* "fixes space, turns it into points, tight measurements of distance and propinquity, normative geometries, lines of connection that do not allow any excess to surface," law as *nomos* is "the uncountable, incalculable law that distributes emplacements and *lines of flight* (namely, creative processes that push the limits of immanence) on smooth space."[311] Law as either *logos* or *nomos* plays with space through regimes of in/visibility, where positions of hypervisibility or infravisibility can emerge. Stated otherwise, if law is "all over" in the lawscape, it interacts differently with the bodies that come in contact with it and the regime of visibility that characterises any interaction varies accordingly. The territory is a lawscape in the lawscape, one which must always be visible to perform as a territory, to be productive in its territorialising process.

What Brighenti calls "regimes of visibility" represents the set of normative elements which define the organisation of the relations within the multiplicity of the territory, in terms of visibility a-symmetries. The regimes of visibility articulate the process which constitutes the complex emergence of the territory, and create the conditions for the territory to become in/visibile. Along this process, rules are set that establish the reciprocal positioning of bodies, their distance and the consequent in/visibility of the territory in relation to those bodies. Distance is part of the same process and pertains to the same field of visibility that the territory sets through boundaries and sensory qualities. For each territory that is created out of the milieu we will have a field of affective relations mediated by distance, on the basis of which a specific regime of visibility is put at work. From this perspective,

308 Grosz, *Chaos, Territory, Art,* op. cit. p.12.

309 Brighenti, *Visibility in Social Theory and Social Research,* op. cit. p.41 (original emphasis).

310 Boccagni and Brighenti, 'Immigrants and home in the making: thresholds of domesticity, commonality and publicness', op. cit. p.4.

311 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, *Spatial Justice*, op. cit. pp.55-56.

the degree of visibility of a given territory is ontologically correlative to that territory. As a consequence, we have a multiplicity of territories, each one in its field of visibility, caught up within specific relations with observing bodies. A given territory may be in/visible because of the specific regime of visibility it has engineered that can include technical and political arrangements, narratives, procedures, or rituals.

Let me take again the camp of containers to show a regime of in/visibility at work. The first expressive sign, the first refrain, was a red line on the ground that delimitated the boundaries of the future emplacement. That yet barely visible but already emergent territory annihilated any distance by capturing into a undesired relation those who had their tents and shacks within the boundaries, making the threat of the eviction totally visible (hence material) to them. Then, the bulldozers and the fence brought to light a new territory on the same physical boundaries substituting a red line with a new regime of visibility made of the technical means of an eviction, another refrain: a fence, police control, people on displacement. Even before the opening of the camp, the white containers and the device for controlling the access of residents made another territory emerge that combined with the already circulating 'city vs jail' narrative and construed an extremely powerful regime of visibility. This territory had been engineered to differentiate its space from the Jungle's: the white colour, the turnstiles, the biometric device, and the fence made sure that the body "feels the work of transformation" in the passage from the CAP to the Jungle.[312] This had not happened, for example, at the Jules Ferry centre, which was fenced and run by the same state-funded NGO, because the centre was already there at the dawn of the Jungle. Its territory could be negotiated with since the beginning.

Transformation, here intended as the process that a body embarks on when the smoothness of her practice is not assured or is even hindered by a number of other bodies with which she has to negotiate.[313] "The visible is the dimension in which distances are created and demarcated."[314] Is the refrain of a white, fenced, and technologically controlled space not setting a highly visible distance with the Jungle? In this territorial movement there are at least two regimes of visibility at work. On the one side, the hypervisibility of the division through a whiteness that is a not so subtle racialised stance; on the other side, the visibilisation of the biopolitical regime of control and surveillance through a biometric device.[315] The appearance of the camp of containers brought planning into the makeshift camp, and with it order and biopolitical control. The first in the visible form of distinction and segregation (what is the inside and the outside?) through both its material and aesthetic quality; the second in the unverifiable dimension of the biometric technology.[316] As I noted earlier in this chapter, the emergence of a territory is always affective. In this case, the visibility of the segregational move and the ambiguity of the biopolitical territory joined to repulse bodies.

On the first days of its opening, the new camp received very few requests of accommodation. Some people were intimidated by the level of surveillance and control, and especially afraid

312 Latour, 'Trains of Thought: Piaget, Formalism, and the Fifth Dimension', op. cit. p.177.

313 Ibid.

314 Brighenti, *Visibility in Social Theory and Social Research,* op. cit. p.56.

315 The biometric device that was chosen to control the access to the camp associated the morphological scan of the hand in 3D with a numerical code.

316 Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison* (trans. Alan Sheridan) (New York: Vintage Books 1995). When describing Bentham's panoptical apparatus of surveillance, Foucaul recalls the main objectives of the panopticon with respect to power: power must be both visible and unverifiable, so that the docile body would auto-discipline to avoid punishment.

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Figure 24. The gate of the CAP: turnstiles and the biometric device at the right. Source: Polyvalence (Facebook)

of having their fingerprints registered. The biometric device which had been installed at the entrance of the camp was designed to recognise the palm print of the registered guest. Many people had arrived in Calais after crossing several borders in Europe and had the fingerprints taken in one country and registered in the European database called Eurodac, or not taken at all. With this system, the European country which is hold responsible for the asylum application is the one where the fingerprints had been taken first. Since many people in the Jungle were trying to get to the UK and did not want to claim for asylum in France or risked to be transferred back to the country where they had left their fingerprints, they were worried that a biometric device could somehow capture their fingerprints and made them available to the police. Why would the state make such a choice with such a predictable outcome? During an informal chat with the communication officer of the local Prefecture, he explained that the choice of the device was based on the level of security it could guarantee, compared to devices such as digital badges, which could be easily exchanged, lost or sold. He could not justify, though, their incapability of anticipating a foreseeable mistrust, by saying that they did not expect any.[317] While the biopolitcal implications of the biometric device will be discussed in chapter 4, I want to mention here another very controversial issue: the system of selection that would have been implemented in order to accommodate in the containers 1500 thousands people out of the then estimated 5500 living in the Jungle before the eviction.[318] When I raised the issue with the then Director of La Vie Active, the French NGO that was in charge of the Jules Ferry Centre and would have also managed the CAP, he commented that they would have probably worked on a "first come, first served" basis, but that they still had to think about it.[319] Whatever the intentions and plans of the French government, the choice of this ambiguous biometric system eventually facilitated the opening of the camp by avoiding to have a mass of people at its gates on the first day.

A little later, the containers began to fill up slowly and after the eviction a waiting list was set up.[320] Soon after the opening of the camp, new functions assigned to the fence, and transformational practices that opened it up, carried out a deterritorialisation of the boundaries between the CAP and the Jungle, thus of the two territories themselves. The fence that separated the CAP from the Jungle, the same fence that manifested so visibly the emergence of the territory of the state, had converted into a passage and a dryer (see figures 25 and 26). It was no longer the territory of the state, in its pure sense, but had already been refunctionalised in an annexe of the Jungle, a whiter and more ordered *neighbourhood* of the Jungle. This is not to say that the camp of container was open. It was open for those who were admitted, but remained a closed and supervised camp for the majority who were not allowed in.[321] But some residents were able to negotiate their territory with it, challenging its regimes of visibility with different ones, and dismantling the original territory by smoothing

317 During the eviction the communication officer was often present in the Jungle to answer journalists' questions. When I met him he agreed to answer my questions on the spot [2 March 2016].

318 The number of people in the Jungle was estimated to be around 5500 people in the whole encampment and around 3500 in the evicted area by the Help Refugees census in February 2016. According to the French state these numbers were overestimated. A census realised by the border police (*Police aux Frontières*) established that around 1000 people were living in the southern area [source: Injunction of the 25 February 2016 issued by the Administrative Court of Lille].

319 Interview with Stéphane Duval, director of the Jules Ferry centre for La Vie Active, 17 November 2015.

320 At the time of the eviction, at the end of February 2016, out of 1500 places 300 were available, according to institutional information [communication officer, 2 March 2016].

321 During my visit to the CAP, which I arranged by telephone with La Vie Active (the NGO in charge of the management on behalf of the French state), I was let in by the communication officer who would have guided me to the camp. But when I had to exit, I realised that I needed help to make it through the turnstile. No NGO worker was available at that moment, so a guest who was getting out through the turnstile, made my body pass with his.

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Figures 25 and 26. The fence between the Jungle and the camp of containers. Source: the author

their process of crossing.

The power to negotiate the regimes of in/visibility is related to the affective nature of bodies encountering the material body of the territory; it depends on their *conatus* – which is in a Spinozan and Deleuzian perspective the body's natural tendency toward empowering combinations with other bodies.[322] As Patton maintains, "defining bodies in terms of the affects of which they are capable is equivalent to defining them in terms of the relations into which they can enter with other bodies, or in terms of their capacities for engagement with the powers of other bodies."[323] To put it simply, bodies' capacity of being affected varies from one to another, and the same body can be affected differently depending on the body (or territory) with which the relation is established. There are bodies that can be affected positively by a white container in an enclosure, without feeling more constrained than they are in an urban-like atmosphere. It depends on their own *conatus*, on the nature of the affective relation they are capable of setting up, on the direction of their desire. Even where all is enveloped in an atmosphere of control, there is always the possibility to break it: despite its supposed securisation, some residents of the containers got in and out the camp by climbing the low fence or digging holes under it. The camp had become part of the Jungle for those who, pursuing their *conatus*, had negotiated successfully with the territory of the state in the contingency of their encounter. For volunteers operating in the Jungle, though, the fence remained a fence in a camp which excluded them and with which they could negotiate only by sticking to the rules of the fenced territory.

The territory does not correspond to an object, for example a camp of containers. It is a process, it is relational and evental, as Brighenti makes explicit. It evolves, it can be fixed (temporarily), and it can be dismantled. At every territorial move corresponds a regime of visibility which is coessential to it. The fence as closure, the fence as passage. As soon as the state built the camp, that territory was shattered, decomposed and transformed in more territorial assemblages that emerged when the territory opened up to new encounters, through boundaries, expressive features, different functions. Each of these territories occupied a block of space-time that was correlative to a regime of visibility. If we confined ourselves to *seeing* the object (like the main narratives), we would keep seeing the object and not the process that produced it and went on transforming it. In this sense, the narratives of the jail had contributed to fix the regime of visibility of the containers to their architectural representation, while practices where altering it, at least by crumbling some pieces.

To any deterritorialisation it corresponds a reterritorialisation. In the last days of the Jungle, before it was entirely bulldozed at the end of October 2016, the camp of containers – emptied of its residents who were dispersed to many centres all over France – was fully occupied by those who were 'recognised' as unaccompanied minors, whose cases were being treated separately and processed subsequently.[324] Minors had to register and receive a bracelet

322 Spinoza, *The Ethics (Ethica More Geometrico Demonstrata)* (Project Gutenberg 2009 [1677], op. cit.; Deleuze, *Spinoza*, op. cit.

323 Patton, *Deleuze and the Political*, op. cit. p.78.

324 During what the authorities called "a humanitarian evacuation", the residents of the Jungle were invited to leave the place and get a bus that would have brought them to one of the Centres of Hosting and Orientation [Centres d'Accueil et Orientation, (CAO)] opened throughout the country to accommodate people from the Calais camp. Hundreds of young boys had to stay in queue to be allocated a place in the camp of containers while waiting for their cases to be processed: they would either be allowed to go to the UK, or sent to a CAO for minors (CAOMI), if they were recognised as minors, mainly on the basis of a facial control. See http://www.lemonde.fr/immigration-

with the number of the bus they would have taken in the next days. The same bracelets allowed them to enter the camp of containers and sleep there until their departure. As reported by the media and volunteers through social media, those who registered were not informed accurately of their fate and their next destination, and around one hundred and fifty children who could not be registered ended up being harassed by the police and sleeping rough in the already half-demolished Jungle.[325] In the twilight of *la lande*, the ex-shipping containers were having their last days too. And before going back to being only a protected area at environmental risk, that piece of land had to show that the state was there, and it had been there all the time. The camp went back to being that first red line, a promise of confinement that the state was making to the 'children of Calais': you will stay here, because you have no other place to go, and we will decide at our discretion when and where you can go, the bracelet being the only simulacrum of home you can get.

2.5 Relentless movement

In geographical scholarship, deterritorialisation is often understood as the departure from territory, as if territory could be left behind, elsewhere, far away.[326] As some observe, many have adopted the concept of deterritorialisation on its own, dismissing the folded dynamism of the de-re-territorialisation process, as it has been offered by Deleuze and Guattari.[327] This shortcoming is not negligible, for at least two reasons. First, it fails to recognise territory as processual, thus confining it to a static and binary condition where it can be found either open or closed, but never in becoming. Second, it conceals the effects of reterritorialisation that entail the capture of any deterritorialising course an assemblage might have taken, for "one deterritorializes, massifies, but only in order to knot and annul the mass movements and movements of deterritorialization, to invent all kinds of marginal reterritorializations even worse than the others."[328] Or, as Kaplan maintains, "deterritorialization is always reterritorialization, an increase of territory, an imperialization."[329] These relentless movements have implications for the territory: one is that while the territory territorialises, it must generate innovation continuously, in order to survive and keep on stabilising. This relentless process, while increasing the territory's organisation, it also entails unrest and instability. This internal instability must then confront with the uncertainty that comes

et-diversite/article/2016/10/25/a-calais-1-056-personnes-mises-a-l-abri-au-deuxieme-jour-du-demantelement-de-la-jungle_5020107_1654200.html; http://www.liberation.fr/france/2016/10/29/la-semaine-ou-la-jungle-de-calais-a-ete-demantelee_1524876.

325 See https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/27/calais-camp-police-detain-young-people-amid-chaotic-scenes; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/01/calais-camp-hit-riots-refugees-teenagers; http://www.liberation.fr/france/2016/11/01/jungle-de-calais-depart-accelere-des-mineurs-apres-le-demantelement_1525571; http://www.independent.co.uk/news/the-calais-jungle-has-become-like-lord-of-the-flies-with-1500-children-left-behind-in-containers-and-a7388021.html#gallery.

326 See Stuart Elden, 'Missing the point: globalization, deterritorialization and the space of the world' *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 8 30, 1 (2005), on how the concept of deterritorialisation has often been used without a reconceptualization of the notion of territory.

327 Elden insists on the misleading use of deterritorialisation when referring to globalization. In particular, it seems to me that the coupled movements of de-re-territorialisation are associated to the global-local polarity, and, more widely, that deterritorialisation is a term that stands for openness against boundedness [see for example Anssi Paasi, 'Territory', op. cit.]. On a more theoretical basis, Caren Kaplan challenges the dialectic proposed by Deleuze and Guattari by claiming that it contributes to the mystification of neo-colonialist interpretations through the celebration of displacement and disconnection. See Caren Kaplan, *Questions of Travel. Postmodern Discourses of Displacement* (Durham NC: Duke University Press 1998).

328 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit. p.228.

329 Kaplan, *Questions of Travel*, op. cit. p.89.

from an environment which the territory contributes to produce through its own operations but which it cannot control. Hence, deterritorialisation is always virtually possible. With deterritorialisation the end of the territory comes, and through reterritorialisation a new territory may arise.

The reading of the territory I adopt here integrates some concepts from Niklas Luhmann's systems theory in its further reinterpretations by Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos and Bryant.[330] In particular I follow Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos' "non-orthodox" reading of Luhmann's autopoietic theory, which spatialises and materialises it through a phenomenological approach which introduces both space and the body into Luhmann's framework.[331] Such non-orthodox approach to Luhmann's theory can offer three advantageous elements to the understanding of the territory and its movements: first, a system is defined "as the difference between itself and its environment", in other words it is the result of an operation of distinction, or differentiation from the environment, through the production of boundaries.[332] This is how a system comes into existence but also how it reproduces its internal operations, through closure. Second, a system is characterised by openness to its environment, a filtered openness through which the systemic environment finds itself internalised in the system, in the terms of the system's own selective functioning and organisation, so that "its exteriority is always internalised" as a movement that challenges the boundaries.[333] As Bryant writes, while closure is the mechanism that helps ward the system against chaos, the constraints of its procedures of selection and boundary-making may involve the risk of collapse, inasmuch as the system is affected negatively by its *exo-relations*, what Bryant refers to as regimes of attraction, because of its openness to the environment.[334] Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos summarizes it very well:

> "A system is a space of environmental happenstance that remains relevant because of the embeddedness of its operations; it is characterised by a multiplicity of contingent possibilities; and it is always and necessarily open to the future in the form of its environmental becomings."[335]

The territory, like a system, is a dynamic entity that strives for stability while being endlessly threatened with unsteadiness. A territorial assemblage, in its emergence, is both territorialisation and deterritorialisation, both closure and openness, it organises its identity and confronts with its exteriority. The exteriority the territory has to deal with is fully material. Rewording Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, the materiality that the territory has to face is made by the bodies and space with which it establishes distance or proximity through normative orderings (i.e. classifying, organising, issuing orders, etc.) and affective codes (i.e. building walls, throwing tear gas, raising flags, etc.).[336] Along this process the territory

330 See Bryant, *The Democracy of Objects*, op. cit.; Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, *Absent Environments,* op. cit.; Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 'Critical Autopoiesis: The Environment of the Law', *University of Westminster School of Law Research Paper* n.11-17 (2011).

331 In *Absent Environments*, Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos puts the Husserlian body that "egocentrically thematises the space in which it moves, so much so that spatiality becomes a quality of the body itself" [p.68] at the spatial centre of its reality, like a system. This way, body and space are understood as co-producing reality, so that "the requisite of presence in interaction is mediated by space and body: thus, autopoietic interaction is now taking into account the generation of perception in the mutuality of corporeality and spatiality" [p.71].

332 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, *Absent Environments,* op. cit. p.3.

333 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 'Critical Autopoiesis: The Environment of the Law', op. cit. p.54.

334 Bryant, *The Democracy of Objects,* op. cit.

335 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 'Critical Autopoiesis: The Environment of the Law', op. cit. p.56.

336 In his reasoning about the system of the law, Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos discusses the materiality of

moves, and moving it controls what it is within its reach. Put differently, it cannot control the environment. This line of reasoning is of particular interest to our investigation of the Jungle, for it provides a prism through which to read how the territory of aid organisations had moved toward a growing internal organisation (and control), how this movement had affected both their struggle for the Jungle and their relation with the environment, and, finally, how the territory of the Jungle had come through multiple movements of de-re-territorialisation only to be eventually reterritorialized on countless territories of exile.

This story follows three threads among the uncountable ones that had combined for the Jungle to come into existence and carry on becoming through a multiplicity of territorial assemblages, (dis)orderings, struggles, and encounters. The three threads – two of which map the aid groups machine and the state machine, one which maps the *stuff* – had continuously crossed, but we will observe them separately only to show their co-functioning through another, unintelligible, thread: that of the people of the Jungle.[337]

Let me start with how the aid organisations had built and reinforced their territory. The story starts always in the middle, because it is composed by many threads. Between the first settlements on *la lande* in March 2015 and the massive arrivals of British people in August 2015, the aid was organised with difficulty by a few local French organisations, due to insufficient human and material resources and a lack of state participation. With many volunteers pouring in and the state taking responsibility in assuring some basic needs, things began to change.[338] In February 2016, an organisation was in place that not only assured services, like food, clothing, shelter provision, medical and legal services, but was also able to take a stance against the state and spoke on the behalf of the inhabitants of the Jungle, as I discuss in detail in the chapter 3. The organisation was a composite and assorted arrangement of people, procedures, and practices with a horizontal functioning and a few recognised leaders that could change over time. In February 2016 forty aid groups worked in the Jungle and their activities were identified by Acted, a French NGO that was in charge of the water and sanitation management on behalf of (and funded by) the French state. La Plateforme de Services aux Migrants, a local network of volunteers that exists since 2011, while not working directly on the camp, had become the hub for all the organisations to coordinate activities and take political stance. L'Auberge des Migrants and Help Refugees, a strong partnership between a local small group and an emergent British charity, coordinated and handled most of the services of food and clothing provision from a well-organised warehouse about ten kilometres far from *la lande*. All these groups run their activities in a totally rhizomatic fashion, everyone on its territory while at the same time knowing exactly (and defending) each others' territorial borders.

The institution of aid territories unfold through closure and openness to the environment by the means of rhythms, which involved not only repetition but unavoidably "a

the law. The process through which the law deals with matter is a territorial one that involves movements of territorialisation as well as deterritorialisation. See Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 'Critical Autopoiesis: The Environment of the Law', op. cit. p.56.

337 The unintelligibility of the exiles is due to the heterogeneity of their trajectories, stories and desires, as well as their different mobilities.

338 http://www.lavoixdunord.fr/archive/d-20150617-39Y4H6?referer=%2Farchives%2Frecherche%3Fdatefilter%3Dlast5year%26sort%3Ddate%2Bdesc%26start%3D30%26word%3Dcalais%2Bpoints%2Beaux; http://www.tdg.ch/monde/europe/La-course-a-la-generosite-dans-la-jungle-des-migrants/story/15924525. Since June 2015 the French state had provided water and sanitation services, waste management and electricity along the main path in the camp, and food, showers, laundry, and accommodation for 200 women and children in the Jules Ferry centre, along with psychological services.

continual displacement of what is repeated/imitated", thus enabling, through succeeding deterritorialisations, the "generation of new rhythms and imitations", hence innovation, and change.[339] Rhythms, as both Deleuze and Lefebvre hold it, implies not only repetition but also "movements and differences within repetition."[340] One point of Christian Borch's analysis of rhythms from a Tardean (and also Lefebvrian) perspective is of interest here from a territorial prism to show how rhythms can be affected spatially by way of border-making operations – that is to say, territorial closure – and how territories change through ruptures of the rhythmical repetition.[341] The aid groups did not land all at once in a vacuum, rather each of them reached the Jungle *in the middle*, where old rhythms were to be followed or challenged and new ones had to be created. Let me introduce two of the apparatuses that built and dismantled territories by producing rhythms, while being in turn transcoded by the events of the Jungle and sometimes reterritorialized elsewhere: meetings and distributions.

One kind of meeting was held weekly in town among the representatives of aid groups, another one took place in the evenings on site among some volunteers and representatives of the residents: if the former were mainly moments for exchanging information and maintained a weekly rhythm and a fixed location during all the life of the Jungle, the latter were the sites for closing borders, controlling others' territories, gaining visibility, and attempting to handle the eventfulness of the Jungle according to its ever-changing rhythms. Accordingly, the latter changed their schedule, location, leaders and attendees over time.[342] After the announcement of the dismantlement of the southern part of the Jungle, on site meetings turned from weekly to daily to respond quickly to the unstable situation. At one of those ones held under the menace of the eviction, and which I attended, a sort of resistance was being organised. Several volunteers insisted that residents should stay in their shack or tent to prevent the state's officials to demolish them. "Stay in your home. If they find you inside, they will not demolish it."[343] On the second day of the demolition, which showed that the French state was determined to achieve the clearance despite the protests, some volunteers and residents began to move the shacks from the south to the north, to save them from destruction. At the next meeting, S., the Sudanese man who used to translate from English to Arabic, complained bitterly about what he meant to be a decision taken collectively and which was completely overturn on the ground. That evening meeting was the rhythmical repetition that, on the one side, reassured the residents who attended on what was going on at a stage they did not control, that of the battle for the survival of the Jungle among volunteers and the French state. On the other side, it comforted the most engaged volunteers – many of whom lived in the camp at the time of the demolition – that the decisions taken at a different level than that of the evening meeting were shared and hopefully accepted, followed, and implemented. As Guattari puts it, "It's always the same old trick: a big ideological debate in the general assembly, and the questions of organization

339 Christian Borch, 'Urban Imitations. Tarde's Sociology Revisited', *Theory, Culture & Society* 22 3 (2005): 93-94.

340 Henri Lefebvre and Catherine Régulier, 'Attempt at the Rhythmanalysis of Mediterranean Cities', in Henri Lefebvre, *Rhythmanalysis. Space, Time and Everyday life* (S. Elden and G. Moore trans.) (London & New York: Continuum 2004) p.90.

341 Borch, *Urban Imitations. Tarde's Sociology Revisited*, op. cit.

342 A more detailed account of how these on site meetings worked is given in the next chapter. Here it suffices to say that meetings were conceived as open, but their schedule was settled at another level of decision-making and spread randomly through word of mouth or in a more controlled fashion, among selected members, through a group chat on whatsapp.

343 Quote from a meeting I attended on the 26 February 2016 and reiterated by the British guy who steered the discussion.

are reserved for special committees."[344] That which looked like the open side of the territory of the volunteers was instead a closure through well-disguised borders, where the survival of the Jungle was fought and the territory strove to become stronger. The flipside was that the uncertainty of the environment and the waving of the many existing territories made those decisions highly volatile and their accomplishments totally unpredictable. A meeting that reterritorialized mobile and unreliable bodies was soon deterritorialized on the ground, where bodies acted as scattered and multiple territories instead of one. That is how it happened that while volunteers (along with some residents) were moving shacks, others were fleeing the Jungle, some were asking for accommodation at the state-led camp, or accepting to go to the recently opened reception centres throughout France (CAO), or looking for accommodation in the not too far camp of Grande-Synthe. All in all, there were as much territories as uncountable individual choices.[345] In ten days the clearance was complete and meetings stopped, only to start again the following month on totally different basis. The new meetings were now closed and led once a week by Acted – the NGO that coordinated state-funded activities in the Jungle such as water and sanitation and waste collection – and only one representative per aid group was admitted, along with one representative per ethnic community.[346] They had gone back to being the logistical platform from where to manage the camp, as if it were a traditional refugee camp, and the sustenance assemblage was eventually functioning smoothly.

Distributions represented the principal activity of many aid organisations and one of the multiple rhythms of the Jungle. Their institution was the dynamic result of both their own repetition and their getting into the other rhythms of the Jungle through differentiation, in perpetual resonance with the environment. Food and clothing supply, as the main activities, followed different procedures which had changed over time in response to conflicts and constraints. In October 2015, when the French small organisation called L'Auberge des Migrants and the group that from HelpCalais had already become Help Refugees, distributions were made by carrying supplies from a recently rented warehouse to the Jungle, spotted some reachable distribution points and just unloaded and served.[347] "This system involved many scuffles between recipients as well as wastefulness, because when one did not get what he wanted he just threw it."[348] Many distributions had the same modus operandi at that time, and the newborn French-British joint venture was not the only one on the field. It was just the one that succeed most in attempting to stabilise its territory through rhythms. Many smaller groups or extemporary volunteers were distributing haphazardly: they used to arrive to the camp with their cars or little vans directly from the other side of the Channel, find a place where to unload, and then hand their supplies out without rhythm, without repetition, a one-time thing. These perturbations did not last. The rising French-British territory incorporated them into its boundaries, invited them to vibrate as one, while it

344 Félix Guattari, 'On Capitalism and Desire', in Sylvère Lotinger (ed.) *Desert Islands and Other Texts* (trans. M. Taormina)(New York: Semiotext(e) 2004): p.264.

345 Grande-Synthe is a town 20 km far from Calais which has been hosting a camp for people on the move since February 2016. The camp has been funded by the Council, the NGO Médecins sans Frontières (France) and then supported by the state.

346 I personally attended to a meeting in July 2016, by asking permission to Acted's head of mission, who gave it reluctantly but eventually let me in. The meeting was organised and steered by Acted in its on-site office.

347 The story of how the HelpCalais hashtag became an international charity will be detailed later. Here it is sufficient to note that three friends from London, after collecting a huge amount of supplies thanks to the social media and bringing to the Jungle, decided to pursue the mission and put up a charity (Help Refugees) to give continuity to the humanitarian work for supporting people on the move, mostly in Europe.

348 Quote from an interview (3 March 2016) with the French coordinator of distribution activities for the French-British "war machine", as he called it, which worked as an umbrella for many others groups on the field.

[27]

[28]

Figure 27. Ticket systems for food distribution. Source: Melissa Harper (Facebook)
Figure 28. Distribution points. Source: the author

was slowly opening up to the Jungle residents' own rhythms and territories. These rhythms were composed of multiple time frames that corresponded to people's heterogeneity and the day/night rhythms dictated by attempts to cross the Channel; of spatial zoning, incompatible encounters between young people from different countries and speaking different idioms, and undesirable items that immediately became rubbish. In February 2016, the French-British group had three permanent points of distribution and worked with a network of residents to provide raw food that was ordered in advance by phone and delivered directly to a middleman who was deemed to represent his community, by means of a system of yellow tickets.[349] The building of the territory of distributions did not unfold without carrying deterritorialisations and reterritorialisations. After a few months of chaos no more unplanned arrivals of groups or individuals were happening. Thanks to a Facebook page, willing and charitable fellows were directed to (and reterritorialized on) the French-British umbrella through which they could give aid by donating and volunteering.[350] As I was told by a volunteer who requested anonymity, and corroborated also with other sources, distributions' smoothness was assured at the beginning through the payment of a bribe. Many knew, but did not like to talk about, that opening to the Jungle meant to let some of its multiple territories territorialize you.[351] A multiplicity of items was first deterritorialized from people's homes or companies' warehouses in the UK to be reterritorialized (and sorted) in the Calais' warehouse, to be reterritorialized again as supplies in the Jungle. And there, its territorial (thus functional) journey was not finished. Supplies could end up at one resident's home, or at the evening *black* market controlled by a Sudanese group, or as waste, going to shape the ever-changing landscape of the encampment. And from there, they could land to the apartment of an Italian researcher, or fatten the Jungle's community of rats, or even be reterritorialized as labour for the waste treatment chain in the region of Calais. It could be by bribing, or it could be by reterritorializing supplies from distributions to the evening *black* market, or as waste throughout the landscape of *la lande*, each territory one tried to frame in the Jungle was fluid and ever-resonating with other territories' rhythms, until its dissolution.

According to many sources, when the state opened the Jules Ferry centre in spring 2015, it also started increasing the pressure on the hundreds of people who lived in temporary makeshift camps in town and next to the port of Calais, by intensifying police raids to squats. At the same time, there were rumours that the French state would have tolerated a camp on the vacant lot in the proximity of the centre. The idea was, as it seemed, to remove people from the city centre and assure more control by assembling them in the same place.[352] In the course of nineteen months between the opening of the centre (and the rising of the Jungle) and its closure, the French state had been holding its pressure on the

349 The system for the identification of the so-called "relais communautaires", the residents' representatives, or community leaders, will be explained in the next chapter. It was put in place since November 2016 and fulfilled different functions, from smoothing distributions to transferring and collecting information, to resolving conflicts.

350 See https://www.facebook.com/pg/CalaisPeopletoPeopleSolidarityActionFromUK/about/?ref=page_internal.

351 Besides the main distribution group, the kitchens that served food in the camp, and which were independent one from another, had to deal with extortion attempts or acts of intimidation. As another volunteer told me during an informal chat (3 March 2106), it existed three mafias in the Jungle that shared the territory and sometimes worked together, being ethnically differentiated into Afghan, Kurdish, and Sudanese.

352 See http://www.liberation.fr/societe/2014/09/03/un-centre-d-accueil-loin-du-centre-de-calais_1093150; http://www.liberation.fr/societe/2015/04/02/a-calais-une-jungle-d-etat-pour-les-migrants_1234044; https://passeursdhospitalites.wordpress.com/2015/03/30/le-ghetto-comme-un-miroir/. The journalist Delphine Kwiczor, from the local newspaper Nord Littoral, and the long-term French volunteer and activist Maya Konforti, confirmed the same narrative. The French state referred to the opening of the centre and its emplacement as an improvement of humanitarian and health conditions in the "best possible location" that local authorities could identify.

Jungle both rhythmically and spatially, without conceding any respite. Between the spring and the summer 2015 the French and British governments implemented the construction of "high quality fencing" to "ensure effective security" to the main doorway to the UK, the port of Calais and the Eurotunnel. With the newborn camp growing at the gates of the port along the road that connects an important motorway junction to the Calais ferries, the two governments decided to "seal the border" with the UK through a massive fencing. As reported by the media, during spring 2015 people from the near camp could take advantage of fortuitous tailbacks to try to climb onto a lorry. This opportunity encouraged dozens of young men to pour out the camp risking their lives and producing what politicians and state officials referred to as "public disorder." And so, a fence was built to separate the northern part of *la lande* from the motorway. In the meantime, the camp was growing in size, more people were arriving during the summer and the beginning of the autumn, and tents were pitched up to the base of the motorway's embankments. Between October and December, both the media and the aid groups through their social media denounced the daily firing of tear gas grenades at groups of people attempting to reach the motorway or occupying it to get into the lorries. During that period, police controls were reported as increasing in intensity and frequency. The police was repeatedly accused of violence and extreme use of force and repressive devices, and clashes multiplied.[353] Things were taking up speed, as more people was settling in, more fences were being erected, and more police was being assigned to control *la lande*'s boundaries. The rhythms were accelerating on every side. In December 2015, the Prefecture issued a ban on the pedestrian access to the motorway. On the grounds of "public nuisance," and in justification of the state of emergency that was declared in France following the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015, a protection area was established on the motorway preventing people from crossing it on foot.[354] The territory of the state was pushing toward the Jungle, it was approaching, opposing at the borders with the multiple territories of the Jungle, which were now converging as one to face the intimidating institutional territory. The ban did not slow down the events, and new lines were soon be drawn to force one territory take on different rhythms by adopting new boundaries: on January 2016, after weeks of unrest, the Prefecture announced that all the shelters built within a buffer of one hundred metres from the motorway would have been evicted as to "restore order."[355] This spatial solution closed the territory of the state by extending its geographical boundaries, by establishing new rhythms on modified spatial basis, and reterritorializing the attempts of sneaking into a lorry on a bare buffer zone, which size corresponded to the tear gas canisters' range, namely, one hundred meters.[356] From this clearance operation to the following dismantlement of the southern part of the camp between February and March 2016 the new territory of control worked. Less people still tried

353 Media coverage and daily reports were provided by the No Borders group in Calais and other activists on social media. See https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/30/lorry-drivers-refugees-calais-warn-escalating-violence; https://calaismigrantsolidarity.wordpress.com/2015/11/10/a-night-of-collective-punishment-by-the-police/.

354 http://www.pas-de-calais.gouv.fr/content/download/20179/145040/file/zone%20de%20protection%20RN%20216.pdf. The ban linked the disorders caused by exiles' attempts to climb onto the lorries, and the consequents clashes with the drivers and the police, with the terrorist threat that was the basis for the declaration of the state of emergency throughout France after the terrorist attacks of 13 November 2015 in Paris (see http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2015/11/14/attaques-a-paris-ce-que-veut-dire-la-declaration-d-etat-d-urgence-en-france_4809523_3224.html). Exceptional measures that limit freedom can be adopted under the state of emergency, namely the institution of protected areas or the ban on rallies and protests.

