Wittgenstein and repetition

“I myself still find my way of philosophizing new, & it keeps striking me so afresh, & that is why I have to repeat myself so often. […] [R]epetitions […] [f]or me […] are necessary.” (CV 1998: 3e) Wittgenstein's style is well known for its recursive—and according to some interpreters, even obsessive-compulsive—quality, but they are part of a thinking method: “I suggest repetition as a means of surveying the connections.” (AWL 1979: 43) The style also mirrors recurring ideas such as “concepts are not for use on a single occasion” (Z 1981: 568), or the “bustle (Getriebe) of life […] comes about only through constant repetition” (RPP 1980b: 625 – 626). The aim of this essay is to show how the notion of repetition (Wiederholung) plays a significant role in the evolution of Wittgenstein's thought. It is the manifestation of a philosophical praxis, and although the notion of repetition remains in the background, it is a constant presence in his production, often featuring alongside his best-known concepts, like rule following, aspect seeing, and his thoughts on music and mathematics. This article will examine the different ways in which Wittgenstein reflects on the question of repetition in relation to the idea of identity, variation, and diversity, and as a fundamental aspect of human practice that is not the mere manifestation of underlying rules or principles, but a necessary condition for their emergence.