355 http://www.lavoixdunord.fr/region/migrants-de-calais-les-abris-de-la-jungle-eloignes-ia33b48581n3259772; http://www.pas-de-calais.gouv.fr/content/download/20840/150681/file/recueil%20spécial%20n°6%20-%2019%20janvier%202016.pdf.

356 This information was provided by the Calais Police Union Representative Gilles Debove during an interview (27 July 2016).

to get into lorries along the motorway, and the buffer zone reduced their chances to reach it before the intervention of the police so that they had to look for other less guarded spaces. Then, the evacuation and destruction of the southern area in March 2016 engaged everybody in the rearrangement of territories that were undergoing a new deterritorialisation, and in negotiating again and again throughout the uncountable encounters the changed environment obliged to make. In a few weeks, things were taking up speed one again. The camp was now reduced to a half in size and pushed northwards, further from the motorway. Reaching the motorway and squeezing into a lorry had become hard, both at night and day. Still, as a police officer told me "they are ready to pay any price. What can we do against determination?"[357] They began in small groups late at night, choosing the right spot along the motorway, further from the Jungle and shielded by woodlands; they carried any useful piece of waste – chairs, garbage cans, trunks, shopping carts – and assembled it quickly in the dark, exploiting short pauses in the traffic flow. They built around ten makeshift barricades each night in April, up to thirty in July 2016. And each night, the "cat-and-mouse" game repeated, each time both the same and different.

At the end of July 2016 the territorial strategy of the state turned from putting pressure on the borders to biting into the economic territory of the Jungle's shops, run along the main road primarily by Afghan people. It started with the police entering the camp and carrying out *administrative and legal* checks with respect to shops and restaurants, on the grounds that "these sellers exercise a semi-commercial activity on the public domain without authorisation and under conditions that do not comply with health and security requirements."[358] It went on with the Prefecture demanding for the closure of the shops to the Administrative Court in Lille, the Court refusing the request, and the state appealing against the decision.[359] It ended with the Supreme Administrative Court validating the eviction of the shops in October 2016, only two weeks before the total dismantlement of the camp.[360] With the final evacuation, which the aid organizations tried again to oppose in Court, the state reterritorialized the residents of the Jungle through dispersal and deterritorialized volunteers and aid groups on new ways of focusing their mission.[361]

It was all about 'stuff', in the Jungle. To put it bluntly, stuff was what *allowed* action in the Jungle, as Latour might have it.[362] It assembled with other bodies consolidating some territories and weakening others. It was ever present, overvisible. It was a body with which it was necessary to negotiate and, in this sense it also produced orderings. By stuff I refer to things made by humans, which in the Jungle means food, both ready-made and raw, clothes and shoes, tools of any kind, wood, tarpaulin, gas tanks, sleeping bags, toothbrushes, cups, notebooks, cigarettes, generators, extinguishers, caravans, blankets, tents, chairs, tables, bottles, and the list could go on an on. How did stuff affect other bodies in the assemblages it entered in? Rephrasing Jane Bennett, by assembling with other bodies stuff enhanced or weakened their power, or even its own power to affect; assembling with humans, it

357 Quote from the night mission on the motorway with Gilles Debove (28 July 2016).

358 Quote from: http://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/hauts-de-france/jungle-de-calais-importante-operation-de-controle-des-commerces-informels-1051339.html (my translation).

359 http://www.liberation.fr/france/2016/08/12/l-etat-se-pourvoit-en-cassation-pour-faire-demanteler-les-commerces-de-la-jungle-de-calais_1471979.

360 http://m.nordlittoral.fr/calais/expulsion-des-commerces-de-la-jungle-de-calais-la-ia0b0n351486.

361 In October 2017, one year after the demolition of the Jungle, these movements have not stopped. People who want to cross the Channel have come back to Calais, aid groups are finding new territories to accomplish their mission, and the state reacts by making those territories as much precarious as possible.

362 Latour, *Reassembling the Social*, op. cit.

[29]

Figure 29. Donations. Source: National Observer

enhanced or weakened habits and ideas.[363] While in the next chapter I discuss how stuff took part in the emergence of an affective atmosphere, here I want to explore its agency within the assemblages within which was entangled. As Bennett suggests, by drawing on Deleuze and Guattari's description of a territorial assemblage, sometimes it happens that an element has a peculiar and special position within the assemblage and the vantage point provides this element of a strong agency, of the power of transforming the assemblage itself into something different and new. Transformation occurs when "a territorialized, assembled function acquires enough independence to constitute a new assemblage, one that is more or less deterritorialized, en route to deterritorialization."[364] This "element of passage" is a vector, "an *assemblage converter*."[365] Stuff in the Jungle was precisely this, a vector of (de) territorialisation, an element that, caught into various assemblages, had the force of pulling them to a certain direction, modifying them, generating orderings, and thus contributing to the formation of the Jungle in *that* and not *another* way.

Let us move across these assemblages. First, stuff is merchandise, is a product that has been made somewhere and then sold elsewhere. To reach this 'elsewhere' the merchandise travels, and travels in lorries. It is part of a complex assemblage of drivers, technological devices, international regulations, companies, labour, workers, inspectors, raw materials, and so on. In 2015 forty-one millions of tons of freight went through the port of Calais, and 1,8 millions of heavy goods vehicles.[366] Calais port is the one with more traffic with the UK, especially for freight. The merchandise travels on roads, it stops at parking lots, and sometimes must wait in lines when the port is approaching. When the merchandise travels, its territory 'on the move' is hidden behind coloured tarpaulin or metal boxes. Yet, it suddenly changes of function turning expressive when it becomes the mode of transport of people who need to cross the Channel without being caught by the police. It is not the lorry that transports migrant people, for the lorry would never travel empty. It is the stuff that makes people cross the Channel.

> "The lorry was full of boxes of German beer. Where would they end up? Who would drink them? [...] When we all were sure that we were in the UK and we were far enough away from the border to be safe, we started to celebrate and shout with joy. We were all very thirsty and we had a truck full of the best German beer."[367]

Stuff, the merchandise, was the element that transformed a commercial territory of freight not only into a territorial assemblage of smuggled migrants; but also into the territory of the Jungle itself, in Calais, the major port between France and England. The refrain of *dougar*, the traffic jams, with long lines of lorries along the road that leads to the port and once flanked the borders of the Jungle, was the becoming-expressive of this passage from one territory to another one, from freight to humans, which nonetheless was made possible by stuff. Lorry drivers were caught between stones and tear gas, fatal accidents occurred

363 Jane Bennett, *Vibrant Matter: a Political Ecology of Things* (Durham: Duke University Press 2010).

364 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit. p.324.

365 Ibid. p.325.

366 See the Environmental Report 2015 by the *Societé d'Exploitation des Ports du Détroit*, available at https://www.portboulognecalais.fr/fr/documentation

367 Mani (from Iran), 'Life after the Jungle', in Marie Godin, Katrine Møller Hansen, Aura Lounasmaa, Corinne Squire and Tahir Zaman, *Voices from the 'Jungle'. Stories from the Calais Refugee Camp* (London: Pluto Press 2017) pp.211-212.

to some of the people who were trying to get on a lorry, barriers were built to slow down vehicles. Stuff was the force of deterritorialisation that led the assemblage of cargos to turn into an encampment of people stuck at the borders.

Second, stuff was the materialisation of compassion. Compassion implies a "view of humanity based on the figure of the victim,"[368] what I also refer to in the next chapter, when I examine the figure of the refugee and the imaginary territory it helps building. Compassion affectively called together human bodies around stuff and translated it into action. As I described with respect to the territory of aid groups, as soon as the two women, who later would have become the founders of Help Refugees, decided to bring material help to Calais, a huge response arose. Tons of stuff were gathered, packed, and then sent to points of collections in London from across the country. A relentless flow of stuff left the UK and reached the shores of France taking the opposite direction of people from the Jungle's desire. While the UK government was despising people stuck in France by calling them "a swarm," thousands of goods, sold or even produced in the UK, were flooding into France, going to occupy first the shelves of L'Auberge des Migrants' warehouse, then to feed, clothe, and sustain the everyday life of thousands of people in the Jungle.[369] This huge inflow was the materialisation at the same time of compassion and action for many who desired to help. On the one side, stuff itself was turned into action by compassion: collecting, sorting, sending, and calling other people into action. On the other side, stuff called for more action: the more stuff arrived in Calais, the more action was needed to sort it, work it, and distribute it. This way, stuff became the territory of compassion, only to be deterritorialised onto new assemblages, sometimes in conflict with each other: the Jungle as a home, and the Jungle as a dump. And so we arrive to the third assemblage. In chapter 3, I consider in more detail how stuff contributed affectively, if not only materially, to feed an atmosphere of the homely; here suffice it to say that stuff helped enhance the habit which made the Jungle a welcoming place, besides building it *physically*.

The becoming-waste of stuff was the compassion-assemblage deterritorialised (and reterritorialised) into a new territorial assemblage of filth, which, in turn, was being reterritorialised into the former, through the very image of squalor that the latter generated. The circular movement was prompt by stuff, which was its vector – following again Deleuze and Guattari – capable of making the territory of compassion pass into that of home and sustenance and then into one of waste and dirt. In the case of stuff is its excessive character that can be endlessly refunctionalised. From this lens, waste is excess that can be source of abjection or even aesthetic gaze.[370]

> "Some days, when I had extra bread, I put it on the rock near my shelter for feeding the birds [...]. One day I understood that rats ate bread, not birds. I was feeding the rats and helped them to grow their population. After some weeks, one night, I saw a rat in my shelter. They had grown so much, and I helped them."[371]

368 Eyal Weizman, *The Least of All Possible Evils. Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza* (London and New York: Verso 2011) p.38.

369 See http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-33716501; https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jan/27/david-camerons-bunch-of-migrants-quip-is-latest-of-several-such-comments.

370 Susan Signe Morrison, *The Literature of Waste: Material Ecopoetics and Ethical Matter* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2015)

371 Mani (from Iran), 'Life after the Jungle', op. cit. p.182.

[30]

[31]

Figures 30 and 31. Waste. Source: the author

On the one hand, waste was the expressive way through which a territory of filth could emerge and nourish the desire for helping, by sending more stuff which would end as waste again on the ground of the encampment: "waste, itself an excess, proliferates, creating even more waste in an uncontrollable spiralling process."[372] On the other hand, waste fostered aid groups' practices of distributing and cleaning, thus consolidating their territory. Distributions of stuff had to be tailored (to avoid waste), and the potential individual donor was asked to send *this* or *that* thing. Teams of volunteers were managed to clean the encampment weekly and collect the garbage that accumulated and had not already been collected by private companies paid by the French government.[373] This practice was a territorial move that involved the circulation of powerful affects around waste.

During one of my volunteering days, I spent a few hours collecting garbage in the Jungle, with a group of a dozen of people. The territory of waste affected differently those who came in contact with it: as for me waste was repulsive. We wore rubber gloves and handled picking tools, but still: we were walking in the mud, we did not know what we would have found under a pile of garbage, we were aware that we could have bumped into an open-air toilet or a rat burrow, sooner or later. And it happened. A girl of my group reluctantly discovered an open-air toilet after one of her rubber boots had plunged into it. I was staring at her while she was trying to wipe her boot and I realised that nobody was showing disgust or discomfort. Many people were helping her with zeal and she even seemed *untouched* by excrements. Meanwhile, some residents of the Jungle stood in proximity and watched us cleaning. Later I stopped by an Afghan shop where a man I had already met was sitting in front of his shop. He was observing us piling garbage bags at collecting points along the main road and asked me if we were paid for doing that. This question, which might appear naïve, conceals the affective distance one wants to draw from her own waste: such a distance is shortened when you observe your waste being collected by an identifiable person or even for *free*. As Susan Morrison says, a "sanitized public cleaning eliminates the personal touch of the rag-picker," for "the more anonymous the person cleaning up, the more unidentified and unidentifiable your own detritus becomes."[374]

Stuff was also the territory of Afghan shop keepers and Soudanese black market. Selling goods was the deterritorialisation of donations, which were transformed into money and reterritorialised into better life conditions or into smugglers' hands, or something else. The movements of goods and supplies were countless.

Gideon Mendel is a London-based photographer who participated to a documentary project in the Jungle. Once he realised that the residents of the Jungle were not very excited about being photographed, he decided to modify his project and create a sort of archaeological archive out of the objects he found on the ground, to "make sense of the complex relationships and politics of the place."[375] Mendel collected and then "forensically" photographed dozens of shoes, gloves, t-shirts, tear gas canisters, toothbrushes, and children's toys. "Mendel's goal is to de-aestheticize the encounter with the refugee bodies, for in aesthetic we find respite. [...] Will we insist on anthropomorphizing the shoes, bonnets and shirts, the bits of

372 Morrison, *The Literature of Waste: Material Ecopoetics and Ethical Matter*, op. cit. p.69.

373 The state-funded NGO Acted was in charge of coordinating the private companies that collected the garbage in the Jungle. Their task was to collect the garbage from bins and dumpsters, not to remove the dispersed garbage.

374 Morrison, *The Literature of Waste: Material Ecopoetics and Ethical Matter,* op. cit. p.83.

375 See at www.gideonmendel.com/dzhangal.

burnt blanket and rusted chairs he has collected?" a critics writes.[376] Yes, is his answer.

Finally, stuff was also the main connection for the residents of the Jungle with the city of Calais, apart from the port and the Eurotunnel. In the city people could top up their phones, buy some food, diesel for generators, alcohol, and the items that were then sold in the Jungle shops. Commercial exchanges with the city were the only relations available to the people of the Jungle for, one by one, public facilities had banned them from using their services. By February 2016, the regulation to have access to the public library in Calais had changed and allowed in only people who could show their identity at the entrance. Likewise, the public swimming pool established that those who were not residents of the city of Calais, had to show a document and a proof of residence if they were to be admitted to the facility.[377]

By examining the emergence of the Jungle from multiple perspectives, we have observed that countless orderings emerged as a result of how bodies encountered, formed assemblages, built territories. We have seen how the Jungle was born as an assemblage of bodies that had to negotiate relentlessly their emplacement and movements. We have mapped the effects of the institutionalisation of practices through the attuning of aid activities to the rhythms of the Jungle, and vice versa. We have also explored how the state had functionalised its territory by means of progressive shrinking of the Jungle's blocks of space-time until it deterritorialized it through the final clearance, only to reterritorialized it onto a million pieces everywhere. We have examined the territorialising movements of stuff and its crucial positioning in the assemblage of the Jungle.

In the course of the lifetime of the Jungle, the power relation between aid groups and the French state (and the UK in its shadow) was not unidirectional, nor it had steady intensity. If we understand the territory as the room for manoeuvre of a body, from which a body can build a refuge, organise, select, shield, close, but also make itself visible, confront with other territories, open and invite in, we are legitimate to look at how territories move in order to problematize power relations. In the Jungle, control resulted from the drawing of territorial borders that were always spatial while being also functional. The aid groups that managed supplies and food distributions had erected a comfort zone from which they could control their internal organisation and keep unruly volunteers at bay. Their territory kept the Jungle in rhythm, resonating with both the aid of the state, the multiple bodies of the inhabitants, and the very material territory of stuff. Waste, black markets, conflicts over distributions, state's actions, and comings and goings were territories of their own, incommensurable and impenetrable. Each territory contributed both to the sedentarisation of the Jungle through infrastructures, provisions, accumulation of stuff, the slowing down of state operations through legal battles, and to its functioning as mobile sanctuary for the temporary residents, the mobility of whom was encouraged precisely by the transient stability of the Calais encampment. People who, for different reasons, had to leave the camp and come back, could find a place to stay, get some food and the supplies needed, no matter his or her peregrinations. In this respect, the Jungle was a refuge, a territory where everybody could go back after trying different options elsewhere, and feel at home despite

376 Text by Dominique Malaquais, at www.gideonmendel.com/art-historian-text.

377 http://www.nordlittoral.fr/archive/d-20151118-3DCG8K?referer=%2Farchives%2Frecherche%3Fdatefilter%3Dlast5year%26sort%3Ddate%2520desc%26word%3Dmediath%25C3%25A8que%2520migrants.

all the discomforts, the risks, and the precariousness.[378] In the next chapter I show how the process of sedentarisation, which the aid groups promoted through their territorializing practices, the state did not obstruct, the inhabitants of the Jungle reinforced, and which was fostered by the inflow of stuff, had being desired. I show also how this desire steered the struggle toward the safeguard of the camp itself rather than against the governance of the political concern. The French state confronted with the Jungle first as a foreign jurisdiction, whose borders needed to be watched in order to control it. As soon as the Jungle, which the state had left to become its environment – thus out of its reach and out of its cone of intelligibility – had started revealing its unruliness and its unmanageable growth, the reaction was to push challenging those borders. Defending the borders is not the same as controlling a mobile territory. To learn this lesson the French state had to go through the relentless squeezing of bodies and space in the Jungle, in an attempt to buy some precious time for the organisation of the 'perfect' *dispositif* of the Centres d'Acceuil et d'Orientation (CAO), which would have liberated Calais by scattering asylum seekers throughout France, as I suggest in chapter 4.

378 I can here cite a few examples I personally learnt about. A., a Tunisian guy who had been in France illegally for a while, used the Jungle as a place where to have some rest from the tough life in Paris, where he sometimes had to sleep rough because he could not find a job in the black market. Or As., who left the camp for the time necessary to try to get to the UK from Belgium. When his endeavour failed, he got back to Calais, where his friends still stayed. I. was waiting for his application for asylum to be examined and meanwhile went back and forth from Calais to Paris for visiting friends.

Chapter 3

Gravity

A centre can be thought of as an endogenous force, internal to the machine, which develops by circular irradiation in all directions, taking everything into its orbit, a mechanic continually jumping from one point to another, and from one circle to another.[379]

> "The epithet *Jungle* refers (also) to the exuberance of activities, buildings, the wonder of wooden-tinkered shelters, trolleys for carrying water jugs, makeshift braziers, carpentry made with pallets or intertwined branches. One facade is nice: art of urban recycling, tarpaulin collage, eclecticism of given or recovered material, a surrealist Christmas tree, and also a huge Eritrean church illuminated by religious paintings. Feeling guilty for being fascinated by this world, for appreciating all its creations as if we were enjoying a contemporary art exhibition, kind of voyeur who finds pleasure in this place's exoticism. The extra-ordinary is at each tent's corner and amazes endlessly. In Calais the Jungle can be visited and attracts active tourists. Every ten meters a superlative slips out, each time imbued by astonishment."[380]

Stuff, but not dispersed and scattered stuff with no direction. Rather, composed and organised stuff, with a *sense*. The Jungle had been assembling stuff, people, and practices, through countless encounters, multiple territories, and relentless movements of negotiation. Along the territorial process of its emergence and constitution, it kept on attracting excess. Excess of stuff, excess of people, excess of practices. To the list of bodies that built it, which I introduced in the previous chapter, more should be added. And more people: students, comedians, festival organisers, artists, musicians, retirees, teachers, academics, aid workers, fashion bloggers, playwrights, priests, artisans, carpenters, lawyers, filmmakers, journalists,

379 Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues* op. cit. p.105.

380 Gipsy Beley and David Rohi, 'Petit apercu de ce que raconte Calais' at http://www.lacimade.org/petit-apercu-de-ce-que-raconte-calais/ (accessed 4 January 2016), my translation.

labourers, bakers, photographers, shop keepers, barbers, imams, cartoonists, activists, interpreters, farmers, doctors, business owners, architects, from Pakistan, France, England, Spain, Malaysia, Eritrea, Afghanistan, Italy, Germany, Tunisia, Sudan, Gambia, Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Ireland, United States, Japan, Iran, Scotland, Ethiopia, Kuwait, Belgium, and so on and so forth, had spent some time of their lives in the camp of Calais between March 2015 and October 2016. What did make the Calais camp a centre of gravity for so many different people? For some of them the Jungle was a "hell of place, utterly distressing" and "good for animals, not for humans." For others "it felt as a community" and it was "a celebration of the creative force of life," born out of "chance and necessity."[381] How can we account for the process that produced this particular assemblage of bodies that was the Jungle? And in particular, how can we account for "the relational capacities that belong to the doings of bodies or are conjured by the world-belongingness that gives rise to a body's doing?"[382]

If up to here we have entered the Jungle through its mobile territories, if we have already been allowed in the familiar harbour that each territory tried to erect, in this chapter I go deeper in the atmospheric cocoon that the assembling of multiple territories created by means of affect. The notion of affect being already evoked, here I first explore its encroachments into a broad body of literature, to get to a conceptualisation of affect that insists on the consequences of bodily encounters in terms of forces and intensities that are activated, and actions that follow. I then discuss the process through which affect territorialises collectively through imaginaries, until it coalesces as a collective event, an atmosphere. This process is observed in how the Jungle had both come into being and been engineered collectively as an atmosphere of the homely, an affective common lawscape whose occurrence was prompted by the conatus of each single territory that contributed to its emergence. The atmosphere is a tricky occurrence, which is capable of enclosing you within an illusion of comfort and fulfilment from which you do not want to withdraw. But this does not come without consequences.

3.1 What an affect can do?

In the editorial that is considered "the turning point in geography's recent appreciation of the importance of emotions and affects,"[383] in 2001, Anderson and Smith call for a programme of work that recognises "the emotions as ways of knowing, being and doing in the broadest sense; and using this to take geographical knowledges – and the relevance that goes with them – beyond their more usual visual, textual and linguistic domains."[384] Without offering a theoretical paradigm, and making indifferent use of the terms emotions, feelings, and affect, they urge scholars in the geographical field to engage with "emotive topographies" with the purpose of getting rid of those approaches that remove human experience from

381 Quotes from: https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2016/jun/08/refugees-calais-jungle-camp-architecture-festival-barbican?utm_content=buffer59d4d&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer; http://www.standard.co.uk/lifestyle/london-life/meet-the-army-of-creative-london-volunteers-at-the-heart-of-the-calais-jungle-a3176986.html#gallery; http://theworldwidetribe.com/thelotusflower/; https://blogs.mediapart.fr/sebastien-thiery/blog/140216/considerant-calais; http://www.liberation.fr/debats/2016/03/06/les-lecons-urbaines-de-la-jungle_1437829.

382 Seigworth and Gregg, 'An Inventory of Shimmers', op. cit. p.11.

383 Pile, 'Emotions and affect in recent human geography', op. cit. p.6.

384 Kay Anderson and Susan Smith, 'Editorial: Emotional Geographies', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* NS 26 1 (2001): p8.

their analysis. In the same vein, in the very influential book Thrift wrote with Ash Amin, the Spinozan logic associating passions and (human and non-human) bodies to the emergence of sociospatial processes is proposed to shift attention both from the built environment as static container of action to flows, movements, and intensities, and from the known patterns to "a set of *ecologies of ignorance*."[385] Since then, theories of affect have gained momentum and taken on relevance in a wide range of disciplines, including cultural studies, planning, human geography and urban studies. As some scholars hold it, there is no one such a theory of affect, rather there is a multiplicity of approaches and conceptualisations that often are not clearly demarked and blur into each other, or sometimes might even be in contradiction.[386] As I try to point out, not only there are disparate theories of affect, but there is also much ambiguity on what affect is and if and how it can be distinguished from other concepts such as emotion, passion, desire, and feeling.

Clinging to different points of departure and taking on different inspirations, Sedgwick and Massumi advanced, in the mid-1990s, two lines of thought about affect with the main aim to promote an alternative way for social theory contra signification and symbolization, and their welding to structure, deemed to paralyse scholarship onto a binary logic and prevent further elaboration on difference and potential for change.[387] Segdwick' conceptualisation gets inspiration from the psychologist Silvan Tomkins, who assigned to affect a relevant role as agent of action and activator of relations with other bodies in a phenomenological perspective. Affects – a basic set including shame, interest, fear, anger, surprise, joy, distress, and disgust – have a biological innate nature that can amplify sensations when combined with drives within a stimulus-response movement and are the basis of human motivation and behaviour, according to Segdwick.[388] From a totally different prism, Massumi draws his theory of affect on Deleuze' reading of Spinoza in order to integrate the unexpected and inexplicable of the events produced by affect into the "set of invariant generative rules" that structure establishes.[389] For several reasons, Massumi's conceptualisation of affect has especially become influential in social sciences, thus impacting on a strand of literature which puts an emphasis on affect as an unformed and unstructured entity, its bodily nature, its comprehensibility as effect, and its origin in the pre-conscious. First, referring to affect as a critical point which holds virtuality, hence all the potential for becoming and non-linear development, he recalls some features of the theories of chaos and complexity, in particular the existence of uncertain and undetermined phenomena in systems when they reach the so-called bifurcation point, as in thermodynamics.[390] The fascination with chaos and disorder, with uncertainty and randomness, has affected from the fifties onwards many domains, from the scientific to the philosophical. As Katherine Hayles has underlined,

385 Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift, *Cities. Reimagining the Urban* (Cambridge & Malden: Polity 2002): p.92 (original emphasis). The expression "ecologies of ignorance" is borrowed from Niklas Luhmann's *Observations on Modernity* (Stanford: Stanford University Press: 1998). For Luhmann, there is a knowledge of ignorance, which is the result of the operations of closure of the system and which leaves an unmarked space in the system's environment, an absence. As Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos holds it, "Absence is seen as the unmappable, inexplorable, non-domesticated space of ignorance within the system, the very limits and limitations of knowledge." (Philippopoulos-Mihalopulos, *Absent Environments*, op. cit. p.3.

386 See Seigworth and Gregg (eds.) *The Affect Theory Reader,* op. cit.; Ruth Leys, 'The Turn to Affect: a Critique', *Critical Inquiry* 37 (2011): pp.434-472;

387 See Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank, 'Shame in the Cybernetic Fold: Reading Silvan Tomkins', *Critical Inquiry* 21 2 (1995): pp.496-522; Brian Massumi, 'The Autonomy of Affect', in P. Patton (ed.) *Deleuze: a Critical Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell 1996): pp.217-239; Clare Hemmings, 'Invoking Affect', *Cultural Studies* 19 5 (2005): pp.548-567.

388 Sedgwick and Frank, 'Shame in the Cybernetic Fold: Reading Silvan Tomkins' op. cit.; Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, *Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, and Performativity* (Durham & London: Duke University Press: 2003).

389 Massumi, 'The Autonomy of Affect', op. cit. p.221.

390 See for example Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, *Order out of Chaos* (New York: Bantam Books: 1984).

among poststructuralists "chaos is deemed to be more fecund than order, uncertainty is privileged above predictability, and fragmentation is seen as the reality that arbitrary definitions of closure would deny."[391] Moreover, poststructuralists' take on the concept of the virtual, especially Deleuze's, as *the realm of potential* where "futurity combines, unmediated, with pastness", is a central point in the so-called flat ontologies that shift focus from the analysis of pre-established entities to the process that brings them into being.[392] In this respect, Massumi interprets affect in terms of a system which is granted autonomy by its openness to its environment, and it is captured as soon as it crystallises into situated perception, or conscious emotions. In other words, autonomy is the quality that enables the unpredictable to happen, thus opening to change. Second, accounting for affect as the Spinozan bodily transformation which results from bodies encountering other bodies, Massumi engages with those strands of thought – such as new materialist ones – which insist on both the vitality ingrained in material (thus also social) processes and the distributed and emergent character of agency, considered as manifesting itself not as "the property of concrete, isolable entities [but as] distributed throughout the networks in which these entities are embedded."[393] And third, through the Spinozan prism, the focus on the encounter of bodies as the space-time block where action unfolds and bodies can exercise their capacities for affecting or being affected while at the same time leaving a dark space of unknown about their full potential for acting, resonates in many recent works in human geography, urban studies, and political science.[394]

Despite this seemingly homogeneity of discourses, the vagueness and elusiveness of the concept, and its semantic proximity to emotion, have been at the heart of an intense debate that has sprung up within the broader geographical field. The discussion has confronted different approaches aimed to both challenge the tendency to adopt forms of representation in accounting for socio-spatial processes, and promote a greater attention toward models of communication other than human language.[395] The attempt to sharply classify diverse

391 N. Katherine Hayles, *Chaos Bound. Orderly Disorder in Contemporary Literature and Science* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press: 1990) p.176.

392 Massumi, 'The Autonomy of Affect', op. cit. p.224. See also Manuel De Landa, *Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy* (New York: Continuum 2002); Bruno Latour, *Reassembling the Social* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005).

393 Hannes Bergthaller, 'On the limits of Agency: Notes on the Material Turn from a Systems-Theoretical Perspective', in S. Iovino and S. Oppermann (eds.) *Material Ecocriticism* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press 2014) p.37; see also Diana Coole, 'Agentic Capacities and Capacious Historical Materialism: Thinking with New Materialisms in the Political Sciences', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 41 3 (2013): pp.451-469; Rick Dolphijn and Iris van der Tuin (eds.), *New Materialism: Interviews and Cartographies* (Ann Arbor: Open Humanities Press 2012).

394 The emphasis on the encounter is particularly relevant in non-representational theory and notably in a strand of research termed "assemblage thinking", which has been emerging as a ethos that enables to understand the social as "an ongoing process of forming and sustaining associations between diverse constituents" [Ben Anderson, Matthew Kearnes, Colin McFarlane and Dan Swanton, On Assemblages and Geography', *Dialogues in Human Geography* 2 2 (2012) p.174]. What I refer to as "the dark space of unknown" echoes the Spinozan idea of the impossibility of having access to all the capacities of the body. In other words, as Graham Harman puts it, when a body (*object*, in Harman's language) drifts into an encounter and somehow composes with other bodies, "Its neighboring objects will always react to some of its features while remaining blind to the rest" [Graham Harman, *Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry of Things* (Chicago: Open Court 2005) p.81, cited in Bryant, *The Democracy of Objects*, op. cit. p.70].

395 For the debate in geography over the notion of affect, emotion and their convergences or differences, see for example: Ben Anderson, 'Affective Atmospheres', *Emotion, Space and Society* 2 (2009): pp.77-81; Mikkel Bille, Peter Bjerreggard, Tim Flohr Sørensen, 'Staging Atmospheres: Materiality, culture, and the texture of the in-between', *Emotion, Space and Society* 15 (2015): pp.31-38; Liz Bondi, 'Making Connections and Thinking through Emotions: between Geography and Psychotherapy', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 30 4 (2005): pp.433-448; Liz Bondi and Joyce Davidson, 'Lost in Translation', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 36 (2011): pp.595-598; Giorgio Hadi Curti, Stuart C Aitken, Fernando J Bosco and Denise Dixon Goerish, 'For not limiting affectual and emotional geographies: a collective critique of Steve Pile's 'Emotions and affect in recent human geography'', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 36 (2011): pp.590-594; Tim Edensor, 'Illuminated

traditions by identifying and displaying their dissimilarities and convergences has had as a result to raise many voices against what has been considered "a categorical violence" to the engagement with entities that are "inherently amorphous and elusive."[396] Some scholars have suggested that if the distinction between "affect (as a pre-personal field of intensity), feeling (as that intensity registered in a sensing body), and emotion (as that felt intensity expressed in a socio-culturally recognizable form)" is so hard to be maintained, then the notion of atmosphere can help overcome the dualistic framing by offering to "investigate the simultaneity of – rather than difference between – emotion and affect that the recent affect literature has discussed."[397] How so? Again, it is suggested that the ambiguity of the ontological and epistemological status of atmospheres, their ever-changing nature, is precisely what gives them the power to "answer the question of how the social relates to the affective and emotive dimensions of life" since "they are impersonal in that they belong to collective situations and yet can be felt as intensely personal."[398] Is this indetermination productive when it comes to account for how the socius is generated *also* through intensities that are the outcome of material encounters? It seems so, judging from the volume and the richness of recent contributions in the domain of social sciences. However, "the question is not: is it true? But: does it work?"[399]

In the context of this work, the notions of affect, emotion, and atmosphere are investigated, articulated, and handled not with the purpose of "emphasising the affective and emotional aspects of personal and social life",[400] or "describing people's rich experiences of place and emotions."[401] Rather, these concepts are much needed for different reasons. First, I agree with the urgency of adopting a vocabulary – and related concepts – that is able to express the manifold dimensions of the world we live in, for, as Sloterdijk beautifully holds it, "it is through the occurrence of abundance in the modern that the heavy has turned into appearance and the 'essential' now dwells in lightness, in the air, in the atmosphere."[402] In this sense, I argue for a framework which shows what "affect can do."[403] Otherwise stated, if affect is the term for an intensity that may be liberated when bodies come together, here the interest is in what effects that intensity produces on those bodies and how it makes them assemble. Of particular importance here is to understand how bodies and affect relate, how emotions can be manipulated, and how atmospheres emerge and are reproduced.

If the distinction between affect and emotion can serve the purpose of creating (or reinforcing) disciplinary boundaries or, by contrast, their muddling can avoid the risk of engaging with bounded definitions and categorisations, my endeavour is precisely not to engage in that

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Atmospheres: anticipating and reproducing the flow of affective experience in Blackpool', *Environment & Planning D: Society and Space* 30 (2012: pp.1103-1122; Steve Pile, 'Emotions and affect in recent human geography', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographer*s 35 (2010): pp.5-20.

396 Bondi and Joyce Davidson, 'Lost in translation, op. cit. p.595. And also Pile, 'Emotions and affect in recent human geography', op. cit.

397 Derek p McCormack, 'Engineering affective atmospheres on the moving geographies of the 1987 Andrée expedition', *Cultural Geographies* 15 (2008): p.414, cited in: Bille, Bjerreggard, Sørensen, 'Staging Atmospheres: Materiality, culture, and the texture of the in-between', op. cit. p.35.

398 Anderson, 'Affective Atmospheres', op. cit. p.80.

399 Brian Massumi, 'Translator's Foreword: Pleasures of Philosophy', in Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousands Plateaus*, op.cit. p.XV.

400 Pile, 'Emotions and affect in recent human geography', op. cit. p.5.

401 Ibid. p.7.

402 Peter Sloterdijk, 'Against Gravity: Bettina Funcke Talks with Peter Sloterdijk', *Bookforum February/March* (2005) available at http://www. bookforum. com/archive/feb_05/funcke.html [accessed on 15 March 2017].

403 Seigworth and Gregg, 'An Inventory of Shimmers', op. cit. p.24.

debate. There is no point in defending one terms against the other. Rather, there is the necessity to define what theoretical framework is the best suited for investigating how agency is activated – not only in the human subject but throughout the real, in a posthuman perspective – and how it can be directed through the modulation of bodies' (individuals and collectives) capacities to affect and be affected. From this perspective, affect and emotion might easily be construed as interconnected and part of the same continuum where individuals and their environment merge, where "both emotions and senses originate as much in the body as in its environment, and subsequently [that] there is no constructive difference between internal and external origin, namely senses and emotions."[404] In this vein, following Spinoza, affect is understood in its manifold unfolding as both sensory flow and material exchange, which involves both the body and its environment in that it impinges upon the body and yet, by affecting other bodies, it exceeds it.[405]

In the next sections, I sketch a theoretical framework of affect – and their emotional aspects - by drawing from a Spinozan and Deleuzian tradition, which views bodies as expressing their agency according to their capacity of being affected by other bodies *au hasard des rencontres*, to wit, when caught in one of the multiple assemblages they happen to be part of.[406] Subsequently I investigate, through the Spinozan conceptualisation of emotion and imagination, how affective moves can build territories; thus arriving to the concept of atmosphere and its performativity in the case of the Jungle, understanding the emergence of that social body both as (an atmospheric) centre of gravity and inescapable trap.

3.2 A matter of agency

During the eviction fires burst and spread rapidly throughout the camp, destroying huts and tents, creating a carpet of ashes, engendering chaos. You could spot people running to get extinguishers, fleeing, heading toward fire to save tanks from explosion, calling for help, rushing aimlessly, making videos. One day the fire grew very big. After the first minutes of confusion, most people reached the main access of the Jungle, its western gate, and gathered watching the fire expanding, between uneasiness and awe. At some point, some young men from the camp might have thought that the police was busy with the fire and they could try to call for a *dougar*, block the motorway sneak into the lorries. It could have been a riot, but in the end nothing happened. I witnessed a tense moment between some CRS and a few teenagers, but in a rather short time the young men were back to the no man's land playing. Meanwhile, the fire had been almost put out and everything was getting back to normal, as it were.

"How would political responses to public problems change were we to take seriously the vitality of (nonhuman) bodies"?[407] In the preface of her influential book *Virtual Matter*, Jane Bennett lays down this question as the basis for her inquiry into the agency of matter. Bennett's materialism is one which adheres to an ontology of objects, where the subject

404 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, *Spatial Justice*, op. cit. p.109.

405 Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 'Atmospheres of Law: Senses, Affects, Lawscapes', *Emotion, Space and Society* 7 (2013): pp.37-44.

406 Gilles Deleuze, *Cours sur Spinoza*, 24 January 1978, http://www.webdeleuze.com/php/texte.php?cle=14&groupe=Spinoza&langue=2.

407 Bennett, *Vibrant Matter: a Political Ecology of Things*, op. cit. p.viii.

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[33]

Figure 32. Looking at fire. Source: the author

Figure 33. Calling to *dougar*. Source: the author

is *dead* and different materialities express distinctive forms of power and capacities of acting when connected and combined with other materialities. In this view, the source of action in our world is not to be located only in the human body but it must be understood as distributed across an "ontologically heterogeneous field," with a power "to make things happen, to produce effects."[408] Reality is, here, the rhizomatic one suggested by Deleuze and Guattari, where agency is distributed along the lines of the assemblage. By the same token, but expanding the idea even further, Karen Barad claims that agency is not a property that is possessed by something, it is rather an *enactment*, "a matter of possibilities for reconfiguring entanglements."[409] Under this perspective, agency is not "about choice (...), it is about the possibilities and accountability entailed in reconfiguring material-discursive apparatuses of bodily production."[410]

Assuming a distributive notion of agency against a traditional idea of a human power that would derive from the human will to act, Bennett shows how intentionality loses importance, morality is replaced by ethics, and causality turns from effective to emergent. In Kantian and Hegelian traditions, which inform a vast strand of academic research in social sciences, agency is self-determining and rational, body and mind are separated and governed by different laws, and human beings' acts must be bounded to moral laws. If the subject is regarded as the source of causal events through her intentional acts, Bennett argues, we end up missing the complexity of the overlapping and conflicting interaction of manifold intertwined entities that are involved in a process of events in non-linear and unpredictable ways. This position echoes Nietzsche's assertion that "that which gives the extraordinary firmness to our belief in causality is not the great habit of seeing one occurrence following another but our inability to interpret events otherwise than as events caused by intentions."[411] Stated otherwise, if the subject is not the cause of events, neither is intention. Human intentionality in the new materialist account is not totally dismissed, but its centrality to action is scattered among other, possible, sources. Another consequence of strewing agency across a variety of nonhuman bodies and material practices is that the idea of a centralised control is weakened, along with its origin in a willing being, and the moral judgment is superseded by what Connolly calls an *ethic of cultivation*.[412] Such an ethics is not based on universal values but it is a contingent act of care which emerges along the process of assembling of multiple materialities, "the actual – though temporary – result of the combination of powers that affect bodies."[413] In a world of distributed agency, moral judgments and categories are bodies among many others that – when caught in an assemblage – might produce effects and contribute to the rearrangement of relations. In body's situatedness within the assemblage, both desire and responsibility unfold. I am discussing issues of responsibility in chapter 4, here it is important to underline its relation with agency, its rhizomatic character and its ethic more than moral *sense*. Finally, causality is emergent to the extent that instead of expressing linear lines of cause-effect, it refers

408 Ibid. p.23 and p.5.

409 Karen Barad, 'Interview with Karen Barad', in Rick Dolphijn and Iris van der Tuin, *New Materialism: Interviews and Cartographies* op. cit. p.54.

410 Ibid.

411 Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power* (trans. Walter Kaufmann and R J Hollingdale) (New York: Vintage Books 1968) p.295.

412 William E Connolly, 'The 'New Materialism' and the Fragility of Things', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 41 3 (2013): p.401.

413 Ansaloni and Tedeschi, 'Ethics and Spatial Justice: Unfolding Non-linear Possibilities for Planning Action', op. cit. p.326.

to the process through which events come into being out of disorder, and cause and effect redound on each other. Emergent causality is, for Connolly, "a mode in which new forces can trigger novel patterns of self-organization in a thing, species, system, or being, sometimes allowing something new to emerge from the swirl back and forth between them."[414] As Bennett suggests by citing Hannah Arendt, it is impossible to identify the cause of complex events, for "elements by themselves probably never cause anything. They become origins of events if and when they crystallize into fixed and definite forms."[415]

The decentring of the human subject from its privileged position of independent and rational agent, not only responds to the need of confronting with a world where human processes are so profoundly entangled with non-human ones, not least technological things, but 'stuff', more broadly;[416] also, it opens up our thinking of agency as a capacity of acting that is conferred to bodies engaged into a relationship – a co-functioning, as Deleuze and Guattari put it, that is an assemblage. If "[a]n assemblage owes its agentic capacity to the vitality of the materialities that constitute it", where does this vitality come from? From desire. Desire is the productive force that pushes bodies toward life, what Rosi Braidotti drawing on Spinoza calls *potentia,* "the ontological drive to become."[417] Vitality, life, desire. There are more terms to add to this list that thinkers have employed to explore the idea of an energy, an intensity, a creative impulse that pushes toward production. For Henri Bergson it is the movement of life, *l'élan vital*, that which is capable of relentlessly create new forms and new lines of transformation. This movement carries an infinity of virtualities that emerge as singularities when it encounters matter, with a tendency toward association, or assembling, as Deleuze would have it.[418] Guattari and Deleuze, in Anti-Oedipus, calls desiring-machine the vital force, in Nietzschean terms, that produces reality by making multiple, heterogeneous, and continual connections, following the rhizome instead of the tree map.[419] In their schizoanalytical model, desire is productive in that it has the force of both organising and dis-organising bodies, thus preventing any definitive fixation. In other words, desire enables change to happen, "desire is the real agent."[420]

If agency is not located in the subject, where does it originate? In a materialistic perspective such as the one I have just delineated, the answer may come from Spinoza's concept of affect.

To fully explore Spinoza's sense of affect and its implication in this work, we must first understand the ontological tenet of his monist philosophy, namely that the Spinozan world is composed by one substance, *Deus sive Natura*, and that every thing in the world is a mode of existence of the substance. Multiple modes of existence differ from one another precisely

414 William E Connolly, *A World of Becoming* (Durham and London: Duke University Press 2011) p.44.

415 Hannah Arendt, *Essays in Understanding, 1930-1954. Formation, Exile and Totalitarianism* (New York: Schocken Books 1994) p.324.

416 Recent trends in continental philosophy, materialism and realism, claims for new frameworks capable to confront with new developments such as "the looming ecological catastrophe, and the increasing infiltration of technology into the everyday world." [Levy Bryant, Nick Snircek and Graham Harman, 'Toward a Speculative Philosophy', in Levy Bryant, Nick Snircek and Graham Harman (eds.) *The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism* (Melbourne: re.press 2011) p.3).

417 Rosi Braidotti, *The Posthuman* (Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press 2013) p.134.

418 Henri Bergson, L'Evolution Créatrice (Les Echos du Maquis 2013 [1907] at http://www.echosdumaquis.com/Accueil/Textes_(A-Z)_files/L%27e%CC%81volution%20cre%CC%81atrice.pdf).

419 Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus,* op. cit. See also Eugene W Holland, *Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus. Introduction to Schizoanalysis* (London and New York: Routledge 1999).

420 Deleuze and Claire Parnet, *Dialogues*, op. cit. p.103.

in that they hold different degrees of power of affecting and being affected by other modes. From this perspective, two bedrocks can be pointed out. First, contra Descartes, body and mind are both modes of the divine substance, whereas body is a mode of extension and mind is a mode of thinking. In this sense, mind is the idea of the *corresponding* body and actions (or passions) in the mind are actions in the body, and vice versa. "What we have is the idea of that which *happens* to our body, the idea of our body's affections, and it is only through such ideas that we know immediately our body and others, our mind and others' (II, 1, 1). So there is a correspondence between the affections of the body and the ideas of the mind, a correspondence by which these ideas represent these affections."[421] Second, the capacity for affecting and being affected is, in Spinoza, conjoined with power (*potentia*) and action, the two being coincident and "necessarily filled with affections."[422]

Deleuze tells us that what we call affect is *affectus* in the *Ethics* of Spinoza. In an extremely cogent account of Spinoza's conceptualisation of affection and affect, Deleuze starts by highlighting two aspects. One is that in Spinoza the idea of a body – that is, its representation – is itself a body. Stated otherwise, ideas pertain to reality exactly as the body which representation they refer to. Affections are a particular type of idea that can be an image or a mark on the body.[423] The other aspect is that affect is a different mode of thinking than the affection and it presupposes the idea of the body we are related to. From a Spinozan perspective, to put it simply, the reality we deal with is both idea (image-affection) and affect. It is at the same time a sequence of ideas that impinges on me for as long as I connect to the world, and an uninterrupted variation that concerns my body. Variation of what? Here, it becomes evident why the concept of affect is productive: every body undergoes an endless variation of its capacity of acting (*puissance d'agir*) as a consequence of its interaction with other bodies. As my body connects to the world by encountering other bodies (or ideas of other bodies), a series of ideas follows one another and my body keeps on changing according to how these ideas compose with me: when my body encounters another body with which it enters in (a joyful) composition, my power of acting is enhanced; vice versa, when my body's coherence is threaten by another body, my capacity of acting is hampered. In other words, Deleuze explains reading Spinoza, our encounter with the world is a sequence of ceaseless variations "in the form of increasing-decreasing-increasing-decreasing [...], a sort of melodic line of continuous variation that defines affect (*affectus*) both in its relation to ideas and its difference in nature with them."[424] In this sense, affect is the relentless variation of my body's capacity for acting that depends on body's different modes of thinking and understanding the real, that is, my ideas of the world. Deleuze points out that, if image-affection and affect are related and the latter results somehow from the former, affect is not simply an idea of a different kind. While the affection expresses the effect on my body that is produced through the combination with another body, the affect reveals the transition from two states of the body itself and is not directly related

421 Deleuze, *Spinoza,* op. cit. (original emphasis) p.87.

422 Deleuze, *Spinoza,* op. cit. p.97.

423 Deleuze, *Cours sur Spinoza,* 24 January 1978 (my translation), op. cit. Spinoza on the mark which are left on human body: "The human body can undergo many changes, and, nevertheless, retain the impressions or traces of objects (cf. II. Post. v.), and, consequently, the same images of things." [Spinoza, *The Ethics (Ethica More Geometrico Demonstrata),* Project Gutenberg 2009 [1677], available at: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3800/3800-h/ 3800-h.htm (accessed 1 April 2017), III, post.2]. According to Deleuze, in Spinoza these images or corporeal traces are image-affections (*affectio*), which indicate the effects of other modes on one mode. [Deleuze, *Spinoza. Practical Philosophy,* op. cit. p.48]. This will be recalled in the next section with reference to imagination.

424 Ibid.

to the affecting body.[425] "It is certain that the affect implies an image or idea, and follows from the latter as from its cause (II, ax. 3). But it is not confined to the image or idea; it is of another nature, being purely transitive, and not indicative or representative, since it is experienced in a lived duration that involves the difference between two states."[426] As Rei Terada writes, affects "occupy the interval between affection and action."[427] In Spinoza's various transpositions of the concept of affect, notably those inspired by Massumi's reading of Deleuze, affect has thus become the impersonal, non-representational, and unqualified entity, to distinguish it from subjective and qualified emotions.[428] It should be made clear that neither Spinoza nor Deleuze's conceptualisation suggests telling apart affect from emotion as Massumi does. Rather, in Spinoza, as we have seen, being body and mind autonomous mode of the same substance, actions and passions affect it both, for "if the object of the idea constituting the human mind be a body, nothing can take place in that body without being perceived by the mind."[429] Deleuze, on the other side, calls the affects also *sentiments*, which become feelings in the English translation. And most importantly, affections and affects not only are the way toward the knowledge of the world, as I have showed in the first chapter, but they are so because they perpetually generate change and action. Thus, "if senses are, so to speak, the libidinal formation, the locus where desire is formed, and emotions are the representation of the material desire, the *signs* of the material, then any distinction between the two is forced."[430] In this vein, desire, which is an affect (a passion) in Spinoza, shares the same machinic power with the desire of Deleuze and Guattari, in that "it always wants more connections and assemblages;" it produces, and "its product is real."[431]

Recalling what I mentioned in chapter 1, when I referred to knowledge in a Spinozan perspective, Deleuze explains that Spinoza distinguishes among three degrees of knowledge which we acquire through the ideas we have of the world. Images-affections are those which provide us with an inadequate knowledge based only on the effects that bodies produce on us. Having only these ideas means, in Deleuze's words, to live "au hazard de rencontres," without knowing anything about the nature of the encountered body except its impression on me.[432] Then there are the notions that tell us something about the causes which make the encountered body pleases us at the empirical level. To use a Deleuzian example, if I know how to swim I can compose with the wave accordingly in order for my power to be enhanced and not reduced (for not drowning). Finally, we have the ideas-essences, a kind of knowledge toward which every human should tend but hardly reaches because one must know exactly the nature of the encountered body, the nature of hers, so to determine if their mutual composition can be a good one. This is why it is so important to know what a body

425 "By 'affect' I understand affections of the body by which the body's power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained..." in Spinoza, Ethics III,d,3 [Deleuze, *Spinoza*, op. cit. p.48). I here cite Spinoza in Deleuze, because the Project Gutenberg's translation instead of the term 'affect' for *affectus* employs the term 'emotion', which here might be confusing.

426 Deleuze, *Spinoza,* op. cit. p.49.

427 Rei Terada, *Feeling in Theory. Emotion after the 'Death of the Subject'* (Cambridge MA and London: Harvard University Press 2001) p.115.

428 Brian Massumi, *Parables of the Virtual. Movement, Affect, Sensation* (Durham and London: Duke University Press 2002) p.28.

429 Spinoza, *The Ethics (Ethica More Geometrico Demonstrata),* Project Gutenberg 2009 [1677], available at: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3800/3800-h/ 3800-h.htm (accessed 1 April 2017) II, prop.12.

430 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, *Spatial Justice,* op.cit. p.114.

431 Ian Buchanan, 'Desire and Ethics', *Deleuze Studies* 5 (2001): pp.7-20. As Buchanan emphasises: "Productive desire cannot be the desire for something, it must produce something," [p.17].

432 Deleuze, *Cours sur Spinoza,* 24 January 1978, op. cit.

can do. According to Spinoza, experience alone cannot tell us much about it. Rather, if we acquire those he refers to as adequate ideas – notions and essences – we provide ourselves with the means through which to refrain from getting overwhelmed by passions, to wit, affects that may enhance temporarily our *potentia* but limit our access to an adequate knowledge of the world.

Despite their diverse relevance for acquiring knowledge, each of these ideas brings the body to action. What is more, for Spinoza action equates to power and power is the essence of finite beings, to which a capacity to be affected corresponds.[433] Where does this power, this capacity to affect and to be affected, come from? According to Spinoza, it comes from the *conatus*, or the effort of every finite being to persevere in existing and maintaining its capacity to be affected. Conatus is the impulse for action, from which the relations of one body with another one flow and assemblages are formed. It is "the first foundation, the *primum movens*, the efficient and not the final cause."[434] It differs from affection in that if the former is referred to the singularity, the finite being as a whole, the latter assigns emotional value to the other finite being we connect with.[435] Conatus pushes bodies to pursue what is good for them, to seek joy and try to compose with those bodies that are capable of increasing their power of acting. In other words, conatus is the endeavour that makes our existence relying on the relations of our body's power with other bodies, our environment.[436] From this point of view, as Bennett holds it, "Spinoza's conative bodies are also *associative* or (one could even say) *social* bodies, in the sense that each is, by its very nature as a body, continuously affecting and being affected by other bodies."[437]

The idea of a Spinozan ontology that can be read as relational is associated to individuation, which is the process through which individual finite beings differentiate from the environment. As Gilbert Simondon puts it, this process is not a finite one that would find its completion once the unity of the individual would have been achieved, thus producing two separate entities, the individual and the environment. Rather, the process of individuation is "a perpetual one, it is life itself, according to the fundamental mode of becoming: *the living preserves in itself a permanent activity of individuation*."[438] This process is double in Simondon, to wit, it is both individual and collective, or transindividual as he calls it. In the Spinozian account of transindividuality, Balibar explains that the conatus, in its striving for individuals' own conservation and thus (at least temporary) stability, spurs on a relentless reproduction of their constituent part, both in bodily and psychic terms, on the necessary condition that they exchange with the environment, and other individuals.[439] In other words, conatus is at the basis of the collective individuation. Conatus is thus "the vital process that gives the sense of individuation (i.e., of the being's never-ending becoming), that moves the individual along multiple directions into the collective context."[440] The necessity for things to be in relation to persevere in being is sustained also by the assumption that things are

433 Gilles Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* (trans. Martin Joughin) (New York: Zone Books 2005).

434 Deleuze, *Spinoza* op. cit. p.102.

435 Etienne Balibar, *Spinoza: from Individuality to Transindividuality* (Delft: Eburon 1997).

436 Olli Koistinen and Valtteri Viljanen, Introduction, in (Olli Koistinen ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza's Ethics* (New York: Cambridge University Press 2009).

437 Bennett, *Vibrant Matter: a Political Ecology of Things,* op. cit. p.21 (original emphasis).

438 Simondon, *L'Individuation à la Lumière des Notions de Forme et d'Information,* op. cit. p.27 (my translation, original emphasis).

439 Balibar, *Spinoza: from Individuality to Transindividuality,* op. cit.

440 Ansaloni and Tedeschi, 'Understanding space ethically through affect and emotion: from uneasiness to fear and rage in the city', op.cit. p.19.

causes in themselves and their being causes cannot but produce effects. Therefore "they immediately cause some effect(s) and are effect(s) of some cause(s)."[441] We will see in the next section how the relation with other bodies works, here suffice it to say that despite their inadequacy in the Spinozan perspective, ideas that come from imagination - image-affections – are at the basis of processes of social interaction and assembling.

There was more than one agent in the eviction. One was the institutional team composed by the police, the private company in charge of demolishing huts and tents, the private company in charge of collecting the debris, the mediators of the OFII, and the representatives of the Prefecture.[442] Another agent included all those, inhabitants or volunteers, who unrelentingly disassembled-removed-displaced-reassembled huts and people's belongings from the southern to-be-dismantled area to the northern still-tolerated one. And then there were fires. No one really knew how fires burst. To say it more clearly, someone must have known how this or that fire burst, by being a direct witness or by being the one who started the fire in the first place. In the end, everyone had their own personal story. For the Prefecture it was an Afghan tradition of setting fires after leaving one's own place;[443] for many volunteers it was the police on purpose, to accelerate the cleansing of the camp, or by accident as a consequence of tear gas canisters throwing. For an Afghan man I talked to, it was teenagers from his community who, precisely, were just rascals and were at the same time excited and scared by the ongoing events. At any rate, fires were by far the quickest, most violent and spectacular executor of the ongoing eviction.

3.3 Imaginary territories

Through the discussion on the significance of affect in Spinoza's account of individuals' power and the social character of individuals' affective nature, a framework emerges from which it is possible to analyse how this sociability unfolds, to wit, how individuals (bodies) come and hold together. Let me recall that in Spinoza the mind is the idea of the body, that is, mind and body are connected through the relations of ideas of things, be them the body itself or other individuals. In this sense, what happens to the body, the way it is affected through its encounters with the world, affects also the mind. And what is more, because affections of an object leave a mark on the body even once the object is no longer present, the mind endures the same affections in the form of imaginings: "the modifications of the human body, of which the ideas represent external bodies as present to us, we will call the images of things, though they do not recall the figure of things. When the mind regards bodies in this fashion, we say that it imagines."[444] Against this backdrop, imagination has a strong bodily dimension, for it is through the body that the mind gets in contact with the world. As Moira Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd suggest, such cognitive connection to reality implies an awareness of the transformations that occur in the body as a result of its encounter with other bodies (or ideas). As they say, "in being aware of its body, the mind is

441 Balibar, *Spinoza: from Individuality to Transindividuality,* op. cit. p.13.

442 OFII stands for "Office Français de l'Immigration et de l'Intégration", the state agency in charge of implementing French policies in the field of legal immigration.

443 http://www.europe1.fr/societe/incendies-dans-la-jungle-de-calais-la-prefete-parle-de-tradition-les-associations-furieuses-2883113.

444 Spinoza, *The Ethics (Ethica More Geometrico Demonstrata),* Project Gutenberg 2009 [1677], available at: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3800/3800-h/ 3800-h.htm (accessed 1 April 2017) II, note on prop.17.

[34]

Figure 34. After the fire. Source: the author

aware not just of one material thing but of other bodies impinging on that body. It is aware, that is, of its own body together with other bodies and of other bodies together with its own."[445] The perception of the affects of other bodies on us, together with the perception of our own body, is at the basis of imagination and imagination is intimately linked to both how affects are transmitted and how, affectively, individuals can bind – or not – together. Imagination might be a useful prism through which to regard at the formation of what Gatens and Lloyd call collective imaginings, which can be organised by and through affects to the point of becoming expressive territories and acquiring political force. If we agree with Spinoza that ideas (and appetites, and passions) are real as bodies are, we should be careful about how imagery "can persist in the form of powerful social fictions even when the explicit beliefs associated with these images and fictions are not consciously endorsed."[446]

How does this process work in Spinoza? When I encounter other bodies, my own body is affected in multiple ways and my perception of them is presented to my mind in the form of an image, which, associating in turn to either active (joy) or passive (sadness) affects, leads my body to act accordingly. Furthermore, if this encounter is one that affects me positively, I will have also my conatus and my emotions intensified, and with them my power to imagine. Then, if this encounter involves multiple bodies in an assemblage, "the power of these images is strengthened or diminished by the dynamic social collectivities formed or disrupted by the associations our bodies form with others."[447] Balibar sums this up convincingly by describing our relation with the world as a "double process of identification," where we first identify ourselves with other individuals (human or nonhuman) who/that give rise to our feelings of love or hate, pleasure or unpleasure, through a *mimetic process*, that is, through the projection of our own affections upon them.[448] In other words, when we interact with some body that we imagine like us, of which we haven't had any previous affect, and we imagine it to have some particular affect, we will get the same one, by imitation. And accordingly, as Spinoza explains, we will love what bodies we love love, and hate what bodies we hate love.[449]Gabriel Tarde gives us an interpretation, from a microsociological perspective, of how this process works. According to Tarde, provided that the human individual has a natural tendency toward imitation as form of communication, at the heart of the social we have imitation processes that unfold with a sort of self-organising force. I imitate because others imitate, I imitate also when I counter-imitate.[450] Imitation is repetition, with a *vibratory rhythm*, that produces and reproduces collective bodies even at distance, through a communication which is inherently affective. Imitation, thus, is a refrain, an expressive mode of building a territory, even an imaginary one. We must not forget that the expressiveness through which a territory emerges is the mode of the territory of functioning, of territorialising, hence of triggering action. And this process is affective, employs affects to unfold. As Borch argues, while imitations stabilise identities, or collective identifications, rhythms introduce variations that may destabilise imitations,[451] thus bringing about what Tarde calls innovation, which is in Deleuzian terms a deterritorialisation. Not

445 Gatens and Lloyd, *Collective Imaginings,* op. cit. p.14.

446 Ibid. p.4.

447 Ibid. p.40.

448 Balibar, *Spinoza: from Individuality to Transindividuality,* op. cit. p.27.

449 Spinoza, *The Ethics (Ethica More Geometrico Demonstrata),* Project Gutenberg 2009 [1677], available at: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3800/3800-h/ 3800-h.htm (accessed 1 April 2017) III, prop.19-27.

450 Gabriel Tarde, *Les Lois de l'Imitation: Etude Sociologique* (Paris: F. Alcan 1921); Borch, 'Urban Imitations. Tarde's Sociology Revisited', op. cit.

451 Borch, 'Urban Imitations. Tarde's Sociology Revisited', op. cit.

every repetition brings about rhythm though; rather, rhythms happen when repetition/imitation acquires expression. When repetition/imitation sets a territory. Paraphrasing Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, rhythm is the material side of imagination, where "blocks of movement across time and space combine to build, every time anew, a form of identity that is radically divorced from similarity and fully given to the difference and individuality of every beat."[452] In this sense, and given the deeply associative character of the imitative movement, imagery can be construed as a working arrangement, an assemblage of things that co-operate, in a space-time block, toward the satisfaction of its own conatus, which seeks to persevere in its becoming by including what it pleases it and excluding what it displeases it. The imagery is held together as an assemblage of image-affections that refers to a common, even if not necessarily either undifferentiated or homogeneous, affect. We do not know how it assembled in the first place, but we can distinguish its expressive and rhythmical features as it unfolds. To sum up, imaginary territories arise through a double movement: first, an image – which is an affect born out of the encounter amongst bodies – enters into a collective rhythmic process of imitation, and thus is transmitted and communicated. Then, this process territorialises the flux of affect into collective imaginings. Once these territories have emerged, they are real and powerful enough to affect in turn bodies that are involved in the same assemblage. They have become part of the lawscape.

In the jumble of the Jungle, there were as many imaginaries as there were individuals, but some of them were stronger than others and their power of affecting was greater than others. Each of these imageries was capable of drawing marked boundaries, of letting some bodies in and others out, of increasing its power of affecting through the intensification of affections: the greater the excess between two different affective states of the bodies involved in an imagery, the more powerful the force of this imagery to affect other bodies. In this sense, the conatus of each imaginary is to produce excessive states, "to experience joy, to increase the power of acting, to imagine and find that which is a cause of joy, which maintains and furthers this cause."[453] Imagination is related to the conatus and like the conatus it can both empower and endanger the body.

Imaginaries are territorial in that they emerge expressively through a refrain, which is a means of materialising the force of the conatus to strive for attracting what empowers it and rejecting what undermines it; drawing boundaries through which to exclude and include; visibilising their presence through the repetition of their features; distributing space and time to construct their identity; and stabilising identities through continual, rhythmical, innovations.

Imagine a wind-blown wasteland covered with coloured tents that had their first life at a music festival,[454] scattered bushes, small wooden shacks, tags that welcome you to Sudan or confide a wish to go to England, debris and rubbish all around, mud flats that turn into floods as soon as it rains. And it rains often in the north of France. And then, imagine running into young underdressed men wearing flip-flops, looking busy and in a hurry along the main

452 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 'Milieu, Territory, Atmosphere: New Spaces of Knowledge', op. cit. p.85. Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos clarifies here that this understanding of identity comes from Deleuze and Guattari's notion of *hacceity*: "a hybrid collectivity that does not focus on the individual but on the connection of the individual with other bodies in the broader sense of the term", (p.85, note 3, original emphasis).

453 Deleuze, *Spinoza,* op. cit. p.101.

454 Many tents in the Jungle were collected from the music festival in Glastonbury and brought to Calais by British volunteers.

muddy road full of shops and afghan restaurants, while some other young men are collecting water from a tap next to an Ethiopian church. You thought you were in France and now it looks like you have found yourself in a slum of a big city somewhere, but where? In Kabul? In Khartoum? In Addis Ababa? What you realise, once back to consciousness, is that you are in France, but you are also elsewhere, here and now. If you are in France, why are these people living in slum conditions on the edge of a city, longing to cross over to Britain and in the impossibility of leaving the encampment that has become their refuge? It is because they are *refugees*. They have fled war, persecution, and misery and are now searching protection in Europe, where they only find rejection, more misery, and vulnerability. As I argue below, it is not a matter of truth or falseness when it comes to fiction: it is the affective force of imagination that construes, at least partially, our apprehension of the real. And, as Teresa Brennan says, imagination is (also) a physical force.[455] I remark here that imagination, and with it imaginary territories, has the force of controlling bodies. Through the imitating process, bodies are involved into a collective territory that organise them accordingly. I am trying to show you how below, by referring to the Jungle and its turning into an atmosphere.

To put it bluntly, by referring to fictions I do not mean that the people of the Jungle had not suffered or were not experiencing dramatic situations. Rather the opposite, I want to highlight the fact that putting an emphasis on their being victims eventually can result in negative outcomes, both politically and analytically. People stuck in the site of Calais were called refugees by volunteers, activist and many British media. This term was strategically rejected by state officials and the French government, who referred to the inhabitants of the Jungle as migrants. From a mere juridical perspective, most of them did not have a refugee status.[456] Yet, some did have; many were asylum seekers in France, some other had legally the right to claim for asylum in France or to ask to be reunited with their family in the UK. Some others had documents issued by another European country, their presence in France being thus legally acceptable. Some others were undocumented and probably did not fit into any of the criteria for asylum, making of them the most vulnerable ones to the asylum regime. However, there is more than a techno-legal dimension in the term *refugee*. The inhabitants of the Jungle were called refugees to stress their right to be where they were and to obtain hospitality and humanitarian assistance. As Costas Douzinas puts it, "giving a name is a hegemonic practice. It takes a determinate particularity and turns it into universality."[457] This is true whether you use the term refugee or migrants, but with different consequences. In this section I focus on the former, in the next chapter I deal with latter.

In the fifth chapter of her book on *The Origin of Totalitarianism*, Hannah Arendt addresses the problematic of the refugees by considering them those who have become homeless, (*de facto*) stateless, and rightless.[458] Refugees, Arendt argues, become rightless as soon as,

455 Teresa Brennan, *The Transmission of Affect* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press 2004).

456 The legal definition of refugee is included in the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol "relating to the status of refugees", which was adopted in Geneva at a United Nations Conference, then ratified by 145 state parties. It define refugee a person who "is outside his or her country of nationality or habitual residence; has a well-founded fear of being persecuted because of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and is unable or unwilling to avail him— or herself of the protection of that country, or to return there, for fear of persecution." See Article 1A(2) at http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.

457 Costas Douzinas, '*Stasis Syntagma*: the Names and Types of Resistance', in Matthew Stone, Illan rua Wall, and Costas Douzinas (eds), *New Critical Legal Thinking: Law and the Political* (Abingdon and New York: Routledge 2012) p.35.

458 Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (Cleveland and New York: the World Publishing Company 1958). Arendt employs both the term refugee and stateless. Here is not the definition that counts, but the association she has made between the loss of the protection of one's own state, that is the loss of citizenship, and the deprivation

finding themselves in the impossibility or the unwillingness of being protected by their state, they first lose their national rights, thus falling "back upon their minimum rights", then they are confronted with a new community that refuses to guarantee them either.[459] In her view, for individuals who have lost any quality except those defining them as belonging to the human species, what Agamben refers to as bare life, human rights prove to be powerless. This is why, Arendt maintains, "the prolongation of their lives is due to charity and not to right."[460] The image of individuals deprived of rights and preserving only their human attributes, is the one conveyed when the term refugee is used not in the legal sense but alluding to someone who, having fallen out of the political sphere and the protection of the state, being ascribed to a pure human dimension, is deemed to express the need, first and foremost, for getting back her right to humanity. As Agamben argues, with the term refugee, so difficult to be defined politically, the idea of refugee, the notion of refugee, and the imagining about the refugee, easily fall into a confused apprehension of an individual, more often a multitude, which represents the loss of human rights and its consequences. And pity, or compassion, to use Didier Fassin term, emerges as the corresponding affect of that image.[461] Compassion becomes soon the explanation and reason behind action. And then compassion becomes itself action for a cause that is autopoietic: it aims to boost and raise the same affect in others, to make compassion grow, to spread as epidemic. Indeed, "emotion is not only internal transformation [...]; it is also a certain impulse across a universe that has a sense [*sens*]; it is the sense of the action [...] the emotion extends into the world as action the way the action extends into the subject as emotion."[462] The emotion turns collective easily through action. But then, action and emotion together have the power to conceal what the act of imagining collectively has discarded, for example the fact that people who are not yet refugees, technically speaking, live under the threats of the asylum regime: they still have to pass a process in order to become legally refugees and this is highly unpredictable, entails risks of deportation, expulsion, of remaining in illegality for an indefinite amount of time, as I show in chapter 4.

During the eviction, at one of those evening meetings where the volunteers coordinated the action with some migrants, the discussion revolved around how to attract the attention of the media and directing it to "change the way refugees are seen."[463] A British girl took the floor to say that she had just come back from London and she wanted to report how the media were representing the situation in Calais. "Three images had a positive impact and two had a negative one", she said, "For the positive ones, they showed the Iranian guys with sewed lips; a child running from teargas; and Sudanese guys offering tea to French officials in the middle of the eviction. On the negative side, they reported refugees throwing stones to the police, and fires".[464] "While the first three help reinforce the imaginary of victimisation"

of any right as a human being. Giorgio Agamben draws on this to construe the notion of bare life. See Agamben, *Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, op. cit.

459 Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism,* op. cit. p.292.

460 Ibid. p.296.

461 Fassin, *Humanitarian Reason. A Moral History of the Present*, op. cit.

462 Gilbert Simondon, *L'individuation Psychique et Collective* (Paris: Aubier 1989) p.109, cited in Ansaloni and Tedeschi,'Understanding space ethically through affect and emotion: from uneasiness to fear and rage in the city', op.cit. p.21.

463 Quote from Tom, a British volunteer who was leading the discussion. During the time I attended the evening meetings, with the exception of the last one before they ended completely, Tom was always the leading chair. He was an actor and a monk and his charisma led him often to the stage. As once a researcher I met in Calais told me, after one of those meetings "In the end, it is always Tom who decides. If he doesn't agree with one's discourse, he just drops it" [5 March 2016].

464 The girl is referring to the hunger strike that a group of around ten people from Iran went on as soon as the

she added, "the other two spoil the perception of the refugees." The refrain of the *refugee*, through the diffusion of pictures and discourses that stressed their dire life conditions in Calais, was communicating affectively a call for solidarity in which affects were transmitting images that had the force of acting and pushing bodies to act. When during the summer 2015 the then British Prime Minister Cameron referred to people in Calais as "a swarm of people coming across the Mediterranean, seeking a better life, wanting to come to Britain," was harshly criticised.[465] One month later, the picture of the lifeless body of three-years-old Aylan with his red t-shirt travelled around the world,[466] everything changed in Calais' aid practice. According to Christian, the president of l'Auberge des Migrants, the main French charity in Calais, following the release of the photo of the little Syrian boy, British volunteers arrived in droves and some groups started raising money for the camp of Calais, for the *refugees*.[467] A long term volunteer, one year later, was writing on a Facebook group page that was created as the emotional response to Cameron's words,

> "this group is effectively just one year old. 12 months + 1 day ago, there was nearly no UK (and European) volunteers in the camp. Was mostly a handful of burned out French volunteers wondering if they'd be able to reach the autumn, go through the winter...while No Borders were recording police abuses. This group was created right after Cameron's speech about the "swarms of migrants." First dozens, then hundreds, then thousands of people felt the need to engage directly. This group, among others, is the consequence of people considering: "That's enough". One year later: this group is still here, Cameron is not."[468]

What the media was calling the refugee crisis, which during that summer was associated to an unprecedented flux of people across the Mediterranean,[469] brought many people from Britain to Calais to volunteer and provide supply to "make sure they have clothes, food, shelter, and water," and eager to "make a difference."[470] The image of Syrian displaced people fleeing war and drawing in the waters of Mediterranean Sea on the shores of Europe helped the transmission of compassion toward any person on the same route. If this association

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eviction started. They decided to sew their lips to protest and in the hope of urging more migrants in actions of resistance. Through a lawyer hired by the French charity l'Auberge des Migrants they asked that their quest reach the European Court of Human Rights. They stopped their strike (and unstitched their lips) two weeks later, with no political results. As it was reported during the weekly meeting of aid groups, the European Court refused to take the case into account because the Iranian men were not considered as vulnerable subjects [16 March 2016].

465 See http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-33716501; https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jan/27/david-camerons-bunch-of-migrants-quip-is-latest-of-several-such-comments.

466 On 2 September 2015 the umpteenth drawing of people attempting to reach the Greek coasts from Turkey let several Syrian citizens died. Among them, a three-years-old was found on the beach, and the photo of his little dead body was published worldwide. See https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/02/shocking-image-of-drowned-syrian-boy-shows-tragic-plight-of-refugees.

467 Christian Salomé reported this element during an informal interview [20 November 2015], but I heard him repeat it in other occasions.

468 Post on the closed Facebook Group "Calais – People to People Solidarity – Action from UK" [31 July 2016].

469 See http://frontex.europa.eu/news/number-of-migrants-in-one-month-above-100-000-for-first-time-I9MlIo; http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/08/02/number-of-refugees-to-europe-surges-to-record-1-3-million-in-2015/. The UNHCR reported of 322.500 arrivals to Europe by the sea from January to August 2015, against 219.000 in the same period of 2014, and 60.000 in 2013 [UNHCR, Initial Response Plan for the Refugee Crisis in Europe. June 2015-December 2016, accessed at http://www.unhcr.org/partners/donors/55ee99880/unhcr-supplementary-appeal-initial-response-refugee-crisis-europe-december.html on 17 April 2017].

470 https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/in-french-migrant-camps-volunteers-provide-what-governments-will-not/2016/05/19/c7e3c6b8-3129-4407-9bff-aa3bd964524e_story.html?utm_term=.3cec44ef7319; https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/sep/03/britons-rally-to-help-people-fleeing-war-and-terror-in-middle-east; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/12/help-refugees-calais-accidental-activists?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other.

made it easier for the multitude of people coming from different countries to find hospitality among European citizens, with the massive mobilisation of charities and individuals,[471] it also brought about a distinction in different categories of vulnerability, according to the country of origin. Syrians were put at the vertex and the so-called economic migrants at the bottom.

When I met A. he told me he was Syrian. He showed me his village on a map, on the coast, not far from the border with Lebanon. A. and his friend told me that they had arrived to Calais separately from Turkey, and A.'s family was still there in a refugee camp. He had flown Syria three years before and stayed in Paris where he had been working illegally in a bakery. For this reason, he could speak a bit of French. They both wanted to cross the Channel, because they had friends in the UK, they said, and because it would be easier to find a job there. A. became familiar to me during the weeks of my fieldwork. We met in the Jungle, got some tea, had chats about life in the encampment. He was looking for the right smuggler to make him hide in the right lorry at an affordable price. One day I could not reach him by phone, so when I met an Italian activist I knew he knew, I inquired her about him. "Are you talking about the Egyptian guy?" she asked. I realised in that precise moment that I did not know anything about the people of the Jungle. As Spinoza would put it, my knowledge was mainly affective. As I would have learnt later, A. was neither Syrian nor Egyptian, he was Tunisian. He had built many territories out of the imagery of the refugee, to protect himself. As Tunisian, he would have been just an economic migrant, not only for the governments that would consider his legal status, but also for all the volunteers and aid workers who were there because of the *refugees*.[472] The imagery of (especially Syrian) refugees was a powerful force driving to action, affecting many people with feelings of compassion for people in need, and joy when they could help them. On the other hand, it possessed the force of marking a territory, of drawing boundaries, thus leaving outside those who did not fit in. For A., to enter that territory meant to put up a story that could adhere to the image of the refugee, at least as long as he was living in the "refugee camp" of the Jungle.

The human rights that people lost in Calais, where both French and UK governments took care of the inhabitants of the Jungle mainly for security reasons, were reintegrated into the territory of the refugee through images that emphasised their belonging not only to the human species, but especially their extraordinary qualities as human beings. That is how the media told stories about artists and engineers, and the street artist Banksy represented on a wall at the access of the camp the image of Steve Jobs as a refugee, referring to his origin as the son of a Syrian migrant in the US.[473] Storytelling is the process of engineering imagination and imagination is itself a means of action. It is engineered because it functions by selecting and controlling. "There are a great many things which cannot withstand the implacable, bright light of the constant presence of others on the public scene; there, only what is considered to be relevant, worthy of being seen or heard, can be tolerated, so

471 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/dec/10/calais-jungle-refugee-camp-volunteer-conditions; https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/features/2015/9/11/uk-volunteers-rally-to-help-syrian-refugees-1.

472 It is interesting to note that, in what Fassin calls the "moral geography" of migration, in 2001 Syrian people enjoyed a worse reputation as migrants than, for example, Saddam Hussein's Iraqis [Fassin, *Humanitarian Reason*, op. cit. p.147].

473 https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2015/dec/11/banksy-uses-steve-jobs-artwork-to-highlight-refugee-crisis; http://www.lemonde.fr/culture/article/2015/11/27/dans-la-jungle-de-calais-une-fabrique-d-art_4818708_3246.html; https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/11/arts/international/refugees-in-calais-jungle-record-an-album.html.

that the irrelevant becomes automatically a private matter", Arendt argues.[474] Through the storytelling of the refugee, an affective relation is established between me and the image of the refugee that corresponds to a joyful idea. A joyful idea is what leads me to action, enhancing my capacity of acting. Someone who needs me. Someone who deserves my help because he is more than human but this excess has been taken away.

The assemblage of the aid work in the Jungle emerged out of the collective emotion of compassion arisen with the so-called refugee crisis, but then was organised through practices of humanitarian aid and autopoietically fed by the relentless production of storytelling about both the desperate conditions of life of people in the encampment, and their resilience, their talents, and humanity. It is not new that emotions expressed in either discursive or non-discursive ways can be powerful. Hume, in Deleuze's reading, recalls that in the case of tragedy, imagination is a vector of passions, capable of transmitting passions to the imagination of spectators: "How is it that the spectacle of passions, which are in themselves disagreeable and bleak, can come to delight us? The more the poet knows how to affect, horrify, and make us indignant, 'the more we [are] delighted."[475]

"As an assemblage constituted by institutions, discourses, international conventions and protocols, national policies, NGOs, the UN, refugees, aid workers and the like, humanitarian advocacy tends to territorialise and congeal identity under the population signifier 'refugee'."[476] By April 2016, the image of the refugees was so marked and territorialised that some volunteers felt the need to protect it also from themselves by establishing a code of conduct especially aimed at those individuals who were arriving as aid workers without affiliating to any of the organisations operating on the field. I already mentioned about it in chapter 1, when I referred to it for the turn it took with respect to personal relations between volunteers and inhabitants of the Jungle. The first draft of the code of conduct had the following sub-title: "These rules have been established by the communities of refugees and apply to every actor and volunteer. Their goal is to assure a maximum of cooperation and respect in the context of every relationship between volunteers and refugees."[477] The code included different kind of constraints and obligations, such as the ban on taking photos or videos of people without permission, or the ban on drinking alcohol. Two points of the code were about behaviour: the code invited to avoid any "inappropriate behaviour between volunteers and refugees" and "any disrespectful, shocking or violent behaviour" while in the Jungle. The first point disappeared in the final draft, as a consequence of disagreement among volunteers. During a meeting I attended, one of the volunteers bemoaned that the code was putting the entire burden on volunteers, without taking into account that the relationship volunteer-refugee could result in offensive behaviour also on the side of the refugees. However, during those meetings, the affective territory of the refugee was strong

474 Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press 1958) p.51.

475 Gilles Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity. An Essay on Hume's Theory on Human Nature* (trans. Constantin V. Boundas) (New York: Columbia University Press 1989) p.57.

476 Rosanne Kennedy, Jonathon Zapasnik, Hannah McCann and Miranda Bruce, 'All Those Little Machines: Assemblage as Transformative Theory', *Australia Humanities Review* 55 (2013): p.51.

477 The first draft of the code of conduct was written in French and shared among associations during the weekly meetings. According to an activist I interviewed the code of conduct was proposed and defended by some long-term volunteers. As I learnt during a meeting between aid groups representatives and the so-called community representatives, the need for the code arose when one or two community leaders complained about volunteers getting too close to migrants and playing favourites. Aid groups operating in the Jungle had already a code of conduct which they asked newcomers to sign. Nevertheless, due to a great number of volunteers coming independently and to the "unofficial" status of the camp, according to leaders of the main aid groups it was difficult to enforce any rule.

and bounded, and contesting it meant founding another territory without knowing the consequences of the rupture. It meant creating another imagery in opposition to the strong, existing one. This new imagery was rejected, not on rational basis, but simply because it was not able to pass into the collective dimension of affect that was completely dominated by the first one. And this affective territory marked a clear distinction between the "refugees" and the volunteers.

If, as we have seen, imagination is prompted by conatus, imaginings can empower as well as endanger the body. The body called into question here is not the individual body, but the body of the multitude of the temporary inhabitants of the Jungle hold together by imaginings. Mainly among the volunteers, but spreading through the media and affecting the migrants themselves, the image of *refugees* as bare lives in need for any basic supply, waiting for the volunteer to take care of them and the individual donor to contribute from distance, was a powerful one. Narratives around the people of the Jungle were two-faced but brought to the same conclusion: on the one side they told the story of one of more-than-human people, gifted and creative, who deserved help by virtue of their more-than-humanity; on the other, the narrative that accompanied aid practices conveyed the image of people in desperate conditions, so in need of everything.[478]

In a Spinozan perspective, images are modes of thinking and knowing. The residents of the camp were apprehended as a compact and homogeneous multitude claiming for help to survive, and the huge humanitarian response was orchestrated accordingly, depriving them of their political voice and stabilising an identity which did not exist as such in reality. As Liisa Malkki contends, "in universalizing particular displaced people into "refugees" – in abstracting their predicaments from specific political, historical, cultural contexts – humanitarian practices tend to silence refugees."[479] In her account of the philanthropic treatment of images of displaced people in Burundi and Rwanda, Malkki shows how mainstream representations of refugeeness tend to build both an *anonymous corporeality*, that is a depersonalisation of each individual out of the mass of the refugees, and a knowledge based on their being merely human. Michel Agier shares the same thought by affirming that "the humanitarian system induces the social and political non-existence of the recipients of its aid."[480] In the case of the Jungle, refugeeness was less embodied by the mass of people than by two other imageries: the raw spatial materiality of the precarious settlement and its expanding presence in a miry wind-blown wasteland, and scenes of clashes with the police along the motorway. It was both the historicity of their arrival to Calais and the actual conditions of their living there. And the imagery of their conditions recalled their helplessness in front of the state capture, which had to be counterweighted by a replacement: you need me to speak in your behalf. Even when the journalists interviewed the individuals, the repetition of the same images was conveyed, through insistence on the dire conditions of life in the Jungle, questions about origins and attempts to cross the Channel. When stories were asked, only a few spatial key words were employed – Syria,

478 The Jungle grew as a city with many economic activities run exclusively by migrants, mainly Afghan. Other activities, such as schools, community restaurants, and cultural practices, were run mostly by volunteers and aid groups. See Francesca Ansaloni, 'Multiple Expulsions. Affective and Material Evictions in Calais', *Lo Squaderno* 44 (2017): 39-41.

479 Liisa H. Malkki, 'Speechless Emissaries: Refugees, Humanitarism, and Dehistoricization', *Cultural Anthropology* 11 3 (1996): p.378.

480 Michel Agier, 'Between War and City: Towards an Urban Anthropology of Refugee Camps', *Ethnography* 3 (2002): p.322.

Talibans, Isis, Libya – which referred to same image capable of assemble together what Tarde would call the public, even at a distance, thanks to identification and the affective force of a collective knowledge.[481] "What these representational practices do is not strictly to dehumanize, but to humanize in a particular mode",[482] or, put differently, what they do is to classify people according to an imagery that, eventually, serves the (autopoietic) purpose of reinforcing itself, of affirming its compassion and its resulting response. It is, as Agier defines it, "a universalistic type of thinking", which leaves no room for alternative action.[483]

It does not matter whether the imagery reproduces what is true or false. For Spinoza, as long as we imagine, we strive to maintain our power of existing, thus enhancing our capacities of affecting and being affected by the environment, the world. Imagination is this way deeply linked to materiality, for we are affected and we affect always through our bodies. Furthermore, as Gatens and Lloyd hold, "socially shared fictions play a constitutive role in binding a group of individuals together"[484] thanks to the affective dynamic between bodies and the inherently relational force of affect. In this sense, "imaginative constructions of who and what we are, are 'materialised' through the forms of embodiment to which those constructions give rise. The imagination may create fables, fictions or collective 'illusions', which have 'real' effects, that is, which serve to structure forms of identity, social meaning and value, but which considered in themselves, are neither true nor false."[485] Whatever the correspondence of reality to the imagery of *refugees*, its materiality, its embodiment with the camp, the residents, and their stories, made it real, made it matter. And as I am arguing, this and other imaginaries contributed collectively to the dissolving of territorial boundaries into a light and comfortably pneumatic sphere.

3.4 Never-ending gravity

"I want to think of atmosphere as a force of attraction. As such, it is embodied by each body yet exceeding the body because it cannot be isolated."[486] This is the force of affects, to "go beyond the strength of those who undergo them. Sensations, percepts, and affects are *beings* whose validity lies in themselves and exceeds any lived."[487] The excess of affect is its being at the same time individual and collective, both flooding the body and yet directed elsewhere. In this sense the idea of affect is not centred in the subject, but extends to configurations and articulations amongst various bodies and senses that are both material and immaterial, and is being happening at the edge of the body, where the body and the world meet.

We need to start again from here, from the capacity of bodies, through affects, to combine with other bodies, to enter assemblages, to form temporary compositions with heterogeneous elements that co-operate, to build common territories, to spread imaginings.

481 Gabriel Tarde, *L'Opinion et la Foule* (Paris: Félix Alcan 1910).

482 Malkki, op. cit. p.390.

483 Michel Agier, 'Humanity as an Identity and its Political Effects (a Note on Camps and Humanitarian Government)', *Humanity: an International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* 1 (2010): pp.29-45.

484 Gatens and Lloyd, *Collective Imaginings. Spinoza, Past and Present*, op. cit. p.123.

485 Ibid.

486 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 'Atmospheres of Law: Senses, Affects, Lawscapes', op. cit. p.41.

487 Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?,* op. cit. p.164 (original emphasis).

In this assembling of bodies through affects, something important happens in terms of social production: whereas bodies stick together and cluster around affects, emotions, and images, whereas bodies "move at the same speed in such a way 'that they communicate their motions one to another in a certain ratio, these bodies are reciprocally called united bodies'"[488], they become part of an emergent field of intensities through which they are connected and hold together, an atmosphere. The atmosphere is the complex entity where affects "enter into virtual conjunction" and form "points of melting, of boiling, of condensation, of coagulation."[489] In terms of desire, the atmosphere is a collective machinic assemblage, it produces reality collectively. It is still a territorial assemblage, but one where boundaries have disappeared and the gravity of territory has lost weight, has become air. It happened in Calais. Something thickened while remaining suspended in the air, something attracted other things like gravity, without being located in any particular body, without showing gravity.

And yet, how do we know what an atmosphere can do? If we follow aesthetic and phenomenological accounts of atmospheres, such as that of Hermann Schmitz, we are provided with an atmosphere which is as an experience of the subject, spatially "without borders, disseminated and yet without place, that is, not localizable", somehow floating alone independently from bodies.[490] Gernot Böhme, whose thought has influenced many works on atmospheres in the last decades, while drawing on Schmitz, distances himself in that he understands an atmosphere as embodied "in the relation between environmental qualities and human states", something which is an outcome of bodies and their relations with the environment, that which makes possible for environmental qualities and human states to relate.[491] In his endeavour to overcome the dichotomy subject/object still present in Schmitz's version of atmosphere, Böhme construes things ontologically as *ecstasies* which *radiate* their force out to the environment, instead of thinking of atmospheres as emanating from the subject. This way Böhme conceives atmospheres as the spaces impacted by the ecstasies of things, by their excess. Böhme's understanding relies on the presence of a perceiver and a perceived, and the conscious experience of the human being's, on the awareness of her state of being in an environment.[492] This perspective is fascinating, but outlines an object, the atmosphere, whose existence is dependent on a perceiving subject and part of the subjectivation process in space. Still, as Ben Anderson questions, how do we account for collective affects?[493] Acknowledged that affects are collective by nature, as we have seen, for their capacity to connect and assemble bodies and their unfolding from bodily relationships, not only they are "not reducible to the individual bodies that they emerge from,"[494] but also they do not express conscious processes. They cannot be fully captured by perception because of their virtual movements that are only partially fixed by cognition.[495] Affect are collective because they are always involved in assemblages,

488 Baruch Spinoza, cited in Derek P. McCormack, 'Engineering Affective Atmospheres on the Moving Geographies of the 1897 Andrè Expedition', *Cultural Geographies* 15 4 (2008): p.418.

489 Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 1. The Movement-Image* (trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam) (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press: 1997): p.103.

490 Hermann Schmitz cited in Gernot Böhme, 'Atmosphere as the Fundamental Concept of a New Aesthetics', *Thesis Eleven* 36 113 (1993): p.119.

491 Ibid. p.114.

492 Ibid.

493 Ben Anderson, 'Affective Atmospheres', *Emotion, Space and Society* 2 (2009): pp.77-81.

494 Ibid. p.80.

495 Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual*, op. cit. p.35.

and "since every assemblage is collective, is itself a collective, it is indeed true that every desire is the affair of the people, or an affair of the masses, a molecular affair," as Deleuze contends.[496]

To explore what an atmosphere is and does, I draw on Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos' posthuman and ontological understanding of atmospherics. To introduce the concept of atmosphere, Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos builds on the idea of excess in the first place, of *hyperaesthesia*, the increase in sensitivity across all the senses. The term is to be found in David Howes' understanding of how consumer capitalism operates through a sensual logic in order to lure the consumers with commercial purposes. It can be understood as the excess of sensuous flow that can "create experiences" around a body (an object, an idea, an image).[497] In his "theory of spheres", Peter Sloterdijk provides an account of how the social unfolds – what he terms "spatial multiplicities" – by using the metaphor of the foams, which are structures that seek to build stability for the individual through *connected isolation*, that is, forming a "endoatmospherically protected space", a sphere, which maintains relationships with other spheres.[498] The stabilisation of each of these spheres, Sloterdijk argues, is the result of a Tardean mimetic process that is possible if "climatic conditions of immunity akin to each other" are already in place.[499] In other words, the coagulation to which Deleuze refers can happen if bodies are crossed by an excess of similar affects which spread mimetically, as it occurs with imaginings, as we have seen. This contagion is made possible precisely by the hyperaesthesia that overfloods bodies. It could be a commercial space which envelops you with a delicate scent of flowers and a slow piano music, or a flow of enthusiast people pouring into the streets to celebrate an event. It could be the visual and discursive overload of communication about the refugee crisis in Europe. Or, it could be the material, affective, and symbolic excess of a makeshift camp at the borders between France and UK.

What the term hyperaesthesia conveys is also the idea that through a logic of senses – and affects, I would add – something powerful can emerge that directs and influences the actions of bodies that are captured into it. This powerful thing is an atmosphere, "the excess of affect that keeps bodies together," "a floating ontology of excess."[500] The atmosphere is part, like the imaginary territories we have seen in the previous section, of the continuum of the lawscape, the space of every body's law, and both emerge affectively and collectively. Yet, they belong to different regimes of visibility and once emerged, they deploy a force that impacts other bodies with diverse intensity. In other words, the consequences on bodies in terms of control and ordering are not of the same degree. Imaginary territories can reinforce an atmosphere. The key difference between the two occurrences is that, on the one side, for an imaginary territory to operate effectively it needs a regime of hypervisibility. It needs that the territory is expressive and visible in order to establish what/who is inside and what/who is outside, to affect bodies and get them together by imitation. It needs to mark and weight: distinction must be made evident for the territory to function. With the atmosphere, conversely, the distinction, albeit present, must be made invisible. The

496 Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues*, op. cit. p.96.

497 David Howes, 'Hyperesthesia, or, the Sensual Logic of Late Capitalism', in David Howes (ed.), *Empire of the Senses* (Oxford: Berg 2005): pp.281-303.

498 Peter Sloterdijk, *Sfere III. Schiume,* op. cit. (my translation) p.240.

499 Ibid.

500 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 'Atmospheres of Law: Senses, Affects, Lawscapes', op. cit. p.41.

law of the atmosphere is disguised. For the atmosphere to work, boundaries need to be blurred so that you do not see that you are wrapped in a bubble. You must not see what is *outside*. As I show below, atmospheric mechanisms are extremely powerful in controlling and conditioning bodies.

Three three features of the atmosphere make it what it is and function the way it does. The first feature of the atmosphere is *the distinction between interior and exterior*.[501] The excess of a symbolic, sensorial, and emotional flow that overwhelms bodies must find a drain, a channel, and the atmosphere is what can seize and contain such sensory excess. In order to emerge, the atmosphere establishes boundaries, it distinguishes the inside from the outside, it territorialises. You are in, *if you feel like*. And, as soon as you are in, you *are* the atmosphere. Unlike phenomenological approaches to atmospheres, here we do not have either subjects or objects, nor we have bodies *in the atmosphere*. Rather, we have an ontological continuum where the atmosphere coincides with the bodies of which is made, and vice versa.[502] Interior and exterior thus are not ontologically drawn (you have never left the lawscape); as the result of atmospheric operations, that is of the functioning of the atmosphere itself to constitute its separateness from the environment, they are rather part of the same Möbius strip. If atmosphere is born out of excess and affective overflow, it works toward its control through partitioning. The atmospheric separation serves the purpose of the atmosphere – either to feel safe, or cosy, or to feel empowered, or else – by creating an enclosure, but finally it rests on the world that is left outside, which exists, despite any boundary, "in an ambiguous continuity", as Francisco Klauser puts it.[503] The bodies that become part of the atmosphere "are there only for one purpose: the perpetuation of this atmosphere for just a little longer, as long as possible, or as long as 'needed'."[504] Furthermore, the desire to perpetuate the atmosphere, and with it the belonging to a pneumatic comfort, is the source of "the very affects that desire its continuation."[505] In other words, the affects that sustain the atmosphere are relentlessly reproduced in order for the atmosphere to keep on being. So far, this is a territorial operation. But then, the atmosphere gets thicker, it envelops while becoming invisible, thus acquiring more power than a territory, and more stability.

The power of distinction is twofold. On the one hand, once an interior and an exterior have been put in place you cannot escape anymore, you find yourself trapped in your airy comfortable inside and what is outside becomes at least worthless and uninteresting, at worst threatening and fearsome. This is what Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos calls "the affect of contentment" of an atmosphere. It is the trickiest one, the one that makes you feel good inside, leaving you with no reason to forsake.[506] It is the air conditioning, the *space of immersion*.[507] As Marie-Eve Morin holds it, "the best immunisation of the interior, is the integration of that outside."[508] On the other hand, because the atmosphere has no

501 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, *Spatial Justice,* op. cit. p.141.

502 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 'Atmospheres of Law: Senses, Affects, Lawscapes', op. cit.

503 Francisco R. Klauser, 'Splintering Spheres of Security: Peter Sloterdijk and the Contemporary Fortress City', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 28 (2010): p.333. In this paper Klauser refers to architectural and spatial solutions to fix the atmosphere, which nonetheless can be considered, in the context of this thesis, in both its dimensions, material and immaterial.

504 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, *Spatial Justice,* op. cit. p.108.

505 Ibid. p.129.

506 Ibid. p.142.

507 Peter Sloterdijk, *Sfere III. Schiume* (Milano: Raffaello Cortina editore 2004).

508 Marie-Eve Morin, 'Cohabiting in the Globalised World: Peter Sloterdjik's Global Foams and Bruno Latour's

access to the outside except through its own functioning, that is, through its relentless auto-reproducing and thickening, it offers *an illusion of synthesis*, as far as "to be inside is to be safely identifying with 'the right side'."[509] This reassuring interior, Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos maintains, is protected by a membrane that is as real as it is illusionary, and which we produce in order to feel *good*, to correspond our desire for belonging. It is real insofar as we are affected by it, but it is illusionary to the extent that it is a rupture, no more than a distinction that is operated by the system – the atmosphere – in order to perpetuate itself: "the air inside is one with the air outside."[510] The illusion of synthesis, as a result, brings about the invisibilisation of the atmosphere itself, making it even more difficult to withdraw from it. The hyperaesthesia has been contained and the affective excess that made the atmosphere emerge in the first place has been engineered to dissimulate the enclosure. If the atmosphere arises from affective chaos, it must restore order to persevere in being. "While relying on affective excess for its emergence, *atmosphere absorbs the excess of affect, mops around its contingent leakage, tidies up anything that can go differently, and engineers the already given direction of affects in a collective way.* Affect is desire directed, atmosphere is affect castrated, de-excessified, normalised."[511]You are inside but you cannot realise it until (and if) you withdraw.

> "Although the Jungle is bad, people have made it home. They have made shops, restaurants, barbers, community kitchens, lives for themselves. They have hung pictures on their tarpaulin walls, they have planted flowers in plastic bottles outside their front doors. Some people have door mats, some people little bedside tables, where they keep a donated English novel, underlining the words they are yet to learn. Every body has personal touches, a snippet of their individuality, a slither of their dignity woven into those wooden structures, constructed with love by volunteers and refugees alike."[512]

In a documentary called *The Lotus Flower*, which makes the case for the Jungle as an emergent community, volunteers and migrants alike talk about the arising of an eventful place in the Jungle despite hardship. Through their words and their smiles, they convey the image of a vibrant multicultural neighbourhood where everyone is engaged in building something across difficulties, be it material or immaterial: a place, relationships, hope. "It is a horrible place, but at the same time there is a human spirit that is absolutely incredible", said Maya, a French woman who was living in a caravan with a guy from Pakistan as friend and protector.[513] While a migrant confirmed that "although it is a hard life, here we have managed to form our community, our family."[514] At the heart of the social production of care and belonging that was the Jungle there was its being "an experience where every kind of people from all nationalities live together...brotherhood...humanity," "a unique kind of community

Cosmopolitics', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 27 (2009): p.62.

509 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, *Spatial Justice,* op. cit. p.144.

510 Ibid. p.144.

511 Ibid. p.130 (original emphasis).

512 http://theworldwidetribe.com/2016/02/dont-bulldoze-the-calais-jungle/ [the Worldwide Tribe is a British charity that was set up following a work that a travel blogger and his documentary filmmaker brother from Kent made in the Jungle of Calais, both collecting stuff for the inhabitants of the camp and communicating on it].

513 Quote from the documentary "The Lotus Flower", by Finlay O'Hara, http://theworldwidetribe.com/thelotusflower/.

514 Ibid.

you cannot find anywhere else in the world," "a city of hope," filled with moments "that are absolutely magical."[515] The Jungle felt like "a world village, the neighbourhood of humanity, the forum of societies,"[516] it felt like a "potential city," an "ephemeral city" of "international urbanites," as we have seen in chapter 2.[517] In the words of many, it was vibrant, intense, and full of humanity. It was "the place where everyone wanted to be."[518] An urban utopia to come.

According to those narratives, the Jungle was an urban assemblage both vibrant and homely, both lively and welcoming, despite the mud, the lack of infrastructure, and its despairing precariousness. "The sense of beauty, I hope nothing will never tear it off the human heart. And on the dune, in this collective destitution, this sense is present under the shed of shacks made of loneliness and solidarity. Mutual aid, conversations, smiles, tea, sharing, the cold lights of restaurants and shops, friendships. At Sami's and elsewhere, Kuwaitis, Sudanese, Syrians or Ethiopians...meet every day, they share their day, some bread."[519]

We must be careful here. These narratives weighed, are as material as matter. They were affects and they had agency, they stuck, they marked territories. Still, you did not feel the weight. As soon as you read or heard them, those words lured you with images of vibrancy, humanity, and hospitality. One day, a volunteer on her Facebook profile wrote "You can't kill it [the Jungle]: refugees and volunteers are still working together, learning from one another, sharing with each other...This new community-being is strong, it will stay, no matter what happens to the Jungle."[520] Narratives were bodies that reproduced the affects they were born from in the first instance, thus reinforcing the atmosphere of the Jungle, in a circle of autopoietic process. In the Jungle you could find all what you needed, if you could give up some comfort. You could find warmth, conviviality, eagerness, and sharing. You could feel *at home*, even more welcomed than *chez toi*, because you were welcomed into a community. The atmosphere of the homely, familiarity and intimacy. Territories of sustenance, imaginary territories, and material territories of stuff: they were all brought together within the atmosphere.

Jean-Luc Nancy, in *The Inoperative Community*, recalls (and then warns against) the characters of the lost community that from Rousseau to the Romantics, through Hegel and until today, has been yielding the nostalgia of "an archaic community" that should be reconstituted:

> "Community is not only intimate communication between its members, but also its organic communion with its own essence. It is constituted not only by a fair distribution of tasks and goods, or by a happy equilibrium of forces and authorities: it is made up principally of the sharing, diffusion, or impregnation of an identity by a plurality wherein each member identifies himself only through

515 Ibid.

516 Groups of architects, artists, planners, and intellectuals starting from the eventful camp of the Jungle, "at the edge of city and slum" ("entre ville et bidonville", in French), built an urban utopia of what they viewed as the city which could embody hospitality, in opposition to the inhospitality offered by the French and British Governments. See the Perou https://reinventercalais.org/, and Actes et Cités https://www.actesetcites.org/jungle. Here quote from the architect Cyrille Hanappe of Actes et Cités at http://www.liberation.fr/debats/2016/03/06/les-lecons-urbaines-de-la-jungle_1437829.

517 https://reinventercalais.org/1-pour-laccompagnement-dune-cite-ephemere-du-xxie-siecle/.

518 Michel Agier, 'Ce que les villes font aux migrants, ce que les migrants font à la ville', op. cit, p.30 (my translation).

519 Quote from the Facebook profile of Anne Gorouben, a French painter who spent several weeks drawing portraits of people of the Jungle, between November 2015 and July 2016 (my translation)

520 Quote from the Facebook profile of an Italian volunteer who had been living in the Jungle, sharing a shack with some Syrian men for almost nine months in 2016.

> the supplementary mediation of his identification with the living body of the community. In the motto of the Republic, *fraternity* designates community: the model of the family and of love."[521]

The sense of self-fulfilment that derives from the idea of belonging to a community was dominant in the atmosphere of the homely in the Jungle; the idea of sharing something special and magical because unique. As Marie-Eve Morin points out, "the members [of the community] are, in their plurality, impregnated with the same identity so that each member identifies himself or herself and each other by identifying with the living essence or the living body of the community,"[522] in a mimetic fashion. The symbols of this community were the spaces dedicated to social and communal activities: the dome, the Jungle book library and schoolrooms, the Ethiopian church, the restaurants, the Legal Centre, and so on. Every time the French authorities threatened the encampment with expulsion and demolition, these places emerged as the emblems of what was at stake, that is the destruction of bonds, of community life, of any source of humanity. As we have seen in chapter 2, it happened when the French court decided to save only the communal places during the March eviction; it happened also when, in July 2016 – one year after the initial spreading of economic activities in the Jungle – the French Prefecture sent the police to control, search, and confiscate goods from shops and restaurants of *la lande*, on the grounds that these activities "engender public nuisance and nurture an underground economy."[523] In this case, when aid groups instituted civil proceedings against the decision to close the economic activities, the French court ruled against the French state on the basis that, despite being illegal, these shops and restaurants functioned also as "pacified spaces of encounter between migrants and with volunteers."[524]

The atmosphere worked precisely against the precariousness and in favour of the homely, especially through matter. Since the first tents were put up on *la lande*, everybody started building its sedentarisation. New tents were pitched, the soil was levelled out, bushes were cut, path-like lines were opened in the mud across the landscape. A few toilets at the beginning, provided by a French NGO, with neither water nor electricity. And then, little by little, thanks to the perseverance of the aid groups in place, the French government authorised and, in some cases funded, more infrastructures: more toilets distributed throughout the space of the camp, public electricity along the main road, water points, a rationalised system of waste collection, a few roads' bases stabilised with gravel.[525] Along these improvements, the Jungle had been an everyday place of unremitting activities aimed to build, repair, expand, embellish, and globally ameliorate the material conditions that made it a home for many. As Ash Amin describes an informal settlement that grew piecemeal: "these objects, and the cares, skills and chains of possibility they gather,

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521 Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Inoperative Community* (trans. Peter Connor, Lisa Garbus, Michael Holland, and Simona Sawhney)(Minneapolis and Oxford: University of Minnesota Press 1991) p.9.

522 Marie-Eve Morin, 'How do we live here? Abyssal intimacies in Jean-Luc Nancy's *La ville au loin*', *Pharresia* 25 (2016): p.116.

523 http://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/hauts-de-france/jungle-de-calais-importante-operation-de-controle-des-commerces-informels-1051339.html.

524 http://www.francetvinfo.fr/france/hauts-de-france/migrants-a-calais/la-justice-refuse-la-fermeture-des-echoppes-de-la-jungle-de-calais_1587479.html.

525 In October 2015 after being brought before the court by some aid groups for "serious shortcomings" in providing basic infrastructures in the Jungle, local and state authorities were ordered to "take measures to guarantee hygiene and drinkable water facilities." See at http://lille.tribunal-administratif.fr/content/download/50062/438918/version/1/file/1508747%20V3%20anonymis%C3%A9.pdf.

dominate the spatial and social landscape of the emerging settlement."[526] In this sense, such infrastructures are more than just material, they are social and symbolic, as they participate in the making and shaping of the place's "functionality, sociality and identity."[527] What characterises theses entanglements is their capacity of producing the everyday life of people who are imbricated in them, not only in functional and material terms, but also in cultural, symbolic, and imaginative ways. In this respect, Brian Larkin is correct when he says that "they [infrastructures] emerge out of and store within them forms of desire and fantasy and can take on fetish-like aspects that sometimes can be wholly autonomous from their technical function."[528] As two analyses conducted in the camp of Calais have showed, the Jungle assembled a great variety of infrastructural arrangements that originated from likewise different circumstances depending on housing or commercial traditions, on aid groups' projects, on specific material constraints, on imaginaries.[529] For the camp to develop as it did, a huge commitment and both material and emotional investments were devoted, encouraged in particular by the availability of land, time, energy, and solidarity in the form of donated goods and labour on voluntary basis. In chapter 2 I showed how stuff built territories of its own as merchandise, materialisation of compassion, and waste. These territories contributed all together to the atmosphere: as supplies they built materially the home of the Jungle and they regenerated affects through the same materiality, in an autopietically movement. Materials, which were brought into the encampment to build it and then ended up as waste, on the one hand were engineered in order to keep on reproducing the Jungle as a home; on the other hand, those things were a matter of identity, they reinforced the dual separation between the humanitarian, who provided help and stability through stuff, and the state, which threatened this stability. Volunteers in the warehouse carried on repeating that every activity was fundamental, and most of activities had to do with stuff: loading, unloading, moving, sorting, piling, carrying, cooking, cutting, assembling, collecting, and so on and so forth. Countless posts on the social media were meant to call for more stuff. But the construction of this identity was not realised through expressive boundaries: it was the atmospherics of rhythms, liveliness, community feelings. Its materiality was in service of the atmosphere in its affective dimension.

The rapid growing in the level of organisation of the camp, the consolidation of the habitat – which was evolving from lighter and more precarious tents to more solid and comfortable shacks, the increasing of basic infrastructures, the proliferating of a wide range of activities of commercial and cultural nature, the rising presence of long term volunteers and activists working and even living in the camp: all this, combined with a fulfilling sense of haven, and with a desire for community, was building a thick atmosphere of the homely that rewarded the volunteers, awed artists, architects and journalists, reassured migrants, and worried the authorities. Everybody was enveloped and could see nothing else than that, a commingling of heterogeneous bodies in the process of rooting. Even those, like me, who were just in transit for a while, could not help but desire the perpetuation of the eventful Jungle. Even for A., who used the camp as a resource by going there whenever he could not find work in Paris and life in the city had become too hard, the final dismantlement of the Jungle was

526 Ash Amin, 'Lively Infrastructure', *Theory, Culture & Society* 31 7/8 (2014): p.145.

527 Ibid. p.137.

528 Brian Larkin, 'The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure', *Annual Review of Anthropology* 42 (2013): p.329.

529 I have already mentioned these studies: one was conducted by the multidisciplinary group Perou (https://reinventercalais.org/atlas/symphonie/; https://reinventercalais.org/atlas/business/); the other one by a group of student in architecture of Paris Belleville (https://www.actesetcites.org/intro).

[35]

Figure 35. A scheme for requesting donations. Source: Facebook group

unthinkable until it happened.

To these bodies, we may add that the great majority of the visitors of the Jungle had either a humanitarian mission or a touristic attitude. In March 2016, at a conference, Christian Salomé, president of L'Auberge des Migrants, reported that each weekend he was asked to accompany between fifteen and twenty people to visit the Jungle, to see what it looked like.[530] Students and researchers went there to analyse the different architectural forms, the vernacular typologies of the settlements, the emergent city. Artists arrived, made their tags and went away. Journalists and photographers were ubiquitous. There was a force of attraction that was extremely hard to resist. This way, the atmosphere made it difficult for those who were enfolded by it, to see beyond the Jungle, to deal with the complexity of the legal and political conditions of the migrants beyond the *hic et nunc* of the Jungle.

An atmosphere is both emergent and engineered, Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos maintains. It emerges from the desire of bodies that constitute it and is engineered to "generate the very affects that desire its continuation."[531] It is an autopoietic mechanism. The more the Jungle settled down, the more stuff got into, the more its inhabitants desired it to take root and worked to nurture this desire. The engineering of the atmosphere of the homely needs an exterior to reinforce the interior, a rupture in the continuum.[532] The distinction from the outside was generated through rituals, routines, and refrains: the vibrancy of the making up of the city-like camp and of the daily practices that kept it alive was the only reality and even the political claims orbited around this only one law of the atmosphere. Food, clothes, shacks, relationships, exchanges, language classes, care and humanity: everything was included in this enclosure and the maximum immunisation from the outside was the exclusion of the political. The exclusion of the political took place through its inclusion in the atmosphere, by assigning a political dimension to humanitarian practices and making of the Jungle a political body because of its sedentarisation, instead of its transience. Through the refusal to acknowledge the political stance of choosing the sedentarisation over other possible actions, politics was illusionary expelled from the atmosphere. [533] The people of the Jungle were included in the atmosphere through their political exclusion. The atmosphere made the humanitarian regime seem unavoidable as the answer to migrants' needs; but in order to visibilise this dimension, it needed to conceal the political one. As I discuss in the next chapter, the atmosphere of the homely participated in concealing the situation of stagnation, and the difficulty of escaping the Jungle. Let me take, for example, the hunger strike of a group of Iranian men during the March eviction. On the evening of 2 March 2016, a group of Iranian men decided to go on hunger strike and sew their lips together to make their protest visible. The next day another group of Iranians joined them. They protested against the "inhuman treatment" reserved to them in the Jungle by French state and their main claim was the end of the destruction of the Jungle. The hunger strike ended after 25 days and after the first days had little cover on the media. The group of eleven men was taken care by the activists of the No Borders, who were the only ones not engaged in the humanitarian activities, but active on legal information and collecting records of police violence. The group kept on repeating that they were doing the strike for

530 Speech given at Le Channel, Calais, 2 March 2016.

531 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, *Spatial Justice,* op. cit. p.129.

532 Ibid.

533 A volunteer once cried on her Facebook profile "humanism, not activism!" [quote from the Facebook profile of a long term volunteer who had served in one of the communitarian kitchens in the camp for one year].

all the people in the Jungle and they expected more of them to join their protest. This never happened. In chapter 4 I discuss issues of resistance, here I would rather focus the attention on how an emergent protest was affectively obscured by a flow of intensities directed to protecting physically the encampment from its dismantling. In their statement at the end of the strike, which was centred entirely on the claim for improvements in the encampment, they reported that representatives from the UNHCR and the Defenseur des Droits, whom they had met to negotiate their requests, "have assured us that they will issue reports on the conditions of The Jungle."[534]

I am not saying that asylum and hospitality issues were completely dismissed, at least in discourses. Nonetheless, on the one hand hospitality was framed through the atmospheric lens of the present time of the Jungle so that hospitality ended up being embodied by the Jungle; on the other, the atmosphere itself, through its very mechanism, masked what was artificially built as the outside – namely the regimes of (im)mobility that I discuss in the next chapter – thus leaving no space for negotiation and, possibly, for change.

3.5 In/hospitality

The enclosure of the atmosphere made the Jungle a home. Can such closure become hospitality? I leave for the next chapter the (temporary) closure on the possibility (or impossibility) of a politics of hospitality, by now let me open the last section of this chapter with a territorial understanding of hospitality which draws on Jacques Derrida's line of thought. Hospitality is a concept that has been thought through widely in relation to issues of cosmopolitanism, migration and asylum.[535] In particular, a strand of thought has borrowed from the normative conceptualisation of Immanuel Kant who, in *Perpetual Peace*, identified the law of "universal hospitality" as associated to "the right to the earth's surface." The earth being finite, the right to travel across it implies, for Kant, the right of the stranger "not to be treated with hostility." This hospitality (or "not hostility"), the welcoming of the stranger, is nonetheless limited to the "right of a resort" and not of residence.[536] It is not a humanitarian act of hospitality, that of Kant, is a welcoming whose limits and conditions are established normatively by the guest, the one whose territory (normatively understood) the stranger reaches. The stranger is central as the figure in relation to which hospitality must be thought in many contemporary accounts. Within the paradigm of hospitality as the welcoming to the stranger, inspired extensively by Emmanuel Levinas' ethics *as hospitality*, "the stranger becomes a commodity fetish that is circulated and exchanged in order to define the borders and boundaries of given communities," Sara Ahmed claims.[537] In this framework, she goes

534 See at http://care4calais.org/hunger-strike-ends-25-days/.

535 Jennie Germann Molz and Sarah Gibson, 'Introduction: Mobilizing and Mooring Hospitality, in Jennie Germann Molz and Sarah Gibson (eds.), *Mobilizing Hospitality. The Ethics of Social Relations in a Mobile World* (Aldershot: Ashgate 2007); see also Sara Ahmed, *Strange Encounters. Embodied Others in Post-Coloniality* (London and New York: Routledge 2000); Seyla Benhabib, *Another Cosmopolitanism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006); Zygmunt Bauman, 'Living Together in a Full World', paper Presented at the *On Hospitality Seminar,* Leeds University, Leeds, UK, 2–4 March 2002 (accessed at http://www.leeds.ac.uk/cath/ahrc/events/2002/0302/bauman.html; Jacques Derrida, *Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas* (trans. Pascale-Anne Brault, Michael Naas) (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1999); Mustafa Dikeç, 'Pera Peras Poros: Longings for Spaces of Hospitality', *Theory, Culture & Society*, 19, 1–2 (2002): pp.227–247.

536 Immanuel Kant, 'Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch', in Hans Reiss (ed.) *Kant's Political Writings* (trans. H.B. Nisbet) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1970 [1795]), cited in Dikeç, 'Pera Peras Poros: Longings for Spaces of Hospitality', op. cit. p.233.

537 Ahmed, *Strange Encounters. Embodied Others in Post-Coloniality*, op. cit. p.150.

on, we end up concealing that in the act of welcoming, the other is already accommodated "into an economy of difference."[538]

Derrida's understanding of hospitality departs from the conditionality that characterises the Kantian articulation, while engaging with the other through the articulation of the host-guest relation. Kant's hospitality, Derrida holds, is "only juridical and political,"

> "it grants only the right of temporary sojourn and not the right of residence; it concerns only the citizens of States; and, in spite of its institutional character, it is founded on a natural right, the common possession of the round and finite surface of the earth, across which humans cannot spread ad infinitum."[539]

For Derrida, if hospitality, as peace, must be institutionalised (what Kant suggested), traces of hostility will be always present for hospitality (and peace) to be guaranteed *perpetually*. If hospitality is grounded on the juridical and political power of the state, it cannot but be conditioned. This normative hospitality is "the law of one's home," where the host as guest is sovereign and governs the rules that open or close the door, the duration of the stay, the code of conduct.

> "To dare to say welcome is perhaps to insinuate that one is at home here, that one knows what it means to be at home, and that at home one receives, invites, or offers hospitality, thus appropriating for oneself a place to *welcome [accueillir]* the other, or, worse, *welcoming* the other in order to appropriate for oneself a place and then speak the language of hospitality."[540]

For hospitality to arise, Derrida writes, a home must exist in the first place, and so a master. But a master is the one who maintains the authority in her home, who sets up the conditions, thus limiting hospitality itself.[541] The aporia of a conditional hospitality, for Derrida, is insurmountable. However, it is this aporia that allows Derrida to cross the border of hospitality *as aporia*. The notion of threshold comes to facilitate this crossing. By restating the right of one being the master in one's own home, hospitality *reste toujours au seuil d'elle meme*: "it governs the threshold – and hence it forbids in some way even what it seems to allow to cross the threshold to pass across it. It becomes the threshold."[542] It then becomes apparent that the aporia is being played out in terms of territorial movement, in the ambiguous threshold between a mark boundary and a porous threshold. "For there to be hospitality, there must be a door. But if there is a door, there is no longer hospitality." If there is a home, Derrida insists, there is a master who sets conditions, who decides whom is welcomed into her home, when, and for how long. "There must be a threshold. But if there is a threshold, there is no longer hospitality."[543]

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538 Ibidem p.151. Ahmed contends that multiculturalism can be the other side of the coin of the "stranger danger" discourse, for it identifies the stranger as the *origin of difference*. She argues "it is the processes of expelling *or* welcoming the one who is recognised as a stranger that produce the figure of the stranger in the first place." [p.4]. She thus challenges Levinas' ethics from this standpoint.

539 Derrida, *Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas,* op. cit. p.87.

540 Ibid. p.15 (emphasis in original).

541 Derrida, *Of Hospitality,* op.cit.

542 Jacques Derrida, 'Hostipitality', *Angelaki* 5, 3 (2000): p.14.

543 Ibid.

This point is where I depart from Derrida and I engage in a deterritorialisation which follows the reasoning that has brought us this far. Two elements must be recalled. First, territory – and home as territory – is not a bounded and immobile space where one is master forever. The territory moves, is unstable, and might have holey boundaries. Territory is a relation, not an object. In this sense, no one is master of this relation the same way as one would be sovereign 'at home': if so, there would be only closure, but territory is about both closure and opening. Here, *au seuil*, we have a threshold that is a space of negotiation where everything can happen, as in the everlasting passage of the virtual into the actual, to which I return in the next chapter. The threshold is not the marked line of the boundary, which draws a line in time and space (inside/outside, before/after); rather, it is a process, a transition, along which bodies negotiate their positioning, their direction, even their conatus. In this perspective, hospitality is not 'home': it is the threshold along the home-making process: once you have crossed it – if you can cross it as a result of the negotiation – you have entered the home-territory and it is no longer matter of being host or guest. You are in, you are part of the territorial assemblage. Once the threshold has been crossed, it disappears, but it must exist for negotiation (hence, hospitality) to be possible. Hospitality is a movement of resistance against the becoming boundary of the threshold. The territory emerges from the expressive drawing of boundaries; still, its come into being is not only closure and its opening might always be a breach. If "to dwell is [...] a *recollection*, a coming to oneself, a retreat home with oneself as in *a land of asylum or refuge*, which answers to a *hospitality*, an expectancy, a *human welcome*,"[544] as Emmanuel Levinas holds, one must remember that one dwells on a threshold.

The atmosphere of the homely Jungle left no space for thresholds. As I have argued in this chapter, atmosphere dramatically sets an outside and an inside, while at the same time conceals boundaries behind a fiction of inclusiveness ("there is no outside"). The atmospherics of the Jungle visibilized only the Jungle, the home, thus hampering the possibility of negotiating 'another' hospitality, or, more substantially, of claiming it. Only a withdrawal from the atmosphere would liberate the threshold from its engineered invisibility. The withdrawal from this atmosphere never happened and in what follows I try to explore this occurrence and its consequences in terms of the possibility of resistance to emerge. To my account I add more lawscapes and territories that delineate an even more oppressive and enveloping web of orderings and control. Together with the atmosphere of the homely, they contributed to limiting and hindering a liberating withdrawal. Would have a withdrawal been enough for a 'welcome' to be said? As Philippopulos-Mihalopoulos contends, even if an atmosphere collapses, "one always falls back into the lawscape."[545] In other words, one is never finished with negotiating with other bodies' law, their territories, their movements, and their orderings.

544 Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press 1969) pp.155-56, cited in Derrida, *Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas,* op. cit. p.38 (emphasis added).

545 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, *Spatial Justice,* op.cit. p.150.

Chapter 4

Withdrawal

What has happened to me is not just an isolated case. If it were it would not be of much importance as it's not of much importance to me, but it is a symptom of proceedings which are carried out against many. It's on behalf of them that I stand here now, not for myself alone[546]

The atmosphere has no outside. The regime of (in)visibility of the atmosphere is one which allows no space for what is outside. In this sense, the atmosphere is an emergent affective technology that sets thresholds against which the world is organised into different fields of (in)visibility. Put differently, the atmosphere strategically establishes what Brighenti calls "selective *blindings*" that determines what is concealed and what is in plain sight.[547] Strategy is not intended here as a mainly rational process, rather, it is meant as a mechanism of the atmosphere itself that aims at its continuation. As we have seen, enclosing is one of these strategic moves of (in)visibilisation: through the enclosure, the outside becomes invisible.[548] This does not mean that the outside disappears. Rather the contrary: the outside is accommodated within the inside of the enclosure and is framed in terms of the atmosphere's need. In what follows I am exploring what is 'outside' of the atmosphere and relentlessly included within. Not only every body in its own way contributed to the constitution and thickening of the atmosphere in the Jungle, which, as we have seen so far, was a technology of control. Orderings and control were also the result of the atmospheric management of time: in the eternal present of the Jungle, there was no space for the future. In turn, future was the lawscape of the asylum system, removed from the atmosphere, the regime of (im)mobility that operated through processes aimed to divide migrant people and atomise their struggle, both spatially and biopolitically. Practices of atomisation occurred also in the Jungle, where individual struggles were fought through individual 'good' encounters: with a smuggler, with a volunteer, with a 'good chance', and with the

546 Franz Kafka, *The Trial* (Dover Thrift 2009) p.51.

547 Brighenti, *Visibility in Social Theory and Social Research*, op. cit. p.175.

548 Ibid. p.176.

material and affective provision of the Jungle itself. Where was collective resistance to be found, then? This is the question that orients the chapter, and to which I try to answer in the last two sections, where I explore the notion of crowd as a transformative event, that of resistance as the possibility for a crowd to emerge by means of a complete withdrawal from the atmosphere, and, finally, resistance also as conatus, that is resistance against the forces that block our striving for being.

4.1 Feeding the atmosphere

French and British governments, the security measures, the CRS with their anti-riot gears and their tear gas canisters, the Dublin III regulation, the smugglers, the mafias, the local extreme right groups: they all were there. Each of them was part of the assemblage and each contributed to its functioning, construing the Jungle as a home. The Jungle was the only place to be for an undesired migrant in Calais. The authorities in Calais set the Jungle in the first place, when migrants who were occupying public spaces in town were invited to resettle in a wasteland in the outskirts. This original move was the founding of the Jungle as a refuge: providing no services, no aid – thus passing on the burden to a bunch of volunteers – the local and central authorities were keeping control while withdrawing. And as soon as the camp had become a refuge, they intervened by dismantling it. As Agier writes, the camp was torn down the moment "there was something like a city that was being set up and this was turning into a welcoming place."[549]

The French and British governments, with the generously funded transformation of Calais into a militarised landscape of razor-wire fences, walls, deforested plots, checkpoints, and ubiquitous police lights, made the Jungle the place where to come back each time an attempt of crossing failed, or each time one was found where he was not supposed to be. The Jungle, the porous prison, the walled home. Security measures never stopped being reinforced since the Jungle begun. Sniffer dogs,[550] x-ray scanning systems, thermal cameras, CCTV, police officers:[551] The more the Jungle got crowded, the more the technology of control got tough, and the more the Jungle got crowded, in a inexorable vicious circle that extended the temporary nature of the encampment and strengthen its image of a long-term settlement.

French police officers in riot-gear, the CRS, were the watchmen of the Jungle. Migrants could get in and out without being bothered neither questioned, through a racist mechanism based on appearance. Conversely, presumed non-migrants could be prevented from entering on a random basis.[552] CRS rarely entered the Jungle for protocol reasons related to their safety, as we have seen, thus drawing a nominal threshold between a striated against a smooth space. *Tolerance* of the Jungle meant zero tolerance outside it. Most importantly, this 'tolerance' concealed, under cover of an outlawed law that allowed the Jungle to exist, that at any time

549 Agier, 'Ce que les villes font aux migrants, ce que les migrants font à la ville', op. cit. p.28 (my translation).

550 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/police-sniffer-dogs-new-recruits-and-handlers-needed-for-calais-crisis-10436310.html.

551 https://calaismigrantsolidarity.wordpress.com/2016/09/10/home-office-quietly-advertises-80-million-privatisation-of-calais-border-security/.

552 Aid volunteers reported occasionally of being denied access without explanation or on indiscriminate grounds, depending on the biased decision of the officer in charge at the very moment of their passage.

the law could come back and simply be enforced in the form of partial or total dismantling.

Patrols by some far-right groups amplified the sense of harbour of the Jungle: they never dared to enter, they covered at night the roads that the inhabitants of the Jungle followed to reach the port, the Eurotunnel or the parking areas, harassing them or assisting the forces of police in their work of hunting them out. For the inhabitants of the Jungle getting out of the camp was very risky, especially after dark. Asylum procedures and immigration policies made the Jungle an "asylum waiting room,"[553] a "decompression chamber."[554] The regime of mobility control in Europe, which establishes the illegality of people on the move according to the borders of the countless territories that the regime relentlessly builds, meanwhile produces blocks of time-space where these people are caught into for an indefinite time span, until their case for asylum has been assessed, until their attempt to cross another border has been successful, until their *Dublinised* status allows them to make a claim for asylum.[555] In the Jungle, according to the French journalist Maryline Baumard, almost 63% of those who had been evacuated in October 2016 were waiting for their asylum claim to be processed while still attempting to cross the Channel.[556]In this sense, the camp was a temporary home, preferred, more welcoming or accessible than the institutional ones, the Centres d'Accueil de Demandeurs d'Asile (CADA), which were often at capacity.

The smugglers, the 'mafias', what are we talking about? The issue is a controversial one, because it refers to a subterranean phenomenon that is framed as criminal by authorities, while being considered as an essential resource by those who want to move on to another destination on their European roaming. Let me digress for a moment, since smuggling is a relevant part of the assemblage of the Jungle for at least two reasons. First, set aside the criminalising legal conceptualisation, the line that separates the migrant person from the smuggler is thin if not inexistent, as I explain below. Second, smuggling as for-profit activity needs clients and, in this sense, the Jungle offered rich market opportunities. The *Smuggling of Migrants Protocol* adopted by the United Nations Convention against 'Transnational Organized Crime' defines smuggling as "the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident."[557] The

553 Henk van Houtum, 'Human Blacklisting: the Global Apartheid of the EU's External Border Regime', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 28 (2010): p.971.

554 Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Nielsen, 'Né qui, né altrove – Migration, detention, desertion: a dialogue', op. cit. Mezzadra and Nielsen refer to the "decompression chamber" in relation to the labour market. In their view, camps and detention centres function as temporal techniques to leave people on hold until the labour market need them. I cannot commit to this meaning in the case of the Jungle because I do not have information in this regard. Nonetheless, the idea can be extended to a broader framework of temporal government of migrants' mobility, as Papadopoulos & al. maintain [Papadopoulos, Stephenson, and Tsianos, *Escape Routes*, op. cit.].

555 Dublinised is a term that is informally used by legal organisations to designate those people who have claimed for asylum in a European state which is not responsible of their demand, according to the Dublin III regulation [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:180:0031:0059:EN:PDF], because they have been registered (and fingerprinted) in another European state. Those people must wait a variable period of time for either being transferred back to the state that registered them, or having their claim processed in the state where they have made it. According to Dublin III, the person who claims asylum in a state different from that where her fingerprints have been taken must wait up to 6 months that the former state asks the latter to accept to receive back the migrant and process her claim. Meanwhile the person is obliged to attend regularly to meetings with state officials, otherwise the period starts over.

556 Baumard published this figure on her Facebook profile on 6 January 2017. Asked if it was an unofficial one, she let me understand that she obtained it via informal contacts with state officials. See also http://www.lci.fr/societe/demantelement-de-la-jungle-de-calais-qu-est-ce-que-les-migrants-dublines-2009230.html.

557 United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime, *United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto* (New York 2004) art.3, pp.54-55 https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf.

French law avoids definitions but punishes "any person who, through direct or indirect help, facilitates or attempt to facilitate, the irregular entry, movement or stay of a foreigner in France," if an exchange has occurred.[558] In both cases, the legal definitions match only a partial aspect of the border crossing, only an offshoot of the multiple rhizomatic ones that form the mobility machine, which is protean and varies according to places in response to the supply-demand balance, local networks, and specific constraints. As several scholars argue, if illegal migration may often imply the violence and coercion of smuggling practices, it nevertheless represents a survival strategy for many and can't happen without the assistance of smugglers.[559] The French freelance journalist Arthur Frayer-Laleix, who, pretending to be a migrant, travelled from Peshawar to Calais in 2013-2014, explains that smugglers are less considered criminals than facilitators or agents by migrants. Most of the times, the border crossing is a "tentacular and artisanal" commerce more than an organised criminal activity.[560] Smugglers are often from the same countries as the migrants themselves; sometimes they are migrants on the move who have been "hired" by a network of more professional smugglers and work for a while to save money for their journey. Sometimes it is just a migrant who is helping some friends close the door of a lorry, for the next time someone else will "close the door behind him."[561]

Not only some facilitators lived in the Jungle, but sometimes inhabitants of the Jungle turned themselves into facilitators for a while, or, as the blogger Philippe Wannesson told Frayer, they helped friends waiting for their "chance." The figure of the smuggler is ambiguous and is completely embedded and intermingled with the life of the Jungle, with its sedentarisation, which carries flows of money coming (also) ironically from aid organisations and volunteers, as well as state subsidies allocated to asylum seekers.[562] In a very material way, the practice of assisting people in their attempts to illegally cross the borders also fed the atmosphere of the Jungle: one knew that it was the right place where to be not only to have some rest between retries, but also to organise each try for as long as necessary. As Mani, who had to spend many months in the Jungle, writes: "Anytime I came back from a try, sometimes at dawn, when I walked in this street after maybe 5, 6 or more hours of walking, running, and escaping the police in the freezing weather, the first step in this street was like the first step in paradise."[563]

In the next section, I want to add another element to the atmosphere: time. The atmosphere has a spatial dimension that corresponds to the territorial assemblage from which it has

558 https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?idSectionTA=LEGISCTA000006147789&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070158&dateTexte=20091124; and https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000030330486 [the Supreme Court specified the existence of an exchange in order to differenciate between acts of solidarity and criminal acts].

559 See for example: Nandita Sharma, 'Anti-Trafficking Rhetoric and the Making of a Global Apartheid', NWSA Journal 17 3 (2005); Rutvika Andrijasevic, Trafficking in Women and the Politics of Mobility in Europe (unpublished PhD thesis 2004).

560 Arthur Frayer-Laleix, *Dans la Peau d'un Migrant. De Peshawar à Calais, Enquête sur le 'Cinquième Monde'* (Paris: Fayard 2015) p.340. Frayer-Laleix made his inquiry before the Jungle I am referring to was settled. Nevertheless, his findings are very consistent with my fieldwork. As many longterm French volunteers used to say, history was simply repeating in Calais.

561 Ibid. p.361; see also http://www.gisti.org/spip.php?article4445.

562 As I mentioned elsewhere, more than one volunteer in the Jungle let me know about bribes organisations had to pay to "mafias" in order to pursue their activities. In France asylum seekers who are waiting fro their claim to be processed receive subsidies as much as 360 euro each month. The presence on the camp of a great many asylum seekers means that, as Baumard argues, "more than one and a half million euros were monthly injected in the informal economy of the Jungle."

563 Mani (from Iran), 'Life after the Jungle', op. cit. p.190.

arisen, so that it is mobile in space. This means that withdrawing from the atmosphere is not matter of moving away, but removing the desire for it, acting a transformation, as we will see in the last sections of this chapter. Time is part of the same block with the spatiality of atmosphere, it is an affective dimension that cannot be separated from the bodies that form the atmosphere. In what follows, I discuss time from this standpoint, on the one side to show how it was engineered to fulfil atmosphere's conatus for keeping on surviving, on the other side, to set the stage for the exploration of the notions of crowd and event, to which a particular time corresponds, one capable of bringing about change.

4.2 Withdrawing the future

> "The future is captured in an eternal present, the past is spatially engineered to tilt in a specific way, and the bodies move or stay still according to their desire. This is the grand atmospheric illusion, where desire is one, undifferentiated, decontextualised, floating in the formaldehyde of stability."[564]

The atmosphere is filled with the present tense, as Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos holds it, because it is this present that the atmosphere longs for extending, through repetition, *ad infinitum*. In order to achieve this libidinal purpose, I argue, the atmosphere invisibilises the future and reterritorializes it in a perpetual present.

In his construction of the concept of time, Henri Bergson provided a material and Spinozan explanation of present as *durée*, a present that includes the past and the future of the body, against a chronological and historical apprehension of time as divided in past, present, and future.[565] Bergson illustrates that the reason for which we have the impression of a rupture between past, present, and future is to be ascribed to our body, to its necessarily material presence in space and time, by which it feels and moves. In feeling and moving, the body occupies specific space-time blocks that at any moment are included in a given sensation/movement system, thus appearing to consciousness as detached from past and future. Reality, however, is a continuous process, whereas the body is "the centre of action" from which sensations and movements deploy and produce duration, "the actual state of my becoming."[566] This is our present, Bergson maintains, "the very materiality of our existence [...], a system of sensations and movements and nothing else."[567] The past takes part in the present through sensations and movements, in that it is included by means of images which are turned into sensations, thus producing reality in the present.

Reality is duration; if it weren't so, we wouldn't have transformation and becoming. We wouldn't have future, only present. Time, as duration, "is the continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future and swells as it advances."[568] This unceasing becoming of

564 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, *Spatial Justice,* op.cit. p.195.

565 Henri Bergson, *Matter and Memory* (trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer) (New York: Zone Books 1991).

566 Ibid. p.138.

567 Ibid. p.139.

568 Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution* (Trans. Arthur Mitchell) (New York: Henry Holt and company 1913) p.4 [*L'Evolution Créatrice* op. cit. p.13].

the world is what brings into it novelty and innovation, while engendering the unpredictable body of the future, which way of actualisation is undeterminable. Thereby Bergson outlines a theoretical framework that Deleuze will borrow in his formulation of the notion of the virtual, which is inherent to his idea of time. "This is the paradox of the present: to constitute time while passing in the time constituted," Deleuze says.[569] He also rejects the chronological interpretation of time as composed by the three sequences of past, present, and future and proposes a reading which echoes Nietzsche's foundation of the concept of the eternal return: that of a time which is past, present and future at the same moment. "The present must be simultaneously present and past, present and yet to come, in order for it to pass [...]. The present must coexist with itself as past and yet to come."[570] This is the inescapable logic of a philosophy of becoming: time as an already passed and yet to come present; present not as a dimension of time, but as the only existing temporal dimension.

Deleuze identifies three temporal modes that are not to be intended as occupying the same line. Rather, Deleuzian time is an intensive one, which advances by growing in dimensions.[571] According to Deleuze, it is by means of a synthesis – a contraction – that the present passes, by means of a habit that is able to integrate what has been repeated into an anticipation of the future.[572] One mode of time is thus constituted through habit as living present, in relation to which past and future are determined. This mode is a circular movement that enables us to ascribe to our present. Through the contraction of the habit, the present never stops reproducing itself and in so doing it generates an expectation of its return. Habit, construed as the space occupied by the present that never passes, which constitutes us and our actions in duration, and that desires its continuation, does not explain the becoming, the present that passes. It is here that Deleuze introduces the paradox of a present and a past which *are* simultaneously. As Elizabeth Grozs explains, past "lives a shadowy and fleeting existence," and "its reality is virtual, for it exerts its influence indirectly, only through its capacity to link to and thus to inform the present."[573] What both Bergson and Deleuze believe is that past is the condition for the present to come into being, but not as a sequence of events; rather past and present are related by a virtual coexistence. It is not past as remembrance, as a representation which would be present in the living present as such; rather, it is a pure past, a virtual past, which *has never happened*.

This conception of time as duration entails the relentless unfolding of the new as the repetition of the different of what has already been, "the future as the eternal return."[574] How is the new produced in this theoretical framework? Again, Deleuze takes inspiration from Bergson to develop the notion of the virtual as what is real without being actual, to wit, a field of potentialities that produces reality when it actualises it. In this perspective, the future is the indeterminate and unpredictable actualisation of a movement which holds together past and present, while always differentiating in its outcome. This time of the virtual is what Deleuze terms *Aeon*, which he counterposes to *Chronos*, the time of the actual. Aeon is the time of becoming, where only past and future exist and eschew the present; it is the time of subversion. Conversely, Chronos is the present as the only time that

569 Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* (trans. Paul Patton) (New York: Columbia University Press 1994) p.79.

570 Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (trans. Hugh Tomlinson) (London & New York: Continuum 1986) p.48.

571 Zourabichvili, Deleuze. *Une Philosophie de l'Evénement,* op. cit.

572 Le Garrec, *Apprendre à Philosopher avec Deleuze,* op. cit.

573 Elizabeth Grozs, *Time Travels. Feminism, Nature, Power* (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin 2005) p.102.

574 Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition,* op. cit p.90.

exists, the time of the habit, the time that excludes past and future by including them into its own being. It is the time that "must still express the revenge taken by future and past on the present in terms of the present, because these are the only terms it comprehends and the only terms that affect it."[575] It is the cyclic time of the return, "reassuring time, time that flows, sequential time", where "future can be only a future present,"[576] the measured time of actualisation.

In the atmosphere "the present is everything."[577] The Jungle was the atmosphere of the indefinite time under which people's lives were suspended, waiting to cross the Channel, to receive the answer for their asylum claim, counting on an event that would have changed their life. And it was the atmosphere of daily routines, the present that never passed and yet was always returning, the infinite present of active boredom, lines for food, phone charging, busy nights and lazy mornings, garbage, hot tea, shared moments, loneliness, wandering, past remembrances, surfing the web, building, repairing, recycling, walking, fleeing from the police. An eternal time of interwoven presents. The unending sequence of the presents of Chronos.

In this atmosphere, past was present not as the pure Bergsonian past, but embodied by the presence, in the living present, of thousands of people whose past were both so visible and unknowable. The past of those people was also embodied by the presence of hundreds of volunteers, journalists, artists, and researchers, who assembled (in) the Jungle contracting past and future into the present of the encampment. Storytelling in the media and throughout social networks condensed the homogeneous time of the Jungle into past and present struggles, the suffering of the past and the humiliation of the present. Future was excluded from the atmosphere through its inclusion as indefinite wait, as an ever-postponed moment. Future was invisibilised by the atmosphere through the *ultravisibilisation* of past and present. Future was wrapped up into a London dream, as if every struggle could find its solution in crossing the Channel and reaching the long-awaited sanctuary. What about life beyond the Jungle? The Jungle was clearly a precarious refuge, but it gave a sense of home and hopeful waiting. Beyond it, beyond its blurred boundaries, however, there was no collective withdrawal, as we will see below.

By invisibilising the future, the Jungle left in the shadows the prolonging of an indeterminate time of waiting during which migrants are vulnerable to a regime of (im)mobility management that is based on the referral of their state of waiting and the prospect of detention or deportation, what Nicholas De Genova calls *the economy of detainability*.[578] In this view, undocumented migrants are all subject to a regime of detainability, even though only some of them are actually detained, according to an administrative apparatus that adds precariousness and uncertainty to people whom the law does not authorise to stay and circulate within its jurisdiction. In France, if one is found undocumented during a police

575 Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* (trans. Mark Lester) (London: the Athlone Press 1990) p.164.

576 Andrea Mubi Brighenti and Mattias Kärrholm, 'Three Presents: on the Multi-temporality of Territorial Production and the Gift from John Soane', *Time and Society* 2016: p.10.

577 Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* op.cit. p.62.

578 See Nicholas De Genova, 'Detention, Deportation, and Waiting: Toward a Theory of Migrant Detainability', *Global Detention Program Working Paper* 18 (2017). Available at https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/detention-deportation-waiting-toward-theory-
migrant-detainability- gdp-working-paper-no-18 (accessed 26 May 2017); Nicholas De Genova, 'The Production of Culprits: from Deportability to Detainability in the Aftermath of 'Homeland Security'', *Citizenship Studies* 11 5 (2007): pp.421-448.

control, she can be hold in custody for a maximum of 16 hours in order for her identity to be checked. Then, if she is found to be irregularly in France she can either be released with an obligation to leave the French territory (OQTF); or she can be detained longer in view of her deportation to her country of origin or to the European country responsible of her asylum claim, according to the Dublin Regulation. In the meantime, she is held a detention centre the time necessary for the procedure to be handled.[579]

For a migrant staying or travelling *without authorisation,* the living present that virtually separates her from her future is a present of indeterminacy and suspension. De Genova writes that "this seemingly mundane and merely bureaucratic condition invariably reveals its absolutist character by enforcing a condition of indefinite waiting and being made to live with protracted uncertainty – even if it is never activated in the form of an actual detention."[580] In the French procedure, a person is detained for a maximum of 45 days and then either deported or released: in other words, she can be admitted again into the hazy dimension of a waiting present after being detained. As Peter Nyers puts it, unauthorised migrants live like ghosts, invariably *at borders*, "in constant fear of detention, deportation, and surveillance by the authorities."[581]

More specifically in the case of the Jungle, the indefinite present and the removal of the future could be observed on the one side in the routine enforcement of the law, which exposed migrants caught outside the protective aura of the Jungle to the persistent susceptibility to detention and eventually deportation. On the other side, it was made visible in the Jungle itself, which atmosphere turned the encampment into a trap for many, when the time of Chronos – the eternal present – was ruptured by the final removal and the displacement of thousands of people. As I have showed in chapter 2, the Jungle was an exception during and beyond its lifespan: the inhabitants of the Jungle, although living a dangerous and harsh everyday life in the encampment and being prevented by tear gas from crossing the motorway headed to the port, were not subjected to police controls or capture as long as they stayed within the borders of the encampment.[582]

Beyond the spatial and temporal boundaries of the Jungle, the modes and practices of the governance of migration, besides making migrants prone to detention, expelled them from the space of asylum. Expulsion was carried out by both hampering their access to asylum procedures and compelling them to containment through a forced mobility, as Martina Tazzioli maintains.[583] Migrants could be subjected to an obligation to leave the French territory (OQTF) before they could even submit a claim for asylum, or had to wait for weeks before they could get access to the office in charge of asylum claims (PADA),

579 If the person has being registered in the Eurodac database and her fingerpints have been taken in another European state, this latter will become responsible for her asylum claim and the procedure of transfer should be initiated, according to the Dublin III regulation. In case the person has not been registered in Eurodac, she could be returned to her country of origin or released an Obligation à Quitter le Territoire Français (OQTF), which implies that within 30 days the person must leave France or becoming criminal under the law. See https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070158 [accessed 29 Mai 2017].

580 De Genova, 'Detention, Deportation, and Waiting: Toward a Theory of Migrant Detainability', op.cit. p.7.

581 Peter Nyers, 'Community without Status: Non-status Migrants and Cities of Refuge', in (Diana Brydon and William D. Coleman eds.) *Renegotiating Community: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Global Contexts* (Vancouver: UBC Press 2009) p.127.

582 A person in the Jungle could be questioned by the police in case of suspicion of crime. Nevertheless, this occurrence was quite rare.

583 Martina Tazzioli, 'The Expulsion of Humanitarism. The Hampered Channels of Asylum in France', *Lo Squaderno* 44 (2017) pp.29-33.

meanwhile living under the detainability condition.[584] In May 2016 the employees of the PADA in Paris published a letter on an online journal to denounce bad working conditions and malfunctioning. They complained that they were overburdened and understaffed and that tensions were growing accordingly. They wanted to draw attention to the fact that the clogging resulted in a waiting list of ten thousands people and several months of wait before each process could be started, which in turn "condemned several thousands of vulnerable people to living several months unlawfully, in total precariousness, without access to fundamental rights and under the risk of being arrested, detained or expelled."[585] Tazzioli points out that in the specific case of Calais, which encampment was to be emptied at any cost under political calculation, a spatio-temporal strategy was also at play through internal displacement, with two emblematic moments in time. In October 2015, an exceptional number of migrants was arrested in Calais and deported to detention centres further away from the north of France.[586] Once released, they returned to Calais by their own means. Starting from the Autumn 2015 all throughout 2016, each week one or more buses left Calais directed to the Centres of Hosting and Orientation (CAO) scattered all over France, inviting the inhabitants of the Jungle to leave the makeshift camp and "take some rest" in a CAO before making a final decision on their European journey, be it to claim for asylum in France or to return to one's own country.[587] Or, rather, to get back to Calais and try again one's *chance*.

The removal of the future and the celebration of an eternal present of referral, precariousness and displacement beyond the Jungle was the counterpoint to a living present of waiting. The government of the border in Calais thickened this present and filled it with the asphyxiating pressure of an approaching steamroller. Vague and unclear deadlines defined the contours of the future of the Jungle: up to what size would it have been tolerated? Until when? After the partial dismantling, what would have been the fate of the remainder northern part? The withdrawal of the state fostered the atmospheric sense of hospitality ("I can stay as long as I want") I discussed in chapter 3 both through its indefinite and ambiguous tolerance and by leaving no other option than the Jungle: security levels were relentlessly intensified, so much that the construction of a huge wall along the motorway heading to the port started less than two months before the complete destruction of the camp and ended one month and a half later, when its *raison d'être* had already disappeared.[588] Thus, the boundaries of the indefinite wait were pushed even further as a result of the growing obstacles that were arranged and the growing number of people who were clumping in the *cul-de-sac*.

In the meantime, the Centres of Hosting and Orientation (CAO) were being organised. According to the humanity-firmness rhetoric, the CAOs were places where migrants could find respite [*répit*] from the hardship of the Jungle and a proper shelter [*mise à l'abri*], far from the conditionings of the Jungle, from No Borders and smugglers.[589] Migrants who

584 PADA is the acronym of Plateforme d'Accueil de Demandeurs d'Asile (Platform for the reception of asylum seekers). It is the office where migrants who want to submit a claim for asylum in France are addressed in the first place.

585 https://blogs.mediapart.fr/la-chapelle-en-lutte/blog/210516/lettre-ouverte-de-salariees-de-la-pada-geree-par-france-terre-dasile-paris-19eme (my translation).

586 https://www.streetpress.com/sujet/1447346215-calais-avion-bus-pour-vider-la-jungle#.

587 As I explained in the Introduction to this work, the CAOs were accommodation centres that the French state had started organising in autumn 2015 to reduce the number of people in Calais and sort them.

588 http://www.lavoixdunord.fr/region/mur-anti-migrants-a-calais-le-gouvernement-britannique-ia0b0n3719062.

589 When the eviction of February 2016 was ongoing, this was the official discourse of the Prefecture.

accepted to go to a CAO would have two options: either they would not follow an asylum path in France, thus being allowed to stay in the CAO up to one month; or they could claim for asylum and benefit from the accommodation in the CAO up to three months. If the latter option was an airlock between the Jungle and a centre for asylum seekers [CADA], the former was another step in the deferral circuit of the infinite present of precariousness, and detainability but further from the protective embrace of the Jungle. Whereas the CAO project could have looked like the answer to the desire for a different present, for a present with a future, its obscure outline and, especially, its unknown and unpredictable outcome, turned those centres into a trap for some.[590]

Before and during the eviction in March 2016, one day a week a bus waited not far from the entrance of the Jungle with a destination which changed every week and was not more than a point on a map for people who were hardly familiar with the French territory. At that time, the buses were not very popular and often left Calais almost empty. The atmosphere of the Jungle was still powerful and the hope to cross the Channel for many was still alive. During the partial eviction, inhabitants and volunteers were moving shacks from the south to the north, but uncertainty about the French government's plan had made a breach in the Jungle's atmosphere of refuge. Some migrants decided to leave the camp under eviction and some activists tried to dissuade them from going to a too much vague destination, out of the (less and less) reassuring community of the Jungle.[591] Two months after the dismantling of the southern part, not only buses left full, but also some people slept outside at night to be sure they would be the first to get on the bus in the morning. In July 2016, the CAO system was so congested and requests were so high that buses were insufficient and tension was rising among people on hold. The CAO project was still opaque and unreliable, but the Jungle could not reassure anymore as it did before. The partial dismantling had made visible what was lying beyond the Jungle: the indeterminate future of the government of (im)mobility. According to a feature that was provided during a ministerial meeting about CAO in July 2016, almost half of those who departed from the camp in Calais to go to a CAO were abandoning it without starting any asylum process.[592] Again, people were kept on the move, far from Calais, on deferral. Besides, a report of the French Bureau for Immigration and Integration (OFII) informed that out of 7153 registered in the CAO at the end of 2016, almost 2500 (34%) were under the Dublin regulation. For the *dublinés* the trap was the confirmation of their deportability beyond the Jungle, even in a place, the CAO, which could appear as the new refuge. A confirmation that there was no outside: once out of the atmosphere of the Jungle, one was back into the lawscape of the asylum regime and home, one's own territory, had to be renegotiated. And still, for many there was no actual withdrawal from the Jungle, for they came back after a brief experience in a CAO.

590 Tazzioli terms this "the humanitarian trap," meaning the humanitarian rhetoric according to which migrants were allured to get the buses to the CAOs to have some rest and decide about their future. What some of them got instead were expulsions to their countries of origin or to other European countries under the Dublin regulation.

591 Some activists went so far as to persuade migrants who were about to get on the bus to remain in the Jungle. When the final dismantling happened at the end of October 2016, activists and volunteers could only monitor the overall procedure.

592 This fact was reported during the weekly aid groups meeting in Calais by the vice-president of the French organisation L'Auberge des Migrants, who attended the meeting organised by the Interior Minister.

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[37]

Figure 36. A bus for the CAO. Source: the author

Figure 37. Some belongings going to the CAO. Source: the author

4.3 Regimes of (im)mobility

The operation of division is essential in the government of migration, for it produces at least two significant results which are both material and immaterial at a time: on the one side, division, especially when it comes to borders, functions as a means to spatially disperse people with the purpose of both preventing them from turning into an unruly multiplicity, and thwarting migration from emerging as a visible political problem. As Tazzioli contends, this partitioning is particularly striking at border zones because it is at the border that migrant collective formations manifest mostly their temporary divisible character.[593] At the border, Tazzioli says, migrant multiplicities are grouped to be controlled and "are governed through and for the division of the migrants, sorting them into different channels, producing differentiations and then individualizing the 'hold' on their lives in order to prevent the formation of collective political subjects."[594] On the other side, division operates by telling good from bad, 'genuine' refugees from undeserving migrants, thus generating a binary categorisation by which people can be managed accordingly and steered to follow a divergent path, both legally and spatially. This outcome, of which I provide further detail below, derives from the legal and normative mechanism of asylum procedures in Europe, in particular the asylum system as it stems from the Dublin Convention and following regulations.[595]

Before exploring the processes of division at work, let me briefly make a point about the term 'migrant'. So far, I have used various expressions to refer to people stuck in the Jungle. I have called them 'the inhabitants of the Jungle', 'people', sometimes 'migrants', dismissing the term 'refugees' for its particular connotation, which I discuss in chapter 3. The use of a term or another is not neutral, it originates from a choice. The legal characterisation of many terms that refer to people on the move and their performative role is well expressed here:

> "Unlike 'refugee', for instance, the term 'migrant' does not strictly correspond to a specific legal status and by implication does the work of consigning various people on the move to the nebulous category of presumptive 'irregularity' or 'illegality'. Nonetheless, as suggested above, the more rarefied term "refugee" can tend to relinquish any analytical substance to the narrowly juridical (and highly exclusionary) determinations of governmental authorities. Meanwhile, the term 'asylum-seeker' overtly signals the subjection of people on the move to the asylum application procedure, but commonly encompasses both those who will and will not ultimately be granted the status of 'refugee', as well as various intermediary juridical categories of partial recognition and provisional (often precarious) 'legality'."[596]

With the purpose to break through "the partitions that the humanitarian regime and

593 Martina Tazzioli, 'The Government of Migrant Mobs: Temporary Divisible Multiplicities in Border Zones', *European Journal of Social Theory* (2016): pp.1-18.

594 Ibid. p.2.

595 Dublin Convention, at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:41997A0819(01)&from=HU.

596 De Genova and Tazzioli (eds.), 'Europe/Crisis: New Keywords of "the Crisis" in and of "Europe"', op. cit. p.16.

migration policies create,"[597] I preferred not to connote people according to the legal dimension, which is not the focus of this work. Only in this chapter, when referring to the asylum regime, I have reluctantly chosen to use the term migrant, which remains, with its ambiguity, a generic one.

Division produces both a taxonomy and a topology through a process of individualisation that follows movements of territorialisation. Migrants are territorialised into a delimited space which becomes a camp, where they can be better controlled and, most of all, kept away from the city. The multiplicity is thus grouped; it is a potential crowd that is better maintained divided through movements of deterritorialisation. In the Jungle, at least three different movements of deterritorialisation were at work. First, the asylum process itself. In the course of the process, migrants are divided according to a binary logic that is supported by identification systems (such as biometric techniques), and are subsequently scattered. Once identified, their paths are channelled into either an (however uncertain and individualised) asylum procedure or a status of illegality.[598] In the Jungle lived together people who had formally claimed for asylum and were waiting for the outcome (some at risk of expulsion, the *Dublinés*), people who had already received their papers, people who had been rejected, people who were not interested in the French asylum and only desired to cross the Channel, people who did not apply for asylum in absence of a 'good case'. It was not necessary to formally enter the asylum process in order to be deterritorialized: the deterritorialisation movement wrapped up every body with its dualism; it did not let anyone outside. Along this movement, people's struggles poured into atomised cases, and multiple lawscapes were created that turned the Jungle into a fractal. The lawscape built for the individualised migrant was one full of walls and material constraints which remained invisible for others and could be overcome either through the law or through space, by exploiting their porosity. Through the law, it meant, for example, taking advantage of appealing procedures based on technicalities, as a legal advisor explained to me.[599] Through space, it meant either escaping the French lawscape to end up in the British one by crossing the Channel, or negotiating one's presence in the lawscape for example by organising 'good encounters', as I argue in the next section.

In both cases, the manifold emergent lawscapes, one for each migrant, could end up segregating even more migrants' paths and struggles. However, individualisation is a mechanism that not only hampers the becoming of the individual, in Simondon's sense, through identification, but also establishes the boundaries between her and the others within the same operation. As Esposito puts it, "individual literally means this: to make indivisible, united in oneself, by the same line that divides one from everyone else."[600]

The overall migration policies in Europe keep on asserting the reduction of migrants' multiplicity to the dualism that results from the process of identification, and France

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597 Garelli and Tazzioli, 'Choucha beyond the camp, op. cit.

598 As De Genova maintains, following the Foucauldian approach to power, illegality is produced by the law. See Nicholas De Genova, 'Migrant "illegality" and Deportability in Everyday Life', *Annual Review of Anthropology* 31 (2002): pp.419-447.

599 As the legal advisor Elisa Mora explained to me, often it was possible to free people on technicalities, such as errors made by the police or state officers during the apprehension of the undocumented person. Interview held on 14 June 2017 by telephone. Elisa Mora is a legal expert who spent almost one year at the detention centre (CRA) in Coquelles to provide legal assistance to migrants apprehended in Calais. She worked there from February to November 2016.

600 Roberto Esposito, *Bíos. Biopolitics and Philosophy,* op. cit. p.61.

makes no exception. The humanity versus firmness principle states precisely this, that there are good migrants who deserve protection and bad ones who, because their claim is illegitimate according to the asylum law, are undesirable and hence treated accordingly with extreme toughness.[601] This appears very clearly in the latest reform of immigration law in France. The law that entered into force in November 2016 has two main goals: on the one side it is intended to facilitate the process for those who are deemed to have the right to protection, on the other side it aims to fight more vigorously against illegal immigration.[602] When I interviewed Elisa, a former legal assistant at the detention centre of Coquelles, near Calais, she used the term *acharnement* to describe this firm side of the new law, a term that in English means both tenacity and persecution.[603] Elisa substantiated the particular border situation in Calais, explaining that the toughness used on migrants in the area during the existence of the Jungle was not aimed at detention as final solution.[604] Conversely, a technique of dissuasion was adopted which intended to temporarily remove people from the makeshift camp, and more broadly from the area of Calais, and give them hard times, hopefully discouraging them from coming back or reaching the UK. This is the second mode of deterritorialisation of migrant people, carried out by temporarily holding and possibly scattering them throughout France. At the same time this operation enabled the increase of the numbers of migrants strained by the controlling process in Calais. By way of example, Elisa clarified that during the eviction in March 2016, when the political goal was to reduce the dimension of the camp, both in size and number of inhabitants, to a surge in the number of controls and apprehensions corresponded, in the end, a total rate of almost one hundred per cent of those apprehended who were released in 48 hours. This happened as the apprehended was either already an asylum seeker, or non-removable because coming from a country at risk.[605] Meanwhile, those people had been transferred to a detention centre far from Calais, being forced, once released, to reach Calais by their own means.

The third movement of deterritorialisation was related to passage, or, as the inhabitants of the Jungle called it, the 'chance'. Passage was the moment that separated those who had made it to the UK from those who did not, even if that one was not everybody's dream. Nathanaël, from the *Plateforme de Services aux Migrants*, told me that passages had always worked by cycles: at certain times many people could pass without nobody being able to explain how, if not that, as once the director of the Port seemed to admit to him during

601 The two-headed politics was inaugurated in France already in the late Eighties by the French Minister of the Interior Rocard who referred to it in terms of *rigour* and *humanism*. It was later at the beginning of the years 2000 that the French Minister Nicholas Sarkozy confirmed and revamped the same idea by using the now (in) famous expression "firmness and humanity", which registered the politics of immigration into the case-by-case framework. For an overview see Frédérique Cornuau, Xavier Dunezat, 'L'Immigration en France: Concepts, Contours et Politiques', *Espace Populations Sociétés* [Online], 2 (2008), accessed the 19 May 2017 at http://eps.revues.org/3330; DOI : 10.4000/eps.3330.

602 https://www.immigration.interieur.gouv.fr/Info-ressources/Actualites/L-actu-immigration/La-loi-du-7-mars-2016-relative-au-droit-des-etrangers.

603 Interview held on 14 June 2017 by telephone. Elisa Mora is a legal expert who spent almost one year at the detention centre (CRA) in Coquelles to provide legal assistance to migrants apprehended in Calais. She worked there from February to November 2016.

604 Elisa described the detention-release of migrants as a game. According to the French normative, when a migrant is apprehended she can be detained for a maximum of 16 hours to verify her identity. If she cannot demonstrate her right to be in France, she is subjected to an expulsion measure, which can be voluntary or forced. In both cases the migrant could appeal in 48 hours, but in the second case (and if she loses the appeal) she is detained for a maximum of 45 days and then either expulsed or released. In Calais expulsions were the last option, because almost every migrant in the camp was from country at risk, such as Afghanistan, Sudan, or Eritrea, thus non-removable or removable with difficulty. So the game was more to apprehend them and possibly to transfer them to other centres in France, where they finally would be released but had to find their way to Calais again.

605 Nonetheless, arbitrary expulsions to these countries were sometimes carried out.

an interview, the police once in a while turned a blind eye.[606] Tazzioli calls this mechanism "draining" and she assigns it a role in the partial lightening of the mass of migrants when this latter had become too large from a political and material point of view.[607]

A movement of reterritorialisation can likely follow deterritorialisations. This is the case when one is caught into the asylum process and in the first instance is submitted to a division mechanism through individualisation. What happens next, as soon as one's identification is accomplished, is the transformation of one's body into information, into code:

> "The most common manifestation of the border in Europe is not to be found along the geographical border line of the Schengen area, but rather in digital records on laptops belonging to the border police; in the visa records of European embassies in Moscow, Istanbul, Accra or Tripoli; in the checkpoints of Heathrow, Tegel, Paris Charles de Gaulle or Mytilini Odysseas Elytis airports; in the German central register of asylum seekers (ZAST); in the online entries of the Schengen Information System (SIS), where the data on persons denied entry to the Schengen area is administered; in the Eurodac, the data system administered by the Commission, where the fingerprints of asylum seekers and apprehended illegalised migrants are stored."[608]

In 2003 the European Commission established a system, the Eurodac regulation, which responded to the need of supporting the implementation of the 1990 Dublin Convention and, more globally, laying the foundation for a common European asylum system. The Dublin regulation that derives from the Convention establishes the state of European Union that shall be in charge of examining an application for international protection, based on the principle that the state of (irregular) entry would be the one responsible for the asylum claim. Eurodac is an asylum fingerprint database to which each member state has access to collect, transmit, and compare data, and its objective is precisely to support the control activity under the Dublin regulation.[609] Launched ideally as an instrument directed to asylum seekers and potential refugees, in the sense of the Geneva Refugee Convention, Eurodac has been extended to irregular border-crossing control through the collection of data of irregular migrants, either those apprehended for illegal crossing or those present on the territory of a state without regular documents.[610] The data system has thus come to function, *de facto*, "as a – potentially deterring – instrument of immigration control and for the maintenance of 'law and order'."[611] In this vein, a recent proposal for an update of Eurodac has been directed at reinforcing its control power with respect to illegal migrants, retaining data for longer periods and sharing identity information with third countries for

606 *La Plateforme de Services aux Migrants* is a network of local associations in the Calaisis, the area around Calais, which promotes the activity of advocacy for migrants and organises meetings during which the fieldwork is coordinated.

607 Tazzioli, 'The Government of Migrant Mobs: Temporary Divisible Multiplicities in Border Zones', op. cit.

608 Papadopoulos, Stephenson and Tsianos, *Escape Routes. Control and Subversion in the Twenty-first Century*, op. cit. p. 176.

609 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:180:0001:0030:EN:PDF.

610 In addition to the criteria and mechanisms for determining the state responsible for an asylum claim, Eurodac is aimed to identify irregular entry and residence of "third country national or stateless person" (https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/20160504/eurodac_proposal_en.pdf)

611 Jonathan P. Aus, 'Supranational Governance in an "Area of Freedom, Security and Justice": Eurodac and the Politics of Biometric Control', *SEI Working Paper* 72 (2003) at https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=sei-working-paper-no-72.pdf&site=266.

return purposes.[612] Hence, if Eurodac is meant to identify asylum applicants as it is professed by the Migration and Home Affairs of the European Commission,[613] what it does instead is "governing by identity," which implies a great number of techniques that have become the main means to carry out migration policies through classifying, categorising, tracking, and controlling individuals, be them asylum seekers of 'illegal' migrants, as the asylum's taxonomy establishes.[614] Biometrics is one of these instruments and serves precisely this purpose in the government of migration of the European Union: it establishes identity, it individualises bodies by making them *speak*, it transforms the body into information. Biometrics designs a lawscape that is visible as it were concentrated in the biometric device, but expands on an undetermined spatiality from which is hard to get away.

In the first step of the asylum process, the aspiring asylum seeker is requested to tell her story and it is on the basis of her story, its credibility and reliability, that her request is assessed. If "the heart of the asylum claim is the story,"[615] it is the story that will be submitted to verification, not identity. Identity, instead, is considered to belong to the body, which becomes its bearer in the form of fingerprints and regarded as "a source of instant truth."[616] As Btihaj Ajana argues, this truth, which is carried by the body, excludes the story.[617] So, once the story has been listened and recorded, and once the decision has been taken, the story stops to count and only the body matters. At every following step within or outside the process, irrespective of whether the decision includes or excludes the applicant, only the body will be listened and let speak:

> "A talking individual, who owns the body, is in fact seen as unnecessary and, even more importantly, insufficient for identification. Now only the body can talk in the required ways, through the unambiguous and cryptic language of codes and algorithms. When a body provides the password, a world of information opens. Databases begin to talk. On the other hand, when the individual talks, the words are only met with suspicion."[618]

By the same token, for Alexander Galloway biometrics treats life, human beings, as quantifiable and recordable matter, thus re-establishing a hierarchy that situates in the *aestheticized* body the proof of the authenticity of life.[619] What the encoding does, with the support of the biometric technique, is to deterritorialize the migrant onto a code by separating the body from life, only to reterritorialize it in a database from where it will be freed only by erasure. Once the operation has been completed, it becomes impossible for the body to go back to the previous step, at least for a certain time frame.[620]

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612 See at https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/20160504/eurodac_proposal_en.pdf.

613 https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/identification-of-applicants_en.

614 Louise Amoore, 'Governing by identity', in David Lyon and Colin J. Bennett (eds.) *Playing the Identity Card: Surveillance, Security, and Identification in Global Perspective* (New York: Routledge 2008) pp.21-36.

615 Mentioned on the website of an association that promotes the right to asylum, at http://www.espoirdasile.org/artc/Construire_un_recit/61/fr/article/

616 Katja Franko Aas,'"The body does not lie": Identity, Risk and Trust in Technoculture', *Crime Media Culture* 2 2 (2006): p.154, cited in Btihaj Ajana, *Governing through Biometrics. The Biopolitcs of Identity* (Basingstoke: Palgrave and Macmillan 2013) p.89.

617 Ajana, *Governing through Biometrics. The Biopolitcs of Identity,* op. cit.

618 Aas,'"The body does not lie": Identity, Risk and Trust in Technoculture', op. cit, p.154.

619 Alexander R. Galloway, *Protocol. How Control Exists after Decentralization* (Cambridge, MA and London, UK: The MIT Press 2004).

620 Records in the Eurodac database can be stored up to maximum 18 months. Nonetheless, the proposal of

Put it in the form of a Spinozan adagio, what can a body do when it has been separated from its affective dimension – hence, action – when it has been dividualised? The body of the migrant, deterritorialised through its fingerprints on a database shared by all the state members of the European Union, is one of the most fitting expressions of the Deleuzian *dividual*, the entity that beyond the dual pair individual/mass has itself become "mass, samples, data, markets, or *banks*."[621] Marking the difference from Foucault's disciplinary societies, Deleuze aims to put an emphasis on the radical switch in the exercise of control in the postmodern era of digital machines, where control has become "short-term and rapidly shifting, but at the same time continuous and unbounded."[622] Unlike disciplinary bodies, dividual bodies are hold in perpetual metastability and relentless fluctuation, but their position can nevertheless be blocked at any moment, and then equally be released. In dividual bodies the individual has been dissolved into distributed networks that share information.[623] "Control man undulates, moving among a continuous range of different orbits."[624] In control societies capitalism has produced an epochal change which is reflected in the machines through which power is exercised, to wit, computer and information technology, Deleuze said in 1990.

> "The 'information age' (...) is not simply that moment when computers come to dominate, but is instead that moment in history when matter itself is understood in terms of information or code. At this historical moment, protocol becomes a controlling force in social life."[625]

As Galloway points out, the nature of control to which Deleuze refers is a protological one, that is to say, it is distributed, decentralised, and implies a set of regulations that direct bodies' movements within an environment. In this sense, Galloway argues that "protocological control also affects the functioning of bodies within social space and the creation of these bodies into forms of 'artificial life' that are *dividuated,* sampled, and coded."[626] The type of control upon which a protological system is based is not the old one of confinement, quite the opposite: it is a control grounded on openness and inclusion, which in order to work needs standardization and homogenization. And going back to Eurodac, this functioning is translated into a categorisation of the individual migrant according to three different codes: code 1 for asylum seekers; code 2 for foreigners who have illegally crossed the external European border; code 3 for illegal presence within the Schengen area. When data are compared in order to identify the individual corresponding body, so-called "wrong hits" can occur. As it is described by Brigitta Kuster and Vassilis Tsianos, the wrong hits may inform that the data and the living being associated have had different spatio-temporal movements.[627] For example, the case of a migrant (a third-country national, in the bureaucratic language of the European Union) who is registered and fingerprinted in an entry state, such as Greece or Italy, and when she arrives in other member state she lodges

update of the system would extend this period to five years.

621 Deleuze, 'Postscript on Control Societies', in *Negotiations*, op. cit. p.180.

622 Ibid. p.181.

623 Galloway, *Protocol. How Control Exists after Decentralization*, op. cit. p.12.

624 Deleuze, 'Postscript on Control Societies', op. cit. p.180.

625 Galloway, *Protocol*, op. cit. p.111.

626 Ibid. p.12.

627 Brigitta Kuster and Vassilis S. Tsianos, 'How to Liquefy a Body on the Move: Eurodac and the Making of the European Digital Border', in Raphael Bossong and Helena Carrapico (eds.), *EU Borders and Shifting Internal Security. Technology, Externalization and Accountability* (Springer International 2016): pp.45-63.

a request of asylum, being again fingerprinted. During this block of space-time, data might fail to be transmitted to the Central Unit, so the second biometric registration results as it were the first. When the data arrive, the system signals a mismatch. Data have taken on a life of their own. Unlike other territories we have seen so far, this territory inscribed in the lawscape of the asylum regime has a time of its own, which is not the reassuring present of habit, but the threatening always-imminent future of detention and deportation. From an affective point of view, we understand why the first can be a good, empowering, affect and the latter a bad, weakening one.

4.4 Encounters

If we go back from European protocols and data to the Jungle, we might be surprised to find the two mechanisms of individualisation and dividuation at work in the folds of its struggle. The mechanism of individualisation put into operation by the asylum process worked to separate the individuals from the multiplicity they belonged to, both spatially and legally, as we have seen. So we had a Jungle composed of as many struggles as inhabitants, which position was ever-changing and still indefinitely frozen. The dualism through which the mechanism of individualisation works in the asylum process is an affective one, it depends on the nature of the assemblage that is produced as a result of the encounter between the migrant and her performance during the interview, her story, the officer in charge, the country of origin. As the public officer explains to the journalist Frayer-Laleix, in order to prove that one is persecuted in her own country, documents are requested, but many do not have any. "So, they tell the story that someone else has suggested to tell, or has sold, and they will not obtain anything," thus failing the interview.[628] The interview is the switch that can change your temporary positioning within the lawscape that the protocol draws for you, and it is nothing else than an encounter. In his book on Spinoza, Deleuze recalls that the encounter is the moment when a body enters in affective relation with another body and their commingling can result either in a more powerful whole or in the disintegration of one's coherence. In the same vein, Louis Althusser says that "every encounter is aleatory not in its origins (nothing ever guarantees an encounter) but in its effects [...], in that nothing in the elements of the encounters prefigures, before the actual encounter, the contours and determinations of the being that will emerge from it."[629] It is not possible to know in advance the effect of such composition and its fortuitous character has as correlative the risk of encountering a more powerful body which eventually makes us collapse.[630] Spinoza, in the Deleuzian reading, is convinced that more than anything what really matters is the effort that any body puts into the organisation of her encounters, experimenting compositions that might possibly enhance her chances of empowering her capacity for action.

I met K. on the first day of the evacuation of the southern part of the Jungle, it was the 29 of February 2016. He was with Anne, the French artist I had become acquainted with only a few days earlier, and they struggled through the mob, hand in hand, trying not to be separated. It was a tense moment, where nothing was happening but the ambiance was filled with

628 Frayer-Laleix, *Dans la Peau d'un Migrant*, op. cit. p.368 (my translation).

629 Louis Althusser, 'The Underground Current of the Materialism of the Encounter', in François Matheron and Oliver Corpet (eds.), *Philosophy of the Encounter. Later Writings, 1978-87* (trans. G. M. Goshgarian) (London and New York: Verso 2006) p.193.

630 Deleuze, *Spinoza*, op. cit.

expectation. I have a clear picture of that moment, so I remember that I got impressed by this tall and thin man of African origins with such protective manners. I met him again with Anne in two more occasions and I was invited in his shack for a hot tea. In all I might have met him five or six times, but it was enough to become familiar and exchange promises of meeting again "beyond the Jungle," one day or another. K. is Sudanese and was arrived in the Jungle, like many others, with the intent of crossing the Channel. He did not arrive directly from Sudan, but from Ukraine, where he had been living after fleeing Sudan and had left when the conflict had broken out. Along his journey he was fingerprinted in Hungary, thus becoming one of the many *dublinés* of the Jungle. After some time in the encampment, he decided that he would have dropped his idea of going to the UK and he would have claimed for asylum in France. As soon as he applied, he entered that waiting room between his application and the deadline before which France would have had to ask Hungary to take him back, Hungary would have had to accept, and France would have had six months to organise his expulsion. Once this period expired, France would have become responsible for his application, which was his hope. He waited patiently, and before summer 2016 he was formally included in the French asylum process. In the meantime, a few fortunate encounters would have triggered an important opportunity for him. Anne and some people from the University of Lille were launching a project that would have enabled a few dozen migrants from the Jungle to be enrolled in a special yearly programme, through which they would have studied French at the University while being housed in the campus and, at the end, they would have joined the normal courses to complete their studies. The project, which had obtained the financial support of the French government, succeed and eighty people from eight different countries left the Jungle and were enrolled in the French course in October 2016, only a few weeks before the total cleansing of the camp. K. is one this men, and has by now been granted asylum for five years. These eighty people were selected among more than two hundreds candidates on the basis of a motivational interview and had to meet several criteria, such as the possession of a diploma and the manifested desire for continuing their studies in France. I do not have any idea of what became of those who were discarded along the process. What I know is that the bus for those heading to Lille did not leave from the Jungle, in order to avoid creating confusion just before the eviction. The selected people were transferred in small groups on the sly from the Jungle to L'Auberge des Migrants' warehouse by volunteers.

S. was a Tunisian man and lived in a shack with other three Tunisian fellows, in the area of the camp where most of the Arabic-speaking people lived, next to the Syrian community. I never met him and I learnt his story from one of his friends, who passed himself and his friends as Syrian. S. had an European friend in the camp, F., an Italian activist who I would have met soon after. One day F. got hold of the Italian valid passport of a man who would have it reported lost at a later stage, and with S. organised an attempt to cross the Channel. The plan was to go from Calais further west to Roscoff, a small port in the French region of Brittany with boat connections to Great Britain and Ireland, and from there to get on a boat bound for Plymouth, taking a chance. The choice of Roscoff was made for two reasons: being far from Calais the pressure was lower and there was only one check point, the French one, because Roscoff is among those ports in France where the UK border has been moved on paper but not in practice. So S. and F. reached Roscoff with their Italian passports, one of which had been forged, and they made it to the UK. Once ensured that S. was in good hands and had claimed for asylum in the UK, F. came back to the Jungle.

S.M. and B.H. are respectively from Sudan and Syria and both have a very good command of the English language. When they were in the Jungle their goal was London. I saw them many times in the Jungle, especially translating from Arabic to English, and vice versa, at the evening meetings, or hanging around with some British volunteers. In February 2016, S.M. was also the leader, or spokesperson, for the Sudanese community, but soon after the evacuation of the southern part of the camp he stopped coming to the meetings. When I came back to Calais in July 2016, neither of them was in the Jungle anymore. I learnt that both had made it to the UK in April or May. Six months after being arrived in the UK, they both have been granted asylum for five years and they both work with ex-volunteers they met in Calais. S.M. is collaborating with a non-profit organisation called Refugee Rights Data Project, with whom he has coordinated a research fieldwork in Calais after the cleansing. B.H. has been collaborating with the Good Chance Theatre, which has some projects ongoing in the UK, and he has been playing as an actor in a comedy about the Jungle.

Many similar stories can be told of people for whom the Jungle had been the place of some fortunate encounters, even with non-humans bodies, like a boy who was rescued from a lorry where he was suffocating, after sending a message with a smartphone offered to him by a British volunteer he had met in Calais.[631] Many have expressed gratefulness for the presence of committed volunteers who have helped during and beyond the existence of the Jungle. The stories I learnt are only some visible ones for me, who could observe mostly those migrants who hooked up with the European people I also was connected to. The visibility was implied in the rhizomatic nature of my fieldwork. These stories talk about a striving for making the good encounters, for composing with bodies that could enhance one's power. But they also speak of atomising mechanisms based on affect as the only possible line of flight. Put differently, the two mechanisms of individualisation and dividuation that were besieging migrants in the Jungle, the way we have seen in the last section, operated at the heart of the process of individuation along which the individual and the multiplicity unfold affectively into each other, thus hampering both and, most of all, binding the emergence of a collective to their own rules. Here Simondon again, and Spinoza, might help me unpack this idea by recurring to the notions of affect, emotion, and transindividuation, to show how the collective was prevented from coming into being by these very mechanisms.

As we have seen, Simondon's conceptualisation of the individual considers the human being as never completely individuated. According to Simondon, the individual is to be found in a metastable state of relentless individuation where only a fraction of her actualising potential actualises and a part, which Simondon terms *preindividual,* is preserved as a *germ* for future becomings.[632] Hence, the individual is the result of a continuous process along which she adapts to her milieu, and so doing she transforms herself and the milieu, retaining within herself a capacity, a potential, for keeping on changing. "The individual would then be apprehended as a relative reality, a certain phase of the being that assumes before itself a preindividual reality," which, as a result of individuation, brings forth not an individual, but the individual-milieu couple, in the form of a more organised being that retains through her grown organisation the tensions coming from the preindividual.

In this eternal process of individuation of the individual, the relation between the individual and her milieu is constitutive of the process itself. From this perspective the individual *is*

631 https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/apr/08/afghan-boy-rescued-lorry-m1-texting-lack-of-oxygen.
632 Simondon, *L'Individuation à la Lumière des Notions de Forme et d'Information*, op. cit.

the relation, "the theatre of a relational activity that perpetuates within her."[633] It is from this standpoint that Simondon looks at the emerging of the collective dimension. The collective is not seen as another reality that arises separately from the individual. Rather, it is the result of a process of individuation that is reciprocal with that of the individual, where the preindividual is involved in the unfolding of both conditions. Transindividuation, the mechanism that underlies the collective individuation, has as premise the idea that the multiplicity is already part of the individual in the form of the preindividual reality of the individuating being. Or, as Simondon puts it, "the relation to the world and the collective is a *dimension of the individuation* to which the individual participates on the basis of the *preindividual reality* that step by step individuates [*s'individue*]."[634] What is at the origin of transindividuation? What medium facilitates the relation between the individual and the collective individuations? The answer of Simondon is affect, as Spinoza's.[635] Affect expresses the relation between the two reality of the being, the individual and the preindividual, and it is at a time emotion and action. For Simondon the synthesis between action and emotion, consciousness and affect, cannot be realised in the individual because the distance between the two is unbridgeable. Their inherent multiplicity cannot find a moment of integration if not in the collective dimension. The only locus for the harmonisation of action and emotion is the collective individuation, so that "action and emotion are born when the collective individuates [*s'individue*]."[636] The emotion is what gives a direction to the living being, it is the sense [*sens*] of the action. This is what Spinoza means when he refers to affect as the capacity for affecting or being affected. Transindividuation is thus a different order of individuation which tends to form more complex beings (bodies, in Spinoza's language) by means of affect-actions.

Complex formations are stronger than more simple ones, for both Simondon and Spinoza. For the former because they can express emotions, thus giving unity to affects that otherwise would be scattered through individuals. For the latter because a 'convergence of forces', or "relationships between individuals which are based on their 'common nature' build up a 'collective' or superior individual *without* suppressing their autonomy. On the contrary, they increase their *potentia agendi* (including, of course, their capacity to think or know), and accordingly their capacity for existence."[637] The common nature upon which a collective might arise is not one that can be thought of in advance, planned or anticipated, because it relies on imagination, affect and imitation, as we have seen in the previous chapter. Gatens and Lloyd explain this clearly when they say that

> "Individuals who collectively combine their powers have selected out from nature that with which they may unite harmoniously, rather than engage combatively, in order to form a more extensive body with new powers. Such selections exhaust the scope of human freedom precisely because they involve becoming the cause of one's encounters with others and thus of acting rather than being acted upon."[638]

633 Ibid. p.65 (my translation).

634 Ibid. pp.29-30 (my translation, original emphasis).

635 Simondon uses the term "affectivo-émotivité" to indicate the relation between the individual and the preindividual that are constitutive of the subject. According to Simondon, emotion is the overcome of an affective contradiction between the individual and others, or the milieu.

636 Simondon, *L'Individuation à la Lumière des Notions de Forme et d'Information*, op. cit. p.248 (my translation).

637 Balibar, *Spinoza: from Individuality to Transindividuality* op. cit. pp.21-22.

638 Gatens and Lloyd, *Collective Imaginings,* op. cit. p.102.

At the heart of the pair emotion-action we have the foundations of the process through which, in the Jungle, a collective formation was born on the basis of a "common" that was the only one remained after that the individualising and dividuating mechanisms had taken on any other energetic reserve from individualised and dividuated migrants. If the collective individuation can occur when the individuals involved share the parts they have affectively in common with each other, both at the preindividual and the individual level, a desire for a home and for hospitality was what could be put in "common" in the Jungle.

Individualisation and dividuation were hampering the possibility for the struggle against the border and the asylum regime to be channelled affectively into the collective dimension, to harmonise action and emotion, in other words. The collective dimension of the Jungle could emerge only as an atmosphere of the homely, as I have tried to highlight along the path of this work. As Brighenti insists, following Simondon and Canetti, "multiplicities are neither additions of individual elements nor macro-organisms," but are instead generated by movements and affects.[639] If this can apply also to the Jungle, it must be noted again that too many movements pushed against the emergence of a collective resistance and boosted, on the contrary, its further individualised condition. Not least, the census organised by aid groups during the last eight months of life of the Jungle. As we have seen in chapter 2, the census was supposed to be used against the French government to show that their data were wrong, and consequently the accommodations they were organising throughout France (the CAOs) were not adequate. Despite all good intentions, this technique of counting replicated the dividuating mechanism of associating people to shelters and then codes, somehow reinforcing the dividual condition of being submitted to a biopolitical regime.

It has been argued, with respect to the regime of (im)mobility, that division is a technique to hold off an unruly multiplicity and ensure that it never turns its reserve of energy for transformation against the established order. To avoid its unpredictability and keep its potential for reversal at bay, the mob must never actualise its energetic stock. In other words, it must never become a crowd; it would better remain a passive mass, without one common struggle but as many as possible, preferably atomised and individualised ones.

4.5 The crowd

"We don't want the 'case by case'; we don't want the 'roundtrip'; we don't want 'roundtrip' to the Prefecture; we don't want the appointments at the OFPRA; we don't want the 'come back tomorrow'; we don't want the 'after tomorrow'; after that, there is nothing."[640] Under the slogan "Migrants, welcome!" (migrants, bienvenue!), a great many organisations active in Paris in support of migrants and undocumented people promoted and organised a rally in Calais on the 23 of January 2016, calling together local organisations and British supporters. The demonstration was expected to depart from the Jungle and end in the central square

639 Andrea Mubi Brighenti, *The Ambiguous Multiplicities. Materials, Episteme and Politics of Cluttered Social Formations* (Basingstoke: Palgrave McMillan 2014) p.65.

640 The refrain was declaimed in French: "Le 'cas par cas' (on n'en veut pas); aller-retour (on n'en veut pas); à la Préfecture (on n'en veut pas) aller-retour (on n'en veut pas); à l'OFPRA (on n'en veut pas) des rendez-vous (on n'en veut pas); 'reviens demain (on n'en veut pas); 'après demain' (on n'en veut pas); après il y a rien (on n'en veut pas)." See a video of the rally at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jo75P6m3wRM [accessed on 7 June 2017]. The video was made by a group of activists who are committed to fight against mainstream media's disinformation, as they state on their Facebook page (https://www.facebook.com/pg/actividad/about/?ref=page_internal).

of *Place d'Armes* in Calais, covering the both material and symbolic five kilometres that approximately ward off the makeshift camp from the city. Many people came from Paris and a large number of migrants took part to the parade, so that the media reported more than two thousand participants. The rally passed through some residential neighbourhoods under claims for "freedom," "UK", and "the end of the jungle," then reached the square where it was supposed to finish. At the end of the official rally something happened. A mass of a few hundred people from the Jungle and some European supporters broke through the police line and headed to the port, which was at close proximity. A breach in a fence was opened, one or two hundreds, among migrants and supporters, entered the port, while about forty or fifty of them were able to get on the ship *Spirit of Britain* and occupy it for a few hours before being arrested.[641] Those who were blocked before they could get on the ship, or did not go beyond the breach, were invited to "go back to the Jungle" and escorted by the police all the way up to the encampment. The local authorities condemned the event and blamed the activists of the No Borders group for enticing migrants into unrest. Natacha Bouchart, mayor of Calais, had been demanding for the previous months that the state of emergency, which was ruling in the aftermath of the terroristic attacks in Paris,[642] could be used to have more police and law enforcement in Calais.[643] Following the rally, the Prefecture of the Pas-de-Calais refused any other request for rallying in support of the migrants, being so criticised by Amnesty International for "lowering the threshold to overcome in order to place restrictions on the right to the freedom of assembly."[644]

Movements like this one did not repeat. Occupying for a few hours the *Spirit of Britain,* after a joyful and peaceful parade, was a rupture in the controlled atmosphere of the Jungle, a dreamful political action which shattered the eternal present of the camp with the incorporeal and instantaneous time of *Aeon*, the time without duration, the time of revolt, the time of the crowd.[645] Were the people of the Jungle a crowd? Was it a crowd that mass of people who, running and shouting, broke into the port of Calais and then got on a ship bound for the UK? Why should this matter? As it will become clear throughout the section, the concept of crowd has two interesting implications for this work. On the one side, it can be employed as an analytical tool to explore the overindividualised government of migrations through the lens of the Calais case. In this perspective, to introduce the concept of crowd is not to oppose it to the individual. Rather, starting from dichotomic concepts serves the purpose, in a Deleuzian mode, of reaffirming their irreducible commingling and interpenetration, and thus asserting "the ontological heterogeneity of the social,"[646] where only multiplicities exist

641 See https://passeursdhospitalites.wordpress.com/2016/01/23/un-jour-de-solidarite/; http://mobile.lemonde.fr/immigration-et-diversite/article/2016/01/23/deux-mille-manifestants-pour-soutenir-les-migrants-a-calais_4852528_1654200.html?xtref=acc_dir.

642 The so-called "November 2015 Paris attacks" occurred the night of the 13 November 2015 in Paris and were claimed by Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Following the attacks, the then French President François Hollande declared the state of emergency across France for three months. The state of emergency has since then been extended until November 2017.

643 http://www.nordlittoral.fr/accueil/migrants-decouvrez-ce-que-natacha-bouchart-va-demander-ia0b0n269924.

644 https://etat-a-calais.fr/2016/09/30/la-prefete-interdit-toute-manifestation-revendicative-en-lien-avec-la-question-des-migrants-a-calais-et-dans-plusieurs-communes-du-calaisis-le-samedi-1er-octobre-2016/; https://etat-a-calais.fr/2016/10/13/la-prefete-interdit-tout-rassemblement-revendicatif-en-lien-avec-la-question-des-migrants-a-calais-et-dans-plusieurs-communes-du-calaisis-le-vendredi-14-octobre-2016/. See the Amnesty report at https://amnestyfr.cdn.prismic.io/amnestyfr%2F173a8ea8-ecf5-4917-b52b-437e4e38e188_ai_rapport_un+droit+pas+une+menace_fr-embargo+31-05-2017.pdf (p.19).

645 Brighenti and Kärrholm, 'Three Presents: on the Multi-temporality of Territorial Production and the Gift from John Soane' op. cit.; Zourabichvili, Deleuze. *Une Philosophie de l'Evénement,* op. cit.

646 Andrea Mubi Brighenti, 'La Massa nella Teoria Sociologica classica e contemporanea', *Quaderni di Sociologia* 46 (2008): p.201 (my translation).

[38]

Figure 38. Running towards the Spirit of Britain. Source: Les Calaisiens en Colère (Facebook)

acting in the same assemblage: "one and the same machinic assemblage [which] produces and distributes the whole, in other words, the set of statements corresponding to the complex."[647] On the other side, the undeniable political connotation of the notion of crowd can help focus attention on a politics of the crowd as a possible mechanism through which energy and intensities can be liberated toward transformative goals, toward resistance.

The crowd, the gathering of a mass in public, the mass protest, occupation, is here interpreted, with Judith Butler, as the performative exercise of the right to appear, to claim a political presence "through bodily movement, assembly, action, and resistance."[648] By unpacking the concept of crowd and related notions of multitude and mass (while also exploring the concept of pack) I argue that the Jungle was not such emergence and performed instead following more individual tensions, in accordance with the overindividualising measures for governing migration that we have seen so far, but also as a response to an atmosphere from which it was hard to withdraw collectively.

In their influential work on *Empire*, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri borrow the term of multitude from Spinoza's *Ethics* to promote the idea of a collective formation composed by singularities but capable of realising democracy.[649] Democracy, in their view, would arise by sharing common basis and acting as a single body emerged from a mutual reality of exploitation, to build an "alternative to the political body of capital."[650] Their multitude, while acting as one, rejects the dualism between sovereignty and anarchy by maintaining its distance from both. The absence of a sovereign power, of a unity that governs the subordinated people, in their view, would not be the premise of chaos and disorder. Rather, because the multitude obeys only to its emergent law, as William Mazzarella puts it, it does not release its power to a medium, be it a leader or an organised social body.[651] In other words, the multitude is an autonomous body that emerges out of what Hardt and Negri call "a spiral, symbiotic relationship" that occurs in the production of subjectivity through cycles of communication and cooperation. This body is autonomous to the extent that it is "always and necessarily an open, plural composition and never become a unitary whole divided by hierarchical organs."[652] The multitude is seen as a vital force that is "pure potential", always exceeding control and limits, and nonetheless producing not chaos but *common*. Not the common as a product of a community, which implies the idea of a unitary body, but rather as the result of a process of cooperative production in the form of an excess that cannot be captured by global capital. This excess that is the *common* can be generated through a horizontal network of collaboration based on singular struggles, where differences are not flattened and forces are mobilised toward not only protest, but also creativity and innovation.[653] In other words, the multitude is conceptualised by Hardt and Negri as an unmediated and active social formation functioning "as an open-source society" and which

647 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit. p.34.

648 Judith Butler, *Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly* (London and Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 2015) p.49.

649 Hardt and Negri, *Empire,* op. cit.

650 Ibid.; see also Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Multitude. War and Democracy in the Age of Empire* (New York: the Penguin Press 2004) p.189.

651 William Mazzarella, 'The Myth of the Multitude, or, Who's Afraid of the Crowd?', *Critical Inquiry* 36 4 (2010): pp.697-727.

652 Hardt and Negri, *Multitude,* op.cit. p.190.

653 Ibid.

action "is based not on identity or unity, but on what it has in common."[654] Put this way, the notion of the multitude could be easily applied to the mass of people gathered in the Jungle. More so, if we consider that mobility and migration represent for Hardt and Negri the "privileged terrain" for the struggle against Empire, thanks to their desire for regeneration, for a new beginning.[655] Contra this argument, Laclau contends that "reasons for various groups to migrate are very different and are not unified around any anti-Empire crusade,"[656] meaning that is especially questionable to imagine a (vague) multitude standing outside the rhizomatic weaves of imperialistic power as one political subject. This, in my view, is not the main problem with the multitude of *Empire*.

The multitude is set by the two thinkers in opposition to another mass concept, that of the crowd. They go further: they explicitly define the multitude against the crowd. The multitude, in their terms, is what the crowd is not. The crowd is constituted, in their view, by social subjects that are incoherent and share no common interests, thus appearing as unformed and indifferent, "fundamentally passive in the sense that they cannot act by themselves but rather must be led."[657] In this sense, two are the characteristics of the crowd that oppose it to the multitude, making the latter preferable to the former: the crowd is both heteronomous and passive, namely incapable of acting independently, thus "susceptible to external manipulation."[658]

The idea of the crowd as a disruptive and dangerous entity that might threaten the stability of social order is a legacy of the old crowd semantics, which developed at the end of nineteenth century positioning the crowd as a sociological subject *per se*. In particular, the first European investigations of crowd's behaviour and emergence defined it in terms of irrationality, violence, and de-individualisation, regarding it with terror as a danger posed by a pathological entity to the rationality of the population.[659] In a vein that substantiates Hardt and Negri's hold on crowds, Gustave Le Bon in his well-known *La Psychologie des Foules*, while displaying the loss of rationality in the crowd's destructive attitude under the influence of a collective suggestion, conceived its de-individualisation in its yielding completely to the figure of a leader, as "a servile flock that is incapable of ever doing without a master."[660] Similarly, Gabriel Tarde emphasised in his earliest writings on the crowd its "extraordinary suggestible" nature and its heteronomy, by distinguishing for example between the leader, as the "originator of the hypnotic suggestion that spreads rapidly and contagiously in crowds",[661] and the led, subjugated by the mesmerizing influence. As

654 Ibid. p.100.

655 Hardt and Negri, *Empire,* op. cit.

656 Ernesto Laclau, 'Can Immanence Explain Social Struggles?', *Diacritics* 31 4 (2001): p.9. According to Negri, *multitudo* is at the same time a juridical subject and an unidentifiable physical set of singularities. In *Empire*, as Laclau argues in his critic review to the book [], this ambiguity is problematic for the relevance the concept holds in the political proposal of Hardt and Negri.

657 Ibid.

658 Ibid.

659 For a full historical account of crowd semantics see Christian Borch, *The Politics of Crowds. An Alternative History of Sociology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012). Borch points out that even if in Europe crowds were conceived as dangerous social subjects, some differences among scholars existed. American contemporaries, such as Robert E. Park of the Chicago School, gave a more positive interpretation, viewing them as potentially creative and transformative.

660 Gustave Le Bon, *The Crowd. The Study of the Popular Mind* (New York: Viking 1960) cited in Borch, *The Politics of Crowds* op. cit. p.41. The original French version "la Psychologie des Foules" dates back to 1895.

661 Borch, *The Politics of Crowds* op. cit. p.52. Tarde will shift his interest to another multiplicity, which he will call the public. By contrast with the 'barbaric and primitive' crowd, the public is in Tarde more 'civil and modern'. See Brighenti, *The Ambiguous Multiplicities,* op. cit.

Christian Borch points out, in his later works Tarde explored a more nuanced account of the crowd that could possibly be seen also as a form of sociality, thanks to its capacity of generating imitation and, as such, of establishing social bonds among individuals. So doing, Tarde "assigns a revolutionary-transformative character to the crowd, as its rationality is embodied in fashion-imitation."[662] In this perspective, Tarde interpreted the crowd as both the destabilisation and the manifestation of the social, being the first thinker "to articulate this ambivalent or paradoxical stance towards the crowd."[663] Put differently, as Mazzarella summarises it: "the mimetic transmission that works by picture-thinking and that results in submission to prestige [the leading figure] is *also* the means by which social institutions and even the much-fetishized upstanding individual become possible."[664]

If the notion of crowd had its momentum at the beginning of twentieth century, then the theoretical explorations around the multiplicities would have shifted the focus on the mass, the public, social movements, and the multitude. Even if in Hardt and Negri the notion of crowd seems to be relegated to the old times of the past when the crowds were ghastly entities without autonomy nor transformative power, its dualism with the multitude can be read as less sharp and conclusive, in the end. Once dualism is blurred, what remains is a more complex notion that includes multiple tensions at a time, as I show below. Hardt and Negri's multitude has Spinozan roots. In their reading, Spinoza viewed the multitude in vitalist terms as the force that has freedom as its objective. In this sense, they insist on construing the multitude as a locus of resistance and a creative vanguard of revolution. However, Slavoj Žižek contends, there is a form of "neutrality" in Spinoza's approach to the multitude that is disregarded by Hardt and Negri's emphasis on its creative character. Spinoza knew, Žižek maintains, that "the noblest collective acts are generated by exactly the same mechanism — in short, democracy and a lynching mob have the same source," and that "multitude is resistance to the imposing One, but, at the same time, it designates what we call 'mob,' a wild, 'irrational' explosion of violence that, through *imitatio afecti*, feeds on and propels itself."[665] In the same vein, by contrasting Hardt and Negri's revolutionary multitude and Theodor Geiger's crowd, Borch stresses how the alleged differences between the two concepts might not be so straightforward.[666] Unlike both Le Bon and Hardt and Negri, for whom the crowd is always active, Geiger conceives the crowd as existing even before it takes action. He calls this the latent crowd, an entity which existence we could call virtual, for it is real before the gathering occurs through the conditions that make it a possible event. In its coming into being actively, the crowd displays "a spontaneous 'mass withdrawal' from society" which places it at the same time inside and outside the social body.[667] This does not diverge too much from the multitude's being simultaneously inside and outside capital, in Hardt and Negri's account.[668] It is inside because "there is no longer an outside to capital,"[669] and is outside because it remains "always excessive with respect

662 Borch, 'Urban Imitations', op. cit. p.89.

663 Ibid. p.58.

664 Mazzarella, 'The Myth of the Multitude, or, Who's Afraid of the Crowd?', op. cit. p.718.

665 Slavoj Žižek, *Organs without Bodies*, op. cit. p.31.

666 Christian Borch, 'Crowds and Pathos: Theodor Geiger on Revolutionary Action', *Acta Sociologica* 49 1 (2006). Theodor Geiger was a German sociologist who emigrated in Denmark in 1933 and has received little attention internationally because most of his works have been written in Danish and never translated.

667 Theodor Geiger, *Die Masse und ihre Aktion. Ein Beitrag zur Soziologie der Revolutionem*, reprint of the 1926 ed. (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag 1987) p.75, cited in Borch, 'Crowds and Pathos: Theodor Geiger on Revolutionary Action' op. cit. p.8.

668 Mazzarella, 'The Myth of the Multitude, or, Who's Afraid of the Crowd?,' op. cit.

669 Hardt and Negri, *Multitude,* op.cit. p.102.

to the value that capital can extract from it because capital can never capture all of life."[670]

Another distance between the crowd and the multitude is blurred in relation to the autonomy-heteronomy alternative through Borch's reading of Geiger. According to Geiger, the leader in the crowd is not who controls the mass by imposing her own direction. Rather, the leader conduces it where the crowd itself is inclined to, where its own affective movements lead it. In this perspective, Borch correctly argues, the crowd is itself auto-organised and its heteronomy appear to be more controversial. All in all, the problem with the concept of the multitude is its ambiguity, which ends up describing a multiplicity that has much in common with the classic notion of crowd that I have outlined. As Borch points out, the examples provided by Hardt and Negri as acts of resistance by the multitude, are events that "often recalled the accounts of violent crowds that had been propagated in early French crowd semantics," reporting more "a reconceptualization of the crowd-theoretical tradition under postmodern conditions," than a new model of resistance.[671]

The complexity of the crowds and its political potential have been explored and revealed by the social theorist Elias Canetti. In particular, what Canetti discloses, and which will prove useful in our understanding of the complex nature of the Jungle, is the eventful character of the crowd and the transformative possibilities that it entails. It is especially by construing the notion of crowd as an event itself, instead of a bounded body, that we might better grasp its potential for political transformation. According to Brighenti, Canetti's notion of crowds and packs makes us grasp these multiplicities through a perspective which is different from that of an apparently undifferentiated (and unchanging) whole. He proposes instead to see them as pure movement with its own temporal dimension; a dynamic event along which their heterogeneity undergoes a process of de-differentiation, resulting in a "single, complex wave-movement."[672] The movement itself is what gives the crowd its continuity, without however subsuming its different parts into a whole.

The emergence of a crowd is a rupture, as well as it is its breakdown: like an event, the coming into being of a crowd marks a temporal and a spatial boundary, an affective territory, which has qualitative connotations and establishes an *entre-temps* where, as Canetti contends, "men free themselves from their burdens of distance."[673] This instant sets the threshold between a past where the crowd did not exist in its actual dimension – and Geiger would call its latent phase – and a paradoxical eternal present where the crowd is actualising but ever-changing and under constant threat of disintegration. It is a territorial move from which the crowd is born, for the crowd cannot emerge but expressively out of its milieu.

Density, which in Canetti's terms is the spatial and affective quality of bodies that impinge on one another, is a peculiar trait of the crowd. If we push this reading to an affective dimension, we can understand density as a correlative of intensity, both originating by the same material circumstances that define the gathering of a multiplicity of bodies. Through the zeroing of all distances in the crowd, affect spreads rapidly and widely thus reinforcing the power of the mass and expanding their capacity of affecting other bodies. Canetti refers

670 Ibid. p.145.

671 Borch, *The Politics of Crowds,* op. cit. p.293. One of the examples brought by the two authors is the Genoa's demonstrations in 2001 against the G8.

672 Ibid. p.33. See also Andrea Mubi Brighenti, 'Tarde, Canetti, and Deleuze on Crowds and Packs', *Journal of Classical Sociology* 10 4 (2010): pp.291-314.

673 Elias Canetti, Crowds and Power (trans. Carol Stewart) (New York: Continuum 1973 [1960]) p.18.

to this emotional state as *pressure*, suggesting the idea of a characterisation of the crowd as affectively connoted, but also as submitted to a peculiar temporal block that is defined by a virtual threshold. This time of potentiality before the emergence of the crowd is even more evident in Canetti's description of the "reversal crowd," the revolutionary mass. According to the social theorist, reversal is the result of multiple layers of causality that superpose and stratify during a certain period of time; in this case, the moment of discharge is "the collective deliverance from the stings of commands" that have piled up on bodies: what Spinoza would interpret as an accumulation of negative affects. In order to understand the crowd as Brighenti suggests, that is, in its evental, thus potential, character, it might be worthwhile unpacking Deleuze and Guattari's conceptualisation of how an event comes forth.

The event "is a bifurcation, a deviation in relation to laws, an unstable state that opens a new field of possibilities"[674], Deleuze and Guattari say. This field does not pre-exist to the event, it is rather the event which makes it possible through the emergence of a new subjectivity.[675] It is the metastable field that for Simondon is the potential energy of any system, the essential source of systems' relentless becoming, without which no transformation is possible.[676] In the metastable system which is the event, bodies are submitted to tensions that are both intrinsic and extrinsic, and which (always partial and temporary) resolution is the sense of its own becoming, the possibility of the acquisition of a new form, a novel subjectivity. Through this resolution, which Simondon terms *transduction* and which corresponds to "the release of the supersaturated potential energy of a metastable system," the system can pass from a less organised to a more structured one, by producing new arrangements and generating new relations. For Deleuze and Guattari the event, the ever-lasting movement, is the dead time, the *empty* time where "nothing happens, and yet everything changes" that includes simultaneous *entre-temps* between actualising movements. The event is what presupposes the transformation: it is itself the transformative process because it is filled with *reserve*. As Rodrigo Nunes explains it: "something boils under the surface, but there is no way it could emerge [...]. Then, [...] a threshold is crossed – new dispositions and potentials emerge, accompanied by a transformation in sensibility: the situation is now perceived as intolerable. In a sense, the event has already happened [...]."[677] The paradoxical temporal character of the event, which its ever-lasting becoming appears as static because it pertains to the instant, is also what makes it discernible only when it has already happened, "in an endless awaiting where the 'not yet' and the 'already' never detach from each other."[678]

The event is also the rupture brought about by its effectuation, the difference between two situations (*entre-temps*) that are irreconcilable: when the virtual is (partially) actualised, nothing is like before and the event has vanished in the new situation. In this sense, as

674 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, 'Mai 1968 n'a pas eu lieu. Gilles Deleuze et Félix Guattari reprennent la parole ensemble pour analyser 1984 à la lumière de 1968', *Chimères* 2 64 (2007): p.23.

675 It is worth noting here that the process of subjectification is for Deleuze one of individuation, that is, the perpetual actualising process of the living being through phases of differentiation. So Deleuze: "[Subjectification] has little to do with any subject. It's to do, rather, with an electric or magnetic field, an individuation taking place through intensities..., it's to do with individuated fields, not persons or identities." (Deleuze, *Negotiations,* op.cit. p.93).

676 Simondon, *L'Individuation à la Lumière des Notions de Forme et d'Information*, op. cit.

677 Rodrigo Nunes, 'Pack of Leaders: Thinking Organisation and Spontaneity with Deleuze and Guattari', in Andrew Conio (ed.*) Occupy. A People yet to Come* (Open Humanity Press 2015) p.108.

678 Zourabichvili, *Deleuze. Une Philosophie de l'Evénement,* op. cit. p.93 (my translation). Event, Deleuze and Guattari say, is "the part that eludes its own actualization in everything that happens." (Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy*, op. cit. p.156).

Nunes argues, the event is not only a becoming, it is most of all a metamorphosis, "a becoming something else" than anything that existed before.[679] For the event to burst, the metastable state is a precondition. Nunes again points out that "the event's actualising side is precisely the passage from *formlessness* to (new) *form*."[680] This is what occurs according to Simondon, during the process of individuation, when we have the resolution of tensions which derive from an excess of energy, and the conservation of these tensions in the form of a structuration, until another condition of intensive excess is created and new (social) forms can come out. Simondon calls this state *pre-revolutionary,* "a state of supersaturation (...) where an event is ready to happen, where a structure is ready to spring."[681]

But then, a new form, a novel subjectivity, is not enough to assure a social transformation: for this, it is necessary that the new be not reterritorialized as soon as it arises and, conversely, that it can expand rhizomatically by forming renewed assemblages. "After the event, politics returns to a certain normality; its terrain will have changed, however, through the appearance of newly politicised subjects," Douzinas writes.[682]

As Ian Buchanan clarifies, "the event for Deleuze and Guattari is not measured by a change in the state of things – a large crowd gathering in a public square in Cairo or camping out in New York City is not intrinsically an event in Deleuze and Guattari's thinking. It only becomes recognizable as an event if it brings about a transformation of thought itself, if it yields a new idea, a new way of acting."[683] If a crowd is an event, it is not only in its emergence, at the instant of the discharge, as Canetti would have it; it is also, and most importantly, in the possibility it creates of a new existence, a social transformation, "a radical break with the continuity of things that at once interrupts the usual flow of daily life and initiates its own counter-flow."[684] The crowd-event is a withdrawal from one's comfortable and secure territory into another, collective, territory, which is affectively charged with shared images and emotions.

In the Jungle the discharge never happened and no state of "absolute equality," one of Canetti's crowd's features, was constituted. Canetti says that "within the crowd all are equal; no one has a right to give commands to anyone else."[685] As we have seen along this work, the Jungle, despite its spontaneous unfolding, was not an anarchic system and commands existed in the form of orderings, control, and rhythms. Its spontaneity coexisted and was accompanied by an organised configuration which territorialised the life of the camp through rhythmic patterns. The (even temporary) survival of the Jungle called for *docile bodies*, for any rupture in the everyday habits and rhythms would embroil the authorities and might put camp life at risk. So while orderings and control mechanisms responded to the need of having a better management of aid work and also improving the quality of life in the encampment as much as possible, they also mapped the Jungle with segments that constrained possible lines of flight and arranged bodies into hierarchies, however loose

679 Nunes, 'Pack of Leaders: Thinking Organisation and Spontaneity with Deleuze and Guattari', op. cit.

680 Ibid. p. 109, original emphasis.

681 Simondon, *L'Individuation à la Lumière des Notions de Forme et d'Information*, op. cit. p.556 (my translation).

682 Douzinas, '*Stasis Syntagma*: the Names and Types of Resistance', op. cit. p.42.

683 Ian Buchanan, 'September 17, 2011: Occupy without Counting', in Andrew Conio (ed.*) Occupy. A People yet to Come,* op. cit. pp.196-7.

684 Ibid. p.197.

685 Canetti, *Crowds and Power*, op. cit. p.324.

and mobile.

On the first day of the March eviction some clashes burst immediately after a fire started. Hard to tell who or what was at the origin of the fire, but everyone had already his or her own explication in mind. After some minutes of relative calm, during which most of the other people on site stood observing, some volunteers went find extinguishers elsewhere and the police stood mildly inviting people to keep away, something happened which I would realise only afterwards. In that moment, even if I was very closed to the fire, I could not understand why suddenly people had started running in my direction and some of them were showing the effects of the tear gas in their eyes. Later, I was told that a clash had broken out between the police and some very young boys, with exchange of stones and tear gas canisters. Ten minutes of chaos and then two territories were drawn, facing each other: a police cordon on the side of the (almost extinguished) fire, and a mass of people on the other side of the same road, with British volunteers trying to hold people in place by standing physically between the two counterposed groups.

The high level of intensity of the Jungle was relentlessly kept at bay through the territorial and affective mechanisms that we have already seen, thus preventing the actualisation of such energetic flow into something which could have been disruptive, or maybe politically creative. Instead, the energetic charge was directed to the goal of a temporary and eternally present hospitality, in search for stability and organisation, balancing on a metastable state, sharing not the atmosphere of the crowd, but one of a community. “Emergent properties, intensive becomings, occur only in smooth space,”[686] which is the uncontrollable space filled with movements of deterritorialisation. I am not saying here that the Jungle was a space striated by disciplinary practices. Rather, it was striated by a multiplicity of forces, segmentary lines that organised it, and countless territories. During its lifespan it was habit that produced the common, but habit was a striating force and not a transformative one.

Habit, as the pragmatist Charles Sanders Pierce contends, is the basis of social reproduction and subjectivity, insofar as it pertains at the same time to the individual and the collectivity.[687] It is precisely from the notion of habit as “site of creation and innovation” that Hardt and Negri derives their concept of the multitude, which, as we have seen, can carry the potential for change only if its meaning conflates the crowd’s. In the Jungle habit produced a common, but a common that contributed immanently to the emergence and the engineering of an atmosphere capable of keeping out the political dimension of becoming. The Jungle did not turn into a crowd, it became an atmosphere.

Crowd-events, still, happened. The temporary occupation of the *Spirit of Britain*, the almost daily *dougar* by climbing up the motorway despite the police, the nightlong walks to try to cross the Channel, the night barricades built to stop one or two lorries. Each of this movement was a withdrawal, albeit temporary and incomplete, from the atmosphere of the Jungle. Each of these acts was political and aimed to challenge the border and the asylum regime through situated and immanent struggles. Each of these acts was resistance against the closing of the territorial boundaries of hospitality. Hospitality, which I discussed at the end of chapter 3, stood always behind a threshold. Crossing the threshold and entering the

686 Mark Bonta and John Protevi, *Deleuze and Geophilosophy, A Guide and Glossary* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 2004) p.144.

687 See M. Gail Hamner, *American Pragmatism. A Religious Genealogy* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press 2003).

[39]

[40]

Figures 39 and 40. During the fire. After the fire, lawscapes. Source: the author

hospitable territory was a relentless negotiation that ended either with the closure or the opening, only to start again negotiating. However, as I point out in the next section, these acts worked in the same plane as the asylum, the humanitarian, and the oppressive regime: they reoriented the lawscape of the regimes they strove to defy, but only for a moment, and ended being again stratified. So, where was the moment of transformation? Was there any? Let me try to give an answer in the next section, by first putting forward a thought about responsibility, with respect to withdrawal and resistance.

4.6 Resistant responsibility

Eyal Weizman raises a compelling issue about resistance, agency, and responsibility. With respect to the Palestinian case, Weizman criticizes the conceptualisation of the spatial struggle by scholars inspired by a Lefebvrian approach that he considers too tough on planners and urban policies' role in generating oppression and too soft when it comes to the possibilities of resistance, which is seen mainly in the resilient attitude of the oppressed.[688] Against this dual framework, Weizman prefers considering agency (hence, responsibility) as distributed on a common, flat, *gelatine-like* plane on which all the interacting forces contribute, are "formative" of the same reality, which in our case would be the oppression through (im)mobility.[689]

From this standpoint, how is it possible to conceive of resistance, if it reveals itself as a formative force operating in the same playing field by the same rules as oppressing forces? Can we imagine that, from the common field where forces interrelate, a transformation of the rules of the game might take place?[690] Two preliminary considerations arise from this political question. First, agency and responsibility are collective and distributed. As Hannah Arendt has argued, the collective responsibility for what one has not done is inescapable because it derives from the mere membership to a community, to a collective political dimension.[691] The only way of withdrawing from responsibility would be to leave one's own community, but since nobody can live without belonging to a collective entity, the withdrawal would end up with the acquisition of another responsibility deriving from a newly acquired membership. According to Arendt, the only politically innocent individuals are those who do not belong to any political community because they have been excluded: refugees, stateless people, who are not responsible precisely for being outside any community.

From an ontological perspective, if we go back to how the collective individuation unfolds, responsibility is collective because the process through which the individual individuates collectively relies on an affective relation that connects her to a multiplicity through action. In this sense, "we (but not only "we humans") are always already responsible to the others with whom or which we are entangled, not through conscious intent but through the various ontological entanglements that materiality entails," Karen Barad says.[692] This ontological framework is about a responsibility which is affective (and collective) before being political.

688 Eyal Weizman, 'Political plastic' (interview), *Collapse VI* 277 (2010).

689 Ibid. p.285.

690 Ibid.

691 Hannah Arendt, 'Collective Responsibility', in James W. Bernauer (ed.) *Amor Mundi. Explorations in the Faith and Thought of Hannah Arendt* (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff 1987).

692 Barad, *Meeting the Universe Halfway,* op. cit, p.393.

As Gatens and Lloyd hold it, "processes of formation and transformation of individual selves interweave with the assuming of responsibilities in contexts of friendship and interdependence; and this in turn creates further possibilities of subjectivity and agency."

Responsibility cannot be separated from bodies' agency and affects: if we assume the becoming of a body within and through an assemblage, within a multiplicity of bodies that function together, we cannot but understand agency and responsibility as knotted and distributed. Responsibility for a body, Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos contends, derives from her "being situated with regard to other bodies," meaning that, because every body is part of a continuum, every body has the possibility of positioning herself within the continuum so as to steer the collective assemblage to a certain direction.[693] At the same time, bodies in the assemblage are not equally capable of affecting it. Both their position and their affective potential condition their power to act: there are bodies that are more powerful, better placed in the assemblage and better placed to channel it.

Arendt argues that people who have been excluded from the political arena are the only ones who do not hold political responsibility. These bodies, the migrant bodies, are still part of the continuum, they participate to many assemblages, they affectively commingle with other bodies. However, their capacities for directing them are constantly hampered by striating movements that individualise and dividuate them. Indeed, their virtual reserve of potential for action exists but their process of actualisation is more controlled, canalised, and limited than others'. Their position is bound. Yet, we refer here to a responsibility which is linked to being part of an assemblage and which is collective. Arendt aptly distinguishes between guilt and responsibility, the latter being not a moral judgment but only what originates from bodies' positioning, which in turn comes from one's affectivity, the capacity for affecting and being affected.[694] Moral guilty, in our case, would fall on the most powerful bodies: the state, the asylum regime, the police. Consistently with my framework, I am less interested in assigning faults and more in understanding the functioning of the body of the Jungle by analysing its orderings. From this perspective any body in the Jungle was responsible of the Jungle as a collective formation, even myself for the limited time during which I took part in it, for building territories, for affectively living the experience of a city-like encampment, for being (and acting as) a white woman. Inhabitants, volunteers and activists, policemen, artists, state officials, researchers and politicians: all together they pulled the assemblage to a desired direction, they built territories, they contributed to the emergence of an atmosphere of hospitality. Following Weizman, they all participated in a forcefield, and it is through their interaction that the collective responsibility we are referring to emerged.

The Jungle was the forcefield where multiple territories were built and dismantled relentlessly, an atmosphere came into being and hold reassuringly bodies within it. Atmosphere, Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos maintains, discharges responsibility and relocates it in "a centralised point of atmospheric engineering."[695] So it can happen that you are enveloped in an atmosphere that blocks your position and at the same time prevents you from changing it and from acknowledging your own affective responsibility, which you

693 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, *Spatial Justice,* op. cit. p.62.

694 "In the centre of moral considerations of human conduct stands the self; in the centre of political considerations of conduct stands the world," Arendt says ['Collective Responsibility', op. cit. p.47].

695 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, *Spatial Justice,* op. cit. p.196.

cannot see from within a bubble.

How is resistance *qua* transformation possible then? How does resistance look like caught into regimes of in/dividualisation and an atmosphere that limit responsibility, hence action? Going back to Weizman, he wonders whether resistance might be a complete withdrawal from action, or a different mode of action that includes "the possibility of a break rather the constant elasticity of material organisation and political evolutions."[696] If we consider resistance as an event that changes the way of thinking and acting, then to resist is completely withdrawing from the lawscapes that block you and from an atmosphere that limits your feeling, perceptions, and acts. As Brighenti holds it, resistance is "an action whereby one transforms oneself and the world at the same time."[697] Still, this movement has to face two obstacles. On the one side, the atmosphere is engineered as to embrace bodies in an enveloping comfort, so that no one desires to leave it, as we have seen in chapter 3. On the other side, even if one could succeed and eschew the atmosphere, one would remain trapped by the inescapable movements of in/dividualisation, one would fall back into the lawscape designed for her. As Deleuze puts it, the man of the societies of control, the man who is integrated into a modulating movement, is "a man in debt,"[698] or in other words s/he is an individual who is confined to owing something perpetually not to a recognised entity but to the world. That which is owed is the element which is the focus of both the exercise of the government of migration (and humanitarian practices of care) and its resistance: the living body. As Roberto Esposito holds it, "while it [the body] is the object of control and exploitation, since all forms of power produce resistance, it is also the subject of revolt."[699]

In Esposito's understanding of Foucault's thought, life becomes the lynchpin where the movements of, let me say, territorialisation and deterritorialisation unfold and where the relation to power is both one of subjugation and one of liberation. In search of a *politics of life*, Esposito, drawing on Spinoza, Simondon, and Deleuze, goes so far as to locate resistance within the norm that governs the living body, thus shifting the focus from the living body as subordinated to a transcendental norm, to "the norm [as] the immanent impulse of life."[700] In other words, Esposito tries to reconfigure the relation between law and life by replacing the logic of a life that is governed by the norm with one of a co-constitution of life and norm in immanence. The main consequence of this line of thought is that both life and norm are thus seen as unceasing becoming. To begin with, Esposito recalls that Spinoza conceives the modes of existence as characterised by a conatus, that is an effort of persevering in being which is the "natural right" of any body and according to which every body can increase its power of acting, as I illustrated in chapter 3. From this standpoint, Esposito points out, the norm stops being something imposed from somewhere outside and becomes instead "the intrinsic modality that life assumes in the expression of its own unrestrainable power to exist," to wit, the *rule of life*, the conatus.[701] In terms of responsibility, this position assigns to every body the share of responsibility that the body is capable of assuming, according to the interminglings through which is articulated. In this context, the norm is the result

696 Weizman, 'Political plastic', op. cit. p.287.

697 Andrea Mubi Brighenti, 'Power, Subtraction, and Social Transformation: Canetti and Foucault on the Notion of Resistance', *Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory* 12 1 (2011): pp.57-78.

698 Deleuze, 'Postscript on Control Societies', op. cit. p.181.

699 Roberto Esposito, *Persons and Things. From the Body's point of View* (trans. Zakiya Hanafi) (Cambridge and Malden, MA: Polity Press 2015) p.143.

700 Esposito, *Bíos. Biopolitics and Philosophy,* op. cit. p.194.

701 Ibid. pp.185-6.

of a process of normativization that confronts and measures itself with life, not the other way around. In this sense, the two systems, the biological and juridical one, are relentlessly affecting each other, and being the former the outcome of processes of individuation, the latter cannot be but in a state of incessant becoming.

Like Spinoza, Simondon aims to emphasise the condition of metastability of the juridical order with respect to the living being, recognising the tendency of the norm toward eternity through values, which are the preindividual part of the norms and that which endures from one state to another.[702] Following Georges Canguilhem, Esposito substantiates the argument according to which to a negative norm in the form of a prohibition corresponds an affirmative (biological) one that, instead, opens up to the unpredictability of life. To this purpose, the two notions of norm-al and norm-ativity need to be separated: "completely normal isn't the person who corresponds to a prefixed prototype, but the individual who preserves intact his or her own normative power, which is to say the capacity to create continually new norms."[703] Is not this the capacity for affecting and being affected that describes the law (and the lawscape) of each being?

In this line of thought Esposito introduces Deleuze and his concept of "*a* life", pure immanence, impersonal, not ascribable to the bounded boundaries of the individual. "Unlike *the* life of an individual, *a* life is thus necessarily vague or indefinite and this indefiniteness is real,"[704] because it is virtual and because every body has an indefinite spectre of existence where she is not actualised, she is *any* body, she dwells a threshold:

> "The life of the individual gives way to an impersonal and yet singular life that releases a pure event freed from the accidents of internal and external life, that is, from the subjectivity and objectivity of what happens: a 'Homo Tantum' with whom everyone empathizes and who attains a sort of beatitude. It is a haecceity no longer of individuation but of singularization: a life of pure immanence, neutral, beyond good and evil, for it was only the subject that incarnated it in the midst of things that made it good or bad."[705]

From this perspective, resistance is everywhere the living body is exercising her striving for existing, contra norms of any kind that want her bound, confined, modulated, individualised, and dividuated. Resistance is the conatus for life, the norm of every life. It is making life becoming the norm. Still, this immanent resistance seems to be at odds with the idea of resistance as withdrawal from the plane where oppression is exercised. There is no paradox, though: it is only the coexistence of forces that impinge on bodies differently, without being exclusionary. As we have seen throughout this work, the forces that organise bodies are manifold. As Deleuze and Guattari suggest, these forces, or lines, can be found both in molar, instituted groups, and in individuals, atmospheres and (apparently) disorganised groups like crowds.

If we go back to the Spinozan question of "what a body can do," we have a body that is crossed by many segmentary lines and resist to those that attempt to organise its desire, to

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702 Simondon, *L'Individuation à la Lumière des Notions de Forme et d'Information*, op. cit.

703 Esposito, *Bíos. Biopolitics and Philosophy,* op. cit. p.191.

704 John Rajchman, 'Introduction', in Gilles Deleuze, *Pure Immanence. Essays on Life* (trans. Anne Boyman) (New York: Zone Books 2001) pp.13-14.

705 Deleuze, 'Immanence: A Life', in Deleuze, *Pure Immanence. Essays on Life*, op. cit. pp.28-9.

hamper its conatus. As Claire Colebrook maintains, there is not a unitary form of resistance, but a multiple one, in which it is not matter or resisting power, but of each body – be it a molar or a molecular one, be it an assemblage like the Jungle, or an individual confronted with her desire being trammelled - resisting different forces in a different way.[706] It can be resistance as an event that changes the mode of thinking, "l'ouverture du possible,"[707] the reversal of the rules of the game, as Weizman puts it. And this did not happen in Calais. The Jungle was an apparent paradox, in this sense: on the one hand, as a territorial assemblage and even more as an atmosphere, it produced orderings, rhythms, it territorialised and striated bodies that connected with it. On the other hand, it was crossed my many lines of flight, deterritorialising movements and forces that liberated desire, made withdrawal possible, generated always new possibilities to resist oppressive forces.

The Jungle was an encampment plunged into the mud, whipped by wind and tear gas, remote from the city, and also the best available choice for people on the move to sleep and find provisions in Calais, to wait for the next try or for the outcome of the asylum claim. Migrants, volunteers, and artists had made it a lively place where people could meet, exchange, find information, arrange passages, have some rest, help or find help, organise "good" encounters. Resistance in the Jungle was the unrelenting engagement that individuals, whose escape routes were diverted or blocked without respite, had been taking in their striving for becoming, by finding ways out within the porosity of control, transforming practices day by day, becoming *a life*. Going back to the plane where action and responsibility are shared, resistance in the Jungle was not a complete withdrawal, but only an embodied, temporary, and immanent withdrawal from atmosphere, the transient rupture of every lawscape one encountered, the construction of territories for both protecting oneself and connecting to the world.

706 Claire Colebrook, 'Resistance to Occupy', in Conio (ed.*) Occupy. A People yet to Come*, op. cit.

707 Deleuze and Guattari, 'Mai 1968 n'a pas eu lieu. Gilles Deleuze et Félix Guattari reprennent la parole ensemble pour analyser 1984 à la lumière de 1968', op. cit. p.23.

Conclusion

> "From the earliest days, one cannot believe the testimonies: blankets thrown into the sea or puddles, or even soaked in tear gaz. Migrants left without shoes dozens of kilometres away, or woken up with tear gaz. It is not just matter of closing Sangatte, but to ward off, make invisible."[708]

By comparing the aftermath of the final evacuation and destruction of the Jungle of Calais at the end of October 2016 with the aftermath of the countless evictions that have marked the history of migration in Calais, from Sangatte on, one can find the *fil rouge*: it is in this repetition through difference that the border is enacted, contested, and deterritorialised. The police that keep away people from the border, the asylum regime that defines individuals by drawing a border between those acceptable and those unacceptable, the people on the move who challenge the borders that hamper their desire, the aid groups that relentlessly push the borders of the state liability, the border between exploitation and help in the smuggling practice, the border between stuff and waste, images that set the border between compassion and fear, between desperation and hope, and so on.

The main concern of this work has been to explore the possibility of the emergence of the political and resistance out of the orderings that are produced in and through the entanglements of bodies transiently assembled 'at the border'. The research has been empirically based on a fieldwork conducted in the Jungle, the encampment born in the spring 2015 on the outskirts of the French city of Calais and evacuated permanently at the end of October 2016. This encampment has offered the advantage of being unplanned and devoid of any central management, so that the orderings observed were the outcome of a multiplicity of different bodies, both groups and individuals, of molar and molecular forces. Starting from here, it has been possible to go beyond the notion of camp as space of exception, 'emergent city', or 'slum', to articulate a more complex conceptualisation that views the settlement as "a lively arrangement," that is a purposeful multiplicity which is "not simply a happenstance collocation of people, materials and actions, but the deliberate realisation of a distinctive plan."[709] The plan is not a rational one, though, it is rather the result of the co-functioning of the components that gives the arrangement (the assemblage) the desired direction. From this perspective, the Jungle was the result of the material and affective cooperation of the bodies (and space) that constituted it. The interest in working with the notion of assemblage to analyse the Jungle has been twofold. First it has allowed to understand how an entity as heterogeneous as the Jungle could hold together while still remaining manifold.[710] Second, the assemblage, for its rhizomatic nature, can be put at work as a method to arrange a particular set of elements and bodies in order to answer

708 Sabéran, *Ceux qui passent*, op. cit. p.175.

709 Buchanan, 'Assemblage Theory and its Discontents', op. cit. p.385.

710 John Allen, 'Powerful Assemblages?', *Area* 43 (2011): pp.154-57.

to a certain question: the Jungle that I have presented here is the Jungle which I have assembled to study its orderings, but it could have been assembled differently to pursue a different objective. In this sense, an assemblage is also a strategic tool of knowledge. What the assemblage does is to help both avoid bounded conceptualisations and assign a predetermined direction to forces and power relations and this is main reason I thought the Jungle through it.

In this conclusive chapter I am showing how this research has tried to make the Jungle's multiple orderings visible and how it has unpacked the relationship between the emergence of orderings and the becoming political of the Jungle-as-assemblage. To this purpose, I first describe how my approach and method have supported this endeavour. I then retrace the followed path through the various concepts that have, as vectors, directed it: territory, affect, atmosphere, crowd, event. So I recall how, from the relentless building and dismantling of territories, the Jungle was born and engaged into a process of sedentarisation: from a forest to a home. The growing auto-organisation and stabilisation of the assemblage was prompted by the conatus of the many bodies that composed the Jungle: around this common affect an atmosphere could emerge and was engineered to ensure its own endurance. The atmosphere operated as a means of control by keeping bodies within its comfortable bubble and making it difficult to escape: this meant that the Jungle itself became the political problem and other issues, such as the asylum mechanism and the future beyond the life of the encampment, were concealed. A complete withdrawal from the atmosphere never happened. In this framework, political acts could be found in the unceasing practices of challenging and contesting the borders, both materially through crossing or attempts at crossing, and legally by searching (temporary) ways out of the asylum regime through technicalities. Finally, I try to explain how this work has contributed to the literature about camps by taking seriously the effects of affect on bodies' capacity of acting.

Assembling the Jungle

To 'assemble' the Jungle, one not even knows where to start. So one starts in the middle and then follow a thread, then adds another one, and so on. I personally experimented, through the situatedness and embodiedness of my fieldwork, control, orderings, affect, the atmosphere: so the outcome of my probing is not an absolute truth; rather it is a partial one that I have assembled trying to be as accurate and rigorous as possible.

Making a case study of the Jungle has proved productive for the complexity and exceptionality of the circumstance. The Jungle had gathered a great number of people of various origins in a limited area, with a high degree of turnover; it was neither planned nor centrally managed, it showed a certain level of auto-organisation and order without that being ascribable exclusively to one or more molar configurations; it was the last in a number of encampments in Calais since the 90s, so it could be put in context. All together, this provided a rich and composite ground for observation and knowledge production. Indeed, richness can also be risky and tricky, because one must be careful about how to organise and select information. It is a territorial operation, which is difficult and partial, and can also be morally challenging. For example, I had to let aside a number of issues, such as smuggling practices, mafias' traffics, the black market, for their thorny contours and

their wideness, and concentrate on the more accessible (and visible) patterns configured by the relations among aid groups, inhabitants of the Jungle, the state, and the ever-present stuff that materially fed the encampment. The coincidence of my fieldwork with the south eviction was also both an advantage and a constraint. On the one side, it allowed me to observe power relations in a moment of high tension, providing a visible emotional battleground. The observation of power relations, instead of bodies and subjectivities, was then both a choice and an opportunity given by the context. On the other side, it inevitably dragged me into its flow by forcing me to adapt, but also to make an effort to not be carried away, to find a balance between keeping a distance and resonating with the field. I needed to 'feel the atmosphere', but I could not afford to let it envelop me.

All in all, I learnt that, even if in the lawscape certain bodies are more powerful than others, nothing is predetermined. Depending on how the stock of energy, to which both Deleuze and Simondon refer, actualises, on how bodies encounter (if they ever encounter), the multiplicity may take a direction or another. What happened in the Jungle, and to some people in the Jungle, happened *because of* the Jungle, as a consequence of their being entangled with the Jungle.

Orderings and rhythms

"Without crossing there is no border,"[711] but in Calais the border is not only the Channel, the militarised landscape, the apparatus of security. Borders are continuously produced and dismantled, engineered and challenged through the movements of each body in relation to others. Territory is thus the result of each body's relation with its environment: this relation, which is established through a border, is characterised by being mobile and affective, by being both exclusionary and inclusionary. In this PhD I have chosen the notion of territory instead of border because I considered that it could help me, with its both processual and affective dimensions, expand the analysis from the emergence of the border to include its *mode* of emergence. The territory is a border-making process, but is also an expressive modality through which the border manifests itself and thus produces orderings and control. The expressiveness of the territorial movement is important because is what puts in relation bodies affectively, thus stressing the relational and processual quality of the territory-making mechanism. The concept of lawscape, the continuum that bodies and space have to negotiate with the law, is at the basis of this reasoning and can help understand how the presence of a body in space is necessarily influenced by others'. Territory is nothing more than an emergent lawscape, a lawscape that is making itself visible. From this perspective, orderings and control are the result of this territorial process, through which body-in-space connects to other bodies (opening) while auto-organising (closure).

The Jungle emerged from scratch, but piecemeal. Each body had a territory to negotiate, which had to become visible, to close in order to exclude but ready to open in order to include and keep on existing. Refrains and rhythms were the becoming visible of the territory: orderings and patterns were thus produced, but had to be constantly and endlessly renegotiated. Many forces strove for their own territory and the Jungle was in a permanent condition of metastability. Collective territories formed as a result of a concrescence of affects and

711 Ursula Biemann, *Performing the Border* (1999). Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3ICtJ-Vt4jo.

thus mapped new lawscapes, more stable territories, and new lines of functioning and cooperation. Every time two or more territories confronted each other, the metastable system of the Jungle had to search for a new temporary stability and it was impossible to know the outcome of these arrangements in advance. This is the case, for example, of the partial eviction or the construction of the camp of containers.

Stuff was a powerful mobile territory capable of territorialising and deterritorialising unceasingly other assemblages through the force of the affect that it could channel. So stuff was collected or bought in the UK, then transferred to a warehouse, where it gathered a great number of volunteers to be sorted, then reached the encampment where it was distributed and deterritorialised in many ways into different territories: to feed or clothe someone, to make money at the black market, to be exchanged, to become waste, and, not least, to nourish the desire for the Jungle to approximate a home. In this sense, stuff was not exclusive territory of the aid groups, nonetheless it participated extensively in the strengthening of the territory of aid groups with respect to others, and in the emergence of what I have called an atmosphere of the homely. The conatus for home, that is, the effort that many bodies in Jungle put into surviving and persevering in existing, was directed in making the Jungle as homely as possible. Every source was then mobilised, everything was "caught up in the dynamics of *conatus*:"[712] mind and body, affect and imagination, narratives and practices. This effort, the desire it actualised, and the imaginings it fabricated, was directed at increasing the power of acting of bodies, and in the Jungle this meant its very existence. Many people were empowered by the encounter with the Jungle: the volunteers, whose engagement was rewarded by the satisfaction of being helpful and the sense of being part of a historical struggle; the inhabitants of the Jungle, who, despite the dire conditions, could find there the resources for persisting in their journey, who could arrange there 'good encounters' (volunteers, aid workers, smugglers), and for whom the Jungle was the best option available; the French state, for which the Jungle was the hospitality it was not providing, and through which it was gaining time to organise an alternative (the CAOs); the smugglers, who could better coordinate their activity; the researchers and the artists, for whom the Jungle was an endless source of inspiration; even the then Prefect, who after the end of the Jungle got promoted from prefect of a district to prefect of a region.[713]

Into a bubble

All that organising and ordering had a direction, though. It had a *sense*. Not in a centralised or in a rational planned fashion, rather by means of a distributed flow of images, matter and practices, which were affectively shared amongst many. This forcefield was produced by the excess of intensity that crossed the Jungle and was channelled into the tireless building of the encampment, both in a material and immaterial way. I have understood this forcefield through the notion of affect, the capacity of affecting and being affected that is generated by encounters. Affect is a force that is activated when a territory emerges, for a territory always involves a relation. We have seen, both theoretically and empirically, that territory

712 Gatens and Lloyd, *Collective Imaginings. Spinoza, Past and Present*, op. cit. p.27 (emphasis in original).

713 This is an anecdote: Fabienne Buccio, Prefect of the district of the Pas-de-Calais from February 2015 to February 2017, and so in charge, as local representative of the French state, for the government of migration in Calais, was promoted prefect of the Normandie Region in March 2017, 3 months after the final dismantlement of the encampment.

is affective. As Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos says, "an affect does not have one origin – the body or the world – but is materialised as a perspective of a body," and such perspective is the one which puts the body in connection with the world.[714] I have tried, then, to search this perspective in the Jungle and see how it set bodies in motion, made them assemble and hold together. The unfolding of multiple territories that marked the beginning of the Jungle brought about continuous ruptures, which were the effects of movements, negotiations, temporary individuations always challenged by the excess of affect and encounters. In a Tardean sense, the Jungle was the result of a wide range of inventions that originated from the ceaseless confrontation of different territories and the necessary attunement of their rhythms: the long lines to have a meal at the Jules Ferry centre, the distributions through a 'representative' of community, the black market at 8 o'clock every evening, the daily *dougar* or the night barricades, the perpetual inflow and the outflow of stuff, the tea-time at the Jungle's restaurants, the call to prayer, and so on and so forth. Every activity became habit in the encampment, through movements of adjustment which never stopped but progressively stabilised into a limited series of repetitive refrains. Alongside, territories coalesced around collective imaginings that affected the assemblage positively, reinforcing habit and autopoietically reproducing its desire for enduring. And so I introduced the concept of atmosphere, to disclose the affective mechanism that can direct bodies through dissimulation and capture them into a bubble from which they can hardly escape.

Atmosphere is a powerful occurrence and was treated in the context of this research as the affective emergence that could play a part, not alone but along with other movements of control, in the failure to bring about transformation. I need do clarify here: the failure to which I refer is neither a moral judgment, such as a guilt to be attributed to a specific body, nor the predetermined effect of a causal chain. As for the first instance, the overall approach of this work is ethical and rhizomatic. In ethics, which here is drawn on Spinoza's thought, what matter is the affect, namely the affections that might increase or diminish a body's capacity (or power) to affect (or act) and the capacity to be affected or be acted upon.[715] In other words, my interest has been more to understand the direction taken by an assemblage than judging its moral outcomes. This direction is rhizomatic, and so is responsibility. Within an assemblage, responsibility, like agency, is distributed, even if bodies do not affect (and control) it equally. So, in this vein, the emergence of the atmosphere and the becoming of the Jungle was the result of the desire of many, of every body according to its (power) position within the assemblage. As for the causality, as Latour puts it, "causes and effects are only a retrospective way of interpreting events,"[716] and I wanted to stress how the Jungle assembled more than why it did so. Through this approach, I have tried to avoid starting by dividing bodies into categories and I instead aimed to understand how they functioned together.

I have included this work into a strand of literature on camps, but the intention has been to go beyond the notion of camp in the framing of Agamben, and also in the the more composite one which sees camps as the result of the interaction of multiple sovereignties, such as Ramadan's. Even if my work draws upon this latter framework, I believe that by combining the emphasis on the co-functioning of bodies into a heterogeneous and temporary whole,

714 Philippopulos-Mihalopoulos, *Spatial Justice*, op. cit. p.118.

715 Ansaloni and Tedeschi, 'Ethics and spatial justice: Unfolding non-linear possibilities for planning action', op. cit.

716 Latour, *Reassembling the Social. An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory*, op. cit. p.39 (note 30).

with the affective dimension and the resulting agentic capacity of the assembling body, I have been able to provide a richer picture of what a 'camp' might be. Introducing affect into the study of a makeshift encampment means to provide a processual and relational perspective of its making and this, in turn, allows for the inclusion of a multiplicity of agencies and the manifold and never predetermined processes that underlie the unfolding of orderings and control. This framework probably raises more questions than it answers, but leaves open the possibility for further reasoning.

Where is transformation?

The question that has oriented the whole work was whether the assembling of the Jungle could be explained as resistance. The answer is not straightforward. If resistance is transformation, an event that, like a crowd, is able to change thought and mode of acting, to change *the plane of action* altogether, did the Jungle as assemblage resist? Resistance, Weizman argues, cannot play on the same ground where oppression and control operate; it has to reverse the rules first. In the same vein, for Brighenti "if resistance does anything at all, it shows the otherwise of power."[717] Resistance, in other words, is here understood as withdrawal from power. Not a centralised power, not a sovereign power. A power which is better construed as spread along multiple lines that organise, generate orderings, control, and territories. Every line that crosses the real can be resisted, but some lines are more rigid than others. As we have seen along this work, the Jungle was assembled by a number of forces and it is now difficult to establish in relation to which kind of oppressive power we need to consider resistance. We do not have one resistance, we have many, for the many orderings that composed the Jungle, its embracing atmosphere, its mobile territories.

Was oppression to be found in the dire conditions of the encampment? Was it rather embodied by the multitude of people stuck in a place where they did not desire to be because trapped into a regime of asylum that wanted them always 'elsewhere'? Was it to be located in an atmosphere of the homely that dissimulated the future of struggle? Oppression was there, in the form of forces that aimed to organise desire and conatus. Resistance as withdrawal from the atmosphere, however, did not emerge: the atmosphere remained, maybe weakened, even after the dismantling of the encampment. In the aftermath of the final eviction, people have begun to return to Calais and tried to temporary settle near the former Jungle, only to have a place to sleep if the crossing fails. The aid groups, which continue their work in supporting people on the move, have recommenced with distributions. The police have been harassing, chasing people, and hindering distribution the same way it happened in the aftermath of Sangatte, as Sabèran relates. At least, when there was the Jungle, people could find a roof over their head, and it was easier to help.[718] Nothing like a crowd emerged in Calais, but for every oppressive territory and every striating force there were moments of escape and withdrawal.

717 Brighenti, 'Power, Subtraction, and Social Transformation: Canetti and Foucault on the Notion of Resistance', op. cit. p.65.

718 This is what the aid groups think of the situation, as it emerged from their exchanges, which I have had access to through a mailing list.

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